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"The good that we secure for ourselves is precarious and uncertain, is floating in 
mid-air, until it is secured for all o f us and incorporated into our common life."
—Jane Addams, Twenty Years At Hull House
"I got ex-lax in one pocket and aspirin in the other and I work seventeen hours a 
day. All I ask you to work is sixteen, and we'll get that boy on the corner a job."
—LBJ in 1935, to his assistants at the Texas NYA
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Abstract
This study traces the origins and evolution o f Lyndon Johnson's approach to 
political economics and the history o f related economic policy making during the 
Johnson presidential years. His populist roots, experience as a liberal legislator from a 
conservative state in a conservative era, and the maturation o f his ideology and 
economic philosophy—alongside the Keynesian advisers o f John Kennedy's New 
Frontier—form the nucleus o f this study's early chapters. His presidential efforts on 
behalf o f full employment, a demand side approach to economic policy, and the 
"Keynesian revolution" form the second half o f the study.
Ultimately, this study suggests that President Johnson's consensus politics and 
Keynesian economic policies were effective at producing continued and increasingly 
balanced economic growth (across the range of social and economic classes) with 
relatively stable prices that promised to be more, and not less, stable. It also suggests 
that Johnson's approach to economic policy, though partly dependent upon and 
reminiscent o f several pseudo-Keynesian precursors, represented a unique and relatively 
untested attempt at macro and microeconomic policy configuration. More to the point, it 
suggests that neither the Great Society nor the New Economics (the preferred term for 
the Kennedy-Johnson economic policies) lay responsible for the inflation and economic 
instability of the 1970s and beyond.
Bound to the political fortunes of President Johnson, the New Economics remained 
at once a successful and eminently practical attempt at finishing and securing the 
Keynesian revolution, but also a precarious and uncertain political experiment.
Johnson's political decline, therefore, also augured the decline and dissolution o f this 
revolution in political economics. In the end it was the misapprehension and the 
intentional, but not often explicit, rejection of the New Economics, rather than its own
vi
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contradictions or lack o f economic salience, that doomed this revolution to its premature 
demise. And it was largely this change, rather than the legacy o f the New Economics, 
that set the stage for a renewed conservatism and renewed economic instability.
vii
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Chapter 1
Mighty Enough: Guns and Butter and LBJ
It seemed to some of us that the country was going to have a very, very difficult 
time supporting what you might call guns and butter at the same time. And it wasn't 
normal butter it was butter plus.
-Roger Blough, US Steel President, 1971
This nation is mighty enough, its society healthy enough, its people are strong 
enough, to pursue our goals in the rest of the world while still building a Great Society 
here at home.
- Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966 State of the Union Address
President Lyndon Johnson gazed out from behind the podium in the ballroom of 
Washington's Mayflower hotel and signalled that he was ready to begin his address. It 
was the evening of December 4, 1968, only days away from the inauguration o f 
Johnson's successor, and the President had come to bid farewell to the members o f the 
Business Council, a group composed of the CEOs and presidents of the nation's top 
corporations.1 In the preceding five years these business executives had become very 
familiar with and quite accustomed to what they often termed "the Johnson treatment" 
and were at that moment basking in the glow of the President's undivided attention and
1 The Business Council has been superceded by the Business Roundtable, formed in 1972-1973 by BC 
members who wanted to push then President Nixon harder on the issue o f  excessive wage gains by 
construction unions. See Kim McQuaid, Big Business and Presidential Power: From FDR to Reagan 
(N ew  York: Morrow, 1982), 283-290.
1
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the nation's longest period o f uninterrupted prosperity.2 Over the course o f his 
presidency, President Johnson had seldom lost an opportunity to win their favor and 
forbearance. He had entertained 89 Business Council members at the White House just 
12 days after President Kennedy's assassination and, by most accounts, had won them 
over almost immediately. "Gentlemen," Johnson declared on that occasion, "banish your 
fear and shed your doubt and renew your hopes. We have much work to do together."3 
He entertained the entire Council at a White House dinner several weeks later in early 
1964 where he gave them a preview of his upcoming state of the union address. One 
pleasantly surprised businessman exclaimed afterwards: "Its the first time in our history 
that we've been invited to dine in the White House— it didn't even happen under Ike!"4 
Johnson also chose BC legal counsel Henry Fowler to head the Department o f Treasury 
and insured that a small BC delegation met with Treasury Department officials every 
three months. BC member John Connor was also selected to head the Department of 
Commerce. In addition, many other members were asked to help the administration find 
suitable candidates for government regulatory agencies. Few could doubt that President 
Johnson depended greatly upon these business leaders or that he considered them to be 
among his most dependable supporters. This bond became especially conspicuous 
during the 1964 presidential election campaign when BC members, including John 
Connor, had recruited 3000 CEOs to the National Independent Committee for 
Johnson/Humphrey. By late 1968, after five years o f the "Johnson treatment," and five 
years of higher earnings and greater prosperity, President Johnson felt that he had 
indeed won the enduring respect and admiration of the business community.
2 This was an economic expansion that began in May 1961 during the Kennedy administration and would  
continue until November 1969, nine months into the Nixon administration. 102 months in duration, it 
remains the longest unbroken period o f  American economic expansion on record.
3 Quoted in Hobart Rowen, The Free Enterprisers: Kennedy, Johnson and the Business Establishment 
(N ew  York: G.P. Putnam and Sons, 1964), 280.
4 Quoted in ibid.
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By the time Johnson met with the Business Coimcil in December 1968, however, 
times had changed. It had become apparent to Johnson, always possessed of probing 
and sensitive political antennae, that many of these business leaders had begun to shrink 
from the challenge o f his administration's economic strategy. Most members o f the 
Business Council, for example, in the wake of Johnson's proposals to cut several non­
defense items in the 1969 budget, had supported congressional conservatives in their 
attempt to wring out additional social spending reductions. Most had also supported the 
Republican party in the recent Presidential election. Richard Nixon had benefitted from 
their support, rather than Johnson's Vice-President Hubert Humphrey— a stand-in for 
the Johnson economic strategy even as he ostensibly represented a new voice on the war 
in Vietnam.5 Less obvious, however, was the endorsement—offered by an increasing 
number o f BC members—of President-elect Nixon's fundamental economic outlook: 
that the current, troublesome price inflation should be tamed by encouraging a slightly 
higher level o f unemployment.6
While he intended his remarks on this evening to be informal and friendly, and 
hoped that he could avoid using too much of the prepared text, President Johnson also 
wanted to be emphatic about one thing in particular: price stability by way of increased 
unemployment and the old "trickle-down" orthodoxy was a foolhardy, alarmist, and ill- 
conceived strategy and represented an active remnant of a political economy that his 
administration was still trying to erase. Moreover, he believed that the Business 
Council—historic protagonists o f this old orthodoxy and reluctant supporters of 
Johnson's assault upon it—needed to be told this in no uncertain terms. Sensing the 
nation to be on the cusp of a great change in economic policy that would insure a greater
5 See I.F. Stone, "Why Hubert is as Tricky as Dicky," in Polemics and Prophecies, 1967-1970  (Boston: 
Little, Brown, 1970), 49-53, for an insightful analysis o f  Humphrey's stand on Vietnam during the 1968 
campaign.
6 Kim McQuaid, Big Business and Presidential Power, 223, 224, 231, 236, 255. Nixon's CEA chairman, 
Paul McCracken, referred to this approach as "gradualism," suggesting that gradually  higher 
unemployment was what the economy needed.
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and more stable prosperity as it turned away from the traditional conservative doctrine, 
he also knew that this change depended now, more than ever, on the integrity, good will 
and support o f these business leaders. The Republican President-elect, set to take office 
in about six weeks, had already indicated that he would try some of the old economic 
medicine. While the existing economic policy was perhaps less a partisan matter than 
ever before, thanks in part to the success o f the Johnson economic strategy, it was still 
all too likely to unravel under a less watchful, less cognizant President, who attempted 
to revive much o f the laissez-faire or supply side orthodoxy in the process. President 
Johnson knew, for example, that if left unchecked the current inflation was troublesome 
enough and confusing enough to make the old medicine an attractive, if  poorly 
conceived, alternative. "This Nation should not and will not accept," Johnson declared, 
"falling profits, high unemployment, forced retirements, rising bankruptcies, and 
shriveling markets as a remedy for our present problems. We have to find the path 
which brings us to price stability without destroying prosperity."7
President Johnson had begun his speech that night by reminding the assembled 
business leaders, first and foremost, that the nation was currently in its 94th straight 
month o f economic expansion. This expansion occurred, he declared even more 
emphatically, only because the Kennedy and Johnson administrations had turned away 
from the prevailing economic orthodoxy. "Trickle-down" economics would not work, 
Johnson assured his audience, for "it worked just like it sounded. By the time the money 
got down to the poor people it was nothing more than a trickle." The reliance on steeply 
progressive taxation— the so-called "sock-it-to-'em" theory—was equally harmful and 
every bit as foolish, Johnson added. "If you take too much away from the top, you 
discourage industrial expansion, which creates new jobs and you slow down the 
expansion of the economy as a whole, which creates even more jobs, and more money."
7 Public Papers o f  the Presidents: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-1969:1!, "Remarks to Members o f  the 
Business Council," December 4, 1968 (Washington D.C.: U.S.G.P.O., 1970), 1168.
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Declaring both o f these opposing strategies to be simply "another way of slicing the 
same pie," Johnson moved to highlight what was to him both the object o f his current 
concern and the real source of the nation's ongoing prosperity. "In this administration," 
he noted, "we set about to do something new—to use a 'New Economics.'"8
Here was Johnson's clarion call, urging continued trust in and support o f the 
Keynesian economic principles that made up what he called the New Economics. 
Derived largely, though indirectly, from the seminal writings of John Maynard 
Keynes—particularly The General Theory o f  Employment, Interest, and Money 
published on February 6,1936— the New Economics represented the unique American 
effort at implementing the ideas o f the eminent Cambridge economist a generation after 
their inception.9 Embracing the ideas that set Keynesian economics apart from its 
orthodox predecessors—that supply does not create its own demand; that savings will 
not automatically give rise to investment; and that substantial involuntary 
unemployment could exist without recourse to an automatic and efficient economy-wide 
adjustment—the administration of John Kennedy had formulated the New Economics in 
1961. After the assassination o f the young President in late 1963, Lyndon Johnson was 
called upon to continue the crusade, finding it to be a challenge that suited both his 
political prejudices and personal ambition. Political consensus, full employment, and 
mutual prosperity were the obvious, if crudely sketched, hallmarks o f the design; few 
objectives had as much appeal for the new President.
To be sure, by the time John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson began to absorb the 
Keynesian "system," it had been attenuated greatly by both economists and politicians. 
Pent-up consumer demand and Cold War fiscal demands gave the post-Keynesian 
economists a real-world milieu with a greater tolerance for error and left them with little
8 Ibid., 1166.
9 John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory o f  Employment, Interest, and Money (N ew  York: Harcourt, 
Brace, 1936).
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incentive to probe The General Theory all that deeply. The late twentieth century 
American fondness for the economics o f growth also insured that much economic 
policy, Keynesian or not, would still serve to mask, rather than erase, economic 
inequality and irrational inefficiency. "All that economic policy really had to promise," 
Hyman Minsky once noted, "was that the Great Depression would not recur. The simple 
rules o f fiscal policy, which took the form of government contracts and tax 
abatements...succeeded in guiding policy so that a close approximation to full 
employment was in fact achieved and sustained."10 The implementation o f the system 
transpired, as well, without any input from the creator, for Keynes had died suddenly in 
1946 before much of the interpretive debate had even begun. He believed, nevertheless, 
that his ideas would flourish especially well in the United States. "Here, not in 
Moscow," Keynes wrote in 1934 from Washington, D.C., "is the economic laboratory 
o f the world. The young men who are running it here are splendid. I am astonished at 
their competence, intelligence, and wisdom. One meets a classical economist here and 
there who ought to be thrown out o f [the] window—but they mostly have been."11
Though Keynes described The General Theory as "moderately conservative," and 
though his biographers and colleagues suggested that he was a "bad party man who 
often detached himself from the party when they proved unhelpful," the Keynesian 
revolution in the United States became clearly identified with left-wing liberalism and 
the Democratic party.12 Attenuated and muddled as the revolution became, even within 
the domain of professional economics, Keynesianism came to dominate both the 
political economy and the economics profession by the 1960s. A figurative
10 Hyman P. Minsky, John M aynard Keynes (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975), 17.
11 Quoted in Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "The Economist o f  the Century," review o f  John M aynard  
Keynes, Volume 2: The Economist as Saviour, 1920-1937, by Robert Skidelsky, in The N ew  York Times 
Book Review, January 23, 1994, 18.
12 Keynes, quoted in Joan Robinson, "What Has Become o f  the Keynesian Revolution?" in Milo Keynes, 
ed., Essays on John M aynard Keynes (London: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 128; D.E.
Moggridge, John M aynard Keynes (New York: Penguin, 1976), 39.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
7
defenestration had indeed taken place and classical pre-Keynesian economics was 
clearly out o f fashion, even though it had largely become subsumed under, rather than 
displaced by, an often vulgarized Keynesianism. In 1965, John Kenneth Galbraith 
would call the economics o f Keynes "the new orthodoxy," and the ostensibly anti- 
Keynesian economist Milton Friedman would declare that "we're all Keynesians 
now."13
For both political and professional reasons, then, the Kennedy and Johnson 
administrations came to be suffused with economic advisers who were among the first 
generation o f American Keynesians. James Tobin, who would become a member of 
Kennedy's Council o f Economic Advisers, was a Harvard sophomore when Keynes 
published The General Theory in 1936, and was a student o f Alvin Hansen's when 
Hansen transferred to Harvard from Minnesota in 1937 and became known as the 
leading expositor of Keynesian ideas in the United States.14 A Yale professor both 
before and after his tenure on the CEA, Tobin recruited his Yale colleague, Arthur 
Okun, for the CEA staff in 1962. Okun, one of the brightest o f the next generation of 
Keynesian scholars, would introduce the "growth gap" theory to President Kennedy, 
become a Johnson CEA member in 1964 and its chairman in 1968. Seymour Harris, 
Hansen's colleague at Harvard and one o f the earliest converts to Keynesian economics 
after him, eventually served as the chief economic adviser to Senator John Kennedy. 
Harris's popular 1952 publication, The New Economics, would eventually lend its name 
to the Keynesian economic strategy o f the Kennedy and Johnson administrations.15 Paul 
Samuelson, also a student o f Hansen's like Tobin, became known in the 1940s as the
13 John Kenneth Galbraith, "How Keynes Came to America," in Milo Keynes, ed., Essays on John  
M aynard Keynes, 141; Friedman, quoted in "We Are All Keynesians Now," Time, December 31, 1965, 
65.
14 James Tobin, "Keynesian Economics and Its Renaissance," in David A. Reese, ed., The Legacy o f  
Keynes (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1987), 94-95; Galbraith, "How Keynes Came to America," 136. 
Hansen's most popular exposition o f  Keynesian economics was entitled simply A Guide to Keynes (N ew  
York: McGraw-Hill, 1953).
15 See Seymour Harris, The N ew  Economics (N ew  York: Knopf, 1952).
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"acknowledged leader o f the younger Keynesian community." Although Harvard was 
the "principal avenue by which Keynes's ideas passed to the United States," according 
to John Kenneth Galbraith, this M.I.T. professor certainly had a leading role.16 In 1948 
Samuelson published the first American textbook which attempted to explain the new 
Keynesian economics, and he eventually became a key Kennedy adviser during the 
1960 presidential campaign and Kennedy's first choice for chairman of the Council o f 
Economic Advisers in 1961, an offer he spurned out o f his desire to remain in academia. 
Throughout the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, Samuelson remained an 
unofficial but frequently consulted economic adviser.17 Walter Heller, the economist 
who eventually accepted the chairmanship of the Kennedy CEA, and who would 
become Lyndon Johnson's most trusted economic adviser, served as a fiscal economist 
in the Treasury Department from 1942-1946. He was among the Keynesians attracted to 
government service in the Roosevelt and Truman administrations by the example and 
recruitment efforts of FDR Director o f Research and Federal Reserve economist 
Lauchlin Currie, another early convert to the economics o f Keynes. John Kenneth 
Galbraith, perhaps the most outspoken of the Keynesian economists who advised 
Kennedy and Johnson, also came to Washington through the efforts of the unflappable 
Dr. Currie. Currie was, with Utah banker Marriner Eccles, Works Progress 
Administration Director Harry Hopkins, and several others, one of those whose 
previous policy recommendations had been corroborated and encouraged by the 
publication and dissemination of The General Theory. "We didn't sleep much," Currie 
recalled in 1971, "but when we did, the General Theory kept working."18
16 Galbraith, "How Keynes Came to America," 136.
17 Samuelson also became known for the creation o f  the "neoclassical synthesis," an integration o f  
Keynesian macroeconom ic principles with classical (orthodox) microeconomic principles.
18 Currie, quoted in Joseph P. Lash, Dealers and Dreamers: A New Look at the New D eal (N ew  York: 
Doubleday, 1988), 333; Galbraith, "How Keynes Came to America," 135; William E. Leuchtenberg, 
Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1932-1940  (N ew  York: Harper and Row, 1963), 245-246; and 
"We're All Keynesians Now," 65, 67A.
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Indeed, as Richard Musgrave noted, Keynesian thinking was well represented in the 
United States in the 1940s and 1950s. Ralph Flanders o f Jones and Lamson Co. and 
Henry Dennison of Dennison Manufacturing even hired Harvard faculty members to 
tutor them in Keynesian economics and succeeded in converting many other business 
leaders afterward, principally through the Committee for Economic Development. 
Although the business community never adopted anything but a thoroughly 
compromised version o f The General Theory, its willingness to approach Keynesian 
thinking marked the advent o f a potentially rewarding dialogue between business 
leaders, liberal economists, and Democratic politicians. Genuine Keynesian action, on 
the other hand, was slow to emerge.19 "Until Kennedy came along," Walter Heller 
recalled, "the country never had a President who was willing to embrace such seemingly 
unorthodox doctrines and move modem economics to the front burner."20 Furthermore, 
until Johnson replaced Kennedy, the Keynesian ideas, front burner or not, proved 
difficult to implement. Even vulgarized Keynesianism was difficult to sell to the 
American public, and Kennedy possessed at the outset little o f the political capital or the 
political personality required to integrate or supplant the old with the new. "The 
Kennedy machine," William Appleman Williams recalled, "was like a freeway cruiser: 
beautiful on the way to the White House or the moon, but of little help in getting coal to 
Grandma in the snow....Lyndon's contraption...would make either kind of trip."21 By 
temperament and ideology Lyndon Johnson was, indeed, suited to the Keynesian
19 Richard A. Musgrave, "U.S. Fiscal Policy, Keynes, and Keynesian Economics," Journal o f  Post- 
Keynesian Economics, Winter, 1987-1988, 173; Galbraith, "How Keynes Came to America," 137. 
Dennison, once converted, derided those who opposed Keynesianism as "lazy fairies" suggesting that 
they believed in "a Never, Never land o f  invisible hands, perfectly functioning markets, and limitless 
econom ic frontiers." Quoted in Robert M. Collins, The Business Response to Keynes, 1929-1964  (New  
York: Columbia University Press, 1981), 69.
20 Walter Heller, "Kennedy Economics Revisited," in Joseph A. Pechman and N.J. Simler, eds., 
Economics in the Public Service: Papers in Honor o f  Walter W. Heller (New York: W.W. Norton, 1982), 
238.
21 William Appleman Williams, "01' Lyndon and JFK," in Richard Lowitt and Joseph F. Wall, eds., 
Interpreting Twentieth-Century America (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1973), 495-496.
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revolution and the public policy challenge that it implied. His experience and 
personality reflected both an attraction to, and a penchant for selling, many o f the 
prototypical Keynesian concerns. "First the U.S. economists embraced Keynesianism," 
Time magazine noted in 1965, then the public accepted its tenets. Now even 
businessmen, traditionally hostile to government's role in the economy, have been won 
over—not only because Keynesianism works but because Lyndon Johnson knows how 
to make it palatable."22 But Johnson's role in the Keynesian revolution was far greater 
than that of a salesman or translator; he embraced Keynesianism because it often helped 
him say, with greater conviction and power, what he had always tried to proclaim.
When Joan Robinson characterized Keynes, her colleague at Cambridge, she was in 
many ways characterizing Lyndon Johnson as well, a politician with an almost intuitive 
appreciation for Keynes's most significant insights:
Keynes basic view of life was aesthetic rather than political—he hated 
unemployment because it was stupid, poverty because it was ugly, and was 
disgusted by the commercialism of private life....It is true that he enjoyed making 
money for his college and himself but only as long as it did not take up too much 
time....He indulged in an agreeable vision o f the world where economics ceased to 
be important and our grandchildren [could] begin to lead a civilized life. But in 
that vision there [was] room for a rich man to enjoy his wealth in a civilized 
manner.23
Geoffrey Harcourt described Keynes as one who was "usually too optimistic concerning 
persuasion and acceptance; his touching belief that others were as disinterested and as 
full of well-being, as well as being as quick and intelligent as he was, was not always
22 "We're All Keynesians Now," 65.
23 Joan Robinson, "What Has Become o f  the Keynesian Revolution?" 128. See Robert Heilbroner, The 
Worldly Philosophers: The Lives, Times, and Ideas o f  the G reat Economic Thinkers, 6th ed. (N ew  York: 
Touchstone, Simon and Schuster, 1992), 2 5 4 ,261 , 281, for details o f  Keynes's wealth and investment 
prowess. As King's College bursar he turned £30,000 into £380,000 and speculation in international 
markets helped him turn a few thousand pounds into a personal fortune worth over $2,000,000. See also 
Johnson's "Great Society" speech for comments strikingly similar to the Keynesian outlook described by 
Robinson. "It is a place where the city o f  man serves not onlt the needs o f  the body and the demands o f  
commerce but the desire for beauty and the hunger for community..." Public Papers, Lyndon Johnson, 
1963-1964: /, "Remarks at the University o f  Michigan," May 22, 1964, 704-707.
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well-founded."24 William S. White judged Lyndon Johnson in remarkably similar terms: 
"He is weak in understanding that many others are not as perceptive as he is...persisting 
in the assumption that sensible men will understand his purposes without being told, 
just as he would, in fact, understand theirs."25 Keynes was a tireless worker who often 
placed apparently unreasonable demands upon his colleagues. "Some o f those who 
worked with him could not stand the pace," recalled John Hicks.26 Johnson, too, often 
by the force o f his own example, left many of his associates in a state o f bewildered 
fatigue.27 Johnson seems to have shared Keynes's basic approach to political economics, 
his somewhat more hazardous approach to consensus politics, and his affinity for hard 
work.
The Keynesian political economy matched Johnson's affinities, however, precisely 
because it was not a one-sided system based upon class conflict assumptions. Contrary 
to the conventional wisdom, it did not imply a narrow and exclusive focus upon fiscal 
policy or the demand side o f the economy. Although the Keynesian disease was 
insufficient demand and Keynes himself considered the capriciousness o f the supply 
side as the Achilles heel o f any capitalist economy, total supply was to Keynes still the 
essential long term factor. "The Inducement to Invest," after all, Book Four of The 
General Theory, comprised 114 pages. Book Three— "The Propensity to Consume"—  
comprised only 43 pages.28 "It is very much easier to influence the rate o f investment,"
24 Geoffrey C. Harcourt, "Theoretical Methods and Unfinished Business," in Reese, ed., The L egacy o f  
Keynes, 17.
25 William S. White, The Professional: Lyndon B. Johnson  (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1964), 65.
26 John R. Hicks, The Crisis in Keynesian Economics (N ew  York: Basic Books, 1974), 4-5.
27 The example o f  Wilbur Cohen, HEW official and long-time adviser on Social Security to all Presidents 
from FDR to Johnson, may well illustrate this tendency. As a recent biographer put it, "Cohen, a 
prodigious worker, even had difficulty matching Johnson energy and appetite for w ork....If necessary, he 
took a nap in the late evening so he would be ready for the President's call after midnight. Working for 
Johnson required Cohen to put in twelve-hour days and still be ready 'to take a call from the President at 
two o'clock in the morning.'" See Edward D. Berkowitz, Mr. Social Security: The Life o f  W ilbur./. Cohen 
(Lawrence: University Press o f  Kansas, 1995), 189.
28 Emphasis on investment and pagination o f  The General Theory from Minsky, John M aynard K eynes, 
25.
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Keynes once noted, "than to influence the rate of consumption."29 Nor did the 
Keynesian system imply great levels o f government intervention, big government in 
general, or opposition to investment or the marketplace. Investment was so important to 
Keynes's way o f thinking, in fact, that he urged it not be left only to the whims of the 
potential investors themselves. Keynes emphasized, as did his Polish contemporary, 
Michal Kalecki, that the role o f investment was not to provide enough work to employ 
all available labor, but simply to provide tools for the production o f the consumption 
goods demanded by the populace.30 Full employment naturally depended upon 
something else all together. "I see no reason to suppose," Keynes wrote, "that the 
existing system [free market corporate capitalism] seriously misemploys the factors of 
production which are in use....It is in determining the volume, not the direction, of 
actual employment that the existing system has broken down."31 At the beginning of his 
presidency, in December 1963, Johnson echoed this often ignored Keynesian sentiment. 
"The excellence o f the marketplace as a device for distribution," Johnson declared, "is 
beyond question in our minds."32 To Keynes, and to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson 
after him, marketplace dynamics were valuable and worthy o f unflagging 
encouragement, but they could not guarantee full employment. "Keynes's argument is 
not that markets cannot deliver," Frank Hahn noted, "but quite simply that the route the 
economy must take when workers must signal their willingness to work by lower 
money wages is more costly and more uncertain than is the alternative which he 
proposed."33 Bequeathed to him by Walter Heller, Arthur Okun, and his other
29 Quoted in M oggridge, John M aynard Keynes, 133.
30 Michal Kalecki, The Economics o f  Full Employment (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1944), 49.
31 John Maynard Keynes, The G eneral Theory’, 379.
32 Public Papers, Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-1964: 1, 53. See also Michael Harrington, "Markets and 
Plans: Is the Market Necessarily Capitalist?" Dissent, Winter 1989, 56-70, for a variation on this theme 
that dovetails nicely with the Keynesian approach (though Harrington accused Keynes, on page 64, o f  
subscribing completely to the Phillips Curve analysis o f  employment and inflation).
33 Frank Hahn, "Some Keynesian Reflections on Monetarism," in Fausto Vicarelli, ed., Keynes Relevance 
Today (Philadelphia: University o f  Pennsylvania Press, 1985), 12. See also Tobin, "Keynesian 
Economics and Its Renaissance," 108-110.
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Keynesian or neo-Keynesian advisers, but shaped critically by his own experiences and 
political insights, this approach became the means by which Lyndon Johnson proposed 
to silence critics, win converts, and transform the American economy. The emphasis 
was clear: the New Economics was much more than an exercise in inflationary demand 
management, just as it was also something comprehensible and attractive to business 
leaders who surely understood the benefits of steady demand and the socialization o f 
investment even without an understanding o f Keynes and his rebellion against economic 
orthodoxy.34 While Johnson sought nothing more zealously than full employment, he 
also realized, partly through his immersion into the economics o f Keynes, and partly 
through his absorption o f the Democratic party's corporate liberalism, that this was 
impossible without a square focus on, and the partial socialization of, the supply side of 
the economy. "The discouraging pattern o f recessions every two or three years btween 
1949 and 1960," Walter Heller remarked in 1966, "has been broken not by a simple- 
minded devotion to demand stimulus, but by a tight coupling of measures to boost 
demand with measures to boost productivity and hold costs in check."35 Johnson sought 
to remind the Business Council in December 1968, therefore, and dozens o f other 
business leaders throughout his presidency, that the New Economics had rich payoffs 
for the supply side, even as it sought to ameliorate joblessness and poverty. "I pointed 
out," Johnson recalled in his presidential memoirs, "that the more people who were 
employed and working at good wages, the more people there would be to buy their 
products."36 To the Business Council in 1968 Johnson summoned one o f his favorite 
metaphors. "We decided to bake a bigger pie each year," Johnson reminded his
34 Joan Robinson, ridiculing the notion that Keynes saved capitalism from itself, pointed out that this 
presumes that "capitalists are so stupid that they would fail to learn from their experiences during the war 
[World War II] that government outlay maintains profits, unless they had Keynes to point it out to them." 
See Robinson, "What Has Become o f  the Keynesian Revolution?" 128.
35 Walter Heller, N ew Dimensions o f  Political Economy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966),
73.
36 Lyndon B. Johnson, The Vantage Point: Perspectives o f  the Presidency, 1963-1969  (N ew  York: Holt, 
Rhinehart, and Winston, 1971), 30.
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audience, "a pie with more and bigger slices, including some for a direct attack on our 
neglected social problems."37
Although he tended to use rhetorical examples— like the "pie with bigger slices"—  
that seemed to signal a "growth at all costs" approach, Johnson usually exercised this 
rhetoric only when he wanted to highlight economic uncertainty and the not yet 
eliminated spectre o f the nation's traditional and deflationary economic disposition. 
"Unless we are careful," he declared on another occasion, "we can easily become 
fascinated with production for the sake of production alone."38 Implicitly warning the 
Business Council at the end of his presidency that a fair measure of uncertainty still 
prevailed in the nation's economic affairs, and that economic promise or disaster 
remained equal possibilities in the near future, Johnson urged them to get behind the 
new system that had rewarded them so handsomely. He warned them as well o f the 
implications o f a return to the old ways. "God help us," he said, "if we find ourselves 
returning to a period o f high unemployment, with the 'haves' fighting off the 'no longer 
haves' for precious jobs. That is a prescription for social disaster."39
In the long run, President Johnson was acutely aware of how little impact he would 
have on the emerging economic debate, and how critical would be the collective 
participation o f the assembled business leaders. For that reason he strained to reproduce 
for these visiting business leaders a vision o f the consensus he had sought throughout 
his presidency. "But the President does not put his purely personal stamp upon the 
future," Johnson had advised a similar contingent o f business leaders in July 1964. "His 
vision is compounded of the hopes and anxieties and values o f the people he serves. He 
can help guide them toward the highest and most noble of their desires. He cannot take 
them where they do not want to go."40 Four and one half years later Johnson sounded
37 Public Papers, Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-1969: II, 1168.
38 Ibid., 1963-1964: 1, 53.
39 Ibid., 1968-1969: II, 1168.
40 Ibid., 1963-1964: II, 883.
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the same theme, urging his friends in the business community to cling to what he 
perceived as their highest and noblest desires. "I hope my successor will use the tools of 
economic policy forcefully," he declared in his address to the Business Council. "I hope 
he will insist on using them to guarantee full employment. For without full 
employment, he cannot succeed in his other urgent objectives."41
Johnson also acknowledged the presence o f the economy's "Scylla and 
Charybdis"— inflation and recession— and recalled for the Business Council how he had 
seen a similar trend in 1957-1958 when the Eisenhower administration thought a 
recession would bring price stability. "As the experience o f 1957-58 reminds us," 
Johnson declared, "even a recession won't give us instant price stability, but it would 
give instant misery throughout our economy."42 He might have reminded them of his 
first year in Congress as well, for it was then, in 1937, that the Roosevelt administration 
had also placed their concern for price stability above all else. That year, amid tentative 
growth and rising employment—but also increasing inflation, Roosevelt had attempted 
to balance the federal budget and had endorsed an increase in the reserve requirement 
for banks in the Federal Reserve system. "Every time that goddamned fool announces a 
balanced budget," Securities and Exchange commissioner Jerome Frank complained in 
early 1938, "it means that government purchasing power is being cut and that's about 
the only thing that's keeping things together....Nobody on the outside will believe the 
trouble we have with him. Yet they call him a big spender. It makes me laugh."43 With 
this fundamental shift Roosevelt accomplished little in the way of improved price 
stability but sent the nation's unemployment rate into a renewed upward climb, creating 
what many historians and political pundits would refer to as the "Roosevelt
41 Ibid., 1968-1969:11, 1168.
42 Ibid., 1168.
43 Quoted in Lash, D ealers and Dreamers, 322.
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depression."44 Johnson had learned, indeed, almost from the moment he had entered 
Congress, that putting price stability ahead o f jobs was a policy fated to ineffectiveness 
and disaster.
Near the end o f his presidential term, Johnson expressed his hope that President­
elect Nixon would not heed the advice of economists and business leaders who extolled 
the benefits o f "just a bit more unemployment." He remained skeptical, however, for the 
1968 campaign had clearly moved the nation onto new political ground. Civil rights, the 
Great Society, and the New Economics had all come under fierce partisan attacks. "I 
just want to say this," Johnson had remarked only a few days before the election, "in all 
my years in politics—and I went to Washington when Herbert Hoover was President, in 
1931— I have never...seen a slicker, more overorganized, trumped up, misleading, now- 
you-see-it-now-you-don't political campaign than the one the Republicans are waging 
this year."45 Johnson was also skeptical of his successor. On the evening before the 
Nixon inauguration, he whispered to domestic policy adviser Joe Califano: "You're 
going to make some money now for the first time in your life. First, invest it in land. 
This Nixon knows nothing about the economy and its going to go to hell."46
Ironically, Johnson's most tangible source o f optimism lay with the nation's 
business leadership. He knew that many o f them were willing to try progressive policies 
and had recognized the blessings o f the New Economics. His greatest hope was that 
they would become more allied with labor and government in the quest for relative price 
stability at full employment, and he was convinced that more than a few o f the nation's 
business leaders understood, by late 1968, the connection between this nascent alliance
44 Peaking at around 25% at the depth o f  the Great depression, the unemployment rate had improved to 
approximately 14% by 1937. By early 1938 the unemployment rate was back up to approximately 19%. 
Sources: Economic Report o f  the President, 1966; F ederal Reserve Bulletin, Survey o f  Current Business, 
various issues.
45 Johnson, "Remarks in Morgantown at a Dinner Honoring Representative Harley O. Staggers o f  West 
Virginia," October 26, 1968, Public Papers, 1968-1969: II, 1080.
46 Joseph A. Califano, Jr., The Triumph and Tragedy o f  Lyndon Johnson: The White House Years (New  
York: Simon and Schuster, 1991), 337.
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and their own profitability. Trends in the economics profession, current economic 
statistics, and sheer momentum all seemed to be on the side o f the New Economics. Not 
to be discounted, however, was the temperament of the President-elect and the often 
contradictory nature o f the advice he had thus far received. Johnson's greatest fear was 
that Nixon would heed the counsel of Maurice Stans, rumored to be Nixon's choice for 
Treasury Secretary, or o f Vice-President-elect Spiro Agnew who both equated 
profitability with general economic health and who also believed that the nation needed 
much more unemployment to achieve reasonable price stability. It was not that Johnson 
deemed profits or price stability to be insignificant, for he had tried to convince the 
business community through both words and actions that he did not. Profits, he 
believed, could rise both at the expense of the general welfare or in tandem with it, and 
he left little doubt that he preferred the latter course. Indeed, as he had reminded the 
Business Council in December 1968, corporate profits and dividends had increased by 
about 50% since late 1963, both before and after taxes, had made these advances on the 
heels o f similar gains registered during the Kennedy administration, and were the result 
o f an increasingly balanced economy and rising demand. Profits were up but they had 
not risen at the expense of the working class or American consumers in general. 
Likewise, Johnson let it be known, price stability could most assuredly be achieved with 
economic contraction and higher levels of unemployment, but it could also be attained 
without recourse to such a strategy. Price stability certainly demanded a balanced fiscal 
and monetary approach and his administration was achieving that, but it also demanded 
a vigilant and organized microeconomic strategy that took into account productivity 
advances, corporate cost accounting, relative profitability, and corporate price 
discretion. Such was the challenge Johnson laid out for the business community as he 
prepared to depart the White House for retirement in the Texas hill country. Though 
many political opponents were working to convince the business community that their 
recent gains were now threatened by a continuation of the New Economics and the
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
18
inflation that had risen up with it, Johnson remained hopeful that the economic progress 
established under his administration was simply great enough to outlast deluded 
businessmen, President Nixon, or anyone else hoping to turn back the tide, no matter 
what kind of divisive, knuckle-headed politics they practiced. Because real civil rights 
gains— a significant part o f the Johnson economic strategy—were still very much in 
jeopardy, and because the New Economics itself still depended too heavily upon 
Johnson's persuasiveness and upon a small number o f political compromises, the 
direction of policy and the trajectory o f the nation's economy would be very much 
dependent upon the leadership and vision of the business community.47 Johnson hoped 
they would cling to both the principles and the promise of the New Economics.
Despite the unfinished business and his concern for the near future, as 1969 and the 
inauguration of Richard Nixon approached, President Johnson appeared fatigued and 
began to look forward to retirement, for whatever reason. This was a politician, after all, 
who had almost always crowded two workdays into one, and who had clung to a seven- 
day work-week from the beginning of his political career. The clear, cold Pedemales 
river and the purple-crowned hills o f Central Texas beckoned, as did a lighter, less 
frenetic daily regimen. He looked forward to schedules with lots o f room for 
improvisation and time for quiet reflection. He vowed to start smoking again and to quit 
worrying about his diet. And he longed to escape the feeling, as he once put it to Jack 
Valenti when he felt hemmed in by the daily schedule before him, that he was being 
killed slowly, "like being nibbled to death by ducks."48
47 Johnson was sympathetic to criticisms o f  civil rights progress, in particular, having remarked in 
August 1965 after the Watts explosion, "I've moved the Negro from D+ to C-. He's still nowhere. He 
knows it. And that's why he's out in the streets. Hell, I'd be there too." Quoted in Doris Kearns, Lyndon 
Johnson an d the American Dream  (N ew  York: Harper and Row, 1976), 305. Johnson also made a similar 
remark after the King assassination and subsequent riots in April, 1968. "If you keep your foot on a man's 
neck for a hundred years," Johnson told George Christian, "then you take your foot off, what's he going 
to do?" Cited by George Christian in Robert Hardesty, ed., The Johnson Years: The Difference He Made 
(Austin: Board o f  Regents, University ofT exas, 1993), 31.
48 Kearns, Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream, 176. After a trip to the LBJ ranch in late 1969, 
ostensibly to brief Johnson on the Nixon administration plans for foreign policy, Henry Kissinger
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The most interesting aspect o f President Johnson's demeanor, however, as he 
prepared to step down from the presidency, was the surpassing confidence he exuded 
whenever he referred to the legacy o f his social and economic policies, an outlook that 
was exemplified in large measure by the December 1968 Business Council dinner. 
Vietnam would always be a badge of not inconsiderable shame, but the Great Society, 
the thriving U.S. economy, these were things o f which he could always be proud. In the 
autobiography o f his presidential years, published in 1971, Johnson noted proudly how 
United Nations ambassador Russell Wiggins underlined this point at his administration's 
last cabinet meeting on January 17, 1969:
It is seldom that within the electoral span of a single administration do we plant 
and harvest. Usually the results are deferred until after the administration has been 
succeeded by others. We are really orchardists and not grain growers. Crop 
maturity is long deferred. I feel confident, Mr. President, that when the fruits of 
your policies are gathered in, Americans are going to say, 'How great the harvest 
has been.'
At the same meeting, Secretary of the Treasury Joseph Barr added, "I suppose I leave as 
one o f the rare Secretaries o f the Treasury who could say the cash register is full."49
Indeed, when Johnson turned the presidency over to Richard Nixon on January 20, 
1969 the cash register was quite full indeed. Management of the most pressing 
economic problems also seemed well within the expanding grasp o f his departing 
administration. The nation's unemployment rate stood at 3.3%, the lowest figure since 
1953. The budget for the current fiscal year was in surplus (Johnson's second, and the 
third o f the Kennedy-Johnson era), and in fact, would eventually show a higher ($3.1 
billion) actual surplus than Johnson predicted ($2.4 billion) when he left office. The 
budget for fiscal year 1970, submitted on January 15, 1969, anticipated an even larger
recorded a somewhat different perception. "Lady Bird Johnson drove me back to the airstrip and she 
asked me how I thought President Johnson seemed these days. I mumbled something about 'serenity in 
retirement' and she almost drove o ff  the road. 1 suppose flattery has to be related to reality, however 
vaguely." Quoted in Miller, Lyndon , 576.
49 Lyndon B. Johnson, The Vantage Point, 550.
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budget surplus ($3.4 billion).50 The nation had a favorable balance of trade for the first 
time in 11 years, the Dow-Jones index had reached the magical 1,000 level, and the 
economy in general showed little signs o f faltering. Outside o f the high jobless figures 
and the continued underemployment among many o f the nation's minorities, the lone 
trouble spot in the nation's economic picture was price inflation. "America's economic 
success story does have a major blemish—inflation—and I would be less than candid to 
gloss over it," Johnson noted in his December 1968 address to the Business Council.51 
Even here, however, there did not seem to be great cause for continued alarm. While the 
increase in the Consumer Price Index for 1968 stood at 4.7%, too high by almost any 
standard, the CPI increase for Johnson's last full month in office (December 1968) was 
only 0.2%—the equivalent o f a 2.4% annual rate.52 Outgoing chairman o f the Council 
o f Economic Advisers, Arthur Okun, remarked that the nation was finally witnessing 
the "obsolescence of the business cycle pattern," adding as well, in a November 1968, 
memo to Johnson, that the "economy is moving into better balance and we have turned 
the comer toward price stability."53 To the members o f the Business Council the 
following month, Johnson warned that "the slowdown is coming very gradually," but 
that "the economy is no longer plagued by the fever it had earlier this year."54 Johnson 
also continued to receive estimates, after Okun's November memo, suggesting that the 
recently passed tax surcharge bill (June 1968) had begun to subdue inflationary
50 D eficit statistics from Robert J. Gordon, M acroeconomics, fourth edition (Boston: Little, Brown, 
1987), Table B -l, and Lester A. Sobel, ed., Inflation and the Nixon Administration  (N ew  York: Facts on 
File, 1974), 19. The FY 1970 surplus turned into a deficit, however, as Nixon's policies led to higher 
interest rates (intentionally)-that increased payments on the national debt, higher Medicare and Veterans' 
benefits payments (because o f  rising health care costs), and an underestimate o f  tax receipts (for the first 
time since FY 1960) due to the recession beginning in November 1969.
51 Public Papers, Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-1969: II, 1168.
52 Consumer Price Index D etailed  Report, January 1969.
53 James E. Anderson and Jared Hazleton, Managing M acroeconomic Policy: The Johnson Presidency 
(Austin: University o f  Texas Press, 1986), 6.
54 Public Papers, Lyndon B. Johnson , 1968-1969: II, 1168.
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expectations.55 While investment demand seemed to be responding perversely, factoring 
in, perhaps, the supply side tendencies of the President-elect, consumers were changing 
their outlook. As a result, the Gross National Product had slowed from a 6.5% annual 
rate early in 1968 to a less rapid 4% at the end of the year. The budget surplus for fiscal 
year 1969, the curtailment o f Vietnam related military spending in the fiscal year 1970 
budget, and a renewed attack on significant microeconomic problems— from wage-price 
policy to health care costs—also signalled at least some improvement in the price 
inflation outlook. "The budget is now in harmony with the needs of the economy," 
Johnson added in his January 1969 Economic Report to Congress, "and its welcome 
effects are gradually emerging."56 Even on the price front things were looking up.
Despite the promising outlook for price stability as he prepared to leave the White 
House, Johnson remained wary o f the political gamesmanship to which his inflation 
fighting policies would be exposed. Johnson's Republican and conservative Democratic 
opponents had exhibited little inclination to stage a vigorous battle against the growing 
inflationary momentum largely because it had provided them with a convenient tool 
with which to attack and discredit the liberal policies they opposed.57 To many o f them 
it was simply evidence—difficult to refute or qualify—that they were right and their 
liberal opponents were wrong. As a consequence, effective anti-inflation policy had to 
be as politically resilient as it was economically circumspect. If Nixon chose to ignore 
inflation, then, simply because he could still blame it all on his political opponents in 
general—and Lyndon Johnson and the New Economics in particular—there was every 
likelihood that it would begin to feed on itself, altering the expectations and
55 The surcharge called for an additional tax equal to 10% o f  the tax paid under the previous tax 
schedule. If a taxpayer owed $400 in federal tax for 1967, for example, they would ow e $440 for 1968. 
See Chapter 8 for a more detailed examination o f  the tax surcharge issue.
56 Public Papers, Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-1969: II, 1314.
57 See Joseph Kraft, "Republicans Seek to Blame Democrats for Any Inflation," Washington Post,
October 5, 1967, A25. Kraft reported here on the Republican effort to stall the Johnson administration's 
tax surcharge proposal "to the point o f  assuring a stiff dose o f  inflation bound to be blamed on the 
Democrats." See also Chapter 9 for examples o f  this ruse within the Nixon administration.
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prerogatives o f a increasing number of economic actors and confounding the efforts of 
economic analysts and policymakers. Indeed, Johnson had been warned by Arthur Okun 
in May 1968 that accelerating inflation would in itself "strengthen the hand o f 
reactionaries on the Hill."58 Since Johnson had far more to lose at the hands o f 
continued high inflation than did his Republican successor, it is quite ironic that 
Nixon—who ultimately confirmed Johnson's suspicions and ignored inflation 
throughout most of his first term—retained the mantel of the serious inflation fighter 
while Johnson came to be known instead as a President who carelessly fanned the 
flames o f price inflation.
In Johnson's final analysis, however, Vietnam—rather than inflation—had given 
Nixon the keys to the White House. Accordingly, he hoped that inflation might very 
well cease to be the object of partisan politics, keeping it open to solutions suggested by 
the New Economics. "I do not doubt," Keynes once noted, "that a serious problem will 
arise when we have a combination of collective bargaining and full employment. But I 
am not sure how much light the analytical method you apply can throw on this 
essentially political problem."59 While they utilized macroeconomic adjustments, such 
as budget cuts and a small tax rise (surcharge) in mid-1968, Johnson and his economic 
advisers had addressed the inflation problem much the way Keynes had suggested. 
Urging cooperation between labor and business, deploying the significant 
microeconomic leverage that extensive government contracting allowed, and 
highlighting the bargaining power o f managers against consumers, rather than workers 
alone, they had transformed the struggle against inflation from a matter of 
macroeconomic routine into a largely microeconomic effort with primarily political 
overtones and variables. This kind o f politics, unlike that which made inflation a
58 Administrative H istory o f  the Council o f  Economic Advisers, vol.II, Box 1, L.B.J. Library
59 Quoted by Aubrey Jones, "Inflation as an Industrial Problem," in Robert Skidelsky, ed., The E nd o f  the 
Keynesian Era: Essays on the Disintegration o f  the Keynesian Political Economy (New York: Holmes 
and Meier, 1977), 53.
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political football, thrived on consensus and cooperation rather than confrontation or 
party ideology. As such, it served as a substantial source o f the retiring President's 
cautious optimism.
Twenty-five years later, President Johnson's optimism is shrouded in irony and the 
New Economics remains a relic of the recent past, discredited for its well meaning but 
presumably naive approach to the nation's political economy. Leaving the White House 
in 1969, clearly dragged down by the war in Vietnam, Johnson still believed that the 
New Economics possessed great unfulfilled potential.60 Sensing that the initiatives of 
the new approach had only begun to prove themselves, he believed that future historians 
would record a notable and auspicious achievement when they began to judge him on 
the basis o f his protracted economic and social policies, rather than his prosecution o f 
the war in Vietnam. While this seemed unlikely in 1969, with the war raging on, and 
only a little less so when Johnson died in January 1973—two days after Nixon's second 
inauguration and three months before the last American troops left Vietnam— Johnson 
remained hopeful to the end.
Nearly a decade after his death, Johnson truly came to be judged on the basis of the 
economic and social policies he so confidently bequeathed to the next generation. 
Despite the unrivaled economic and social progress o f the Johnson years, however, the 
judgement that Johnson expected to be generous and laudatory turned out to be an 
unambiguous, even chiding, repudiation. By 1980, when Ronald Reagan capped off the 
return to the traditional political economy that had preceded the Kennedy and Johnson 
administrations, the Johnson years came to be seen as as a watershed in American 
economic history, but one with a profoundly sour and economically debilitating legacy.
60 Johnson invariably referred to the 1965 Voting Rights Act as his greatest single  accomplishment. In 
many ways, however, he also saw voting rights as the key to improved econom ic opportunity under the 
N ew  Economics strategy umbrella. "It is the effort o f  American Negroes to secure for them selves the full 
blessing o f  American life," Johnson remarked o f  the Voting Rights struggle in his March 15, 1965 speech 
to Congress. See Johnson, "Special Message to Congress: The American Promise," March 15, 1965, 
Public Papers, 1965: /, 284.
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Ironically, the "bitch o f a war" that critically undermined the Johnson presidency 
suddenly became a noble crusade hampered only by liberal disdain and left-wing 
divisiveness, while the New Economics and its otherwise sparkling record became the 
symbol of American decline and economic instability. Intoning what became a mantra 
for Democrats and Republicans alike in the 1980s, Reagan summed up the Johnson 
years with one o f his most commonly accepted, yet thoroughly misleading, perorations: 
"In 1964 the famous War on Poverty was declared, and a funny thing happened.
Poverty, as measured by dependency, stopped shrinking and then actually began to 
grow worse. I guess you could say poverty won the war."61
Although it represented a conclusion that rested upon myth and upon the nation's 
jumbled emotional compass as much as historical fact, Reagan's assessment was 
generally made believable only for what it implied about the latent, long range effects o f 
Johnson's War on Poverty. No one, Reagan's economic advisers included, could very 
effectively advance the claim that poverty in the U.S had not declined under Johnson, 
for it had by a considerable amount. It became accepted, rather, for its much harder to 
disprove claim that the War on Poverty, the Great Society, and the New Economics had 
saddled the American economy with an inflation that wreaked most of its havoc after 
the Johnson presidency. The true consequences o f Johnson's economic policies, critics 
would hasten to point out, simply were not evident until one had a good look at the long 
run. Producing an inflation that possessed a virtually unstoppable momentum, Johnson's 
economic policies, according to these critics (and the now traditional reading), doomed 
the last quarter o f the twentieth century to economic upheaval and instability and to the 
social malaise created by declining productivity, a parasitic "culture o f poverty," and
61 Ronald Reagan, "Radio Address on Welfare Reform," February 15,1986, in Davis W. Houck and 
Am os Kiewe, eds., Actor, Ideologue, Politician: The Public Speeches o f  R onald Reagan  (Westport, CT: 
Greenwood Press, 1993), 288. Pretending, here, that poverty began to grow worse in 1964, and not in 
1973 when statistics revealed the first increase in the poverty level since the 1950s, Reagan still 
convinced many that Johnson's War on Poverty created little but economic instability and deterioration.
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fractured and uneven economic growth. The "stagflation" o f the 1970s had presumably 
confirmed what the radical right had been saying about the Johnson political economy 
all aiong: it would achieve little but fleeting economic gains, it would promote a welfare 
dependency that would destroy American productivity, and it would create a raging 
inflation that could be tamed only with a strong dose of economic austerity.
The Great Inflation o f the 1970s, then, is seen as both the critical economic malady 
o f the late twentieth century United States, and as the Achilles heel o f Lyndon Johnson's 
Great Society. Johnson tried to do too much too soon, critics charged; his attempt to 
have both guns and  butter sparked an inevitable inflationary spiral. When Nixon and his 
economic advisers spoke o f having inherited a classic demand pull inflation caused by 
the Great Society, few doubted their claims, and the still prevalent assessment of the 
New Economics began to take shape. The Democrats' attempt, Nixon Undersecretary of 
the Treasury Charls Walker exclaimed in 1970, "to have guns, butter, fat, and a Great 
Society, all within a few years, assured that the economy would fall prey to the ravages 
o f deep and accelerating inflation."62 Johnson, himself, had once suggested that "the 
Democratic party had pressed too far out in front o f the American people." By this, 
however, he had implied that his party had pushed political, not economic, changes too 
fast and too far.63 "You wind up reacting when you ought to be acting on a positive 
plan," Johnson told his former assistant Bobby Baker in 1967, "because there's seldom 
time to think things through. You run around putting your fingers in the leaks, trying to 
patch this or that up, but its all too hully gully."64 Vietnam was a quagmire. Community 
Action was often politically divisive. Medicaid and Medicare urgently required cost 
controls. Many other Great Society programs— from Highway Beautification to the Job
62 Cited in Sobel,ed., Inflation and the Nixon Administration, 115. "Charls" is the correct spelling for 
Nixon's one-time Undersecretary o f  the Treasury, a conservative Texas Democrat who had actually 
assisted Johnson in his 1941 senatorial campaign.
63 Johnson, The Vantage Point, 549.
64 Quoted in Bobby Baker with Larry L. King, "Wheeling and Dealing," Playboy , June 1978, 266.
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Corps were also contaminated by hasty compromise and profound political 
fragmentation. The arrest and resignation o f Walter Jenkins in 1964, Johnson's most 
trusted aide and a man whom journalist Sarah McClendon called the "most efficient 
person I ever witnessed in government," also hampered Johnson's organizational efforts 
to some extent.65 "...There was never anyone to really take his place," Jack Valenti 
recalled.66 But when it came to the management o f the economy, President Johnson had 
always marshaled his greatest managerial attributes and his most principled 
uncompromising efforts. That task, Johnson believed, was undertaken methodically and 
coherently; it was anything but "hully gully."
Utilizing both the "perverse effect" theory, which highlighted unintended 
consequences, and still popular fragments of the "old-time" economic religion, critics—  
like Charls Walker—grumbled mostly, however, about a government that tried to do too 
much economically, about the resulting excess demand, and the inevitable inflation that 
followed. To these critics hasty compromise and political fragmentation were irrelevant; 
inflation was clear evidence, they claimed, that the New Economics and the Keynesian 
revolution had simply reached its logical and ignominious conclusion. Foolish enough 
to tangle with the natural laws of the free market, the plaintiffs lamented, Johnson paid 
for it in the long run when the market determined that jobs and economic growth—the 
primary goals o f his policies—would have to be sacrificed to control the price inflation 
produced by these same initiatives.67 To President Johnson and his advisers, however, 
"the market" had played only a secondary role in the creation o f the late 1960s price 
inflation. Inflation was certainly not mitigated by the high demand and full employment
65 Sarah McClendon, Oral History Interview, interviewed by Joe Frantz, February 16, 1972, LBJ Library, 
38.
66 Valenti, A Very Human President, 92. Eric Goldman believed that Jenkins' departure led to a 
"permanently fragmented" White House staff. See Goldman, The Tragedy o f  Lyndon Johnson, 275.
67 The theory o f  the "perverse effect" is often invoked to suggest that Johnson's attempt to push society 
in a given direction moved it wholly in an opposite direction. For an extended discussion o f  the "perverse 
effect" theory as fallacy see Albert O. Hirschman, The Rhetoric o f  Reaction: Perversity, Futility, and  
Jeopardy  (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, Belknap Press, 1991).
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of the Johnson years, but it did not arise exclusively, or even primarily, from these 
factors either. In certain businesses and even in certain sectors there was evidence o f 
some demand-pull inflation, but it was neither widespread nor lasting and in some cases 
would have occurred even below full employment or with a budget in surplus. The 
macroeconomic priorities o f the New Economics were seldom the cause even where 
demand-pull inflation existed to an obvious extent. Inherent productivity lag, for 
example, along with the need for upward adjustment of relative wage compensation, 
often created genuine demand-pull inflation in the nation's service sector, a sector that 
had begun to exhibit substantial growth in the 1960s. Likewise, food and raw materials 
prices also exhibited great sensitivity to increases in aggregate demand and they 
displayed authentic demand-pull inflation midst the full employment o f the late 1960s. 
Yet, they also tended to be triggered by temporary supply shocks and were often 
buttressed by tariffs, import quotas, and subsidies—non-market forces that could be 
readily adjusted with substantial price softening consequences. Changes in supply, not 
demand, were often the key factor. There were also more specific cases, such as the 
shipbuilding industry, in which wartime demand and the need for specialized human 
and physical capital forced a constrained supply to brush up against a burgeoning, and 
in the short run, excessive demand. Despite the residual effects o f inflation in an 
industry such as shipbuilding, with its obvious implications for commercial shipping in 
general and transportation costs to a lesser extent, this was not truly a problem, 
however, related to an economic policy that was somehow too insistent on high demand 
or full employment. A more long-term decline in the dead-weight tonnage o f the 
nation's merchant marine and the special demands o f Vietnam had far greater bearing on 
this still relatively isolated problem.68
68 Dead weight tonnage o f  the nation's merchant marine fell from 13.8 million in 1950 to 12.8 million in 
1973. See "Federal Aids to the Maritime Industry," in Economics o f  F ederal Subsidy Program s, part 6, 
"Transportation Subsidies," Joint Economic Committee, prepared by Gerald Jantscher, 93rd Congress,
1st session, February 26, 1973 (Washington: U.S.G.P.O., 1973).
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It was also true, as the Reagan administration proved to a certain extent in the early 
1980s, that a wide retreat from full employment, combined with curtailed government 
assistance to the unemployed poor and the working class (and higher taxes as well if 
state, local, and social security liabilities are included), could tame much of the nation's 
demand-pull inflation and some of the inflation that was not o f the demand-pull 
variety.69 To Keynes, Johnson, and the New Economists o f the Kennedy-Johnson era, 
however, that was like washing a car with a belt sander. Since much o f the inflation of 
the late 1960s and early 1970s did not arise from excess demand or genuine free market 
forces, it could also be tamed without resorting to strategies that curtailed consumer 
demand, increased unemployment, or widened economic misery. Keynes had, in fact, 
anticipated this kind of inflation, if  and when his full employment prescriptions had 
begun to bear fruit, and the Johnson administration had fully equipped itself, politically 
and ideologically, to fight it. It did imply, however, a sea change in both the habits and 
customs of the business world and the posture of the federal government. "It was an 
obvious rider to The General Theory, Joan Robinson asserted, that if  we are to enjoy 
continuous near-full employment without changing the institutions and habits of 
industrial bargaining, we shall suffer from inflation."70
By the end o f his presidency, Lyndon Johnson saw this need for change as both a 
formidable challenge that his administration had just begun to meet, and as a 
fundamental part o f the Keynesian revolution, an aspect upon which the general nature 
o f The General Theory rested. That Keynes himself grappled incompletely and 
indirectly with this challenge is testimony not to his limited relevance but to the absence 
in his professional career of the peacetime full employment economy necessary to bring 
it all about. For all o f his theoretical brilliance, as D.E. Moggridge pointed out, Keynes
69 Just as the reversion to the old economic orthodoxy has changed the definition o f  "full employment"—  
from 3-4% to 5-6%— it has also changed the definition o f  price stability. A 2-3% inflation rate, 
considered a "stable" rate in the 1980s and 1990s, was deemed unacceptably high in the late 1960s.
70 Robinson, "What Has Becom e o f  the Keynesian Revolution?" 129.
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was a man "whose interests in economic theory were almost completely practical; he 
was never much interested in pure theory except as a guide to action."71 Reparations, 
currency reform, wartime finance, and post-war reconstruction all became objects of 
Keynes's practical concerns; pricing policies at full employment did not.
By the mid-1960s a mostly peacetime full employment economy had been 
established and Lyndon Johnson began what he and his advisers believed to be the 
culmination o f the Keynesian revolution. "I believe we are entering a new era of 
cooperation between government and business and labor and the many groups which 
form this nation," Johnson declared in 1964. "This does not mean that we will always 
agree. It does mean that we have created an economy which has never existed before, 
and which some said could never exist."72 Convinced, at the end of his presidency, that 
consumer demand had caused precious little o f the existing price inflation, Johnson saw 
no reason to heed the warnings o f those who decried the profligacy o f his "guns and 
butter" strategy, who sought deep fiscal retrenchment, or who recommended austere 
monetary policy. He did not blanch at either budget cuts or small tax increases out o f his 
reluctance to cripple the Great Society, though he clearly wanted to expand many of its 
programs. He would have cut some Great Society programs regardless o f the nation's
71 D.E. M oggridge, "The Influence o f  Keynes on the Economics o f  His Time," in M ilo Keynes, ed., 
E ssays on John M aynard Keynes, 1A. On Keynes's avoidance o f  the imperfectly competitive pricing 
model for his chapter on prices in The G eneral Theory, Geoffrey Harcourt pointed out that Keynes was 
MacMillan's reader for Joan Robinson's The Economics o f  Imperfect Competition, and that Harrod 
highlighted for Keynes in the 1920s the advantage o f  having imperfectly competitive microeconomic 
foundations. Harcourt suggests that Keynes ignored such an advantageous microeconomic foundation, 
though he beiieved in it and understood it w ell, because he thought it "tactically unwise." It was as if  
Keynes felt compelled to say, Harcourt suggested, "I will assume a competitive environment so that you 
cannot say that I have obtained my unemployment results by slipping in monopoly, in which situation 
everybody knows (but Harrod demurred) that unemployment can result and yet I will get involuntary 
unemployment and an underemployment equilibrium." See Harcourt, "Theoretical Methods and 
Unfinished Business," 12-13. Describing what he saw as Keynes's tactical mistakes James Tobin recalled 
Keynes's assumption that everyone was a price-taker and added that "Keynes knew better. The 
discussions o f  price and wage formation in his book are full o f  realistic observations, but they are not 
incorporated into the structure o f  his argument." See Tobin, "Keynesian Economics and Its Renaissance," 
117.
72 Public Papers, Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-1964: II, 881.
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fiscal status or price stability. Others sustained cuts precisely because he wanted to 
achieve the proper fiscal balance. Nor did he ignore sage economic advice simply 
because he hoped to continue the nation's tragic and flawed crusade in Southeast Asia. 
By the last full year o f his presidency, had he been able to muster the clarity of thought 
and vision and the political strength required to do the job, he would have been glad to 
end the whole affair on a moment's notice. "Don't worry John," Johnson once Health, 
education, and Welfare Secretary John Gardner in 1967. "We're going to end this war 
and then you'll have all the money you want for education, health, and everything 
else."73 He sought no retreat from existing macroeconomic policy, instead, because he 
believed it to be appropriate and thought it to be moving into better balance even as 
inflation became an increasingly tangible threat to the nation's ongoing prosperity. The 
prescriptions for retrenchment and monetary austerity were precisely the avenues his 
economic strategy was designed to avoid. What he sought instead was a new approach 
to inflation that focused more on the nature o f industrial bargaining, fix-price markets, 
and an increasingly disingenuous style of corporate cost management. This was in part a 
struggle that Johnson had inherited from President Kennedy and had accepted early in 
his presidency. "Like our late President," Johnson told the Consumer Advisory Council 
in late 1963, "I do not believe that the Federal government should be a meddlesome 
busybody, sticking its nose into every aspect o f private decision-making. But I am 
deeply aware... that a renewal o f the price-wage spiral would endanger our domestic 
expansion and our international balance o f payments."74 The appearance of 
unacceptably high inflation rates (3 to 4%) in his last year in office, however, had 
clearly moved this struggle to a higher political ground.
73 Quoted by S. Douglass Cater, Oral History Interview, interviewed by Joe Frantz, May 26, 1967, Palo 
Alto, California, LBJ Library, 22.
74 Ibid., 1963-1964: /, 54.
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The reaction to this effort, that was never popular or well understood to begin with, 
was as swift as it was hostile. Bereft o f steadfast supporters on the Left, largely because 
of the war in Vietnam, confounded by the tepid pseudo-Keynesianism o f his more 
reliable supporters in the business community, and trapped somewhat by the persistent 
belief that he, rather than a system o f economic principles, remained the reason for 
relative wage-price stability, Johnson found few allies in his fight against inflation and 
ultimately had little impact on the economic policy debate that followed his tumultuous 
presidency. Besieged by both anti-Keynesian economists and conservative politicians 
alike, Johnson's approach to relative price stability at full employment, suitable as it 
may have been, stood only a slim chance o f surviving his presidency.
Though their deliberations were seldom discussed publicly, economists joined the 
fray by assailing genuine weaknesses in existing Keynesian models and popular 
versions o f Keynesian economic theory. Monetarists, led by future Nobel laureate 
Milton Friedman, charged that the Keynesians in the Johnson administration had 
ignored money supply to the detriment of price stability. Friedmanites judged Keynes 
the author o f the doctrine that "money does not matter" and believed that the followers 
of Keynes, in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, had ignored the quantity theory 
o f money, a theory that predicted greater price changes than changes in output when 
money supply increased rapidly. In truth, money did matter greatly to Keynes— so much 
so that he saw it as transforming the fundamental nature of the exchange economy—and 
the Keynesian economists o f the New Frontier and Great Society had not ignored the 
quantity theory o f money. They simply termed it invalid and did a thorough job of 
proving it so. As Will Hutton noted, "the Keynesian interpretation of markets 
emphasizes...the manner in which uncertainty, changing expectations, and money all 
combine to put the load of adjustment in markets on quantity rather than price."75
75 Will Hutton, The Revolution That Never Was: An Assessment o f  Keynesian Economics (N ew  York: 
Longman Inc., 1986), 116. Emphasis added.
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Keynes took monetary economics into the short period, D.E. Moggridge added, "into 
the real world where markets adjust to changes at widely different speeds under the 
influence o f uncertainty where the analysis o f neutral money is irrelevant."76 To Keynes 
and the Keynesians o f the Kennedy-Johnson years, money was not an exogenous factor, 
but it was most often a passive one. Only at full employment, when accelerated 
monetary expansion would indeed change prices more than output, did the classical- 
monetarist theory make sense. The ostensibly anti-Keynesian Arthur Bums—teacher of 
Milton Friedman at Rutgers, adviser to Presidents Eisenhower and Nixon, and Fed 
chairman in the early 1970s— may have best summed up the Keynesian position. "You 
know," Bums mused while serving as Fed chairman, "all this talk about the growth of 
money misses the point that what is important about money, particularly in the short 
run, is the willingness to use it—not the size o f the stock or the rate at which the stock is 
growing."77
The monetarist critique remained persuasive, however, in spite of its various 
shortcomings. One reason was that monetary models predicted economic trends in the 
late 1960s with greater accuracy than did some of the Keynesian models. During that 
period, changes in M l, the part of the nation's money stock representing checking 
accounts and currency in circulation, corresponded remarkably well indeed with 
changes in the nation's economic output. In 1966 M l was 22.84% of total production. In 
1967,1968, and 1969, it was, respectively, 22.45%, 21.97%, and 21.54% of the nation's 
GNP.78 This should have, nevertheless, provoked little surprise in the Keynesian camp, 
for Keynes himself had suggested that money supply would move more in tandem with 
the overall economy at full employment and high capacity utilization levels (such as 
those that prevailed in the late 1960s). He also noted that artificial attempts to increase
76 M oggridge, "The Influence o f  Keynes on the Economics o f  His Time," 78.
77 Quoted in Aubrey Jones, "Inflation as an Industrial Problem," 52.
78 Wyatt C. Wells, Economist in an Uncertain World: Arthur F. Burns and  the Federal Reserve, 1970- 
1978 (N ew  York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 24; Herbert Stein, Presidential Economics, 397.
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output with greater supplies o f money, at this same point in the economic cycle, would 
have a more substantial effect on price than it would on output. In fact, the Keynesian 
emphasis on full employment and aggregate demand stemmed largely from Keynes's 
realization that high demand would smooth out the otherwise highly speculative and 
unpredictable preferences for capital investment, and therefore the demand for money, 
and obviate the need for either artificial monetary stimulus or a close watch over the 
money supply. One of the fundamental differences between the Keynesian conception 
o f money and that o f the monetarists was that Keynes believed the private banking 
system, and even private corporations, to be important vehicles for money supply 
changes, particularly during periods o f economic expansion and at full employment. 
The monetarists, on the other hand, conceived o f a system by which all changes in 
money supply came at the direction of the Federal Reserve. That Ml lagged slightly 
behind total production in the late 1960s also suggests that the monetarists were wrong 
about the alleged Keynesian indifference to money supply and the resulting inflation. 
As Frank Hahn pointed out, their tendency to amalgamate consumption and investment 
into total expenditure allowed them to ignore pertinent variables, like productive 
capacity, in the determination o f the price pressure created by total demand.79
Neo-Austrian economists, such as Friedrich Hayek, Ludwig Lachmann, Israel 
Kirzner, and Murray Rothbard, unlike the monetarists, set out to refute the whole 
Keynesian approach. Beginning with an antipathy toward overplanning, which Keynes 
and many of the Keynesians shared, the neo-Austrians suggested that New Economics 
erred in its reliance on a statistical aggregate o f all wages (ignoring real wage structure), 
a simple consumption function which conceived o f a fixed relationship between 
consumption and income, and a conception of capital as homogeneous (without a 
complex interlocking structure or a dependence upon market signals like interest rates
79 Hahn, "Some Keynesian Reflections on Monetarism," 3.
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and prices).80 Against the simple models hammered out from Keynes's original theory, 
used primarily by the Kennedy-Johnson advisers as starting points or crude illustrations, 
rather than complete models, these criticisms were as valid as they were compelling.
But the New Economics was not as simple or as naive as these models often suggested. 
Johnson's economic advisers did utilize, on occasion, an all too generic "wage level" in 
their efforts to determine the general composition o f the nation's demand. But it was 
merely one step in their far greater efforts to bridge the demand gap and to attain full 
employment with relative price stability. At that stage and for that purpose, anything 
more complex was unnecessary. They also made a distinction, between wages in 
different labor markets (skilled versus unskilled; blue-collar versus white collar) when it 
really counted, particularly in the struggle against inflation following the attainment of 
near-full employment in 1966.81 Keynes had also provided the modest rationale for the 
consumption function in The General Theory, declaring that "the fundamental 
psychological law upon which we are entitled to depend with great confidence, both a 
priori and from our detailed knowledge of human nature and from detailed facts of 
experience, is that men are disposed, as a rule and on the average, to increase their 
consumption as their income increases, but not by as much as the increase in their 
income."82 As Hyman Minsky pointed out, the consumption function was to be an 
opening wedge rather than a tool for universal analysis, for Keynes also listed a number 
of factors other than income that affected consumption: net income instead of gross 
income; capital gains and losses; interest rates; anticipated price level changes; 
government and business fiscal and financial policy; and expectations o f future
80 Peter Lilley, "Two Critics o f  Keynes: Friedman and Hayek," in Skidelsky, ed., The E nd o f  the 
Keynesian Era, 30-32.
81 See chapter 6 on the Wage-Price policy o f  the Johnson administration.
82 Keynes, The G eneral Theory, 96.
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income.83 Explaining consumption as a psychological law truly raised as many 
questions as it answered, but the New Economists did not pretend otherwise.84
Keynes's, and Lyndon Johnson's, advocacy of low interest rates, coupled with the 
Keynesian deployment o f the Hicks-Hansen model (IS-LM) and its more sophisticated 
variants, seemed to suggest that market signals (like interest rates) were not signals at 
all, and that they had little bearing on natural movements in the marketplace. The 
simultaneous equilibrium of commodity and money markets in the Hicks-Hansen model 
suggested as much.85 One of Keynes's primary contentions, however, was that interest 
rates were significant market signals but that they often failed to bring savings and 
investment into identity as his Classical predecessors (and successors) claimed. "The 
whole point about expectations [in the Keynesian system]," Will Hutton noted, "is that 
they change, and they may change at any point along the schedule [supply and demand 
for money or L-M curve], to the extent that the very concept of a schedule in which 
interest and income correspond to certain levels of demand for money is bogus."86 As 
Keynes himself noted, greater quantities o f savings tended to lower the rate o f interest, 
but "there were several slips between the cup and the lip."87 The neo-Austrian
83 Minsky, John M aynard Keynes, 27-28.
84 Hutton, The Revolution That Never Was, 135-136. Gardner Ackley, Johnson's CEA chair from late 
1964 to early 1968, in his w idely read publication Macroeconomic Theory, does assert that the 
consumption function lay "at the heart o f  modem macroeconomics," thereby exposing the New  
Economics to the aforementioned criticism. See Ackley, Macroeconomic Theory (N ew  York: The 
Macmillan Co, 1964), viii. In his later publication, Macroeconomics: Theory and Policy, meant to 
replace Macroeconomic Theory, Ackley does explain his contention more clearly: "The purpose o f  this 
demonstration [the validity o f  the simple consumption function] is not to support the conclusion that this 
is all we need to know in order to understand what role consumer spending plays in determining GNP. It 
is intended only (a) as the starting point for a later, far more detailed and critical analysis o f  the 
determinants o f  aggregate consumption, and (b) to provide one ingredient for the simple static 
macroeconomic models that are described in Parts III and IV o f  this book." See Ackley, 
Macroeconomics: Theory and  Policy  (N ew  York: Macmillan, 1978), 170.
85 The Hicks-Hansen (IS-LM ) model was devised by John Hicks in '"Mr. Keynes and the Classics; A 
Suggested Interpretation," Econometrica, Volume 5, 1937, 147-159. IS-LM denotes the strategic 
variables in the basic Keynesian model: IS = Investment/Savings Curve (sloped negatively); LM = 
Liquidity Preference/Demand for Money Curve (sloped positively), y-axis = interest rate; x-axis = net 
national product.
86 Hutton, The Revolution That Never Was, 126-127.
87 Keynes, The General Theory, 178.
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contention that Keynes and the Kennedy-Johnson economists ignored the varied 
character of the nation's capital network is even less plausible. Johnson CEA chairman 
Gardner Ackley pointed out how the acknowledgement o f this character was, in fact, 
one o f the primary reasons Keynes termed investment the most significant, yet also the 
most capricious, element in a capitalist economy:
One possible reason why investment is so difficult to explain and predict is 
essentially the reason that Keynes gave a generation ago. Investment decisions 
depend [upon] judgements about the future, and the rather distant future at 
that....Even if  the future is somewhat knowable in its broad dimensions, 
investment decisions are not made in the aggregate but one at a time and 
independently...and the success or failure o f each such decision depends not only 
on what happens to the aggregate economy but as much on what happens to 
particular firms and industries.88
Although the Hicks-Hansen model was a more accurate representation o f  the basic 
Keynesian approach than a simple consumption function— which ignored the impact of 
the money market upon the savings-investment relationship— it did not consider the role 
o f uncertainty in business investment and portfolio decisions and it implied an 
equilibrium where Keynes suggested there would be none. As such, Hyman Minsky 
noted, "it was an unfair and naive representation of Keynes's subtle and sophisticated 
views."89 Even John Hicks, whose model lay at the source of the descriptive problem, 
decried its misrepresentation. "To many students, I fear," Hicks noted in 1974, "it is the 
Keynes theory. But it was never intended as more than a representation o f what 
appeared to be a central part o f the Keynes theory."90 This model and its more 
sophisticated variants also made it difficult, to the extent that the Kennedy-Johnson 
advisers failed to emphasize its limited usefulness, to defend the New Economics from 
the swelling monetarist or neo-Austrian criticism. Because the Hicks-Hansen model
88 Ackley, M acroeconomics: Theory an d  Policy, 660.
89 Minsky, John M aynard Keynes, 38. Minsky based this claim upon both The G eneral Theory and 
Keynes's rebuttal to Jacob Viner's review o f  Hicks's model. See J.R. Hicks, "Mr. Keynes and the Classics; 
A Suggested Interpretation," Econometrica, 5, 1937, 147-159; and Keynes, "The General Theory o f  
Employment," Q uarterly Journal o f  Economics, February 1937, 209-223.
90 Hicks, The Crisis in Keynesian Economics, 6.
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negated the essential Keynesian unpredictability and disequilibrium o f the investment- 
savings relationship, it made it especially difficult for the neo-Keynesians to defend 
themselves against the monetarist proposition that real income and employment rise and 
fall with money supply. Keynes believed that it did when a savings to investment 
identity was assured; the Hicks-Hansen model (and the prevailing economic status in 
the late 1960s) suggested just such an identity.91
The debate between Keynesian and monetarist economists clearly came to a head in 
the late 1960s as the Consumer Price Index approached unacceptably high levels. 
Because near-full employment had indeed been attained at that point and the monetarist 
special case fitted reality, the debate tended to shift away from general macroeconomics 
and price creation and toward the issue o f price control, ceding significant theoretical 
ground to the monetarists in the process. Inflexible money wages remained a problem 
for a monetarist regime and its attempts to control price inflation, Keynesian economists 
pointed out. Suggested that inflexible wages simply made monetarist deflation too 
costly and ineffective, Keynesians did much to weaken the monetarist paradigm but did 
little to shore up their own. "It has become sort o f a skeet-shooting sport," Axel 
Leijonhufvud noted in 1987, "to take potshots at [Keynesian explanations of wage 
inflexibility] as they pop up in print."92
On the heels o f this debate over wage flexibility arose a third major challenge to 
Keynesian economics. Trying to account for genuine wage stickiness and some cycle in 
real business activity that would still square with a non-interventionist approach, 
neoclassicists, led principally by Robert Lucas o f the University of Chicago, maintained
91 See Axel Leijonhufvud, "Whatever Happened to Keynesian Economics," in Reese, ed., The Legacy o f  
Keynes, 67-68; Leijonhufvud, "What Was The Matter With IS-LM?" in Jean-Paul Fitoussi, ed., Modern  
M acroeconomic Theory (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983); Hutton, The Revolution That N ever Was, 126- 
133; Minsky, John M aynard Keynes, 19-28; Hahn, "Some Keynesian Reflections on Monetarism," 7; 
A ckley, Macroeconomics: Theory and Policy, 358-369, for more detailed analyses o f  problems 
associated with popular Keynesian models, all o f  which I borrowed from heavily.
92 Leijonhufvud, "Whatever Happened to Keynesian Economics?" 67.
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that short-lived, rapidly corrected misperceptions—about future prices, wages, or 
costs— gave way to "rational expectations" about the same that contained no perceptible 
forecasting errors. The neoclassical approach contained two significant criticisms of 
Keynesian economics: labor market stickiness was not caused by ingrained institutional 
habits or customs, as the Keynesians contended, but by short-lived forecasting errors; 
and (once rational expectations prevailed) government macroeconomic intervention was 
fruitless, contrary to the basic Keynesian assessment, since actual values were always 
close to equilibrium values no matter how rapidly or widely they changed.93 Elaborate 
statistical tests do suggest that stock prices, following a "random walk," confirm this 
theory; applying it to the general economy is another matter all together.94 Arthur Okun, 
Johnson CEA member and chairman, provided a brilliant and critical analysis of the 
neoclassical position, and an implicit defense o f Keynesian economics, just before his 
untimely death in March 1980. Okun, the youngest and perhaps the most talented o f 
Johnson's chief economic advisers, still failed to move the debate away from marginal 
skirmishes related to expectations and the labor market, but he was beginning to ask the 
kind o f questions that would bring Keynesian conceptions of the whole economy into 
clearer focus. In a paper presented at a seminar just days before his fatal heart attack, 
Okun remarked:
The theory o f rational-expectations-with-misperceptions provides an explanation
of the business cycle that: represents a constructive effort to deal with questions
93 The most common hypothetical example proffered by the neoclassicists is the example where people 
expect a certain rate o f  inflation but the government expands money supply by an amount that 
temporarily increases inflation by a greater amount than that expected. This would reduce real income, 
cheapen the cost o f  labor for most firms, and therefore give rise to added employment. But the old 
expectation would soon give way to a new "rational" one that would negate this effect before it take take 
place. Its assumptions are generous: added employment can come only with a reduction in real income, 
and the economy is locked into a zero-sum game where firms cannot respond to increased  real income 
with anything other than production and employment cuts. See John F. Muth, "Rational Expectations and 
the Theory o f  Price Movements," Econometrica, 29 number 6, 1961, 315-335; Robert E. Lucas, Jr., 
"Understanding Business Cycles," in Robert E. Lucas, Jr., ed., Studies in Business C ycle Theory 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1981); Thomas j. Sargent, Rational Expectations an d  Inflation (N ew  York: 
Harper and Row, 1986).
94 Ackley, M acroeconomics; Theory and Policy, 234-235.
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that sorely needed to be asked, is logically impeccable and theoretically satisfying 
in its response to those questions, does not identify in operational terms the 
specific nature o f the cyclical process, and fails to account for the duration and 
many key features o f the actual cycle....Once imperceptions about relative prices 
are eliminated, what prevents that prompt restoration o f a full-blown Walrasian 
equilibrium consistent with relative price information? Is a second type o f sand 
being thrown on the classical machinery in such hybrid models? I look forward to 
further modeling in this area that should help to answer my questions.95
But Okun never placed supreme faith in any o f the models, constructed either by his 
Keynesian colleagues or by the anti-Keynesian neoclassicists. "Models are bankrupt," 
Okun noted on a different occasion; "they pay little attention to the real world."96
In short, Keynesian defeats in the professional economics debate over the origins of 
inflation and stagflation came largely as a result of neo-Keynesian attempts to create 
predictive mathematical models that often obscured as much o f the Keynesian 
revolution as they illuminated. Models that relied on computers and hundreds of 
equations clearly gave the New Economists insights and predictive capabilities that they 
would have otherwise lacked, but they always remained heavily dependent upon a 
shifting variety of ceteris paribus assumptions. Too often were the defenders o f the 
New Economics caught in an interesting and suggestive battle over competing models 
when the questions they were actually trying to answer eluded any precise mathematical 
formula or construct. Constructive insights were achieved along the way—by 
Keynesians and anti-keynesians alike—but Keynesianism was somehow transformed 
into a system that left Keynes behind.97 The bastardized Keynesianism that was
95 Okun, "Rational-Expectations-with-Misperceptions As a Theory o f  the Business Cycle," Journal o f  
Money, Credit, and Banking, November 1980, Part 2, 817, 821. Okun's comments were part o f  a seminar 
on rational expectations held in February 1980 by the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy 
Research. Walrasian equilibrium: a theory o f  general equilibrium developed by the French economist 
Marie Esprit L6on Walras (1834-1910) constructed around a system o f  simultaneous equations that 
attempted to show how all prices and quantities were uniquely determined. In comparison, as the 
Keynesian economist Frank Hahn once put it, "non-uniqueness o f  equilibria is what Keynesian policy  
prescriptions are all about." See Hahn, "Some Keynesian Reflections on Monetarism," 7.
96 Quoted in Richard Rose, "Changing Markets," in James P. Pfiffner and R. Gordon Hoxie, eds., The 
Presidency in Transition (New York: Center for the Study o f  the Presidency, 1989), 275.
97 See Ackley, Macroeconomics: Theory and Policy, 406; and Tobin, "Keynesian Economics and Its 
Renaissance," 120, on the contributions o f  the anti-Keynesian monetarists and neoclassicists. "In
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presumed to be the modus operandi o f the Johnson administration had downplayed the 
system of taxation, the relative prices o f commodities, the distribution o f  wealth, and 
the distribution o f consumption; government only had to insure that investment 
absorbed the amount o f savings at full employment and then all would function 
smoothly, efficiently, and equitably. But all was not well for those who followed this 
pseudo-Keynesian formula.98 The mid-1960s success of the New Economics "was too 
good to be true," Gary North contended, even though this success stemmed more from 
sincere attempts to transcend the corporate liberalism that most everyone (including 
North) had mistaken for the economics o f Keynes.
What followed was at least mildly disturbing to the faithful Keynesian victors: the 
price inflation and rising interest rates o f 1968-69, the recession o f 1969-71, back 
to back federal deficits o f 25 billion each (big money in those days) in 1971 and 
1972, the price and wage controls o f 1971-73, the recession of 1975, the coming 
o f double digit inflation in 1978-80, the worst recession(s) in 40 years in 1980, 
and in 1981-82, and the $200 billion annual federal deficits after 1982. These 
unpleasant events did not fit the glowing Keynesian paradigm.99
Nor did they stem from  anything but the most vulgarized version o f the Keynesian
paradigm, in ascendence only after Lyndon Johnson and his Keynesian advisers left the
White House. "If Keynesian economics failed," Geoffrey Barraclough remarked, "it was
because they were not Keynesian enough."100 It was Nixon in 1971, when he told
particular," Ackley noted, "monetarists point out that central bankers concentration on the level o f  
interest rates or on the 'condition o f  credit markets' as appropriate targets or indicators o f  monetary policy  
has often been the source o f  perverse monetary influence." Predicting a "ressurection o f  Keynes" James 
Tobin declared that one constructive insight attributed to the "rational expectations" approach was that 
"the effectiveness o f  policies requires both that they be anticipated and understood by the public and that 
they will work i f  anticipated and understood."
98 Much o f  my thesis suggests that Johnson, Kennedy, Heller, Ackley, Okun, et al were not among those 
who followed it.
99 Gary North, "Why Murray Rothbard Will Never Win the N obel Prize," in Walter Block and Llewellyn  
H. Rockwell, Jr., eds., Man, Economy, and Liberty: Essays in Honor o f  M urray N. R othbard  (Auburn: 
Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1988), 99.
100 Geoffrey Barraclough, "The Keynesian Era in Perspective," in Skidelsky, ed., The E nd o f  the 
Keynesian Era, 110.
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Howard K. Smith, "now I am a Keynesian," rather than Johnson in 1969, who failed to 
realize this.101
Monetarists, neo-Austrians, and neoclassicists all determined that there were 
numerous weak spots in what passed for the Keynesian system. They did not launch a 
public policy revolution, however, to match the coherence and integrity o f even the 
vulgarized Keynesianism they helped to disintegrate. Some economists invoked the 
neoclassical rational expectations approach to predict that oil price rises in the 1970s, 
given the nominal GNP, could not raise the general price level.102 In the wake of this 
obviously erroneous prediction, Axel Leijonhufvud noted that neoclassical theory 
"made macroeconomics go the same way as the movies: the plots became strangely 
simple-minded, but the new special effects were simply mind boggling!"103 Few 
politicians or public policy analysts have found the mathematical rigor of the 
neoclassicists to be very useful as a result. Likewise, monetarism enjoyed a brief heyday 
in the first few months o f the first Nixon administration, and then again under 
Presidents Carter and Reagan, when stubborn inflation seemed to call for an unwavering 
monetary fix. In both cases policymakers were forced to abandon monetary targets to 
pull the economy out of recession. On the other hand, to the genuine Keynesian 
economists and to the intuitive Keynesian politicians such as Lyndon Johnson, public 
policy was the realm that mattered most. "When men get heated about Keynesianism," 
J.T. Winkler suggested, "their concern is with public policy, not the realm of ideas."104
In the realm o f public policy, the attack on Keynesianism and the New Economics 
assumed only a pseudo-technical character, and borrowed little more than the unproven 
assumptions or the often incompatible conclusions of the more persuasive and
101 See Tom Wicker, One o f  Us: Richard Nixon and the American Dream  (N ew  York: Random House, 
1991), 551-552.
102 Okun, "Rational-Expectations-with-Misperceptions," 822.
103Leijonhufvud, "Whatever Happened to Keynesian Economics?" 70.
104 J. T. Winkler, "The Coming Corporatism," in Skidelsky, ed., The End o f  the Keynesian Era, 79.
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sophisticated professional economics criticism. Often depicted as a "supply side 
revolution," this attack tended to have only a tenuous relationship to either economics or 
a revolution, and it actually began (in the administration of Richard Nixon) long before 
it was officially declared (in the administration o f Ronald Reagan). Its most significant 
and compelling premise was that Keynesianism implied great and increasing 
government intervention, that this described a tendency toward socialism and away 
from capitalism, and that Keynesian failure (inflation and stagflation, with all of their 
concomitant disasters) also implied, therefore, the salience o f the orthodoxy Keynes and 
the Keynesians had tried to overturn. That this orthodoxy was in essence corporate 
capitalism—a system that required significant government intervention and which often 
possessed profound anti-capitalist tendencies—was often glossed over in a mish-mash 
o f conflicting microeconomic prescriptions. Many o f its benefactors, for example, 
harbored (and exercised) the belief that corporations should not be allowed to fail. Risk 
aversion had clearly become a significant part of a system that presumed to enshrine the 
risk- taker.105
Implicit to the defense o f the resurgent corporate capitalism was a faith its 
benefactors had assumed anti-Keynesian economists had already justified: government 
intervention on behalf o f the poor and the unemployed was destined to fail unless it 
came voluntarily by way of profitable, carefully nurtured private companies responding 
only to market forces. Often unaware that this approach made these very market forces, 
upon which the welfare of the working class theoretically depended, harder to estimate 
or even understand, policymakers, political pundits, journalists and historians alike 
began adding an elaborate social and political context to the economic criticism of the 
Keynesian revolution. Moreover, analysts who found reason to doubt the claims of the
105 See John Kenneth Galbraith, "The Nixon Administration and the Great Socialist Revival," chapter in 
Economics Peace and  Laughter (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1971), 100-113, for an extended essay on 
this subject.
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supply side insurgency—and there were many who did—tended to highlight its 
shortcomings either by a simple comparison to the more interventionist liberalism o f the 
1960s or by isolating them without a clear view of the fundamental economic strategy 
that had provided their ideological foundation.
The distillation o f borrowed economic criticism into a more fundamental political 
attack on the New Economics may be best exemplified by Charles Murray's influential 
1984 publication Losing Ground. Referring to the 1967-1973 period as the latter stage 
o f the Great Society, Murray suggested that policies established during this period 
helped the poor in the short-run but created dependencies that were economically 
destructive in the the long run. Invoking the perverse effect theory but ignoring the 
trend whereby the supply o f labor actually increased along with poor relief benefits, 
Murray suggested that the War on Poverty and its constituent programs had created a 
powerful work disincentive.106 Basing overall welfare benefits on those offered in 
Pennsylvania (benefits that increased at twice the national average), and ignoring both 
the sharp reduction in real welfare benefits after 1972, and the impact of the 1975 
Earned Income Tax Credit (with its added work incentive), Murray contended that 
minimum wage employment simply offered less financial reward than a broken 
marriage and welfare assistance.107 He added that it was this work disincentive that 
fractured and weakened the U.S. economy in the 1970s and beyond. Moreover, the root 
o f the problem, to Murray, was Johnson's economic strategy, even though Richard 
Nixon presided over much of the period in question. Murray simply assumed that the 
1970s inflation originated with excess demand, that Johnson's strategy consisted largely 
o f social spending programs aimed exclusively at the poor and that, until Nixon ordered 
John Ehrlichman to "flush the Great Society," in 1973, he had continued to structure (or
106 See Michael Katz, The Undeserving Poor: From the War on Poverty to the War on Welfare (N ew  
York: Pantheon Books, 1989), 174, for an analysis o f  the labor market effects o f  the War on Poverty.
107 Robert Greenstein, "Losing Faith in 'Losing Ground,'" New Republic, March 25, 1985, 12-17.
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expand upon) its programs with Johnson's priorities and strategies intact. This last 
assumption has, indeed, become an article of faith among most historians o f  the period. 
Taking the harmful inflationary and work disincentive effects o f these programs for 
granted, Murray's work purported to show how the "welfare" programs o f the Great 
Society, coupled with Johnson's New Economics, led directly to the productivity decline 
and unemployment o f the 1970s.108
Herbert Stein, a member and eventual chair o f Nixon's Council o f Economic 
Advisers, also framed a critique o f Johnson's economic policies around the idea o f the 
perverse effect or the notion of unintended consequences. Noting what he calls 
"incipient inflation" in the economy as early as 1965, Stein faulted Johnson for relying 
on an "incomes policy" to hold down inflation.109 Professing his belief that federal 
policymakers under Johnson were not cagey or sophisticated enough to follow a 
deliberately inflationary policy (to increase revenues without a tax rise so as to finance 
wide-ranging social spending schemes), Stein blamed Johnson for the Great Inflation, 
but felt compelled to say that he probably did not mean to do it.110 Johnson erred 
intentionally, as Stein saw it, only in so far as he rejected fiscal and monetary measures 
in the struggle against inflation. To Stein, inflation simply caught President Johnson off­
guard and relatively unprepared—and unwilling— to do battle.
Louis Galambos and Joseph Pratt echoed the first part o f Stein's appraisal, 
suggesting that the Johnson administration doomed its economic policies to failure by 
relying too exclusively on the "jawboning" of America's corporate leaders. Designed to 
hold the line on prices by gearing prices and profits to productivity levels, this scheme
108 Charles Murray, Losing Ground: American Social Policy, 1950-1980  (N ew  York: Basic Books, 
1984).
109 Stein was instrumental in helping Nixon categorically reject Johnson's wage-price policy in 1969, in 
itself one o f  the primary causes o f  the 1970s inflation. See Chapter 9 for more on N ixon, Stein, and the 
rejection o f  the Johnson strategy against inflation.
110 Herbert Stein, Presidential Economics: The Making o f  Economic P olicy from  R oosevelt to Reagan  
and Beyond  (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984).
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broke down, according to Galambos and Pratt, under the strong inflationary pressures 
created by the concurrent impact o f Great Society and Vietnam War spending. "The 
nation bought more guns and more butter," they declared, "but at the cost o f strong 
inflationary pressures."111 The primary assumption here was that excess demand created 
these "strong inflationary pressures", and that the proper management of this inflation 
was incompatible with the Great Society, at least while the war in Vietnam raged on.
In 1991 a partial reformulation o f these earlier appraisals appeared in Chain 
Reaction: The Impact o f  Race, Rights, and Taxes on American Politics, coauthored by 
Thomas Byrne Edsall and Mary D. Edsall. The Edsalls, attempting to explain the 
backlash against the liberal policies o f the Democratic party, suggested that Johnson 
erred in making certain special interest groups (blacks and the poor in general) the 
favored wards o f the state, thereby alienating white middle-class voters. The Edsalls 
also claimed, in contrast to their thesis, that "the presidential realignment o f the 
electorate that began after the election in 1964 has created a politics in which neither 
national party effectively represents the shared economic interests of the poor and of the 
working and lower middle classes."112 Scolding liberals, for doing both too much and 
not enough, and for aiming their programs exclusively at the poor, the Edsalls portrayed 
the mid-1960s as "The Fall."113
To the Edsalls, Johnson simply adopted an economic strategy that was as expensive 
as it was self-defeating, that brought inflation instead of growth and productivity, and 
that also allowed the Democratic party to stray from universal concerns to the concerns
111 Louis Galambos and Joseph Pratt, The Rise o f  the Corporate Commonwealth: U nited States Business 
and Public Policy in the Twentieth Century (New York: Basic Books, 1988), 206.
112 Thomas Byrnes Edsall and Mary D. Edsall, Chain Reaction: The Impact o f  Race, Rights, an d  Taxes 
on Am erican Politics ( N ew  York: W.W. Norton, 1991), 30.
113 See Adolph Reed Jr. and Julian Bond, "Equality: Why We Can't Wait," The Nation, Dec. 9, 1991. 
735. See also Ronald F. King, Money, Time, and Politics: Investment Tax Subsidies and American  
D em ocracy  (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), for a similar treatment o f  the Great Society and 
the N ew  Economics. King cited excess demand and overcommitment to the Great Society as harbingers 
o f  inflation and economic deterioration. See ibid., 323.
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o f special interest groups alone. It was this fatal meander that created the Great Inflation 
o f the 1970s and which also forced the American electorate further and further away 
from traditional Democratic liberalism. To explain this, however, the Edsalls were 
forced to assume that the over-regulation and the web of special interest projects—that 
made the 1970s so objectionable to them—were really products of the New Economics 
and the Great Society, and not an offshoot o f the anti-Keynesian strategies that followed 
their dissolution.
O f all their assumptions, the most significant was the suggestion that Johnson's 
macroeconomic strategy (which they regarded as something less than a strategy), led 
directly to the economic deterioration of the late 1970s and early 1980s. As they saw it, 
this strategy prevailed in the 1970s because conservative interests were held at bay 
throughout the decade by "the liberal tilt o f the electorate," even when Nixon and Ford 
(or the economically conservative Carter for that matter) sat in the White House. 
Overlooking critical macroeconomic and microeconomic changes ushered in by these 
conservative administrations (often with the acquiescence of the liberals they 
implicated) the Edsalls imagined a history where conservative interests lost out on any 
effort to create a viable economic strategy, and, as they would have it, any chance to 
revive the eroding economic power of the nation as a whole.114 Ignoring the ascendency 
and reemergence o f conservative economics in 1969, the Edsalls proclaimed that the 
inflationist, self-defeating economics o f the 1960s held sway until the Republican party 
won a "major ideological victory" in 1980 by "assigning responsibility for the economic 
deterioration o f 1978-1982 to a history of misguided Democratic policy decisions."115 
Equating the continued popularity o f liberal ideas—expanded educational opportunities 
and civil rights, improved health care, safer working conditions, for instance—with 
hegemony over the nation's economic strategy, the Edsalls failed to make a most critical
114 Edsall and Edsall, Chain Reaction , 158-159.
115 Ibid., 175.
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distinction. Their analysis was nevertheless compelling for its clear and precise cause 
and effect illustrations and, as a result, has carried much weight with those who have 
examined the Great Society and the presidency of Lyndon Johnson since its publication.
In addition to the critics who disparaged the Great Society along with the New 
Economics, were many who admired Johnson's commitment to economic and social 
change but who also tended to implicate his "guns and butter" strategy for the 
unraveling o f the American economy in the 1970s and beyond. Doris Kearns's 1976 
biography o f President Johnson, for example, the only notable work on Johnson in the 
1970s, portrayed the Johnson presidency sympathetically, but placed the blame for the 
Great Inflation, nevertheless, squarely at the feet of the towering President from the 
Texas hill country. "The painless phases o f the Great Society and Vietnam," Kearns 
declared, "came to an abrupt end as the rising costs o f the war combined with the 
increased consumer demand and rising expenditures for the Great Society to produce 
inflation." Total demand was simply pushed "beyond the speed limits at which 
production could be expanded." Recalling Johnson's failure to enact a tax surcharge in 
1966 or 1967, Kearns blamed Johnson for the ensuing inflation. "By refusing to 
administer counter-inflationary measures in the early stages," she noted, "Johnson 
allowed the economy to heat up to the point where even drastic measures could have 
little impact."116 Though she revealed Johnson at one point muttering about how Nixon 
was ruining everything, the economy and the Great Society together, Kearns concluded 
that Johnson, rather than Nixon, was to blame for the inflation and economic 
deterioration that followed his presidency.
In 1984, Allen Matusow, who also professed an admiration for the objectives o f the 
New Economics, singled out the Kennedy and Johnson administrations for what he saw 
as their fateful adoption o f Keynesian economic policies. "Keynesian ideas," Matusow
116 Doris Kearns, Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream  (New York: Harper and Row, 1976), 296.
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concluded, "played no small role in the unraveling o f both liberalism and the 
economy—and no small role, therefore, in the unraveling of America."117 While 
Matusow regarded the social and economic goals o f the New Frontier and the Great 
Society as praiseworthy, he considered the New Economics, particularly as it was 
practiced in the Johnson administration, to be an inept and counterproductive means to 
the attainment of a "Great Society." Johnson's errors included ignoring the potential 
inflationary consequences of his tactical demand oriented policies, exhibiting a lack of 
concern for monetary policy and money supply, and refusing to consider policies with 
implications o f wealth redistribution. Borrowing heavily from the monetarist critique o f 
Keynesianism, Matusow pronounced the New Economics a harbinger o f destructive 
inflation and economic decline.118
Matusow did isolate, however, one of the Johnson administration's greatest 
obstacles, lending his thesis a depth that many other histories o f the Johnson years or 
the Great Society lacked. Suggesting that many of Johnson's economic difficulties came 
from having to do everything for the poor "with the permission o f the affluent," 
Matusow found one o f the most prevalent weaknesses intrinsic to most American 
poverty relief programs.119 Factoring in the political and financial aspirations o f doctors 
under Medicaid and local school board officials under the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act of 1965, Matusow illustrated how the Johnson administration created a
117 Allen J. Matusow, The Unraveling o f  America: A H istory o f  Liberalism in the 1960s (N ew  York: 
Harper & Row, 1984), 179.
118 The latter contention placed Matusow in the camp o f  N ew  Left critics, helping to characterize him as 
one who appreciated the goals o f  Johnson's Great Society, but who felt, at the same time, that the policies 
chosen to fulfill these goals left much to be desired. During a 1986 symposium on the Great Society, 
Matusow put greater emphasis on the wealth redistribution problem. Suggesting that the N ew  Economics 
failed simply because it did not fight poverty as it should have— with a direct attack on income 
inequality, Matusow contended that the only way to combat it is through a redistribution o f  income. See 
chapter for a more detailed analysis o f  the statistical evidence Matusow' relied upon. Quoted in Barbara 
Jordan and Elspeth Rostow, editors, The G reat Society: A Twenty Year Critique  (Austin: LBJ Library, 
1986), 144. Matusow cited statistics which showed the bottom 20% o f  the nation's population receiving 
5% o f  the nation's income— in 1964 and  in 1984.
119 Ibid., 144.
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situation where these more affluent or more politically powerful citizens, rather than the 
poor, came to be the programs' primary beneficiaries. Indeed, the dealing in o f private 
interests—on government programs in general— has been a traditional American 
problem, one that prevailed even in the eighteenth century.120 Matusow could have 
added numerous other examples o f the same phenomenon; as Johnson economic adviser 
Arthur Okun once described it, Great Society benefits for the poor truly came in "leaky 
buckets." Housing assistance, for example, delivered great financial benefits to 
landlords, contractors and the craftsmen hired by these building contractors, almost to 
the exclusion o f the inadequately housed underclass.121 Clearly, but these buckets were 
never counted on for anything more than temporary, stopgap solutions; the critical goals 
and functions o f the New Economics lay elsewhere.
Contending that the inevitable outcome of Johnson's Keynesian economic policies, 
presumably defined by these inefficient, and increasingly costly, programs, was a 
destructive inflation, Matusow raised his class-based analysis o f Great Society politics 
to an entirely different and perhaps more significant level. Adopting the logic o f the 
anti-Keynesian economic critics, Matusow blamed Keynesian economics and the 
Johnson strategy for the economic decline of the 1970s and ignored economic 
orthodoxy that undercut and stymied them both. Whatever benefits the New Economics 
provided in the short run, he maintained, came at simply too great a cost and were more
120 Its prevalence in the early days o f  the Republic, in fact, when most Americans were self-em ployed or 
were in direct, often symbiotic, relationships with entrepreneurs, may help to explain its persistence. 
Though the growing numbers o f  wage-eamers changed the economic equation, certainly in the second  
half o f  the nineteenth century, the American public continued to understand economic success and the 
government's "proper" role as a catalyst for that success, largely in terms that made sense only in the 
earliest days o f  the Republic.
121 Racial discrimination played a large economic role here as well for it strictly limited the location and 
availability o f  prospective housing regardless o f  the ability to pay. Even rent supplements, then, 
introduced as a way to avoid som e o f  the contracting abuses, ended up doing little more than artificially 
inflating the prices o f  housing for many o f  those (poor blacks) who received them. See Jill Quadagno, 
The C olor o f  Welfare: How Racism Undermined the War on Poverty (N ew  York: Oxford University 
Press, 1994); and Phyllis Groom, "Prices in Poor Neighborhoods," in Frederick Sturdivant, ed., The 
G hetto M arketplace (N ew  York: Free Press, 1969), 118-128.
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than offset by the inflationary impact o f the overall scheme. Suggesting that plans for 
genuine wealth redistribution were yet far too idealistic and doomed by the stubborn 
resistance of economic elites, that the concept o f corporate liberalism "cut to the heart of 
the post-1945 political economy," and that the willingness to work with corporate 
America was tantamount to faith in corporate benevolence, Matusow judged the New 
Economics a failure and suggested a supply-side regimen as the only practical 
alternative. The cardinal sin o f the Kennedy-Johnson New Economics, in this 
conception, was Johnson's abandonment o f critical supply side components inherent to 
the prevailing corporate liberalism. Price stability by way o f fiscal and monetary 
austerity, as Matusow saw it, was the most important omission. Not comprehending 
Johnson's skepticism toward, and disparagement of, corporate liberalism in the first 
place, or the real origins of the Great Inflation, Matusow tied Kennedy and Johnson 
firmly to this tradition o f presidential corporate liberalism instead, and blamed them for 
the unraveling o f the American economy.122
In 1986, Paul K. Conkin published a biography of Lyndon Johnson that portrayed 
him as both an effective leader and a master o f consensus politics. Praising him as a 
politician with a genuine affinity for idealism and an eye for effective strategy, Conkin 
even graced the cover o f his work with President Johnson's favorite photo o f himself. 
Found in the LBJ Library files under the rubric "John Wayne photo," this portrait 
captured a tanned, cowboy-hatted Johnson wearing bushy sideburns and looking out 
over the majestic hill country horizon.123 In a brief section devoted to Johnson's 
economic policies as President, however, Conkin was far less charitable. "It was not as 
clear to him [Johnson], as it is today," Conkin declared, as he summarized Johnson's 
economic record, "that the achievement [of his presidency] rested more on factors
122 M atusow, Unraveling o f  America, 33.
123 Paul K. Conkin, Big D addy From the Pedernales: Lyndon Baines Johnson  (Boston: Twayne 
Publishers, 1986).
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beyond his control than on any of his economic policies."124 Referring to Keynesian 
economics as "the fashionable approach," and attributing Johnson's full employment- 
low inflation record to a "happy coincidence o f circumstances," Conkin maintained that 
the prosperity and stability o f the 1960s had been produced by a post-World War II 
agricultural boom, weak foreign competition, baby boomer demand for products and 
services, low interest rates, and low foreign resource costs. On inflation, for example, 
Conkin suggested that Johnson's record looked good because o f high agricultural 
productivity and three Eisenhower recessions in the 1950s. These factors allowed the 
nation to start the 1960s with virtually no inflation, and gave the Kennedy and Johnson 
administrations, as it was implied, time to fool around.125 On jobs, Conkin contended 
that "Johnson was [relatively] lucky on the employment side," pointing out how 1980s 
politicians were not as lucky—having to absorb a higher percentage o f the potential 
workforce (new women entrants), and having to deal with a "more intractable" black 
male labor force. Without questioning how these factors came to be, Conkin suggested 
that post-Johnson economic policy had little or nothing to do with their emergence, and 
that they could only be held in check by demographic changes rather than real policy 
choices.126
Where Conkin credited Johnson with a successful economic policy initiative— the 
imposition o f the 1964 tax cut—he repeated the mistake made by everyone from Ronald
124 Ibid., 200.
125 Ibid., 201-202. Although Kennedy economic advisers often acknowledged the advantage that the late 
1950s price stability offered, they were also aware o f  alternatives to the use o f  recession as a price 
stabilization tool and realized how rising agricultural productivity and declining farm prices had obscured 
substantial industrial sector price inflation by offsetting it. Conkin also overlooks the role o f  the Kennedy 
and Johnson administrations in keeping interest rates low. From the Kennedy administration "twist" in 
1961 (where the Fed adopted a policy o f  supporting long term interest rates while they allowed short term 
rates to decrease) to Johnson's late 1968 recommendations for Federal Reserve reform, low interest rates 
remained a high priority in both administrations. See also Wyatt C. Wells, Economist In an Uncertain 
World, 22. Wells describes Arthur Burns's analysis o f  economic success in the early 1960s in terms very 
much like Conkin's. "The economy had responded so well to stimulus in the early 1960s, he thought, 
because the Eisenhower administration had reduced inflation to practically nothing, creating an 
atmosphere in which business responded to higher demand by increasing output, not prices."
126 Conkin, Big D addy From the Pedernales, 201-202.
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Reagan to Rush Limbaugh: characterizing the cut as a supply-side alternative to a plan 
for increased spending. "In later jargon," Conkin asserted, "Johnson had proved that 
supply-side economic policies could sometimes work." Moreover, Conkin made this 
assertion notwithstanding his contradictory remark in the same paragraph. "The tax cut 
worked," Conkin explained. "It helped stimulate demand and increase production." For 
Conkin and others, the notion o f a demand side tax cut was almost a contradiction in 
terms. Tax cuts were, by their nature, supply side tools. He did suggest at one point that 
"the exact nature o f the cuts or increases determines the areas o f the economy 
stimulated," but ultimately brushed this consideration aside to follow the lead o f other 
commentaries, lumping tax cuts exclusively on the supply side and spending increases 
exclusively on the demand side.127 In Conkin's analysis, therefore—as in Matusow's— 
the New Economics became only a precursor to the supply-side revolution o f the 1980s 
and failed only where it strayed from the supply-side recipe for price stability.128
Other more recent studies, not unsympathetic to the Johnson administration in 
general, have echoed the same themes. William Greider, for example, in his influential 
and critical study of Federal Reserve conservatism, Secrets o f  the Temple, highlighted 
the early results and the great promise o f the New Economics. "The New Economics 
worked," he remarked. "For 106 months, from February 1961 to December 1969, the 
nation enjoyed its longest era o f uninterrupted economic expansion." Greider also noted, 
however, that "the political reality confirmed in later years by subsequent episodes of 
congressional inaction and presidential evasion, was that the New Economics could not
127 Ibid., 202-203.
128 Herbert Stein, a conservative critic o f  Johnson's policies cited earlier, did take a look at the "exact 
nature" o f  the 1964 tax cut and, unlike Conkin, found it to be thoroughly oriented toward the demand 
side o f  the economy. Pointing out how output per person employed actually grew more slow ly after the 
tax cut than it did before, Stein invalidated the claim that the 1964 tax cut had great supply-side 
consequences. Summarizing, he declared that the supply-side benefits o f  the tax cut were "modest" 
compared to its demand-side benefits. See Stein, Presidential Economics, 110. Stein's comments on the 
tax cut, however, were only offered as a statistical commentary on an isolated, and as he saw it, relatively 
insignificant economic event. Conkin's conception, tied as it was to the greater history o f  a twenty-or 
thirty-year period, remains the more popularly accepted o f  the two divergent analyses.
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keep its promises [for price stability].129 In his memoirs, Clark Clifford, unofficial 
adviser and a Secretary o f Defense in the Johnson administration, indicted the Johnson 
economic strategy on similar grounds. "That he [LBJ] overextended himself," Clifford 
declared, "brought on an inflationary spiral, and demanded too much o f a nation already 
in turmoil is clear."130 John Morton Blum offered a similar indictment o f Johnson 
economics, even though he inverted the traditional "guns and butter" explanation o f 
many Johnson critics. Blum asserted that while "domestic expenditures on anti-poverty 
measures were growing," they remained insufficient, and that it was defense spending 
that created the inflation o f  the late 1960s and early 1970s. It was "guns," then, 
according to Blum, and not "guns and butter" or even what US Steel's Roger Blough 
called "butter plus" that brought on the Great Inflation of the 1970s. Blum continued to 
assert, however, in line with most o f the other Johnson critics, that this inflation was 
generated by an economy beset with excess demand. Laying the blame on military 
spending but squarely at Johnson's feet, Blum contended that Johnson "had no intention 
o f curtailing the war in Vietnam to contain military expenditures."131
One o f the most recent attempts to gauge the effectiveness o f the Johnson economic 
strategy appeared in Hobart Rowen's 1994 Self-Inflicted Wounds: From LBJ's Guns and 
Butter to Reagan's Voodoo Economics. While Rowen illuminated many o f the more
129 William Greider, Secrets o f  the Temple: How the Federal Reserve Runs the Country (N ew  York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1987), 331-334. Greider assumed, as have many others, before and after him, that 
N ixon, and perhaps even Jimmy Carter, were devotees o f  the N ew  Economics. Moreover, though he 
openly rejected the way monetary policy had been utilized, Greider remained a monetarist, maintaining 
that "[Milton] Friedman was right" when monetary contraction in 1969 led to a recession. Greider forgot, 
however, that the object o f  N ixon, his CEA chairman, Paul McCracken, and Friedman, was not so much 
to create a recession, but to lessen price inflation with one. In that, their new approach was a clear failure. 
Ibid., 334. See Chapter 9 for a more detailed analysis o f  the N ixon monetary policy.
130 Clark Clifford, with Richard Holbrooke, Counsel to the President: A M em oir (New York: Random 
House, 1991), 655.
131 John Morton Blum, Years o f  D iscord: American Politics an d  Society, 1961-1974  (N ew  York: W. W. 
Norton, 1991), 184. Blum also echoed the thesis o f  David Zarefsky in President Johnson's War on 
Poverty: Rhetoric an d  H istory  (University, AL: University o f  Alabama Press, 1986) who contended that 
Johnson promised more than he could deliver, thereby handicapping the political success o f  the Great 
Society, the War on Poverty, and the New  Economics.
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commonly obscured economic policy changes o f the 1960s and 1970s, including the 
sharp break between the Johnson and Nixon policies, and provided a scrupulously 
detailed and insightful analysis o f the period's international economic developments, he 
also blamed Johnson, like the others, for the Great Inflation o f the 1970s. Although 
Rowen weaved a narrative surpassing in its attention to detail and the nuances o f the 
policy changes between the Johnson and Nixon administrations, he concluded that 
Johnson created an inflation over which Nixon had little control. Reflecting on the two 
decades after Johnson's departure, Rowen remarked: "Johnson's embrace of a forlorn 
and unwinnable war in Vietnam, his insistence that the country could have, in the phrase 
o f the time, both 'guns and butter,' put America on a course from which it has yet to 
recover."132
Bruce J. Schulman offered a similar interpretation in Lyndon B. Johnson and 
American Liberalism, a brief biography released just after Rowen's publication. "No 
decision," Schulman rem arked," so compromised Johnson's presidency as his 
determination to secure both guns and butter—to fight simultaneous wars against 
communism and poverty and to finance both through a dangerous fiscal sleight of 
hand." This effort to have guns and butter, Schulman concluded, "exacerbated a host of 
economic woes— stimulating inflation, slowing growth, weakening the dollar in 
international currency markets, intensifying an unfavorable balance o f payments in 
foreign trade, even undercutting the Great Society."133
Other analysts, still wedded to the excess demand-inflation theme, have suggested 
that Johnson had few economic policy alternatives, given his goal of continuous near-
132 Hobart Rowen, Self-Inflicted Wounds: From LBJ's Guns and Butter to Reagan's Voodoo Economics 
(N ew  York: Times Books, Random House, 1994), x. Rowen does treat the Nixon years differently than 
most, however, making it clear that Nixon mismanaged the economy and worsened an already 
troublesome econom ic situation. For his efforts at investigating and analysing Nixon econom ic policy 
during the Nixon presidency, Nixon advisers Herbert Stein and Charles Colson identified Rowen as "an 
implacable and unscrupulous enemy o f  this administration." Ibid., 78-79.
133 Bruce J. Schulman, Lyndon B. Johnson and  American Liberalism: A B rie f Biography with Documents 
(N ew  York: Bedford Books, St. Martin's Press, 1995), 156, 157-158.
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full employment. Steve Fraser and Gary Gerstle, for example, compiled what they 
referred to as an "historical autopsy," in The Rise and Fall o f  the New Deal Order, and 
offered a convincing explanation for the failure (or political weakness) o f Lyndon 
Johnson's economic strategy. The social democratic initiative necessary for the success 
of Johnson's Keynesian economic strategy, they suggested, was simply cut off in the 
1940s when labor unions lost their class identity, workers moved to the suburbs (and 
became expectant capitalists), and the "social Keynesians," concerned more with 
regulation and reform, lost out to the "commercial Keynesians," who based their more 
conservative concerns on fiscal policy, alone. Afterward, Fraser and Gerstle pointed out, 
it was possible to organize the nation economically only within a limited framework— 
where corporate interests reigned supreme and where the social interests o f the poor and 
the working class would be relegated to the sphere o f interest group politics. Such a 
fate, they noted, made it impossible for Johnson to wage a successful struggle against 
the commercial Keynesians (or those favoring a return to economics o f austerity). When 
the imminent failure became reality, it led naturally to economic disorder and the 
inflation of the 1970s, and it also made Johnson the unwitting agent o f this conservative 
historical trajectory.134 William Appleman Williams, expressing a similar sentiment in 
1973, remarked that "the gut truth of it is that the Great Society was what Franklin 
Roosevelt should have proposed in 1936. It was too little and too late in 1963."135 While 
Fraser, Gerstle, and Williams admired the way Johnson pushed the limits o f the 
framework within which he operated, they faulted him, nevertheless, for the economic 
woes that followed his presidency. Failing to comprehend the futility o f his task, they
134 Steve Fraser and Gary Gerstle, "Introduction," in Fraser and Gerstle, editors, The Rise and  Fall o f  the 
N ew D eal Order, 1930-1980  (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989). See also Robert Collins, The 
Business Response to Keynes, for an explanation o f  the "commercial Keynesian" victory. "America 
defined its postwar political economy," Collins noted, "by embracing the right wing o f  the Keynesian 
spectrum, a right which almost seemed like the center (as it does to historians today) as the defeated 
alternatives o f  the left receded into sectarian memories." Ibid., 16-17.
135 William Appleman Williams, "01' Lyndon and JFK," 495.
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argued, Johnson muddled economic policy to the point where instability, confusion, and 
the stagflation o f the 1970s would soon (and automatically) prevail.
Equally prepared to accept Johnson's responsibility for the unraveling of the 
American economy, others have even suggested that his lack o f  commitment to genuine 
change proved to be the most significant source o f economic disarray and the descent 
into stagflation. Irwin and Debi Unger, for example, in Turning Point: 1968, 
underscored the contention that Johnson fought the War on Poverty more for political 
than social or economic reasons. Though they acknowledged Johnson's political 
dexterity and genuine concern for the fate o f the underclass, the Ungers also suggested 
that Johnson failed because he did not seek the requisite organizational change. 
Highlighting Lester Thurow's charge that the War on Poverty was impelled largely by 
Cold War considerations, and the contention of Frances Fox Piven that it was created to 
placate militant blacks, the Ungers portrayed Lyndon Johnson the economic strategist 
much the way Robert Caro portrayed Lyndon Johnson the politician—as a public figure 
with a desperate hunger for power. William Julius Wilson, took a similar approach, 
contending that the problems of the poor were marginalized within the War on Poverty 
and never became the focus o f Johnson's broader efforts at economic organization. 
Concerned primarily with the inapplicability and fate o f the marginalized and often 
race-specific efforts to combat poverty midst a backdrop of corrosive corporate 
capitalism, Wilson suggested, as did some of Johnson's other critics, that the New 
Economics came unwound in a disoriented inflationary spiral precisely because 
corporate liberalism, rather than a genuine war on poverty, served as its primary 
foundation.136 To these critics, Johnson was simply too fond of the prevailing "system" 
to effect any lasting or profound change.
136 Irwin and Debi Unger, Turning Point: 1968 (New York: Scribner's, 1988); Frances Fox Piven, "The 
Great Society as Political Strategy," in Richard Cloward and Frances Fox Piven, The Politics o f  Turmoil: 
Essays on Poverty, Race, and the Urban Crisis (New York; Pantheon, Random House, 1974), 271-283;
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Despite the prominent consensus that implicated Johnson era policies for the 
inflation and economic decline o f the 1970s, there are a surprisingly large number o f 
historians, economists, and political scientists who have, at the same time, defended the 
Johnson economic record. One of the most detailed and complimentary examinations of 
Johnson's economic policies came from James E. Anderson and Jared Hazleton, in their 
1986 Managing Macroeconomic Policy: The Johnson Presidency. Identifying Johnson 
as a President who established a closer relationship with the Council o f Economic 
Advisers than any before or after, Anderson and Hazleton concluded that Johnson 
absorbed remarkably large quantities o f economic information, that he grasped 
economic ideas readily, and that he also acted— unlike almost every other twentieth 
century President—as an effective coordinator for all o f his administration's economic 
plans.137 Citing testimony by Council o f Economic Advisers chairman Walter Heller, 
they pointed out, for example, that Johnson expected, received, and read approximately 
250 CEA memos per year. Grading Johnson highly in all four categories into which 
they divided macroeconomic policy— fiscal, monetary, wage-price, and international—  
Anderson and Hazleton pointed out only one flawed policy endorsement over the entire 
course o f the Johnson presidency: the advocacy o f expansive monetary policy after the 
passage o f the tax surcharge in June 1968.138 They suggested, in short, that he was one 
of the nation's ablest and most effective chief executives when it came to the 
management o f the nations' economy. Their narrative ended in 1969, however, and 
offered, therefore, no analysis o f Johnson's relationship to the impending inflation and 
economic turmoil of the 1970s.
and William Julius Wilson, The Truly D isadvantaged: The Inner City, The Underclass, an d  Public P olicy  
(Chicago: The University o f  Chicago Press, 1987), 132.
137 Only John Kennedy, among twentieth century presidents, seem s to have approached Johnson's level 
o f  control over the planning and implementation o f  his administration's econom ic policy. N ixon, for 
example, relegated most o f  his economic planning to Arthur Bums in 1969, George Shultz in 1970, John 
Connally in 1971, and Herbert Stein, thereafter, with John Ehrlichman— as Nixon's ch ief domestic policy  
adviser— also playing a significant role throughout Nixon's two terms (until he resigned in April 1973).
138 Anderson and Hazleton, M anaging M acroeconomic Policy, 20.
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In a 1994 essay focused largely on the Carter presidency, Ann Mari May presented 
a statistical examination o f presidential economic scorecards (from Eisenhower through 
Reagan), and concluded that Johnson's record easily surpassed the others. Using 
productivity growth, unemployment, real capital spending growth, inflation, GNP 
growth, and interest rate statistics, May produced a ten-point scale by which to rate 
overall economic performance. With 10 being the best possible score and all categories 
weighted evenly, May's classification system produced the following results: LBJ— 8.2; 
JFK— 7.3; Eisenhower—5.7; Carter—5.3; Nixon— 5.1; Reagan— 4.3; and Ford— 3.9. 
While many would contend that some of these variables, such as unemployment and 
real capital spending growth (if one uses Keynes as a guide), should be weighted more 
heavily than some of the others, Johnson finished atop the categories o f unemployment, 
GNP growth, and capital spending growth, and second in all other categories except for 
inflation (in which he finished third out o f seven). Admittedly crude measures, these 
statistics still reveal important distinctions between the Johnson administration and the 
others, particularly if  scorecard disparity is considered (12% better than Kennedy in the 
second spot and 44% better than Eisenhower in the third position). Based on these 
selective economic statistics, Johnson truly produced an unparalleled economic 
record.139 Like Anderson and Hazleton, however, May did not attempt to gauge the 
effect o f one President's policies upon those o f his successor. The connection between 
Johnson's policy choices and the economic record o f the 1970s remained uncertain.
Most analysts who rated Johnson highly on economic management, unlike May or 
Anderson and Hazleton, tended to focus on specific microeconomic issues rather than 
his larger economic strategy. James L. Cochrane, John Sheahan, George Perry, and 
Arthur Alexander, for example, all published studies of Johnson's wage-price policy,
139 Ann Mari May, "Economic Myth and Economic Reality: A Rexamination o f  the Carter Years," in 
Herbert D. Rosenbaum and Alexij Ugrinsky, eds., The Presidency and Dom estic Policies o f  Jimmy 
Carter (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994), 650-654.
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and determined that Johnson's policies and personal management techniques helped to 
increase price stability.140 John E. Schwarz took a second look at Johnson's War on 
Poverty, in his 1983 America's Hidden Success, and found that "progress did follow 
promise" despite the Great Society's reputation for waste and failure.141 Demonstrating 
that the War on Poverty accomplished much o f what it set out to do, Schwarz also 
suggested, however, that the New Economics (though he simply says "the private 
sector") failed to do its part. "The government's programs were vital in fighting 
poverty," Schwarz asserted, "precisely because the private sector was itself incapable o f 
making more than a marginal dent in poverty among the many millions o f Americans 
who remained trapped within the weaker economic groups."142 Michael Katz seconded 
Schwarz' assessment about the progress made against poverty in the 1960s and 
suggested that when the U.S. really fought poverty under the Johnson administration, 
poverty did not win but was actually reduced by about 50%. Crediting government 
transfer programs for the change, Katz noted that in the 1965-1972 period infant 
mortality decreased by 33%; food stamps improved the diets o f the poor and materially 
lessened hunger; Medicaid payments helped decrease the percentage o f the poor who 
had never seen a physician from 20% to 8%; consumer credit legislation extended the 
first real protection to many purchasers of credit, saving them millions in the process; 
and new federal housing legislation lessened overcrowding in the nation's urban
140 John Sheahan, The W age-Price Guideposts (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1967); George 
Perry, "Wages and the Guideposts," American Economic Review 57, September 1967, 897-904; Arthur J. 
Alexander, "Prices and Guideposts," Review o f  Economics and  Statistics, February 1971, 67-75; and 
James L. Cochrane, "The Johnson Administration: Moral Suasion Goes to War," in Crauford Goodwin, 
ed., Exhortations and Controls: The Search fo r  a  Wage-Price Policy, 1945-1971  (Washington: The 
Brookings Institution, 1975), 194-293. I drew heavily upon these works (especially for chapter 6), 
particularly Cochrane's essay with its frequent verbatim transcription o f  important mem os and its ample 
documentation.
141 John E. Schwarz, America's Hidden Success: A Reassessment o f  Twenty Years o f  Public Policy  (N ew  
York: W.W. Norton, 1983). See also William Raspberry, "Johnson War on Poverty Wasn't a Failure," 
The Advocate, Baton Rouge, LA, January 13, 1995, 7B.
142 Ibid., 39. Like many others, Schwarz used figures for the War on Poverty that included figures from 
the first Nixon administration (1965-1972, in his case), making it more difficult to isolate the effects o f  
the N ew  Economics.
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dwellings, even though Katz demonstrates that many of the real benefits here went to 
building contractors and landlords instead o f the poor.143 Christopher Jencks offered a 
similar assessment o f the War on Poverty and found that food stamps and Medicare 
payments in particular helped improve the lot o f the poor in the United States. Jencks 
noted that there was less evidence to suggest positive results from 1960s federal housing 
initiatives, but concluded that overall, while it did not make poor people live like others, 
the War on Poverty did materially improve their lives.144 Jonathon Kozol recalled his 
own experience teaching in a Roxbury, Massachusetts "freedom school"— funded by the 
Johnson administration under the Office o f Economic Opportunity—and remembered it 
for both its accomplishments and its economic efficiency. "I'm always amused," Kozol 
remarked, "when I hear conservatives say 'we threw all that money at the poor, and it 
didn't do any good.' They didn't throw that much money at the poor, and it did a lot of 
good. We ran that program on $3,000 per year—that was my salary, the salary of a local 
mother who became a co-director...we bought all the books we needed, and we served 
almost 500 children."145
Most who saw much to admire in Johnson's handling of the economy or the War on 
Poverty, however, still treated the 1970s as an almost irrelevant part o f their 
calculations. The inflation and joblessness of the period were acknowledged, but only 
reluctantly, as if these trends mystified explanation, confounding all ideological 
approaches to economic management in the process. Most who disparaged the New 
Economics, on the other hand, for social, political, or economic reasons, found in the
143 Katz, The Undeserving Poor. Katz also echoed William Julius Wilson’s contention that these 
programs failed, eventually, because they were separated from the broader and more fundamental 
strategy by which the nation guided its economy in general. Schwarz pointed out that after government 
transfers, poverty (based on was reduced from approximately 18% in 1960 to about 4-8% by the mid 
1970s. See Schwarz, America's Hidden Success, 31-32.
144 Christopher Jencks, "Economic Inequality and Political Legitimacy," in Thomas R. Dye, ed., The 
P olitical Legitimacy o f  Markets and Governments (Greenwich, CT: Jai Press, 1990).
145 Jonathon Kozol, "Jonathon Kozol," interview by Gordon W. E. Nore, The P rogressive, December 
1991,34-36.
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stagflation of the 1970s either a ready-made confirmation o f their often deep-seated 
economic prejudices or a logical explanation o f shortcomings in the existing Keynesian 
economic models. Few—on either side o f the debate—have addressed the most 
significant economic questions. Many of Johnson's critics, for example, simply assumed 
that there was excess demand, that it caused inflation, and that this inflation, in turn, 
brought economic decline. Even economists, who have developed far more compelling 
and sophisticated analyses o f the New Economics— also concluding that it was destined 
to fail—have generally discredited economic models that reflected the thinking of 
Keynes or the genuine objectives o f the New Economics only vaguely or incompletely. 
Those who sympathized with Johnson's political and economic objectives, on the other 
hand, often found it difficult to disentangle the Johnson and Nixon policies or to discern 
the real trajectory o f the New Economics, and largely avoided the effort all together, 
accepting the conservative diagnosis o f the 1970s inflation as a consequence.
When Lyndon Johnson left office in January 1969, he clearly left a number o f small 
fires burning. Indeed, the struggle against inflation, particularly in 1968 and 1969, was 
often described as "firefighting" by many of Johnson's economic advisers. Was the New 
Economics, however, an instrumental and necessary part of the firefighting? Or was it 
the primary reason for the persistence o f those economic problems that were the object 
o f this activity? Moreover, what was it that came unraveled first? Was it the economy at 
the hands of an ill-fated scheme for full employment with price stability? Or was it the 
New Economics, held fast by the personal energy and political power of the nation's 
thirty-sixth President, and fated, perhaps, to oblivion without him? Did the United 
States simply aim too high, only to be humbled by an economic reverberation from 
which it would never recover? Or was it mighty enough to pursue the goals o f the New 
Economics, even as it fought a tragic war half-way around the globe? These are among 
the most pressing— and most often ignored—economic and political questions o f the 
last quarter of the twentieth century.
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Chapter 2.
Learning The Political Economy
It isn't a new car that pulls over to help you when you are broke down with the senile 
carburetor; it is somebody who knows what it is to be broke down with a hurt machine.
- Ken Kesey
He mocks the people who proposes that Government shall protect the rich and they 
in turn will care for the laboring poor.
- Grover Cleveland, message to Congress 1886
Though he often mimicked the style o f reactionary businessmen, and was 
perpetually intrigued by the schemes o f power politics, most who knew him well 
described Lyndon Johnson as a thoroughgoing populist. "Oh yes," Gardner Ackley 
remarked, "he had all kinds o f prejudices and ideas. Pro-farmer, pro-small businessman, 
anti-banker, anti-Wall Street. He was a real populist."1 At a 1990 symposium on the 
Great Society, Harry Middleton cited a letter written to Johnson by John Kenneth 
Galbraith: "You and Wright Patman and I are the last o f the populists. When we die they 
will have to stuff the corpse."2
There are a large number o f books and articles, of course, that assert the opposite— 
that his populist sentiments comprised only the polished veneer o f an unmitigated
1 Gardner Ackley, Oral History Interview, in Erwin C. Hargrove and Samuel A. Morley, eds., The 
President an d  the Council o f  Economic Advisers: Interviews with CEA Chairmen (Boulder: W estview  
Press, 1984), 232.
2 Harry Middleton, introductory comments at a symposium celebrating the 25th anniversary o f  the Great 
Society, "LBJ: The Difference He Made," Austin, Texas, May 4, 1990.
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wheeler-dealer personality with conservative instincts. Robert Caro's two volumes, The 
Path to Power and Means o f  Ascent are perhaps the most notable in this regard, but Caro 
was anticipated as early as 1960 by Ronnie Dugger's work for The Texas Observer and 
by books such as J. Evetts Haley's 1964 publication, A Texan Looks at Lyndon: A Study 
in Illegitimate Power and William Pool, Emmie Craddock, and David E. Conrad's 
Lyndon Baines Johnson: The Formative Years, published in 1965.3 Stressing Johnson's 
ties to conservative lobbyists, lawyers, political fixers, and campaign contributors, these 
writers suggested that Johnson moderated his conservative instincts only as he sought a 
wider political constituency, moving steadfastly from New Deal bureaucrat to Congress, 
the U.S. Senate, Senate majority leader, and finally to the Vice-Presidency and 
Presidency o f the United States.
Some evidence does suggest that Johnson was the type o f political character 
described by Caro, Dugger, and his other critics. Johnson's refusal to sign the March 
1956 "Declaration o f Constitutional Principles," otherwise known as the Southern 
Manifesto, for example, long regarded as a symbol of his incipient liberalism, may have 
come at least partly out of concern for the preservation of Southern political power. 
Richard Russell o f Georgia, an ardent foe of black civil rights and a signer o f the 
Manifesto, but also one o f Johnson's most powerful supporters in the Senate, seemed 
almost anxious to bless Johnson's refusal to sign this document, a document by which 
101 southern congressmen and senators pledged their undying faith to the old order and 
their commitment to resist school desegregation in the wake o f the 1954 Brown decision. 
"Dick Russell," Strom Thurmond recalled, "told us that Johnson couldn't sign it because 
he was the majority leader."4 Mississippi's segregationist senator, John Stennis seemed as
3 See J. Evetts Haley, A Texan Looks a t Lyndon: A Study in Illegitimate Power (Canyon, TX: Palo Duro 
Press, 1964); and William C. Pool, Emmie Craddock, and David E. Conrad, Lyndon Baines Johnson: The 
Form ative Years (San Marcos: Southwest Texas State College Press, 1965).
4 Quoted in Mark Stem,"Lyndon Johnson and Richard Russell: Institutions, Ambitions and Civil Rights," 
Presidential Studies Q uarterly, Fall 1991, 692.
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anxious as Russell to absolve Johnson of any genuine predeliction for black civil rights. 
"Just Senator to Senator, o f course, we wanted him to sign it," remarked Stennis, "but at 
the same time we recognized that he wasn't just a Senator from Texas. He was a leader 
and had a different responsibility to that degree....It wasn't held against him...by the 
Southerners."5 While Johnson, Estes Kefauver, and Albert Gore, Sr. were the only 
southern senators not to sign the Manifesto, Russell was shrewd enough to see that this 
would enhance Johnson's power as Senate majority leader, perhaps a more significant 
consideration for besieged southerners in 1956.6 When Johnson helped pass the first civil 
rights bill since Reconstruction the following year, Senator Russell was equally anxious 
to qualify Johnson's role. "The victory [for the civil rights bill] would help Johnson in his 
1960 bid," Russell told a group of southern leaders, "to win the Democratic presidential 
nomination."7
Johnson's reputation as a conservative "wheeler dealer" was also founded upon 
concrete evidenceand was certainly not mitigated by his close association with prominent 
conservative politicians, lobbyists, and business leaders. Indeed, many o f his benefactors 
were outspoken conservatives. Alvin Wirtz, a prominent Austin attorney who 
represented oil and gas companies; George and Herman Brown, the fiercely anti-labor 
commercial contractors who financed many of Johnson's political campaigns; John 
Connally, who eventually became a Republican and a Nixon administration cabinet 
member; Roy Miller, the rich and powerful lobbyist for the Texas Gulf Sulphur 
Company; and Richard Russell were all key Johnson associates. Johnson's legislative 
scorecard was also punctuated with support for prominent conservative initiatives. His 
support of Taft-Hartley restrictions on labor unions in 1947 disillusioned many o f his
5 Quoted in ibid.
6 When Johnson agreed to seek the Minority leader, soon to become Majority leader, position in late 1952 
he asked Russell to move his seat behind his so that he could more easily seek advice from the senior 
senator.
7 Quoted in Stem, "Lyndon Johnson and Richard Russell," 695.
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closest liberal supporters and convinced many others that his conservative instincts were 
beginning to surface.8 Failing what was regarded then as a litmus test for liberals by 
supporting this legislation, Johnson voted for the bill and to override President Truman's 
veto; to many he was simply staking out a more conservative position for himself in the 
wake o f President Roosevelt's death. In 1949, as chairman o f the Senate Interstate and 
Foreign Commerce subcommittee, Johnson helped engineer the rejection o f Leland 
Olds, a liberal maverick and technical expert on the Federal Power Commission, from 
the FPC's chairmanship. Olds had antagonized Texas oil and gas interests by supporting 
the regulation o f all natural gas sold in interstate commerce, hitherto inapplicable to all 
but large utility companies, and Johnson responded, in part, by allowing demagogic, ad 
hominem attacks on Olds during his confirmation hearing. In a speech before the full 
Senate that outraged some of Johnson's liberal friends, Johnson leveled his own charges 
against Olds: His "record is an uninterrupted tale o f bias, prejudice, and hostility, 
directed against the industry over which he seeks now to assume the powers o f life and 
death....Shall we have a Commissioner or a commisar?"9 Two years later, as chairman of 
the Senate Preparedness subcommittee during the Korean conflict, Johnson issued 
stinging reports o f a "dangerous armament lag" and a policy that produced too much 
butter, but not enough guns. In one report, issued in December 1951, Johnson noted: 
"This report spells out for the American people the payoff for the wasted months that 
have been spent in a fruitless search for a formula that will give us both butter and guns 
in ample quantities. The results have been excellent in terms of butter. But unfortunately
8 Conkin, Big D addy From the Pedernales, 116.
9 Robert Dallek, Lone S tar Rising: Lyndon Johnson an d  His Times, 1908-1960  (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 373-378; Paul Conkin, Big D addy From the Pedernales, 125- 
127. Johnson, quoted in Dallek, Lone S tar Rising, 377. See also Ronnie Dugger, The Politician: The life 
and Times o f  Lyndon Johnson, The D rive fo r  P ow er from  the Frontier to  M aster o f  the Senate (N ew  York: 
W. W. Norton, 1982), 350-356. Dugger called Johnson's "purpose" in this charade to convince "the oilmen 
back in Texas that he was their man." Ibid., 355.
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butter— even fortified butter—is not enough to stop Communist armies."10 Even in the 
late 1960s, when there seemed to be a liberal ascendency in American politics, and little 
reason, therefore, to clothe liberal tendencies in conservative rhetoric, Johnson exhibited 
what some would characterize as conservative or reactionary tendencies. "He privately 
expressed some quite reactionary views on welfare," Johnson CEA chairman Arthur 
Okun recalled in a 1978 interview, "concern about disincentive effects, concern about 
creating a mentality o f being on the dole."11
This evidence notwithstanding, Johnson generally remained a "liberal as 
conservative," or genuinely conservative only with respect to thrift, the work ethic, or the 
willingness to confront foreign aggression or government fraud. His refusal to sign the 
Southern Manifesto undoubtedly improved his political stature, but it was also something 
about which he never hesitated to remind his southern friends. He had also been 
instrumental in preserving much of the Supreme Court's Brown injunction when Senator 
Eastland's Judiciary committee attempted to weaken it. When he shocked a New Orleans 
audience in 1964, by telling them that it was time to cease playing "Nigra, Nigra, Nigra" 
politics, the nineteen hundred Louisiana Democrats in attendance, two thirds o f whom 
opposed his civil rights policies, knew they had heard the unvarnished truth.12 According 
to Eric Goldman, Johnson deployed a three-pronged strategy vis-a-vis the South and civil
10 Quoted in "Rearmament Lags Dangerously— Senators Denounce Fumbling," Newsweek, December 3, 
1951, 19. There is more than a little irony here in that Johnson's opponents would make the same claim, 
over his strenuous objections, a decade-and-a-half-Iater. As Evans and Novak noted, however, "Johnson's 
private dislike and distrust o f  the uniformed military deepened even as he took their side in the 
rambunctious quarrelling between civilian and military authority at the Pentagon." See Rowland Evans 
and Robert Novak, Lyndon B. Johnson: The Exercise o f  Power (New York: The New  American Library, 
1966), 47. Eliot Janeway in the N ew York Times Magazine, on June 17, 1951, and the Saturday Evening 
Post, on May 19, 1951, also published accounts o f  the "watchdog committee" very favorable to Johnson.
11 Arthur Okun, Oral History Interview in The President and the Council o f  Economic Advisers: 
Interviews with CEA Chairmen, edited by Edwin C. Hargrove and Samuel A. Morley (Boulder,CO: 
W estview Press, 1984) 276.
12 See Eric Goldman, The Tragedy o f  Lyndon Johnson, 245-248, for an eyewitness account o f  the speech, 
truly one o f  Johnson's most electrifying, and the audience's response to it. Although they gasped and sat in 
stunned silence for a moment at the conclusion o f  the speech, the audience soon responded with growing 
applause and a roaring five minute standing ovation.
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rights: talk straight and don't water down your liberalism; emphasize the Constitution; 
and highlight the economic deception practiced on the South in getting them to "hold the 
negro down."13 Johnson's outlook on civil rights, like his economic philosophy, bore the 
stamp o f Texas hill country populism, national liberalism, and his own seasoned disdain 
for what Richard Hofstadter called the "paranoid style."14 To Johnson, every culture and 
nearly every political persuasion had redeeming values; the politician's task was to forge 
a consensus built upon the most honorable concerns of the nation's various regions and 
political parties, often the very concerns least prominently displayed. Manifested in 
Johnson's concern over welfare work disincentives as well as civil rights, this approach 
enabled Johnson to see that some welfare program (Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children) requirements contained real work disincentives. AFDC payments in some 
states, during the late 1960s, were as low as $8 per month, and remained intact only if  the 
recipient earned less than $30 per month. At that point and above, every three dollars 
earned forced a two-dollar reduction in welfare benefits. Although the infamous Laffer 
Curve remains an indistinct phenomenon that cannot describe real-life responses to the 
existing tax code, this 67% real tax rate, at such low levels of income, may have come 
closer to a Laffer Curve scenario than any rate imposed on the America's wealthiest 
citizens, before or after.15 Okun, fellow CEA member Merton J. Peck, Joe Califano, and 
Johnson all sought changes in the AFDC program to remedy this and other problematic 
side effects.16 The sums were paltry, the rules were self-defeating, and the programs
13 Ibid., 244.
14 See Richard Hofstadter, The P aranoid Style in American Politics an d  Other Essays (N ew  York: Knopf, 
1965).
15 The Laffer Curve, devised by Art Laffer o f  the University o f  Southern California, suggested that since 
tax revenues would equal zero at a 0% rate and (theoretically) at a 100% rate, there must be a theoretical 
midpoint above which any rate increase would actually reduce total revenue (and a continuum o f  points 
above this level where a rate decrease would increase total revenue). The only sure thing about the Laffer 
Curve is that a 0% tax rate would produce zero revenues and that the middle o f  the curve is, as John Allen  
Paulos described it, "a whirlpool o f  snarls and convolutions" without a distinct turning point. See John 
Allen Paulos, A Mathematician Reads the Newspaper (New York: Basic Books, 1995), 21.
16 See memo, Arthur Okun to LBJ, July 22, 1968, and attached memo, Joe Peck to Joe Califano, White 
House Central Files, LA 8, Box 33, LBJ Library.
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contained real work disincentives. Johnson did not forsake liberalism by recognizing as 
much nor did he adopt the all too familiar but illogical corollary to the recognition of 
these disincentives: that welfare recipients were fundamentally different from other more 
productive American citizens. Johnson's striving for political power, his close association 
with conservative or reactionary individuals, his support of Taft-Hartley, and his concern 
over welfare work disincentives, indicated little more than his willingness to work with 
conservative politicians and his recognition o f partial truths within their greater, often 
thoroughly misguided conservative ideology. John Maynard Keynes once warned 
Franklin Roosevelt that if  he worked business leaders "into the surly, obstinate, terrified 
mood of which domestic animals, wrongly handled, are so capable, the nation's burden 
will not get carried to market; and in the end, public opinion will veer their way."17 Not 
privy to Keynes's instructions, Johnson had, nevertheless, absorbed their critical insights; 
at their worst, he believed conservative business leaders susceptible to careful political 
manipulation, at their best, the possessors of integrity and misguided altruism and the 
potential benefactors o f an entire nation. "I never wanted to demagogue against business, 
Wall Street, or the power companies," Johnson told Doris Kearns, "1 wanted a minimum 
of rhetoric that would inflame or incite...either business, management, or labor.
Whenever I talked with businessmen I never engaged in personal infighting. I thought 
FDR was wrong; he didn't realize you can appeal to the pride o f businessmen— make 
them know that their grandchildren will be looking to see how their money was 
spent..."18 There is precious little evidence to suggest that Johnson's "conservatism" was 
anything more than an habitual frugality embellished by the apparent success o f this
17 Quoted in James McGregor Bums, Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox (New York: Harvest, Harcourt 
Brace Jovanovich, 1956), 332.
18 Quoted in Kearns, Lyndon Johnson and the American D ream , 92.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
69
approach, an approach designed to construct a practical and more universally acceptable 
brand of liberalism.19
Perhaps the earliest, and certainly one o f the more enduring political lessons Lyndon 
Johnson ever learned was that populists or genuine liberals seldom succeeded with the 
kind o f partisanship that entailed either/or political solutions. For the populist or liberal 
politician, failure to compromise usually implied complete legislative failure simply 
because the political odds were almost always stacked overwhelmingly against them. 
Johnson also became convinced that the rare liberal victories, that came on such partisan 
grounds, inevitably achieved solutions that were as dissatisfying as they were 
incomplete. In 1958, when he attempted to outline his political philosophy, Johnson 
declared:
There is likely to be merit in the views o f the minority, quite as much as there is 
wisdom in the views o f the majority. We have, as I see it, an obligation to seek out 
that merit, if  it is there, and not merely content ourselves with obliging the 
majority, for the majority's wisdom—however wise— is never the sum of all 
wisdom....To grant audiences to 170 million Americans would be exhausting. So 
we make our divisions, our classifications, and our cross-classifications which 
permit us to forego the listening and searching we ought to do. This popular view 
is, I feel, very much counter to our American philosophy based on the thinking o f 
men like Jefferson and Madison. I do not believe we have arrived at an answer 
until we have found the national answer, the answer all reasonable men can agree 
upon, and our work is not done until that answer is found—even if  the process 
requires years o f our lives.20
One remarkable feature of Johnson's career in the Senate was that out o f the 
hundreds of reports filed by committees and subcommittees over which he presided, not 
one was ever handed down with a negative vote or minority report.21 "It came and went
19 See Robert A. Caro, The Years o f  Lyndon Johnson: The Path to Power (N ew  York: Vintage Books, 
Random House, 1983), xiii-xx, 369-386, 469-475; Dallek, Lone Star Rising, 268-297; Conkin, Big D addy  
From the Pedernales, 76-147, for more detailed accounts o f  Johnson's relationships with Wirtz, the 
Browns, et al, and Johnson’s "conservative" tilt in the 1940s and 1950s.
20 Lyndon Johnson, "My Political Philosophy," in A Time fo r  Action: A Selection From the Speeches and  
Writings o f  Lyndon B. Johnson, 1953-1964  (N ew  York; Atheneum, 1964), 8-10. Reprinted from the Texas 
Quarterly, Volume I, N o. 4, Winter 1958.
21 Sam Houston Johnson, M y Brother Lyndon (New York: Cowles Book Co., 1969), 100.
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and the country was preserved," Johnson noted of his years as Senate majority leader, 
"even though we had a Democratic Congress and a Republican President, because we 
tried to understand each other, and we tried to give each other credit for being motivated 
properly."22 The public's relative ignorance of the odds favoring conservative lawmakers 
and their corporate constituents made it even more unlikely that principled liberal 
convictions would evoke enough public sympathy or outrage to offset their otherwise 
politically untenable positions. Politically active citizens, such as those in the nation's 
business community, tended to have an influence on public policy issues that far 
exceeded the level implied by either their number or their political visibility. As Sidney 
Verba put it in a 1990 study o f economics and political equality: economically 
advantaged groups tended to be less visible in their political activity, and therefore 
tended to have their influence underestimated; less advantaged groups who, out of 
necessity, engaged in more conspicuous political activity, tended to have their influence 
overestimated.23 Favoring the affluent over the disadvantaged, this phenomenon tended 
to cement the conservative tilt o f American politics and made liberal flexibility an 
absolute necessity. To Johnson there were several ways out of this political conundrum, 
each o f them likely to reinforce the practicality and strength of the other: outright 
bargaining, by which lesser policies were sacrificed for policies o f greater import; 
compromise, by which lesser policies were substituted for policies o f greater integrity 
and significance; and the search for the more transcendent middle ground, by which 
liberal or populist strategies genuinely satisfied the fairest, most disinterested, concerns 
o f both camps. Johnson's willingness to forego an attack on Taft-Hartley, a bill he 
believed to be more symbolic and innocuous than the conventional wisdom had 
suggested, in exchange for the ability to support liberal minimum wage, federal
22 Lyndon Johnson, The Johnson Presidential Press Conferences, Volume 2 (N ew  York: Earl M.
Coleman, 1978), 1014.
23 Sidney Verba, "Politics, Economics, and Equality," in Dye, ed., The Political Legitim acy o f  Markets 
an d  G overnm ents, 44-45.
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assistance, and tax legislation, was an example o f the first tactic; the 1957 Civil Rights 
bill, an example o f the second; and the Keynesian economic strategy o f his presidential 
years, an example o f  the third.24
When he began forging a close and lasting political friendship with Hubert 
Humphrey in the early 1950s, Johnson would often chide Humphrey for being a member 
o f the liberal group o f senators he called "the bomb throwers." Humphrey's proposals 
were "bombs" not because they were too radical for Johnson's political tastes, but 
because they too readily polarized the debate and aroused the more powerful 
conservative opposition, an opposition that could otherwise be neutralized or tamed more 
effectively with a quieter and less defiant political strategy. Indeed, one o f the reasons 
Johnson chose Humphrey to be his running mate in 1964 was because o f his subsequent 
willingness to absorb and utilize this political lesson. "I want to work with you and only 
you from the bomb throwers," Johnson told Humphrey late in 1952.25 Republican Everett 
Dirksen often proved to be a dependable Johnson ally for much the same reason. "I trust 
that the time will never come in my political career," Dirksen once declared, "when the 
waters o f partisanship will flow so swift and so deep as to obscure my estimate o f the 
national interest."26
Marking Lyndon Johnson's path to power were numerous examples o f bargains 
struck, compromises offered, and apparent capitulations to conservative adversaries.
Most often, however, these did not represent a lack o f principle or the lack of a firm 
commitment to a populist-liberal ideology but opportunities, lost on or lost by politicians 
o f a similar stripe, to adapt and implement an instinctive populist approach to the nation's
24 When Lyndon's brother Sam announced that he had prepared a press release attacking Taft-Hartley, 
Lyndon asked him, "Have you read the bill, Sam Houston?" When his brother replied that he had not, 
Lyndon then suggested, "Well, you'd better read it before you go o ff  half-cocked and start calling it anti­
labor. I've read every word o f  that bill— several times— and it isn't what labor says it is." Quoted in Sam 
Houston Johnson, M y Brother Lyndon, 74.
25 Dallek, Lone S tar Rising, 425.
26 Quoted in Sam Houston Johnson, My Brother Lyndon, 145.
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economic policies. That this path coursed over the uneven and shifting landscape that 
was the American political economy for much of the twentieth century— charted for the 
voting population by little more than corporate profitability figures—made it difficult to 
follow or discern. No liberal or populist scheme, imaginative and captivating as many 
were, possessed an explanatory power comparable to that o f the reigning supply side 
pattern. Seven and a half million Americans may have joined Huey Long's "Share Our 
Wealth Society" by 1935 but sixteen and a half million voted for Republican presidential 
nominee Alf Landon in 1936, who carried only Vermont and Maine. Even Long's 
"radical" blueprint failed to recommend real changes in the way the private economy was 
structured and explained; what it suggested was little more than the need for substantial 
tax code revision and roughly sketched changes in the nation's spending priorities.
"Other politicians had promised to remake America," Long wrote, "I had promised to 
sustain it." Long's "Share our Wealth" was clearly designed to modify, not supplant, the 
existing corporate capitalism.27
Equally significant to Johnson's search for the appropriate economic strategy was 
that he came of political age during the era o f Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal when the 
lines separating liberal from conservative economics were as indistinct as they would 
ever be. Roosevelt, a politician Johnson once referred to as "a second daddy," seemed to 
have thrived on the blurring of these lines; they helped him weaken his conservative 
political opposition even as they allowed the strengthening and preservation o f the
27 See T. Harry Williams, Huey Long  (N ew  York: Knopf, 1969), 676-706; Alan Brinkley, Voices o f  
Protest: Huey Long, Father Coughlin and the G reat Depression  (N ew  York: Vintage Books, Random 
House, 1983), 179-186; and Glen Jeansonne, Messiah o f  the Masses: Huey Long an d  the G reat 
D epression  (New York: HarperColIins, 1993), 114-120, for details regarding the "Share Our Wealth 
Society" and analysis o f  its goals, especially Brinkley, Voices o f  Protest, 179-182, and Jeansonne, M essiah  
o f  the Masses, 119-120. Discussing Long's hastily written My First Days in the White House, Williams 
noted that Long proposed to appoint Herbert Hoover as Secretary o f  Commerce and John D. Rockefeller, 
Jr. and Bernard Baruch to head the "Federal Share Our Wealth Corporation." Cited in Williams, Huey 
Long, 845-847.
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corporate capitalism he deigned to accept.28 If  the New Deal was truly new in its 
approach to economic strategy, it remained a precursor to something greater, a way of 
resolving the imbalance between state and society that simply had to precede a more 
profound economic revolution. Its economic blueprint remained, in the lifetime o f its 
creator, a diverse and incomplete document. The only thing certain about the Roosevelt 
economic strategy, Ellis Hawley noted, was that laissez-faire was dead.29 Indeed, 
Roosevelt's most pressing and intractable political problem was learning how to appease, 
tame, or otherwise harness powerful and often intransigent conservatives who had been 
sufficiently comfortable with the political status quo and the prevailing definition o f 
laissez-faire. Laissez-faire had never implied a truly "hands o ff' approach to political 
economics; government efforts to enhance and protect profit had always comprised a 
frequently exercised proviso to the general rule. After Roosevelt, it implied little more 
than the imagined, wholly absurd concept that it was.30 While Johnson sought to mimic 
Roosevelt's tactics for disarming conservatives, he also sought to transcend the crisis- 
bound New Deal, and to answer a problem FDR never was able to resolve: how to 
subvert and replace conservative recipes for economic success, dominant even when 
conservative politicians were not.31 Had Roosevelt not died suddenly just before the end 
of the Second World War, perhaps he could have confronted this predicament. Forced to 
coax the nation out o f the Great Depression and into a global war, he found that he had
28 "He was just like a daddy to me," Johnson remarked when he first heard o f  FDR's death. Quoted in 
Wiliam E. Leuchtenburg, In the Shadow o f  FDR: From Harry Truman to Ronald Reagan  (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1983), 121.
29 Ellis Hawley, The N ew D eal and the Problem o f  M onopoly: A Study in Economic Am bivalence 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), 52.
30 See Allen Dawley, Struggles For Justice: Social Responsibility an d  the Liberal State  (Cambridge: 
Belknap Press, Harvard University Press, 1991), 1-13, 297-417, for an analysis o f  the New  Deal as both a 
resolution to the prevailing imbalance between the state and society (primarily corporations) and as a 
product o f  the search for consensus that was shaped critically by the era's class conflicts. See also Ellis 
Hawley, The New D eal and the Problem o f  M onopoly, 12-52, for an examination o f  the incoherence o f  the 
N ew  Deal economic philosophy.
31 See George W olfskill, The Revolt o f  the Conservatives: A History o f  the American Liberty League, 
1934-1940  (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1962), for a detailed examination o f  FDR's most powerful 
conservative opposition and the tactics by which he undermined their political effectiveness.
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neither the time nor the wherewithal to propose sweeping economic change. "It is 
fashionable to praise FDR for his lightness and skill in maneuvering over the muddy 
terrain o f American government," Andrew Shonfield noted. "It is less usual to recall that 
he left it a lot muddier than he found it."32 As he advanced to national prominence, 
Johnson became convinced that he could clean up this muddy landscape. His praise for 
FDR and the New Deal continued throughout his career, and came without hesitation, 
but he knew there was much more left to do. "We cannot be content in the 1960s, he 
would later declare early in his presidency, "with the answers o f the 1930s."33
This murkiness, however, did open up unique opportunities for Lyndon Johnson as 
he tried to create a more liberal economic blueprint for the South and for the nation at 
large. Few politicians, if  any at all, possessed his affinity for and understanding o f both 
conservative political personalities and liberal or populist economic principles. He truly 
believed that he could persuade any one, and he saw consensus as something valuable in 
itself, not just as a means to a better end. "If I hadn't left when I did," George Wallace 
remarked after meeting with Johnson during the 1965 Selma voting rights protest, "he'd 
have me coming out for civil rights."34 On the other hand, this would be a handicap as 
well, for it insured that any populist or liberal reorganization of the nation's economy had 
to pass muster in two distinct ways. It must bring unparalleled prosperity and, at the 
same time, it must also convince the general public that this prosperity was dependent 
upon— and not created in spite of—the populist or liberal reform blueprint. Much of 
Lyndon Johnson's political career, steeped in the populism o f the Texas hill country and 
the national liberalism o f the Roosevelt revolution to which he was apprenticed, turned 
out to be preparation for this two-pronged challenge.
32 Andrew Shonfield, M odern Capitalism: The Changing Balance o f  Public an d  Private Pow er (New  
York: O xford University Press, 1965), 318.
33 Lyndon B. Johnson, Public Papers, 1963-1964: 1, 250.
34 Eric F. Goldman, The Tragedy o f  Lyndon Johnson (N ew  York: Knopf, 1969), 315.
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Bom August 27, 1908 at Stonewall, Texas, in the heart o f the central Texas hill 
country, Lyndon Johnson was reared in a family well known for its populist political 
views. Lyndon's grandfather, Sam Ealy Johnson, Sr., joined the Texas Populist party in 
1891, railing then against former President Grover Cleveland for the gold standard-tight 
money views he espoused in his campaign to regain the presidency in 1892. Sam 
Johnson, Sr. had also made a small fortune raising and driving cattle in the late 1860s, 
but had lost it all beginning in 1871. The first extensive railroad company agreements to 
fix prices combined with a subsequent recession (1873) in the Northeast to destroy the 
opportunity for profit in the cattle trade. The role of Eastern bankers and corporate price- 
fixers here, though he learned about it second-hand, would not be lost on Sam's grandson 
Lyndon.
Lyndon's father, Sam Ealy Johnson, Jr., was a cotton farmer and populist politician 
elected to the Texas legislature in 1904 who made a career out o f fights against railroads, 
lumber companies, and utility companies. Burned financially in the 1905-1906 cotton 
futures market, he gave up his legislative seat in 1908, the year Lyndon was bom. 
Regaining it in 1918, Sam, Jr. became one of the few Texas politicians o f the period not 
to support any o f the anti-German sedition laws sweeping through the Texas legislature. 
Lyndon's brother, Sam Houston, captured vivid memories of their father cursing the local 
"kukluxsonofabitch" for their moronic, predatory racism. "I never realized," Sam 
Houston noted later, "that 'sonofabitch' was a separate word, standing all by itself, until I 
got to high school."35 Lyndon's father developed a reputation for this defiant support of 
civil liberties and for his unswerving populism. But, like his father before him, Sam 
Jr.was struck by an economic recession generated elsewhere. In the 1920-1921 recession
35 Sam Houston Johnson, My Brother Lyndon , 30.
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cotton prices dropped to 8 cents/lb. and Sam Johnson, Jr. went $40,000 into debt, later 
fell ill, and was forced to accept donations o f food from neighbors to survive.36
Lyndon looked up to his father, was often allowed to sit by his desk at the state 
capitol building in Austin, and plainly absorbed many o f his views on politics and 
economics. "I want to be like my daddy," he once remarked as a youngster, "getting 
pensions for old people."37 In 1919 and 1920, when Sam Johnson led the fight in the 
Texas legislature to procure funds for drought relief, Sam's poorest constituents and his 
oldest son recognized and remembered both his concern and effectiveness. Of 
Representative Sam Johnson the Blanco Record Courier recalled: "Because o f his 
influence and insistence, Texas was one o f the first states to recognize the public 
emergency which arises from a long series o f private disasters—the foundation stone 
upon which has been built the modem conception of government as exemplified in the 
administration of President Roosevelt."38 It seems that Lyndon was also greatly affected 
by his father's financial setbacks, and by the impact o f his father's insolvency on the rest 
o f the family. He always vowed, for example, to relieve his mother and other hill country 
women of the back-breaking domestic labor they were required to perform just to keep 
their families healthy and alive. Much of Lyndon Johnson's later effort on behalf of 
public power and rural electrification stemmed from a long felt desire to change 
materially the lives o f the hill country women.39
Though Lyndon's father attracted great opposition from conservative bankers and 
merchants as well as members of the KKK, the Texas hill country was clearly fertile
36 Caro, Path to Power, 89-94; Dallek, Lone Star Rising, 55-56; Conkin, B ig D addy From the Pedernales, 
24-25.
37 Dallek, Lone Star Rising, 50. Doris Kearns noted that the death o f  Lyndon's grandfather, in 1913 when 
Lyndon was five years old, also instilled in Lyndon "a feverish eagerness" to resemble his father. Cited in 
Kearns, Lyndon Johnson and  the American Dream, 34. Pool, Craddock, and Conrad, Lyndon Baines 
Johnson: The Formative Years, 34, noted that Sam Ealy Johnson, Jr. was also a "warm admirer o f  the 
progressive legislation that comprised Woodrow Wilson's 'New Freedom.'"
38 Cited in Caro, Path to Power, 83. Blanco Record Courier, October 28, 1937.
39 Virginia Durr, Oral History Interview, LBJ Library, interviewed by Mary Walton Livingston, October 
17, 1967, 13.
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ground for populist sentiment. The Texas Farmer's Alliance, which eventually gave rise 
to the more nationally oriented People's party, was created in Lampasas, Texas, in 1877, 
a town on the northern edge of the central Texas hill country. In 1892, although Lyndon's 
grandfather was not among the winners, Populist candidates swept the hill country in 
both state and congressional elections. If the Texas hill country possessed an affinity for 
populist politics, however, it tended to favor a unique version o f populist protest, for the 
traditional foes—banks and railroads—were absent there. Some hill country cattlemen, 
like Lyndon's grandfather, were affected at one point by late nineteenth century railroad 
companies, by way of the Chisholm trail and the Topeka, Kansas railroad terminal, but 
most hill country citizens were not. Instead, they turned their scorn and resentment, 
Robert Caro pointed out, on local merchants who offered expensive products and 
expensive credit. "Ninety-five percent of the merchandising business was a credit 
business in those days," remarked Simon Burg, grandson of a hill country merchant.40 
When Texas Farmer's Alliance membership swelled from 50,000 in 1885 to over 
200,000 in 1890, it did so largely because of a single simple message: "join the Alliance, 
build a county cooperative, a county general store if need be, and get free o f the credit 
merchant."41 But most o f these efforts failed. Aided politically by Dallas bankers and the 
Eastern manufacturers who supplied them, and economically by the lack o f competition 
in such a sparsely populated area, hill country merchants continued to administer 
monopoly prices and interest rates well into the twentieth century. The speeches and 
slogans o f the populist minority, Robert Caro noted, "were hopeless exercises, 
irrelevancies when the reality of legislative action was considered."42 Weaned politically 
on local opposition to these kind of schemes, Lyndon Johnson would have little trouble 
recognizing similar practices later at the hands o f the nation's largest corporations.
40 Quoted in Miller, Lyndon , 18.
41 Caro, Path to Power, 35.
42 Ibid., 82.
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Ultimately, the populist political persuasion o f Sam Ealy Johnson, Jr. provided his 
eldest son with a bridge to the class-based economic populism of other more successful 
and well known Texas politicians. Lyndon's father was known to be an admirer of 
populist Texas governor Jim Ferguson, and this admiration, according to Eric Goldman, 
rubbed off on his son.43 Though Ferguson served as governor from 1915 to 1917 when 
Sam Johnson was out o f office, Sam was known as a Ferguson man. "Our daddy," 
recalled Lyndon's brother Sam, "was a staunch supporter o f that wonderful rambunctious 
liberal, James E. Ferguson, about the most popular governor in Texas history."44 
Ferguson, often referred to as "Farmer Jim," entered the 1914 gubernatorial campaign 
without having held any political office, running as a quiet anti-prohibitionist and as an 
outspoken defender o f Texas tenant farmers. He began his campaign that year with a 
provocative statement not unlike those Sam Johnson was known to proclaim: "Whereas, 
I, James E. Ferguson, am as well qualified to be Governor o f  Texas as any damn man in 
it; and Whereas, I am against Prohibition and always will be; and Whereas, I am in favor 
o f a square deal for tenant farmers; Therefore Be It Resolved that I will be elected."45 A 
lawyer, insurance agent, and banker by trade, Ferguson built his campaign largely around 
promises to tenant farmers, 52% of all Texas farmers in 1910. He also succeeded— 
judging from his campaign speeches and from election returns— in convincing 
landowners and businessmen that all would benefit from his proposals to assist tenant 
farmers. Unlike many radicals and reformers o f his era, Ferguson never adopted a "soak 
the rich" economic strategy. When he was elected he delivered a law that limited crop 
rental percentages to one third of the cotton crop and one fourth o f all other crops and 
abolished the practice of requiring tenant farmers to pay additional cash bonuses. He 
began the practice o f furnishing state aid to rural schools, expanded appropriations for
43 Goldman, The Tragedy o f  Lyndon Johnson, 44-45.
44 Sam Houston Johnson, M y Brother Lyndon, 46. When Johnson ran for the senate in 1948, Miriam "Ma" 
Ferguson, widow o f  "Farmer Jim" lent her name and influence to Johnson’s campaign.
45 Ibid.
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education in general, and, after being elected to a second term in 1916, created the Texas 
Highway Commission that began a massive statewide roadbuilding campaign.46 
Ferguson was a politician who could appeal to landowners and businessmen but at the 
same time concentrate his efforts on helping tenant farmers, the poor, and the 
disadvantaged. Populist in spirit, when populism implied a firm grasp o f the era's 
genuine class struggle, Ferguson emerged as the liberal prototype to which Lyndon 
Johnson ultimately aspired. He was not averse to the amassing of either substantial 
company profits or great personal wealth but believed that both should rise in tandem 
with, rather than at the expense of, the general welfare. As difficult as it was to recognize 
this amid the acrimony of Ferguson's feud with the University o f Texas (he believed the 
university weighed too heavily upon the state treasury to the detriment o f the state's 
grade schools and high schools) and his subsequent conviction on 10 o f the 21 
impeachment charges brought against him, it was not lost on Sam Ealy Johnson, Jr. or 
his son Lyndon 47
After receiving his high school diploma at age 15, spending a year in California 
working odd jobs, and another year back in Texas working as a bulldozer operator and 
truck driver, Lyndon Johnson headed off to Southwest Texas State Teachers College in 
San Marcos, Texas. Because the president o f the college, Cecil Evans, let Lyndon live in 
his garage apartment, Johnson was eventually able to win the president's favor and often 
accompanied Evans on trips to the state capitol in Austin for the debates over the state's 
budget priorities. Here, more than anything else, Johnson began to appreciate what it 
took to wring money out of a conservative legislative body and also saw how only the
46 Joe B. Frantz, Texas: A Bicentennial H istory (New York: W. W. Norton, 1976), 165-167; Walter 
Prescott Webb and H. Bailey Carroll, eds., The Handbook o f  Texas, Volume I (Austin: Texas State 
Historical Association, 1952), 590-592.
47 Frantz, Texas, 167. Lyndon's brother Sam pointed out how Clarence Martin, a neighbor and political 
associate o f  their father, served as Ferguson's ch ief counsel during the impeachment proceedings. Cited in 
Sam Houston Johnson, My Brother Lyndon, 47.
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most persuasive and strident lobbyists commanded the attention o f the state's 
lawmakers.48
His favorite professor at Southwest Texas State, H. M. Greene, undoubtedly 
reinforced Johnson's nascent liberalism, as well as his appreciation for consensus politics 
and his talent for winning conservatives over to liberal economic policies. Greene, 
considered to be a liberal by some and a populist radical by others, lived in a "Thoreau 
type cabin" in the still magnificent Devil's Backbone area of the hill country and ran a 
small experimental farm as well. He taught Government to Lyndon Johnson, developing 
rapport with the young man largely because they shared an affinity for populist politics 
and an appreciation for learning outside o f the classroom. Greene maintained, Johnson 
recalled, invoking his own appreciation o f consensus politics, that "Democracy is o f 
necessity a compromise. It is made of strong-minded men who cannot all prevail as 
individuals. Therefore, their concerted action must be a compromise."49 At the very least, 
Professor Greene encouraged the populist outlook and the emerging liberalism o f his 
gangly and aggressive student. "I didn't go to Harvard or Yale," Johnson later remarked. 
"But I believe Professor Greene knows more government than any professor up there. 
When the going gets rough, I draw upon the wisdom of his teachings."50
After interrupting his studies in 1928 to serve as principal and schoolteacher at the 
Welhausen School in Cotulla, Texas, a small Mexican-American grade school sixty 
miles from the Mexican border, Johnson graduated from Southwest Texas State in 
August, 1930 with a degree in education and history. Much like his brush with prominent
48 Dallek, Lone Star Rising, 72-73; Kearns, Lyndon Johnson an d the American Dream, 48; Conkin, Big  
D addy From the Pedernales, 48-49; Caro, Path to Power, 144-146.
49 Quoted in Pool, Craddock, and Conrad, Lyndon Baines Johnson: The Formative Years, 96; and Miller, 
Lyndon, 28.
50 Quoted in Dallek, Lone Star Rising, 72. See also Philip Reed Rulon, "The Education o f  Lyndon Baines 
Johnson," Presidential Studies Quarterly, Summer, 1982, 403; Kearns, Lyndon Johnson and the American  
Dream, 48-49; Caro, Path to Power, 151. After retiring in 1957, Greene moved to the Ozark Mountains o f  
Missouri, but visited the White House often during his star pupil's presidency. Cited in Pool, Craddock, 
and Conrad, Lyndon Baines Johnson: The Formative Years, 96.
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populist educators and politicians, the Cotulla experience proved to have great impact on 
Johnson's outlook upon and approach to political economics. Speaking before Congress 
in 1965, he recalled his brief tenure at the Welhausen school:
My students were poor and they often came to class without breakfast, hungry. 
They knew even in their youth the pain of prejudice. They never seemed to know 
why people disliked them. But they knew it was so because I saw it in their eyes. 
Somehow you never forget what poverty and hatred can do when you see its scars 
on the hopeful face o f a young child.51
Johnson Health, Education, and Welfare Secretary Wilbur Cohen suggested that Cotulla
was basic to President Johnson's political philosophy. The "experience o f his teaching
those Mexican kids," Cohen noted, "was a very important aspect of his whole life. It
motivated him on...a great many basic ideas that were developed during his presidency. I
think when he saw those hungry children digging into garbage, it was the first time he
had really seen grinding poverty."52 Johnson's youthful experiences, Cohen added, "were
very meaningful to him. He was not an intellectual in the typical meaning o f that word,
being able to develop a theory or concept just by spinning it out as a professor would. It
all grew out o f his relationship with reality."53
After his graduation in 1930 Johnson went on to become the speech and debate 
instructor at Sam Houston High School in Houston, Texas, took the boys and girls debate 
teams to the state finals, and won both reappointment and a raise for the following school 
year. At Sam Houston, however, he would not complete even the fall semester, for in 
November 1931 he won an appointment to his first significant political job, as Secretary 
to newly elected Congressman Richard Kleberg. This position, won with the help of
51 Quoted in Miller, Lyndon, 31. Principal and teacher at the Welhausen school from September 1928 to 
June 1929, Johnson managed in the short time he was there to organize a literary society, coach the debate 
team, organize recess play activities against the wishes o f  the school's six teachers (who had always used 
recess as a cigarette break instead), tutor one student in English after school, tutor the school's previously 
illiterate janitor in reading, and earn twelve hours o f  correspondence credit from Southwest Texas State 
Teacher's college.
52 Quoted in ibid.
53 Quoted in ibid., 32.
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State Senator Welly Hopkins, lobbyist Roy Miller, and most o f all Sam Ealy Johnson,
Jr.—who provided crucial Blanco County campaign support to Kleberg— placed Lyndon 
Johnson's political career on a trajectory that would confirm his predeliction for populist 
sensibilities, consensus politics, and liberal economic policies.54 Hired largely as a 
political favor to his father, Lyndon clinched the position, it seems, at least in part 
because o f the "political touch" he had already exhibited to Hopkins and Miller, and 
because of the impressive interview he had with Kleberg himself a few days after the 
election.55 Off to Washington with Congressman-elect Kleberg, Johnson soon exercised 
this "political touch," on a much broader scale and quickly established close political ties 
to even more powerful politicians, convincing himself in the process that his political 
instincts were appropriate and incisive.
In Washington, three Texas congressmen and one senator from Louisiana, in 
particular, helped refine and shape the young congressional secretary's liberal-populist 
outlook on the nation's political economy. Adding the otherwise menial job o f House 
doorkeeper to his duties as Kleberg's assistant, Johnson used the job to gain access to 
other congressmen in general, especially those in the Texas congressional delegation. In 
short order, he would endear himself to Sam Rayburn, House member since 1913, and 
Wright Patman, member since 1928. Patman, who once referred to Lyndon's father as 
"the best man he ever knew," remembered Lyndon from his days in the Texas legislature 
with Sam Johnson.56 Sam Johnson respected Patman's views enough to tell his son in 
1937, when Lyndon boarded the train for Washington and his first term in Congress, "If 
any question comes up and you don't know how to vote, then go with Wright. You'll 
never make a mistake that way."57 When Patman opened up the 1932 congressional
54 Dallek, Lone Star Rising, 91 -92; Conkin, Big D addy From the Pedernales, 60-61; Kearns, Lyndon 
Johnson an d  the American Dream, 70; Miller, Lyndon, 37; Caro, Path to Power, 213-214.
55 Sam Houston Johnson, M y Brother Lyndon, 44; Dallek, Lone Star R isin g , 92.
56 Caro, Path to  Power, 83.
57 Quoted in Joe Phipps, Summer Stock: Behind the Scenes With LBJ in '48, Recollections o f  a  Political 
D ram a  (Fort Worth: Texas Christian University Press, 1992), 58.
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session by moving to impeach Secretary o f the Treasury Andrew Mellon, he left an 
indelible impression upon the young congressional secretary. Mellon, Treasury Secretary 
since the beginning o f the Harding administraton in 1921, had incurred the wrath o f  the 
fiery Texan for his opposition to Patman's veteran's bonus bill introduced in May 1929. 
Able to speak for an hour "because the Republicans were so shocked," Patman 
hammered away at Mellon's trickle down tax policies, and chastised him for his 
obsession with a balanced budget in the middle of a Depression.58 When it was Mellon's 
turn to respond, there was a recess, and what transpired next was announced in the 
following morning's papers: "Mellon Resigns, Appointed to the Court of St. James."59 
Lyndon had finally witnessed the persuasive power o f the populist politician his father 
had so often praised.
Sam Rayburn, another one o f the Texas politicians to which Lyndon gravitated, did 
even more to encourage the liberal or populist sensibilities of Kleberg's aggressive young 
secretary. Rayburn, who served briefly with Sam Ealy Johnson, Jr. in the Texas 
legislature (1907-1908)— where each held the other in great esteem—arguably came to 
be Lyndon Johnson's most important political mentor. Johnson went out o f his way to 
speak to Raybum as he worked the door to the U.S. House chamber, and he always 
followed Kleberg if  the Congressman was headed to Rayburn's office. He really got to 
know "Mr. Sam," however, only after his marriage to Lady Bird in 1934, and after 
Raybum began accepting the newlywed couple's invitations to dinner. Flattered by Lady 
Bird's attempts at reproducing his favorite Texas recipes— especially chili, black-eyed 
peas, combread, and peach ice cream—and by Lyndon's eagerness to listen to his 
political recollections, Rayburn soon began visiting the couple's apartment for Sunday
58 Wright Patman, Oral History Interview, in Studs Terkel, H ard Times: An O ral History o f  the G reat 
D epression  (New York: Pantheon Books, Random House, 1970), 283.
59 Ibid., 284.
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breakfast as well.60 "You must never underestimate the importance o f Sam Raybum to 
Johnson's career," Hubert Humphrey once remarked.61
Known for his integrity and for his steadfast opposition to railroad companies, 
banks, utility companies and Republican high tariff and "sound money" policies, 
Raybum saw a lot o f himself in the young Lyndon Johnson. For his part, Johnson was 
attracted to Raybum not just because o f Sam's support o f the people over "the interests," 
but also for Rayburn's uncanny ability to measure and control fellow lawmakers. Tommy 
Corcoran, FDR assistant and himself an adept political fixer, said of Raybum, "Sam was 
a genius in handling men...the guy would say exactly what Sam told you he was going to 
say, and if you just answered exactly what Sam told you to answer, you could just see 
these conservative sons-of-bitches coming around right before your eyes."62 To Lyndon 
Johnson few other politicians could be as compelling.
Although Raybum was no less the stubborn populist than Johnson's father or 
grandfather, he differed from them in one significant way. Where Sam Ealy Johnson, Sr. 
and his son had a difficult time securing reform, outside o f the pensions Sam, Jr. won for 
many of his constituents, Raybum got things done. Raybum showed the young Lyndon 
Johnson, in other words, how to remain true to his populist instincts and, at the same 
time, get in on the real action. Pensions were nice but they represented an issue on the 
periphery of the nation's political economy, and Johnson— like Raybum—never one to 
set his sights too low, hoped for more fundamental and significant reform. Raybum 
showed him how to attain the kind of reform that was truly fundamental and worthwhile.
"His family had been poor, and he had been poor," Virginia Durr recalled of 
Johnson, "and he just hated to see people poor."63 On the other hand, he was also 
captivated by the quiet and confident power of wealthy businessmen and their lobbyists,
60 Caro, Path to P ow er , 333-334.
61 Quoted in Merle Miller, Lyndon: An O ral Biography (New York: Putnam's Sons, 1980), 43.
62 Caro, Path to P ow er , 323.
63 Virginia Durr, Oral History Interview, LBJ Library, 9.
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and intrigued by the relative ease with which they defeated populist or liberal opponents. 
Johnson was especially intrigued by the elan and the shrewdness o f Texas Gulf Sulphur 
lobbyist Roy Miller.64 In Austin and in Washington D.C., Miller always seemed capable 
o f dictating the terms o f debate or influencing most any legislator, with the possible 
exception of Lyndon Johnson's father Sam.65 Sam Raybum would introduce Johnson to 
the political game where populists and liberals could wield similar power, where 
conservatives could be shamed, tripped up, baited, trapped by their own rhetoric, or 
where they could somehow be convinced to yield some of the influence they so jealously 
protected. About a year after Johnson came to Washington, he witnessed Rayburn's 
successful efforts on behalf of the nation's first "truth-in-securities" legislation. This 
showed Johnson how a skillful politician could combine populist instincts with effective 
legislation. To Johnson, Raybum was worth emulating, particularly when it came to the 
task o f winning conservative support for liberal economic policies. When the "truth-in- 
securities" legislation went into conference committee, Raybum, as chair of the House 
Interstate Commerce Committee, succeeded first in making the tougher House version 
the basis for negotiations. And when FDR signed the bill on May 27, 1933, it was 
essentially the House bill championed by Raybum that wound up on his desk, despite 
persistent efforts by John Foster Dulles and a team of Wall Street attorneys to eviscerate 
the legislation. Explaining this outcome, Robert Caro credited Rayburn's handling o f the 
Senators in the conference committee: "Senators were guided with deference, deference 
in tone, in solicitation o f their opinions—in all matters except matters of substance."66 
Little excited Lyndon Johnson more than to watch a genuine populist or liberal
64 Johnson held Roy Miller's son Dale to be a similarly attractive figure. See David Broder, "Dale Miller: 
The President's Favorite Lobbyist," Look, April 6, 1965,66-68.
65 Robert Caro pointed out how Miller "dispensed the 'Three B's' [beefsteak, blondes, and bourbons] with 
the most liberal hand in Austin," but also how Lyndon's father resisted Miller's lobbying efforts. "While 
Sam [Johnson] would drink with Roy Miller and the other lobbyists who held court every afternoon at the 
huge Driskill [hotel] bar," Caro noted, "he would insist on 'buying back'— for every drink Miller bought 
him...Sam insisted on buying him one in return." Caro, Path to Power, 80.
66 Caro, Path to Power, 325.
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politician, historically the outmaneuvered and overwhelmed political figure, round up the 
conservative votes. At that, Raybum was clearly the reigning champion. Rewarded for 
his political prowess by being selected Speaker o f the House in 1940, Raybum remained 
one of Johnson's most influential and powerful supporters until his death from cancer in 
1963.67 On the evening o f November 22,1963, not long after Rayburn's death, when 
Kennedy's assassination suddenly and shockingly thrust Johnson into the oval office, 
Johnson saluted Rayburn's portrait in the living room of his Vice Presidential residence.
"I salute you Mr. Speaker," Johnson said reverently, raising a glass of orange juice 
toward the living room wall, "and how I wish you were here now, when I need you."68
The third Texas congressman who would bolster Johnson's faith in liberal economic 
policies and in his own populist political orientation was Maury Maverick, the third 
generation son of a famous Texas pioneer family. While Maverick would not enter 
Congress until 1935, Lyndon got to know him "dam well" in 1932, and helped him buy 
votes in the San Antonio slums (at $5 per head) in that year's county tax collector race.69 
Maverick was an outspoken liberal, a politician who enjoyed shocking people, a 
champion of minority rights, and an ACLU member. When Maverick ran for Congress in 
1934 he enlisted the support o f Congressman Kleberg's young assistant, telling reporters 
that "Lyndon Johnson...is considered to be the brightest secretary in Washington."70 
When he joined the Texas congressional delegation in 1935, Maverick became known as 
one o f the few rookie congressmen who could simply pick up the phone and dial and get 
President Roosevelt on the line.71 While Lyndon admired Maverick's spirited liberalism,
67 Raybum was selected to replace Tallulah Bankhead’s father William, congressman from Alabama and 
Speaker since 1936, when Bankhead died in 1940.
68 Quoted in Jack Valenti, A Very Human President (New York: W.W. Norton, 1975), 7. Valenti, a former 
Houston, Texas advertising executive was decribed by Johnson as "the only man who knows everything 
that goes on in the White House." Quoted in "The Presidency: The American Civilization," Time, May 29, 
1964, 18.
69 Lady Bird Johnson, quoted in Merle Miller, Lyndon, 47; Dallek, Lone Star Rising, 111.
70 Quoted in Caro, Path to Power, 276.
71 Miller, Lyndon, 47.
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and learned much from his principled support o f the poor and the disadvantaged, he 
learned an even more significant lesson in 1938 when Maverick lost his bid for 
reelection. "Don't forget our friend Maury...." Lyndon told White House assistant James 
Rowe, "There's nothing more useless than a dead liberal."72 Despite the ingrained 
American distrust o f power, and Johnson's own disdain for the kind o f power that 
exploited the poor and the disadvantaged, political power itself became an elemental part 
o f Lyndon Johnson's search for pragmatic liberalism with a populist soul. "When I 
thought about the kind o f congressman I wanted to be," Johnson told Doris Kearns, "I 
thought about my Populist grandfather and promised myself that I'd always be the 
People's Congressman, representing all the people, not just the ones with money and 
power."73 Johnson's brush with powerful lobbyists and overwhelmed populist politicians, 
such as Maverick, convinced him, nevertheless, that power, and the ability to 
compromise from a powerful footing, were every bit as important as unswerving political 
ideals. Years later the Economist o f London would describe this approach in terms o f a 
deceptively simple concept: "The big thing to understand is that Johnson's consensus is 
in large measure a brilliant word play for an older concept, more controversial in a 
society where government is ritualistically distrusted; and that is leadership...the 
immediate political fact is that he is leading Congress and the American public as they 
have rarely been led before."74
Though Johnson assiduously cultivated friendships and political ties to Patman, 
Raybum, and Maverick, all fellow Texans, he also became mesmerized by the senator 
from Louisiana who called himself the "Kingfish." Huey P. Long, elected to his Senate 
seat in 1930, came to the Senate only after the 1932 elections enabled his friend Oscar
72 Quoted in Dallek, Lone S tar Rising, 169.
73 Quoted in Kearns, Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream, 91.
74 Cited by Howard K. Smith, "Prologue: A Strong Thread o f  Moral Purpose," in James McGregor Bums, 
ed., To H eal and to Build: The Program s o f  President Lyndon B. Johnson (New York: McGraw-Hill, 
1968), 13.
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Allen to take Huey's place in the Louisiana governor's office. Arriving in Washington at 
the same time as Lyndon Johnson, he immediately went to work flouting tradition in the 
Senate, expressing contempt for greed and for the existence o f poverty, and boasting 
about how he wanted to cut the great American fortunes "down to frying size."75 Lady 
Bird Johnson recalled that "Huey was something of a mystery to Lyndon, like he was to 
a lot o f people."76 Lyndon Johnson knew enough about Long, however, to be intrigued, 
and to mark Long as one o f his political heroes. "When I first came to the Congress with 
Kleberg," Johnson recalled, "I was simply entranced by Huey Long, so much so that I 
made special deal with the doorkeeper to let me know when Long was about to speak on 
the Senate floor."77 When Huey remarked that education should be "regulated on the 
capacity of children to learn, and not on the ability o f parents to pay the costs," Johnson 
applauded.78 When Long recalled his tangles with Standard Oil, Johnson recognized, and 
identified with, his populist vision. And when he lamented the presence of poverty 
amidst plenty, Johnson realized that the "Kingfish" had his finger on the most critical 
political and moral dilemma o f the age. "He thought that every man had a right to a job," 
Johnson recalled fondly, "and that was before the Full Employment Act....He hated 
poverty with all his soul and spoke against it until his voice was hoarse."79
When Johnson became speaker of the Little Congress, a club comprised o f  the 
congressional secretaries prominent in the 1930s, Johnson invited Long to speak to the 
group. Long obliged in early 1935 and delivered one o f his more memorable speeches 
comparing Rockefeller, Baruch, and the wealthy elite to "fifteen people" at a church 
picnic who "go take eighty-five percent of the food" intended for a hundred church
75 T. Harry Williams, "Huey, Lyndon, and Southern Radicalism," in The Selected  Essays ofT . Harry 
Williams (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1983), 226.
76 Quoted in Miller, Lyndon, 47.
77 Quoted in Kearns, Lyndon Johnson and the American D ream , 92.
78 Huey Long, Kingfish to America: Share Our Wealth, Selected Senatorial Papers o f  Huey P. Long, 
edited by Henry M. Christman (N ew  York: Schocken Books, 1985), 129.
79 Quoted in Sam Houston Johnson, My Brother Lyndon, 45.
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members and "run off' with it. "Are we going to let them go?" Long asked the Little 
Congressmen. "No sir! We're goin' to go get 'em by the neck and say, 'Come back with 
that grub you ain't got no business with!’"80 "Many people thought Lyndon, when he 
spoke o f doing things for 'the folks,' was talking pure hogwash," Johnson's brother Sam 
recalled, "but it was a direct pickup from Huey's language."81
For all his admiration, Johnson responded only reluctantly to Long's call for 
programs that clearly entailed a massive amount o f new public spending. At this stage in 
his political career, Johnson still subscribed to fairly orthodox views o f the nation's 
political economy, including the concept o f a limited if not balanced budget. Without an 
extensive economics education, Johnson found that balanced budget views simply 
dovetailed too readily with his more deeply held convictions on personal, corporate, or 
governmental spending in general. Frugality would always characterize his approach 
toward spending and he would always insist upon "a dollar's worth for a dollar spent;" in 
the 1930s he was also unable to conceive o f a fiscal policy that employed intentional 
deficit spending. He agreed with Long that the poor and the disadvantaged should 
receive a fairer share of the favors local, state, and national governments were already 
dispensing, and that there were additional things that state and federal governments could 
do for the poor. He was convinced, however, that this could be done largely with a shift 
in fiscal priorities and with improved government efficiency. Directing more of its 
current funding toward the poor and less o f it toward the wealthy— and ridding itself of 
wasteful practices—the federal government could bring about the redistribution o f 
wealth that Long clamored for and substantial poor relief without having to resort to 
large spending increases or intentional deficit spending.82 Johnson was somewhat
80 Quoted in Miller, Lyndon , 49.
81 Ibid., 47.
82 Given the prevailing fiscal policy (that Roosevelt only reluctantly abandoned)— a supply side approach 
best symbolized by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and the National Recovery Administration—  
such a limited non-Keynesian approach would have undoubtedly produced som e truly beneficial 
Keynesian results. Government deficit spending, had it been endorsed by a Keynesian president, would
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dismayed, then, by Long's apparent willingness to spend the most enormous sums 
imaginable and to do so without the slightest trace o f concern for efficiency. It should be 
noted, o f course, that Long's willingness to spend came largely from his eagerness to be 
politically unorthodox or even politically wreckless; it did not hinge upon any carefully 
sketched budget plans, nor did it stem from any academic conviction that fiscal deficits 
were inherently valuable. He clearly gave no one the opportunity to challenge him or to 
support him on such an unorthodox view. Moreover, parts of the orthodox view, even for 
radical populists like Huey Long and liberals like Lyndon Johnson, still possessed great 
explanatory power. Keynes had not yet published his General Theory, and it was widely 
known among political insiders, though seldom acknowledged, that a vast, and often 
incoherent, array o f corporate-govemment arrangements had soaked up much o f the 
public treasury for as far back as most could tell. It took little political imagination, then, 
even for a well-placed congressional secretary, to conclude that the poor could be lifted 
up without significantly greater public spending. One only had to take some of the 
generous appropriations earmarked for corporate America, Johnson and others like him 
reasoned, and spread them out a little more widely among those Americans struggling to 
survive. At this stage, few populists or liberals saw government as a potential economic 
manager (except with regard to specific industries), and hardly anyone at all spoke of 
demand as the key to investment and growth. Most who championed the cause o f the 
poor and the working class believed, instead, that government only had to police the 
existing fiscal policy to liberate enough money for poor relief, improved education, and 
job training. For someone like Lyndon Johnson, who would carry this persuasion into the 
era o f a more professional and scientific political economy, this meant that efficiency and 
generosity toward the poor could go hand in hand. In his mind they always had.
have been utilized to bolster consumer and investment demand; differing marginal propensities to 
consume would have enabled the shifting o f  government assistance away from the wealthy and to the poor 
to produce, without resort to deficit spending, a smaller but still beneficial increase in aggregate demand.
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In the midst o f  the Great Depression, Johnson was not yet able to see this in 
technical economic terms, nor was he able to produce a comprehensive substitute for the 
economic orthodoxy he still partly accepted. He admired and appreciated Patman, 
Rayburn, and Maverick because they were outspoken and crafty defenders o f both the 
poor and the working class and because they were perfectly willing to use the unique 
powers o f the federal government to solve economic problems. He admired Huey Long 
simply because Long cared for the poor and because he forced conservative opponents to 
confront the many awkward truths that defined American corporate capitalism. When 
Long was shot on September 8,1935, and died two days later, many folks in Louisiana 
and throughout the nation rejoiced; the "dictator o f Louisiana" was dead. "There weren't 
many poor folks among them," Johnson later recalled, "they knew who and what Huey 
was."83
Johnson's entry onto the Washington political scene, however, provided him with 
more than just introductions to the era's leading populist politicians. He also saw, for 
example, how silly and destructive partisan politics could be, for he spent his first year in 
the capital city watching his own party encourage economic turmoil for political 
advantage. As much as he thought Herbert Hoover to be an oafish politician and all too 
strangely detached from economic reality, and as much as he regarded the 269-165 
Republican advantage on Kleberg's side o f the Capitol as a genuine liability, he was still 
chagrined by the level o f Democratic party obstructionism designed solely to prevent 
President Hoover's reelection.84 Working with Kleberg, an ultra-conservative Democrat 
who often referred to FDR as a "Bolshevik," Johnson also became more confident in his 
own ability to persuade or soften the conservative opposition, in the fashion o f his 
political mentor, Sam Rayburn. "Easily the richest man in Congress," Johnson's brother 
Sam recalled, "Dick [Kleberg] had a flair for social life and was only too happy to have a
83 Quoted in Miller, Lyndon , 48n.
84 Dallek, Lone Star R ising , 106.
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diligent resourceful assistant 'tending the store."'85 When Johnson realized that his 
assumption o f almost all o f Congressman Kleberg's day-to-day office responsibilities— 
warranted by Kleberg's inattention to practically everything but his daily pilgrimage to 
the Burning Tree Country Club—had made him somewhat indispensable, he found that 
he could convince the conservative congressman to support liberal New Deal measures 
that he would have otherwise forsaken or opposed. Partly by threatening to quit his post, 
for example, he persuaded Kleberg to support the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933.86 
The folks at home "need this legislation," Johnson warned Kleberg when the 
congressman proposed to vote against the AAA. "With some o f those families down 
there, it's a matter o f keeping bread on the table. If you throw them down, I can't go 
home and face them."87 Taking on added responsibility also exposed Johnson to the 
many avenues upon which congressional power flowed. In 1933, when he 
outmaneuvered Vice President and fellow Texan John Gamer for the right to appoint 
postmasterships in Texas (on Kleberg's behalf), Gamer replied, "who the hell is this boy 
Lyndon Johnson? Where the hell did Kleberg get a boy with savvy like that."88 He also 
learned that he could charm conservatives like his boss, by renouncing supposedly 
"liberal" propositions with which he genuinely disagreed and which otherwise warranted 
little attention. Roosevelt is "spending us into bankruptcy," Johnson would tell Kleberg, 
Roy Miller, and the many other conservatives whose paths he often crossed, often 
provoking an equally inane but salutary response from his conservative audience.89 
When Miller's son, Dale, also a powerful and conservative lobbyist, seemed dismayed by 
the rapport between his father and Kleberg's "New Deal" secretary, the elder Miller told
85 Sam Houston Johnson, M y Brother Lyndon, 44. Bruce Schulman reported that Kleberg "devoted most 
o f his attention to golf, fine dinners, and good whiskey." Schulman, Lyndon B. Johnson an d  American  
Liberalism, 10.
86 Dallek, Lone S tar Rising, 108.
87 Quoted by Russell Morton Brown in Miller, Lyndon, 43. Brown worked alongside Johnson in 
Congressman Kleberg's office.
88 Quoted in Dallek, Lone Star Rising, 113.
89 Quoted in Caro, Path to Power, 272.
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him not to worry, that Johnson "was not a wild-eyed liberal."90 To Johnson, liberalism 
never would imply unqualified government spending, nor had it ever been that way for 
FDR, Rayburn or any o f his other political mentors. Walter Lippmann once noted that 
"no one feels it necessary to identify the science o f chemistry with every theory that 
Davy or Faraday propounded, and there is no more reason for identifying liberalism with 
all that liberals, or men who supposed they were liberals, have at one time or another 
promulgated as gospel."91 Such a characterization reflected much of Johnson's basic 
approach. It nevertheless served him well to pretend among conservative colleagues that 
liberalism was defined by a willingness to soak the rich or spend vast sums o f the 
public's money—as it certainly was for some—and to renounce that approach boldly and 
with colorful contempt. Wastefulness or indiscriminate spending was something Johnson 
truly always abhorred, and he believed that opposition to such calamity defied 
ideological description. But it was also convinced that it was an effective way to make 
conservatives listen more reasonably and carefully to liberal argumentation. FDR often 
blurred his political ideology or economic strategy to irritate opponents, who enjoyed, as 
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. put it, "the advantages of oversimplification which come from 
observation without responsibility."92 Johnson did it to gain their ear and their 
forbearance. Convincing himself that conservatives—even reactionary ones— were more 
politically malleable than they were often perceived to be, Johnson also became 
convinced, more and more, that consensus politics could provide the key to a successful 
liberal economic strategy.
In early 1935, near the end of his stint as Kleberg's congressional secretary, Johnson 
was offered a $10,000 a year position as General Electric's number two lobbyist. Though
90 Quoted in ibid., 273.
91 Walter Lippmann, An Inquiry Into the Principles o f  the G ood Society (Boston: Little, Brown, 1937),
239. It is from this work that Johnson and his speechwriters derived the "Great Society" label for Johnson's 
domestic agenda.
92 Arthur Schlesinger, Jr, The Age o f  Roosevelt: The Coming o f  the New D eal (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 
1959), 530.
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the salary would have been over three times what he earned working for Kleberg and 
equal to Kleberg's own salary, Johnson spumed the offer. Robert Caro suggested that he 
turned it down only after Roy Miller advised him that acceptance would preclude any 
chance for a major political office in Texas. "His reason for hesitating was not principle," 
Caro maintained, but his unrelentless drive for political power.93 Although political 
power was important to the young congressional aide—Johnson would have been foolish 
to think that he could push for economic reforms or win the kind of gratitude he longed 
for without it—so was his predilection for electoral politics and his guarded repugnance 
toward companies like General Electric. Although G.E.'s Gerard Swope had lobbied 
strenuously and effectively for Roosevelt's National Recovery Administration, and 
former G.E. executive Owen Young had just engineered the renegotiation o f German 
reparations in 1929, the company had also just emerged (1931) from a well publicized 
anti-trust lawsuit and had agreed to divest themselves of RCA as a result. Implicated in 
numerous price-fixing schemes, both prior to and following the offer made to Johnson, 
General Electric found itself as the defendant in sixty-five separate anti-trust actions 
between 1911 and 1967.94 The G. E. position truly offered the kind of power Johnson 
sought, but it also seemed likely to restrict the opportunity for meaningful economic and 
political change, the primary reason for which Johnson sought power and influence in the 
first place. In 1936, Johnson would refuse an offer to become a commissioner on the 
powerful Texas Railroad Commission for many of the same reasons 95 By mid-year 
1935, however, Johnson was offered another position, ending the internal debate over the 
G.E. offer. With help from Rayburn and Maverick, and conservative Democrats Senator
93 Caro, Path to Power, 339.
94 Theodore Philip Kovaleff, Business and Government During the Eisenhower Administration: A Study o f  
the Antitrust Policy o f  the Antitrust Division o f  the Justice Departm ent (Athens: Ohio University Press, 
1980), 120-124. G. E. had also been associated historically with public utility subsidiaries, the very 
companies that had resisted schemes to electrify the Texas hill country. See Louis D. Brandeis, Other 
People's Money and  How the Bankers Use It (Boston: Bedford Books, St. Martin's Press, 1995), 118-120.
95 Caro, Path to Power, 363.
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Tom Connally and Congressman Martin Dies as well, on July 26, 1935, Johnson was 
appointed as the Texas state director o f the National Youth Administration, an arm o f the 
Roosevelt administration's Works Progress Administration. Designed to help high school 
and college age kids stay in school, the NYA turned out to be tailor made for a man of 
Johnson's interests and ability. Although the youngest o f all the state NYA directors, at 
27 years old, Johnson soon won praise from NYA national director Aubrey Williams and 
from Eleanor Roosevelt for his leadership o f the Texas NYA. Williams, the son o f an 
Alabama sharecropper and a Southern liberal in the mold o f Leon Keyserling, Abe 
Fortas, and Will Alexander, found much to admire in the young Texan, and soon 
regarded him as the NYA's best and most energetic state director. Eleanor Roosevelt 
added her commendation on a visit to Austin in 1936.96 Praise also flowed from many 
other quarters. Frank Home, uncle to Lena, and one o f the first blacks hired by the NYA, 
told Robert Weaver, then at the Department o f the Interior, that there was "this guy in 
Texas who was really something....Johnson didn't think the NYA was for middle-class 
people, the way a lot o f congressmen did; he thought it was for poor people, including 
Mexican-Americans and Negroes."97 Unlike previous federal and state assistance 
programs in Texas, Johnson's NYA did not exclude blacks. Texas' four black colleges 
and numerous black teenagers benefitted from the aggressive efforts o f the Texas NYA 
and its youthful director.98
By June 1936, the Texas NYA had 135 roadside parks under construction—a project 
idea invented by someone on Johnson's staff and copied by several other NYA 
programs—and 3,600 youths earning thirty dollars per month working on them.99
96 Conkin, B ig D addy From the Pedernales, 75.
97 Quoted in Miller, Lyndon, 56.
98 Caro, Path to Power, 364; Conkin, B ig D addy From the Pedernales, 78-79. See also Richard A. 
Reiman, The New D eal and  American Youth: Ideas an d  Ideals in a  D epression D ecade  (Athens: 
University o f  Georgia Press, 1992), 2-3, for an appraisal o f  overall NYA efforts at combatting racial 
discrimination.
99 Caro, Path to Power, 348.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
96
Despite Robert Caro's charge that Johnson saw the NYA only as a stepping stone to 
greater political power, and as a way to control men, getting large chunks o f the 
approximately two million dollars allocated to the Texas NYA into the hands o f the 
state's poorest citizens is largely what compelled Johnson to curse his assistants, gobble 
lunch at his desk, and work from seven am to midnight, seven days a week. When 
Johnson's boss came to town everything remained the same, including the breakneck 
pace. "One time Aubrey Williams came to Texas," Fenner Roth, one o f Johnson's NYA 
associates, recalled, "It got around one or two o'clock and Aubrey said, 'I'm hungry.' And 
Lyndon just wheeled into a hamburger joint and said, 'Give him a hamburger. We're in a 
hurry.100'" Since Williams and Johnson were already friends and mutual admirers, there 
was little compelling reason for Johnson to offer him lunch on the fly other than his 
desire to keep the Texas NYA on its feet. "Put them to work; get them into school!" 
Johnson would shout to his NYA assistants.101 "The days did not include breaks, coffee 
or otherwise," Robert Caro noted, "and lunch was a sandwich at the desk, or a hamburger 
or a bowl of chili hastily gulped at the six-stool cafe downstairs."102 Although he may 
have wanted to impress Williams with his tenacity, Johnson was anxious to do so largely 
because he was genuinely proud of his NYA accomplishments and because he knew that 
Williams was too. In 1935 and early 1936, few state NYA programs had managed to 
meet established hiring quotas and Williams admitted that the overall program was "off 
to a bad start."103 The Texas NYA, despite the unique scope and complexity o f its 
mission, was one o f the exceptions, a source o f considerable pride and optimism for both 
Aubrey Williams and Lyndon Johnson.
One o f the unique characteristics o f the NYA was its requirement that 75% of its 
funds be spent on wages. Mandated by NYA Bulletin #11, this requirement was
100 Quoted in Miller, Lyndon, 55.
101 Quoted in Caro, Path to Power, 358.
102 Ibid., 353.
103 Quoted in ibid., 364.
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implemented largely to ensure that the program did what it proposed to do: use its 
limited funds to help high school and college age kids stay in school rather than to enrich 
private contractors or suppliers. With the 75% rule, the federal government was, in 
effect, telling its NYA directors that "trickle-down" economics did not produce jobs in 
sufficient number and that supply side leakages were a real problem in any jobs program. 
Whether Johnson acknowledged this explicitly in 1936 or not is unclear. What was 
certain, however, was that he made a strenuous effort to conform to or to exceed the 75% 
rule. "He was very, very detailed, far more than I knew Lyndon was," remarked 
Johnson's NYA assistant Sherman Birdwell. "....He got down to exactly what 
Washington was trying to tell us ought to be done and what it meant to us....He wanted 
things to be absolutely correct."104 Accordingly, Texas NYA jobs were designed to 
produce something o f value and to use as little private contracting as possible. The Texas 
Highway department, created two decades earlier by Sam Johnson's political idol, Jim 
Ferguson, provided concrete and lumber and ferried the student workers to and from 
jobsites in department trucks. The trees and shrubs that the NYA planted along Texas 
roadways, purchased from private nurseries at the outset, were, by 1937, coming from a 
central greenhouse that the NYA had constructed the year before.105 Setting a precedent 
that he would follow throughout his political career, Johnson also endeavored to spend as 
little as possible on administrative expenses. Indeed, the two years during which Johnson 
presided over the Texas NYA, the agency spent less on staff expenses than the modest 
amounts budgeted by the federal government.106 Dependent upon eligibility certification 
from other agencies, Johnson even once organized and arranged an operation by which 
twenty NYA employees attempted to visit the homes of approximately 8000 Austin area 
students in one weekend. Eligibility certificates had arrived for these students late on a
104 Quoted in ibid., 354.
105 Ibid., 368.
106 Conkin, Big D addy From the Pedernales, 76. The administrative budgets for 1936 and 1937, 
respectively, were $90,000 and $133,000.
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Friday afternoon and Johnson informed his staff that he wanted every one o f the 8000 on 
the job by Monday morning. "We didn't contact all o f them," NYA project supervisor 
Ernest Morgan recalled, "but we had 5,600 of them down there, and we put them to 
work."107 No other NYA office came close to matching the efficiency o f Lyndon 
Johnson's. "The productivity o f his staff," Paul Conkin asserted, "had to rival, if  not 
exceed, that o f any government operation in American history."108 In the end, Johnson's 
NYA experience did little to dissuade him from the political economics he had already 
begun to absorb: concerned most critically with full employment, dependent upon 
government guidance and efficiency, and disdainful of independent supply side 
strategies.109
Only when James P. "Buck" Buchanan, Texas' congressman from Johnson's Tenth 
District, suffered a fatal heart attack on February 22,1937, did Johnson divert his 
attention from his NYA directorship. "When I come back to Washington," Johnson had 
promised, "I'm coming back as a Congressman."110 Buchanan's death clearly presented 
Johnson with the opportunity to make this return trip and while Aubrey Williams 
protested, Johnson wasted little time announcing his candidacy for the vacant office.111
107 Caro, Path to Power, 358. Approximately 8000 o f  these certificates had arrived that Friday; Johnson's 
employees managed to reach only 5600 o f  them.
108 Conkin, Big D addy From the Pedernales, 76.
109 The NYA also initiated the first affirmative action program in U.S. history, creating an aid program for 
black graduate students. With the encouragement o f  Aubrey Williams, Mary McLeod Bethune, and 
Johnson (though his tenure at the N Y A , and therefore his efforts, were much more short-lived) the NYA  
urged the study o f  problems unique to America's black youth. See John A. Salmond, A Southern Rebel: 
The Life and Times o f  Aubrey Willis Williams, 1890-1965  (Chapel Hill: University o f  North Carolina 
Press, 1983.), and Richard A. Reiman, The N ew D eal and  American Youth: Ideas an d  Ideals in a  
D epression D ecade  (Athens: University o f  Georgia Press, 1992), for analyses o f  the N YA  mission and 
Johnson's brief but not insignificant role. It is interesting to note that Reiman, in his comparison o f  the 
N Y A  and the Great Society, suggested that the Great Society planners "believed that the poverty problem 
required a surgical solution, not the assault on a broad front preferred by the New  Deal." See ibid., 194-
195. Suggesting that Johnson envisioned his entire economic strategy as part o f  the War on Poverty, I 
contend just the opposite.
110 Quoted in Caro, Path to  Power, 436.
111 According to Johnson's brother Sam, Lyndon was anxious to run from the start but hesitated briefly 
until their father advised him that he should declare right away to discourage Congressman Buchanan's 
widow. "You go on and announce right away," Johnson's father advised. "The minute Mrs. Buchanan 
knows she's got opposition she won't get in. Hell, Lyndon she's too old to campaign." Quoted in Sam
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"There were times when I thought I'd explode from all the excitement bottled up inside," 
Johnson later told Doris Kearns.112 In declaring his candidacy, however, Johnson faced 
tremendous odds and was, at the outset, perhaps the least likely o f the ten announced 
candidates to replace Congressman Buchanan; he was not even mentioned among the 
several "favorites" for the position and his most significant political connections were in 
the Congressional district's least populated area. Yet, not quite two months later, when 
election day came, Johnson received word that he had won the special election over 
seven other candidates with 8,280 of the 29,943 votes cast.113 Although he had been all 
but counted out at the beginning, Johnson had begun his campaign only eight days after 
Buchanan's death and had campaigned longer and harder than any of the other 
candidates. Lady Bird had also given the campaign an early infusion o f  cash with an 
$10,000 contribution— drawn from her expected inheritance— and Johnson collected 
thousands more from a variety o f  sources.114 Indeed, from this point on, Johnson would 
exhibit a virtually unsurpassed ability to raise campaign funds—both for himself and for 
colleagues in the Democratic party—and would also witness the rapid growth o f his own 
net worth.115
Like Keynes or "Farmer Jim" Ferguson, Johnson saw little contradiction between 
populist or liberal economic policies and substantial personal wealth. As Johnson saw it, 
economic liberalism stood, first and foremost, for the eradication o f poverty and for full 
employment, but this also implied stronger markets and greater opportunities for
Houston Johnson, M y Brother Lyndon, 54. See also Caro, Path to P ow er, 390-392; Dallek, Lone Star 
Rising , 144-146; and Conkin, Big Daddy’ From the Pedernales, 79-81.
112 Quoted in Kearns, Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream, 86.
113 As a special election no run-off was necessary under the existing Texas election code. Two o f  the 
original ten candidates dropped out o f  the race before election day.
114 According to Johnson fundraiser, Ed Clark, total contributions amounted to between $75,000 and 
$100,000. Two o f  Johnson's opponents, C. N. Avery and Houghton Brownlee, raised similar amounts and 
a third, Austin attorney Polk Shelton, raised between $40,000 and $50,000. Dallek, Lone S tar Rising, 154- 
155; Caro, Path to  Power, 408-409.
115 See also Robert Caro, "The Years o f  Lyndon Johnson: The Power o f  Money," A tlantic Monthly, 
October 1982, 50-84.
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successful investment and individual affluence. Johnson also engineered a political 
arrangement with Washington friends that allowed him to pass out federal parity checks 
to the district's farmers, a move that almost certainly translated into more than a few 
extra votes. "Well, it outraged me too," one opponent exclaimed, "but I thought he was 
smart as hell to get it done."116 Johnson's father's political connections, and those he had 
established as the director o f the state's NYA, augmented these other efforts and helped 
provide Johnson with a reliable if  slim electoral base. Nevertheless, the two most 
significant factors that helped him win six o f the district's ten counties and the special 
election itself were the support he derived from casting himself as a 100% Roosevelt 
man and his access to state senator Alvin Wirtz' political influence in Austin, the city 
where most of the district's population lay. Presenting himself to the voters and political 
power brokers o f the 10th Congressional District as a New Dealer and a supporter of 
President Roosevelt proved to be an obvious but potentially unprofitable campaign 
strategy. Texas governor James Allred, Austin American and Austin Statesman publisher 
Charles Marsh, and five o f Johnson's opponents were also outspoken supporters of 
Roosevelt and the New Deal. Poll results published in Marsh's papers reported that Tenth 
District voters supported FDR and his court-packing plan by a 7:1 ratio.117 "Nowhere in 
the state," Robert Caro noted, "was support for the President more firm than in the Tenth 
District."118
However questionable the strategy may have seemed, Johnson exploited the 
Roosevelt connection unstintingly, proved himself the only candidate willing to support 
Roosevelt on the infamous "court-packing plan"— introduced only weeks before the 
campaign—and gained a real advantage in the process. "Franklin D. and Lyndon B." 
proclaimed billboards throughout the hill country.119 That President Roosevelt admired
116 Dallek, Lone S tar Rising, 155.
117 Poll results cited in Caro, Path to Power, 395.
118 Ibid.
119 Dallek, Lone S tar Rising, 148.
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Johnson's political savvy, depended on Southern liberals like the young Texan, and 
offered indirect campaign support also improved Johnson's chances. "It is my 
conviction," Roosevelt proclaimed the following year, "that the South presents right now 
the nation's number one economic problem..."120 Determined to encourage Southern 
liberalism as a solution to this problem, Roosevelt clearly pinned his hopes on politicians 
like Johnson.121 In early April, Elliot Roosevelt, the President's son, wired best wishes 
for a "glorious victory in your race for Congress," and Roosevelt spumed C. N. Avery's 
requests to disavow whole-hearted support o f Lyndon Johnson.122 "On the surface the 
administration is keeping hands off the contest," Washington columnist Drew Pearson 
reported, "but under cover is quietly boosting Johnson."123
Johnson had cultivated Alvin Wirtz' friendship while working as Kleberg's secretary 
and had established his NYA office in Austin's Littlefield Building, one floor below 
Wirtz' law office. He had also named Wirtz chairman o f the NYA's State Advisory 
Board. When Johnson climbed the stairs to Wirtz' office for one o f their frequent 
conversations, Wirtz would tell his secretary, "Here comes m'boy Lyndon."124 What 
ultimately clinched Wirtz' support for Johnson's congressional campaign, however, and 
therefore the support o f a number of Austin voters, was his awareness o f Johnson's 
political skills and access to influential congressmen and members o f the Roosevelt 
administration. For his part, Wirtz was an outspoken New Dealer and a proponent of 
public power and aid to the poor, but, like so many of Johnson's role models, he also had 
little dispute, per se, with prosperous corporations, powerful lobbyists, or wealthy 
entrepreneurs, and he liked to effect compromise and cooperation between wealthy 
clients and the less well-off beneficiaries of the New Deal reforms he actively supported.
120 Quoted in Frank Freidel, FDR and the South (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1965), 
99.
121 See ibid., 20-22, 99-102.
122 Dallek, Lone Star Rising, 150.
123 Quoted in ibid.
124 Caro, Path to  Power, 392.
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"You're conclusion wasn't very good," Wirtz once counseled Johnson after Johnson had 
excoriated a local corporate executive. "It's one thing to tell a man to go to hell. It's 
another thing to make a man go to hell....It took me months to get him here and it just 
took you minutes to bust up the whole meeting..."125 Despite this transgression, Wirtz 
sensed that Johnson had a similar- disposition, and he knew that he did not lack the skill 
or the influence to effect artful compromise and provident legislation.
In the early 1930s, Wirtz had cozied up to the Samuel Insull power generation 
empire by acting as its legal representative for potential hydroelectric projects in central 
Texas. By the time o f Congressman Buchanan's death in 1937, he was actively lobbying 
for federal approval o f and assistance with a series o f dams on the central Texas 
Colorado River. While the biggest o f these dams, the Marshall Ford Dam, had been 
given a green light by the Roosevelt administration and had secured tentative financial 
backing from the Department o f Interior's Bureau o f Reclamation, all at the behest of 
Congressman Buchanan, only half o f the $10 million price tag had been guaranteed when 
Buchanan died in February, 1937.126 Wirtz was in a real bind, then, for he had to find 
someone to continue the work that Buchanan, the powerful chairman of the House 
Appropriations Committee, had initiated. Jobs, abundant and cheap power for the 
recently established Lower Colorado River Authority, a state agency represented by 
Wirtz; and profits for the construction firm o f Brown and Root, also represented by 
Wirtz and chosen to do the construction work on the dams, all hung in the balance.127 
Because, as Kleberg's secretary, Lyndon Johnson had already opened doors for Wirtz in 
Washington, and because Johnson's lobbyist friend Roy Miller was a confidante o f Texas 
congressman Joseph Mansfield, chairman of the Rivers and Harbors Committee that
125 Quoted in Dallek, Lone Star Rising, 183. Emphasis in original.
126 This was done at the request o f  the Comptroller General's office who discovered that Buchanan had 
gotten authorization from Roosevelt without any congressional hearing or vote during the 1936 summer 
recess. See Caro, Path to Power, 379.
127 Caro, Path to Power, 376-385; Dallek, Lone Star Rising, 174-176; Conkin, Big D addy From the 
Pedernales, 90-93.
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would decide the dam's fate, Johnson had little difficulty overcoming Wirtz' initial 
reluctance to encourage or support his congressional campaign.128
Indeed, Wirtz had chosen the right candidate; President Roosevelt liked Johnson and 
Roosevelt would ultimately provide all the backing the Marshall Ford dam project 
required. "Give the kid a dam," Roosevelt told Tommy Corcoran after Johnson's election, 
whereupon Corcoran then proceeded to help engineer special authorization for the 
project.129 With the second appropriation approved, the Marshall Ford Dam (later 
renamed the Mansfield Dam) became a certainty, Wirtz and the Browns stood to make a 
great deal o f money, and Lyndon Johnson secured the allegiance and gratitude of 
powerful, soon to be much wealthier, constituents. Often overlooked, however, was the 
most significant payoff here, especially for a professed liberal o f populist origins like 
Lyndon Johnson: cheap and abundant power for an area that previously had little at any 
price. In Johnson's mind, alongside the dreams of higher office and greater power, were 
the memories o f hill country women laboring in primitive kitchens, cooking and washing 
without the benefit o f any electric appliances. "I had visions o f damming the Colorado 
and Pedernales rivers," Johnson later recalled, "of building a simple, rural electrical line 
out to the farmers that lived in my Hill Country, o f providing flood control, irrigation, 
cheap power, o f conserving the land....But the power companies wouldn't let me do 
it."130 Lamenting the prohibitive cost o f stringing new lines into a region populated by so 
few people, Texas Power and Light, the local utilities company, had refused, despite 
numerous entreaties, to provide more than one line for the whole congressional 
district.131 Johnson's persistent lobbying and Roosevelt's empathy spelled the difference
128Caro, Path to Power, 285.
129 Ibid., 460.
130 Quoted in Miller, Lyndon, 69-70. See also Lady Bird Johnson and Virginia Foster Durr, quoted in 
ibid., 9-10, both o f  whom suggest that Lyndon's memory o f  the back-breaking chores his mother had to 
perform motivated his efforts on behalf o f  public power and rural electrification projects.
131 Dallek, Lone S tar Rising, 177. The Rural Electrification Administration had also stymied the 
transmission o f  electrical power to the Texas hill country because o f  its own population density rule.
When Johnson convinced FDR to support hill country electrification and to override the REA density rule,
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and though the dam projects greatly benefitted Alvin Wirtz and Brown and Root, they 
also brought power to the farmers and housewives o f the Tenth Congressional District. 
"Of all the things I have ever done," Johnson wrote former Rural Electrification 
Administration director, John Carmody, in 1959, "nothing has ever given me as much 
satisfaction as bringing power to the hill country o f Texas."132
When the Austin Dam project, further down the Colorado and within Austin's city 
limits, met an impasse in early 1938, Johnson resolved the political and financial 
problems here as well. Because the city o f Austin wanted ownership for the power 
revenues that funded other services, and because the Lower Colorado River Authority 
sought ownership as well to prevent the rise o f a significant competitor in the generation 
o f local power, Johnson was forced to engineer a compromise. On May 2, 1938 the PWA 
granted final approval for a $2.3 million loan with which to rebuild the Austin Dam. This 
was achieved, however, only after Lyndon Johnson devised a plan where the city o f 
Austin would lease the dam to the LCRA for $20,000 annually— payable in electricity 
for a period o f thirty years— and where the city could reclaim sole ownership at the end 
o f the thirty year period for cost plus depreciation. Johnson managed to satisfy both the 
city and the LCRA (and the PWA as well, who did not want to see the LCRA's ability to 
pay back other previous loans compromised) with this innovative financial arrangement, 
and he was able, once again, to secure cheap electricity for the hill country.133 On top of 
everything else, the Austin dam negotiations proved to Johnson that liberal economic and 
social objectives need not be sacrificed with consensus politics or creative financial 
management. He would seldom hesitate to use the same tools in the future.
R oosevelt told John Carmody, then REA director, "you just go ahead and approve this for m e— charge it 
to my account. I'll gamble on those folks because I've been down in that country and those folks— they'll 
catch up to that density problem because they breed pretty fast." Quoted in ibid., 181.
132 Quoted in ibid., 183.
133 L. Patrick Hughes, "Working Within the System: Lyndon Johnson and Tom Miller, 1937-1939," 
Southwestern H istorical Q uarterly , October 1992, 198-200.
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The dam-building exercises clearly gave Johnson an opportunity to ingratiate 
himself with powerful, wealthy, and therefore politically invaluable, Texans like Alvin 
Wirtz and George and Herman Brown. But they did not signal, as it has so often been 
assumed, either a growing acceptance o f economic conservatism or a growing 
preoccupation with money. What "conservative" instincts Johnson possessed clearly 
preceded his congressional career and remained with him for the balance of his public 
life. Frugality and the willingness to entertain conservative, even reactionary, economic 
concerns, always marked Johnson's approach to political economics. Johnson did not 
simply begin to appreciate the ideology of reactionary figures like Herman Brown in the 
late 1930s any more than he had the equally pernicious outlook o f his father's 
conservative opponents in the 1910s or 1920s. He did find, nevertheless, amid Brown's 
generally repugnant conservatism, as he almost always had before with others, what one 
historian referred to as "points o f convergence," and what Johnson's father referred to, 
citing the prophet Isaiah, as the capacity for "reasoning together."134 Regarding general 
political economics and basic economic strategies, Johnson and Herman Brown 
remained polar opposites, but they also shared a "distrust of bureaucratic waste" and 
"intellectual abstractions" and a thorough respect for "practical accomplishments."135 
Despite their ongoing differences, Johnson managed to enlist Brown's financial support 
for liberal causes and Brown managed to win political favors from a true ideological 
opponent. They benefitted each other enormously but they could also "reason together." 
After acquiring radio and television stations and commercial ranch property, Johnson's 
advancing entreprenerial experience also increased his appreciation o f technical and 
managerial innovation as well as the necessity for adequate profits and sound monetary
134 "Points o f  convergence" reference from Conkin, Big D addy From the Pedernales, 93. Johnson's 
favorite biblical quotation, that his father often invoked at family meetings, was Isaiah 1:18 , "Come now, 
let us reason together, saith the lord: Though your sins be as scarlet, they shall be as white as snow, though 
they be red like crimson they shall be as wool."
135 Conkin, Big D addy From the Pedernales, 93.
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policy. But it hardly deepened his already noticeable penchant for consensus or his 
willingness to listen to all sides o f any economic policy debate. "Business," Johnson 
came to say, "is what makes the mare go....I want businessmen to make just as much 
profit as they reasonably can."136 Accordingly, he always reminded business leaders that 
he shared many o f their noblest concerns and that he appreciated their often unique 
talents and personalities. Though he felt much differently about the business 
community's all too frequent willingness to exploit the poor and their equally prevalent 
tendency toward selfishness and social indifference, he also found that consensus politics 
and discourse made it that much easier to establish constructive criticism.
His attitude toward money, too, remained essentially the same over the course o f his 
career. Once he had entered electoral politics, it had indeed become a larger issue and an 
inescapable part o f any successful campaign, and he had always believed that productive 
enterprise should be rewarded with substantial income, but he tended to regard money 
then as he always had: little more than a vehicle by which he could help or please others. 
As Paul Conkin noted, Johnson was the financial mainstay of an extended family for 
much of his adult life. "He helped buy his mother's house in Austin, found a job for his 
sister Josefa in the NYA, tried to keep Sam Houston sober enough to hold down a job, 
and still made payments on old family debts contracted by either his father or 
himself."137 This, coupled with his desire to avoid the economic fate of his father and 
grandfather—who both died penniless, compelled Johnson to become both an incessant 
provider and a person given to almost ineradicable concern for financial solvency and the 
accumulation o f wealth.138 Impressed by what he referred to as Johnson's "peculiar 
attitude toward money," Robert M. Jackson, aide to Texas congressman R. E. Thomason 
in the 1930s, recalled that Johnson's "idea o f money was to buy something for somebody
136 Quoted in Hugh Sidey, "LBJ Populist versus LBJ Entrepreneur," Life, September 9, 1966, 34D.
1 j7 Conkin, Big D addy From the Pedernales, 93.
138 See Caro, Path to Power, xiii-xv, for a brief but close examination o f  this "fear."
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
107
with it. I remember one time just before Mother's Day when I told him I was going 
downtown to get my mother's present. He thought that was a wonderful idea and so he 
went with me. But instead o f just buying a present for his mother, he bought things for 
the mothers o f many people that he knew from Texas."139 Attorney General Ramsey 
Clark referred to Johnson as a "compulsive giver" and recalled that "he just wanted to 
give something always.... You could laugh about some of it, because a lot o f it was kind 
o f junky stuff, but the point was, he wanted to give people something..."140 Johnson paid 
for renovations to the homes o f his less wealthy hill country neighbors, and he once 
arranged and insisted on paying for the emergency surgery o f a former campaign worker, 
blinded suddenly by an allegedly inoperable brain tumor.141 Even when he attracted 
benefactors such as George and Herman Brown, Johnson remained, as Paul Conkin 
asserted, "unusually circumspect in accepting financial help....He remained a relatively 
poor man until after World War II and then accumulated wealth through the indirect, not 
the direct, patronage of well-placed friends."142 In short, Johnson often agreed with 
conservatives who otherwise disparaged his populist heritage and liberal economic 
perspective, used many of the same to finance increasingly expensive political 
campaigns, but did so largely because it enabled him to gain rhetorical, ideological, and 
pecuniary leverage in a conservative political economy. He was not only willing to
139 Quoted in Miller, Lyndon, 537.
140 Quoted in ibid., 538.
141 Ibid.; Ernest Goldstein, in Hardesty, ed., The Johnson Years, 131-132. Craig Raupe, the former 
campaign worker in question, was told originally that he would not live another forty-eight hours. His wife  
panicked, called the White House, whereupon Johnson arranged a transfer to Walter Reed hospital. At 
Walter Reed, Raupe's tumor was removed and his health restored.
142 Conkin, Big D addy From the Pedernales, 93. See also Dallek, Lone Star Rising, 359-360; and Louis 
M. Kohlmeier, "The Johnson Wealth: How the President's Wife Built $17,500 Into B ig Fortune in 
Television," Wall S treet Journal, March 23, 1964, 1,12; and ibid., "Johnson and the FCC: A gency Curb on 
Rival o f  Wife's TV Station Spotlights Touchy Issue," Wall Street Journal, March 24, 1964, 1,14. In the 
first article Kohlmeier noted how the rising fortune o f  the Johnson's broadcast holdings freed Johnson for 
politics and "financed handsome hospitality in surroundings appropriate to increasingly lofty office." He 
also noted how Mrs. Johnson won the valuable wattage increase and network affiliation, which catapulted 
the first Johnson station into financial solvency, more on the basis o f  her husband's liberal beliefs than the 
implementation o f  any political "arm-twisting." (Conservative Texan Robert Anderson headed the group 
o f  previous owners denied similar wattage and frequency requests.)
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oppose his conservative friends and benefactors on issues of economic policy, but 
seemed positively geared for such opposition. Johnson incurred the wrath o f Austin 
mayor Tom Miller, for example, a party to the Austin Dam negotiations, a man for 
whom the Austin Dam was eventually named, and a frequent Johnson benefactor, by 
proposing lower utility rates for LCRA's rural customers in 1939.143 A few years later, 
when Miller wanted Johnson to denounce government gasoline rationing during World 
War II, Johnson defied Miller's wishes and denounced, instead, "those people in Texas 
who would withhold from our armed forces in order to use it at home."144 When he 
sought, in 1937 and 1938, to provide better public housing and to clear the slums in 
Austin that he referred to as "the tarnish on the Violet Crown," Johnson veered onto a 
"collision course" with Herman Brown, dam-builder and Austin slumlord.145 Yet, after 
less than two years as Texas' Tenth district congressman, Johnson had secured for Austin 
a part o f (along with New Orleans and New York City) the first federal aid to cities for 
low-rent housing projects, and Austin's slum dwellings were razed. Indeed, despite 
warnings to the contrary, government competition clearly helped improve housing in 
Austin and it made it possible to remove much of the "tarnish on the Violet Crown;" for 
that Lyndon Johnson could take much credit.
Over the course o f his early political career Johnson also began to understand how to 
assuage the often far more intransigent followers o f these southern conservatives. When 
he fought for slum clearance and public housing in Austin, one resident complained that 
such programs created more problems than they solved because they competed with
143 Hughes, "Working Within the System ,"209. Johnson was equally adept at finding those uncommon 
"points o f  convergence" where conservatives could support, often for selfish reasons, liberal econom ic 
policies. Senator Henry Jackson noted, for example, in a 1978 interview, how oil state conservatives (such 
as Oklahoma Senator Robert Kerr) were also typically "public power men" because they wanted cheap 
electricity for their ranches and farms. Henry M. Jackson, Oral History Interview, LBJ Library, 
interviewed by Michael Gillette, March 13, 1978, 12.
144 Quoted in Dallek, Lone Star Rising, 259.
145 Caro, Path to Power, 473. O. Henry, a one-time resident, referred to Austin as "the city o f  the Violet 
Crown."
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private business. "Yes sir, it is true," Johnson replied, "the government is competing with 
shacks and hovels and hog sties and all the other holes in which the underprivileged have 
to live....If you object to that kind of government competition, then I'm disappointed in 
you."146 In 1938, Johnson, Maury Maverick, and Sam Rayburn cast their votes for the 
Roosevelt administration's Fair Labor Standards Act, the initial federal minimum wage 
law. Because the idea o f a federally mandated minimum wage was perhaps least popular 
in the South where it often confronted profound racial discrimination, Johnson received a 
substantial amount o f criticism for his affirmative vote. But he struck back boldly and 
directly and spoke as if  he possessed not just abiding sympathy for the underpaid 
working class, but also a technical understanding of minimum wage economics: "They 
said it was government interference," he noted in one public address, "and it was. It 
interfered with that fellow who was running that pecan shelling plant [where workers 
averaged $ 1.29/week]."147 Without explaining or perhaps even understanding the 
textbook economics behind a mandated minimum wage and its impact on a 
monopsonistic employer (who could previously pay less than competitive wages), 
Johnson proved, nonetheless, that he could absorb what were often technical principles in 
a decidedly non-technical fashion.148 As he mastered an ever-widening array o f political 
and economic details and came into contact with a greater variety of economic policy 
solutions and problems, he also came to value a more direct approach to the 
encouragement of liberal economics. By the 1960s, Johnson would argue that reformers 
could not "water down" their liberalism and expect to succeed with a civil rights
146 Quoted in Miller, Lyndon , 72.
147 Dallek, Lone Star Rising, 167.
148 A non-discriminating monopsonist, one who is either the only buyer o f  labor services or who colludes 
with others to set a below competitive level wage, and who pays all o f  its workers the same wage, can 
become a wage-taker instead o f  a wage-setter under a government mandated minimum wage. Thus it is 
theoretically possible that a minimum wage might do what the cherished free market was supposed to do: 
increase, rather than decrease, employment in some industries as it provides greater income for that 
industry's workers.
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revolution in the American South; by the 1940s, in the province o f economic policy, he 
had already begun to wield the same strategy.
As Johnson became more experienced with congressional politics he refined his 
understanding of the nation's political economy, and for the most part, his early 
experiences with national economic policy taught him two things: that his populist 
instincts dovetailed nicely with new economic theories appearing in the 1930s, and that 
his predilection for consensus politics made eminent good sense when it came to the 
legislative tug-of-war over the nation's economic policy.
But if  Johnson discovered the inestimable value o f a direct approach to economic 
reform, he also found this to be effective not simply because it threw the opposition off 
balance or because it forced them to confront the mythology o f their own persuasion. 
While it often did as much, it also created, in turn, a situation where consensus was more 
likely to emerge and with it, effective policy. When he took office Johnson was a 
Roosevelt man caught in the middle o f the 1937-1938 "Roosevelt recession." Quickly 
becoming a political confidant o f the President he grew to admire greatly, and someone 
upon whom Roosevelt would depend in his effort to overcome Southern obstructionism, 
Johnson gravitated toward President Roosevelt at a fortunate time for a liberal who liked 
to joust with conservative opponents.149 By early 1938, Roosevelt began to realize that 
his orthodox "balance the budget" approach to the economy had bred little but economic 
disaster, and, in the face of unprecedented corporate greed and obstinacy, he had also 
decided to pursue a more vigorous anti-trust policy. Partly convinced by the "stickiness" 
o f prices in the current economic downturn, Roosevelt even began to consider the novel 
advice o f  several young economists in the administration who were then urging 
Keynesian deficit spending. Early followers o f Keynesianism, Lauchlin Currie and Harry 
Dexter White, were particularly successful in converting the President to new economic
149 See Freidel, FDR and the South, especially 71-102.
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ideas. Although Roosevelt ultimately failed to understand Keynesian economics, in spite 
o f having received several cogent and politically subtle letters from Keynes himself, and 
although he decided to turn away from orthodox economic policy only after much 
hesitation and political calculation, he had, nonetheless, begun to discard many o f his 
conservative economic prejudices in 1938.150 He had decided, for example, to create a 
fiscal deficit for the first time without resort to apologetic, emergency, or transitional 
rhetoric— in spite o f opposition from Treasury Secretary Morgenthau and others. This 
"turn to the left," ultimately more profound and personal than the much more frequently 
cited leftward transformation in 1935, would do much to convince Lyndon Johnson, as a 
freshman congressman, that his populist instincts and liberal policies were right for the 
times and that his own economic theories fit into a national, as well as a regional, 
blueprint. Convinced that most voters were really progressives who nonetheless tended 
to ignore or disparage progressive policy because it lacked the force o f unity or 
comprehensible method, Roosevelt also served as a brilliant affirmation o f  Congressman 
Johnson's affinity for political consensus. "History...shows," FDR had declared in the 
late 1920s, "that conservatives find it nearly always easy to control government at least 
two-thirds of the time because they are united on the perfectly simple proposition of 
'doing nothing' and of'letting well enough alone.'" Progressives and liberals on the other 
hand, Roosevelt pointed out, "have necessarily a constructive program" but "insist on 
dividing among themselves."151 Unity and consensus, as a result, would become, along 
with a decided emphasis on full employment, the hallmarks o f Johnsonian liberalism.
For Lyndon Johnson, Depression era politics and a President bold enough to experiment
150 See John Maynard Keynes to Franklin D. Roosevelt, February 1, 1938 in Howard Zinn, editor, N ew  
D eal Thought (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1966), 403-409, for a representative piece o f  this 
correspondence. "Business men have a different set o f  delusions from politicians...." Keynes reminded 
Roosevelt in one paragraph. "You could do anything you like with them, if  you would treat them (even the 
big ones), not as w olves and tigers, but as domestic animals by nature, even though they have been badly 
brought up and not trained as you would wish." See ibid., 408.
151 Quoted in Freidel, FDR and the South, 21-22.
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with economic policy combined to underscore the practical advantages o f the consensus 
politics he had always been attracted to. From his father's invocation o f the prophet 
Isaiah's, "Come, let us reason together" at family meetings, to his own heartfelt (some 
would say "pathological") need to be appreciated and liked by all, Johnson was always 
inclined to seek consensus wherever it proved to be a practical option.152 Prior to his 
exposure to FDR and the New Deal, however, with an outlook that was thoroughly anti- 
corporatist but never anti-capitalist, he had not yet learned how to build anything more 
than a fragile consensus that was all too dependent upon political favors and 
psychological manipulation. But after meeting FDR, Johnson knew where he wanted to 
go. The Democratic liberals in the Senate, Johnson told Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. in 1960, 
had left the impression that the party was hopelessly divided and that they were "wasters, 
spenders and wild men....The country doesn't want this. The country wants to be 
comfortable. It doesn't want to be stirred up. Have a revolution all right, but don't say 
anything about it until you are entrenched in office. That's the way Roosevelt did it."153
In 1938, Johnson would also witness what he perceived to be an honest attempt at 
consensus and progressive policy coming from the more conservative business 
community. Some business leaders had begun to commit themselves to both FDR and to 
the public at large, even if  a fair measure o f self-interest and perhaps a small measure of 
economic distress had impelled these inventive acts o f statesmanship. Whatever the 
reason, these overtures by business leaders further encouraged Johnson's penchant for 
consensus politics. Edward Stettinius o f US Steel, for example, approached the 
Roosevelt administration in 1938 with what came to be known as "the Stettinius Plan," 
offering to cut prices and keep wages stable in exchange for lucrative government
152 See John Connally with Mickey Herskowitz, In History's Shadow: An American O dyssey (N ew  York: 
Hyperion, 1993), 63. Connally maintained that Johnson's need to be appreciated and liked w as at least 
somewhat pathological.
153 Quoted in Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House  (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1965), 20.
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contracts. Marion Folsom, o f Eastman-Kodak, had previously volunteered his 
company's managerial expertise to help the Roosevelt administration establish 202 
regional social security centers, a favor that had helped solve a tremendous applications 
nightmare. In 1938 Folsom continued to work closely with the Roosevelt administration 
as the President mobilized for potential war.154 Johnson knew, o f course, that congress 
was at the same time preparing anti-trust investigations of several companies, with US 
Steel as the primary target, and he also witnessed, largely because of its politically 
unpalatable contract provisions, the speedy abandonment of the Stettinius plan. At the 
same time, however, he saw that there were a surprising number o f corporate presidents 
and CEOs who would support some progressive economic policies, as Stettinius and 
Folsom had, confounding their liberal and populist critics in the process. Viewed 
critically by many, if  not most, o f their small business counterparts, as "tame millionaires 
who had become accomplices to New Deal criminality,"155 these corporate leaders were, 
nonetheless, readying themselves, in Johnson's mind, to play an increasingly larger role 
in an economy that no longer revolved around their prerogatives alone. Managerial 
liberalism was out o f fashion, at least temporarily, and the federal government was 
destined, for practical economic reasons, to be more than just a facilitator or 
clearinghouse for corporate profit-making schemes. As a result, much of corporate 
America was compelled to support a "New Deal," hoping only to have a hand in shaping 
it. As Kim McQuaid put it, describing the efforts o f corporate lobbyists in the late 1940s, 
corporate leaders became proficient with the "yes, but..." rejoinder, hoping to retain the 
initiative for domestic economic policy even as labor and consumer groups enlarged their 
political clout.156 By the late 1930s, this trend and these practices were readily apparent
154 Kim McQuaid, Big Business an d  Presidential Power, 11-13, 59.
155 Ibid., 114.
156 Ibid., 127.
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to most political insiders, including the young congressman from Texas' Tenth 
Congressional District.
To Lyndon Johnson, this was a clear sign that the middle ground between corporate 
capitalism and socialism was fertile ground, not just for politically advantageous 
compromise, as it may have been for Roosevelt, but also for economic growth and 
progress. After all, business leaders were coming to President Roosevelt with their hats 
in their hands. While they still knew how to help themselves and were surely deserving 
o f some continued government assistance, they were clearly faced with fewer 
alternatives than ever before, and they could also be compelled to accept old perquisites 
and prerogatives with new strings attached. This, Johnson reasoned, would allow the 
government to aid American businesses, not by doing so on the backs o f the poor and the 
powerless, but with the poor and the powerless in mind, to "water the economy at its 
roots," as Leon Keyserling once put it. Minimum wage legislation, tax reform that 
favored the poorest Americans over the wealthiest, and substantial public works 
spending were, accordingly, all part o f Johnson's economic agenda in the 1940s and 
1950s.157 This kind of legislation, Johnson became convinced, rather than an almost 
exclusive focus on supply side considerations and the profitability of the investor class, 
was the key to a more promising and a more stable prosperity.
"There were times in those days," Bill Moyers noted, recalling the Johnson 
presidency, "when he [LBJ] thought the poor are poor because the economy is 
mismanaged against them."158 This attitude, clearly evident during the Johnson 
presidency, stemmed largely from Johnson's early experience as a " 100% Roosevelt 
man" in a capital city bustling with change and experimentation and in an economy that 
cried out for jobs and reinforced consumer demand. Recalling John Kenneth Galbraith's
157 Dallek, Lone S tar Rising, 426-523; Conkin, Big D addy From the Pedernales, 136-137; Schulman, 
Lyndon B. Johnson and American Liberalism, 49-50.
158 Quoted in Jordan and Rostow,editors, The G reat Society, 176.
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suggestion that "modem liberal politicians" had a tendency to overlook the very poor, 
Johnson once pointed out that he "did not suffer the disadvantage of being considered a 
'modem liberal politician.' The closest I came to that description," he remarked, "was 
being called a 'Populist'....So I determined that this Populist politician would be the one 
who finally gave poor Americans some representation and helped them find their voice 
and improve their lot."159 Johnson was a genuine liberal but he ultimately succeeded in 
the American political economy partly because his liberalism was something distinct 
from either the fuzzy conventional description or the withering caricature propounded by 
reactionary critics.
Though largely oblivious, at this point, to the young Keynesian economists who 
were counseling a similar approach to the nation's economy, Johnson envisioned, like the 
Keynesians, a "general theory" applicable during periods o f prosperity and depression, 
and not just a "special theory" designed only for the unique demands o f the Great 
Depression. Depression era policies could be generated, in other words, to stave off 
economic decline, and to quiet the suffering and impatient poor, or they could be 
designed to alter permanently the place o f the poor and the working class in the nation's 
political economy. Johnson, despite the popular perception that he adopted a more 
conservative outlook, showed unequivocal support for the latter, essentially liberal, 
approach. As a congressman and then, after 1948, as a U.S Senator, despite numerous 
feints to the right on everything from labor laws to foreign policy, Johnson proceeded to 
establish a legislative record that reflected his populist roots, his steadfast economic 
liberalism, and his appreciation for consensus politics. And just as he hoped to convince 
conservatives, particularly those in Texas, that he shared some o f their concerns, he also 
hoped to preserve much of his populist or liberal reputation on matters financial or 
economic in character. In August 1940, for example, amid the opulence of the Greenbrier
159 Johnson, Vantage Point, 72.
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resort in White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia, Johnson, acting out o f concern for both 
his image and the economic liberalism he wanted to cultivate, spumed a lucrative offer 
from the wealthy Austin publisher, Charles Marsh. Marsh, with George Brown looking 
on, proposed to sell Congressman Johnson a share o f his oil well partnership. Though 
Marsh was willing to let Johnson pay him out of the proceeds o f the oil wells, with no 
collateral and no down payment, and though Johnson was anxious to avoid the financial 
fate o f his father, who was penniless when he died, the young and still relatively poor 
congressman simply decided that he did not want to become an oil man. "I can't be an oil 
man," Johnson muttered, "if the public knows I had oil interests, it would kill me 
politically."160 His spuming of this offer, however, which would have made him a very 
rich man within just a few years time, did not come only out of concern for personal 
political power, nor did it reflect any aversion toward oil producers in general. Most 
Texas oil producers in the 1930s were independent producers, and were often citizens 
with little accumulated wealth; others were like Charles Marsh's partner Sid Richardson, 
fabulously wealthy and the object o f no small amount o f populist scorn.161 Johnson had 
already learned how to temper his populist rhetoric and to draw upon conservatives for 
political and financial support but he could not afford to obscure his economic liberalism 
much further. Liberal policy required the partial support or acquiescence o f economic 
conservatives, but it also required electoral support from the poor and the working class, 
however beleaguered or inconsequential they were when it came to the formulation of 
actual policy. He could, therefore, go so far as to defend the industry's Oil Depletion 
Allowance, special legislation from the 1920s that amounted to an enormous windfall for 
oil producers, but he could not afford to become one of its direct beneficiaries.162 He
160 Caro, Path to Power, xiv; Dallek, Lone Star Rising, 192.
161 Until Tom Connally's 1935 "Hot Oil Act," which made the Texas Railroad Commission the 
preeminent arbiter o f  oil price and supply in the U.S., even Richardson and others like him were oil 
producers o f  very small means.
162 The Oil Depletion Allowance,created in the mid 1920s under the Coolidge administration, allowed oil 
producers to exempt 27.5% o f  their income from taxation. Changed to 22% in 1969, the 27.5%  figure had
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appreciated and actively courted the indirect support of wealthy oil producers for 
populist or liberal economic legislation, won through decisive financial contributions to 
the Democratic party, but he also believed that this indirect support could potentially be 
negated by the loss o f the more direct support from farmers and from the working class if 
he were to become a Texas oil baron.
Yet it was, in many ways, money that mattered. "The liberals didn't have any 
money," Terrell Maverick Webb recalled; "that's the trouble with liberals."163 As 
unofficial chairman o f the Democratic party's congressional campaign effort in 1940, 
Johnson was well aware o f the party's financial crisis. His party held a 92 seat advantage 
in Congress, but as many as 75 o f these were likely to be lost in 1940. There was little 
doubt that they would be outspent by the Republican party in virtually every 
congressional district; Roosevelt, the party's standard bearer, was running for an 
unprecedented third term; and in Texas, the Republicans were stirring things up for the 
first time since Reconstruction.164 Though Johnson would later admit that he was never 
aggressive in his partisanship, this was largely true only when liberal measures stood a 
chance with either party, as he believed they had in the 1960s.165 Despite Wendell 
Wilkie's presence on the Republican ticket that year, a liberal on many economic and 
social issues, this was plainly not the case in 1940. Tapping Sid Richardson, Clint 
Murchison, and the Browns for enormous campaign contributions, relying at least partly
been arrived at, according to Texas Senator Tom Connally, simply because it sounded scientifically 
determined. See Kenneth G. Miller, O il and Gas: F ederal Income Taxation, third edition (New York: 
Commerce Clearing House, 1957), 9-148; James Reston, Jr., The Lone Star: The Life o f  John Connally 
(N ew  York: Harper and Row, 1989), 196-198; Daniel Yergin, The Prize  (N ew  York: Simon and Schuster, 
1991), 658; Conkin, B ig D addy From the Pedernales, 116. See also Sam Houston Johnson, My Brother 
Lyndon, 84. Lyndon's brother Sam maintained that support for the Oil Depletion Allowance was Lyndon's 
way to offset, politically, his role as Senate minority leader in opposition to Eisenhower (who was 
extremely popular in Texas).
163 Quoted in Miller, Lyndon, 115.
164 John Connally, who would eventually switch to the Republican party in the 1970s, recalled that the 
feuds within the Texas Democratic party over the nominating process in 1940 "were the foundation for the 
emergence o f  the [Texas] Republican party as w e know it today." See Connally, In History's Shadow, 77.
165 See Lewis L. Gould, "Never a Deep Partisan," in The Johnson Years, Volume 3: At Home an d Abroad, 
edited by Robert Divine (Lawrence: University Press o f  Kansas, 1994).
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on the Oil Depletion Allowance and, in the case o f the Brown brothers, lucrative federal 
building contracts to guarantee the accumulation o f these expendable funds, Johnson 
helped engineer a campaign where the Democratic party actually gained six 
congressional seats in 1940. "And it impressed the hell out o f Roosevelt," James Rowe 
recalled, for the President had called Johnson on election day and asked him how many 
seats they were going to lose.166 "The Democrats gained in the House," Bruce Catton 
noted at the time, "instead of taking the heavy loss they were [supposed] to take. The 
chief reason was that the party found a new miracle worker—the youthful and energetic 
congressman Lyndon Johnson."167 And while Robert Caro noted perceptively that 
"Political philosophy played not the smallest role in his [Johnson's] appeals for money," 
this was true only on the surface, for the campaign derived much o f its importance from 
its impact on the long term prospects for New deal liberalism. Much as Johnson 
concerned himself with these long term prospects, he had to keep them submerged lest 
he fail in his efforts to raise adequate campaign financing.168 What was most telling 
about the 1940 congressional campaign was that Johnson's fundraising efforts primarily 
benefitted Northern liberal Democrats since the one-party South was still a Democratic 
stronghold. Personal ambition undoubtedly had much to do with his role in this 
campaign, and he glowed with pride when he saw the true scope of his accomplishment. 
The real basis for Johnson's achievement here, though, was, as it would be throughout his 
career in Washington, his penchant for "bringing conservatives around" to a more liberal 
social and economic agenda. Called the "contemporary Henry Clay" by journalists 
covering the 1956 Democratic convention, Lyndon Johnson began playing the part of the 
"great compromiser" even as early as 1940. From that point on, consensus politics with 
liberal designs became his enduring formula for political success and economic progress.
166 Caro, Path to Power, 654.
167 Quoted in Reston, Jr., The Lone Star, 57.
168 Caro, Path to Power, 663.
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Despite his virtually unwavering commitment to economic liberalism, Johnson 
continued to be dogged by assertions that he was, at heart, an economic conservative. He 
continued to emphasize his frugality and anxiety over wasteful public spending and he 
continued to devote more energy to seeking points of convergence and alliances with 
conservative rather than liberal colleagues. The signal change in his political career was 
supposed to have been his support for Tafit-Hartley restrictions on labor in 1947, a sign 
that he, like other politicians and the rest o f the nation after FDR's death, had moved 
abruptly to the right. Even here, though, Johnson's stand proved to be more o f a political 
reaction, and less a reflection of his more deeply held economic philosophy. Johnson 
"was one of those who gutted us in 1947," H.S. "Hank" Brown o f the Texas American 
Federation o f Labor noted. He "disqualified himself in the eyes o f the working people of 
Texas," remarked Wallace Reilley, A.F.L. leader from Dallas, in 1948.169 Walter Jenkins, 
a Johnson assistant Sarah McClendon called "the most efficient person I ever witnessed 
in government," remembered it somewhat differently. It was Johnson's vote on Tafit- 
Hartley and his vote to override Truman's veto, Jenkins recalled, that secured the 1948 
Senate election for him, a race he won by a mere 87 votes. "A great many voters,"
Jenkins pointed out, "except for that vote were convinced that he was just too far to the 
left."170 Labor unions were exceptionally weak in Texas, even in its cities, and in 1948 
Texas newspapers ran, by Robert Caro's count, 295 editorials suggesting that strikes be 
abolished because they were part of a communist conspiracy to overthrow America.171 
As a result, Johnson simply adopted rhetoric and a campaign strategy that reflected 
mostly his desire to hold on to political office and partly his genuine disregard for what 
he called "irresponsible" unionism. "I am not anti-labor," Johnson shouted at one o f his 
campaign assistants who speculated otherwise. "You should know that. I am pro-labor.
169 Robert Caro, The Years o f  Lyndon Johnson: Means o f  Ascent (N ew  York: Knopf, 1990), 125, 224.
170 Sarah McClendon, Oral History Interview, 38; Jenkins, quoted in Miller, Lyndon , 121.
171 Caro, Means o f  Ascent, 223.
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I'm even pro-union. Responsible union, that is. I am just anti-irresponsible union. A fool 
knows that."172 Welly Hopkins, chief counsel to John L. Lewis o f the United Mine 
Workers, helped raise money for Johnson’s 1948 senate campaign despite the Taft- 
Hartley votes, and made several trips to Texas that year to make cash deliveries. When 
Hopkins arrived in Texas he was inevitably forced to witness Johnson's anti-labor 
charade. "He was saying things that kind o f hurt my ears," Hopkins recalled, "I knew 
there were political reasons for it, but it made me feel a little badly."173 While the Texas 
A.F.L. went on to endorse Johnson's opponent in the 1948 senate race, Coke Stevenson, 
national A.F.L. leaders and Walter Reuther o f the Congress o f Industrial Organizations 
worked quietly behind the scenes to support Johnson's candidacy. Tommy Corcoran also 
contacted a leading official in the Railroad Brotherhoods who promised to get "a 
favorable word" down to the Brotherhoods in Texas before the campaign ended.174
When Lyndon Johnson called for reporters so that he could explain his support for 
Taft-Hartley, he generally emphasized his unwavering commitment to workers, his 
contention that Taft-Hartley was not the ominous legislation it was often made out to be, 
and that Coke Stevenson had only made a "corrupt bargain" and was actually the anti­
labor candidate. "Just a readjustment," Johnson replied when Wick Fowler o f the Dallas 
News asked him about Taft-Hartley. "Just filling in the loopholes that nobody realized 
were in the Wagner Labor Relations Act."175 And when Robert Wear o f the Fort Worth 
Star-Telegram asked him about the union view and the potential end of the union shop, 
Johnson replied, "Nothing's dead. Nothin's killed....Those union fellows who negotiate
172 Quoted in Joe Phipps, Summer Stock, 70. Emphasis in original.
173 Quoted in Caro, Means o f  Ascent, 225.
174 Dallek, Lone Star Rising, 314-315.
175 Quoted in Joe Phipps, Summer Stock, 156. At one stop during the campaign, Johnson also used Fowler 
to demonstrate what he believed were the true intentions o f  the Stevenson campaign and the D allas 
M orning News (which had originally reported and emphasized the union endorsement o f  Stevenson and 
condemnation o f  him self). "Don't blame Wick [Fowler]," Johnson told an audience in Jasper, Texas, "for 
his bloodsucking, scoundrel boss who has ordered him: 'Go after Lyndon Johnson. We can't have a man 
who knows how to get things done in Washington. Next thing you know he'd be doing something for the 
people." Quoted in ibid., 190.
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those contracts. They're not labor anyway. Not a callous in a carload. I just want to 
know—and I think the people o f Texas deserve to know—if my opponent made a trade. 
Where does he stand on Taft-Hartley?"176 When Johnson decided to issue a formal 
statement on Taft-Hartley for the 1948 campaign, he delivered a sermon in San 
Augustine, Texas that was unusually tepid and lengthy but which also emphasized his 
own support for "the laboring man" and the deceit of his opponent:
I am sorrowed and profoundly shocked by printed reports out o f Fort Worth that 
the Executive Board o f the Texas Federation o f Labor—a handful o f labor bosses 
in a smoke-filled room—has decided to back one my opponents for the democratic 
momination to the U.S. Senate....Should the story prove true, it represents the first 
time that the Texas Federation o f Labor will have ever given its stamp o f approval 
to any statewide candidate for public office. Further, it would represent 
endorsement o f one whose entire public life until this time has been devoted to 
undermining rather than supporting the union movement....I feel confident that if  a 
poll were taken o f rank-and-file members, ther would be overwhelming approval 
of my candidacy above all others.
Looking out for the laboring man has been a tradition in the Johnson family. My 
grandfather was a founder o f the Texas Populist movement. My father, Sam 
Johnson, as a member o f the Texas legislature, wrote, fought for and obtained 
passage o f the first Texas Railroad Retirement Act more than thirty years ago. In 
my case, serving those who earn their living by the sweat of the brow has become 
more than simply carrying on a family tradition. It is an honored heritage.177
Staking out his support for the more popular but also more innocuous parts o f the bill,
Johnson also implied that he would be willing to alter Taft-Hartley if it proved to
undermine real economic progress. "On one section o f the law my attitude will not be
changed. That's the section which requires the head of a labor union who seeks
advantage under the act to file an affidavit that he's not a Communist, or member o f the
Communist party."178 Choosing to support Taft-Hartley, a complex piece of legislation
176 Quoted in ibid., 156-157. Emphasis in original. When columnist Jack Anderson asked Stevenson to 
comment on Taft-Hartley, Stevenson siad he did not have his notes with him and therefore could not tell 
Anderson where he stood. The Johnson campaign distributed Stevenson's response, reported in Drew 
Pearson's column, wherever they traveled throughout Texas. Lyndon's brother Sam called the Pearson 
column "the single most important factor in the election." See Sam Houston Johnson, M y Brother Lyndon,
76.
177 Quoted in Phipps, Summer Stock, 186-187.
178 Caro, Means o f  Ascent, 276.
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that was foreshadowed by state level restrictions and, surprisingly, by A.F.L. proposals 
made during World War II, Johnson was essentially choosing to safeguard the viability 
of his political career and his liberal economic strategy with a veneer o f cold war anti­
communism and visible resentment toward undemocratic union practices.179 Johnson's 
gamble— one with compelling odds in the late 1940s—was that his career and his 
economic strategy would become increasingly significant while the cold war and the 
labor-baiting, so popular and compelling in the late 1940s, would fizzle and fade. While 
his response to McCarthyism later in the 1950s seemed to vindicate this approach (he 
was one of the architects o f the plan to wait out McCarthy and let him destroy himself), 
the tragedy of Vietnam was constructed partly on the surprising persistence o f radical 
anti-communism, a force that was much larger than Senator McCarthy, and on the 
accompanying, and equally surprising, persistence of this early Johnsonian formula for 
political success.
Outside o f the Taft-Hartley case, and perhaps the Leland Olds affair in 1949, where 
he deployed the same anti-communist rhetoric, Johnson's involvement with economic 
legislation revealed little o f this presumed "turn to the right," and more of his sustained 
commitment to liberal economic policy.180 In an August 19, 1942 radio broadcast, with 
the nation's war effort banking on increased industrial output, Johnson criticized factory 
owners whose plants were running at only 70% of capacity. The following year he voted 
to keep private oil companies out o f the Elk Hills naval oil reserve in California, and 
defended the federal government's Renegotiation Act which allowed for the automatic 
revision of government contracts with excess profits (already having saved the Treasury
179 See James Gross, The Reshaping o f  the National Labor Relations B oard  (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1981), for an examination o f  labor's role in shaping what were essentially anti-labor legal 
restrictions.
180 Olds was an outspoken liberal renominated to The Federal Power Commision by President Truman in 
1949 who was defeated 10-2 by the Foreign and Interstate Commerce Committee o f  which Johnson was a 
part. Johnson, according to some, led the attack on Olds for his radical journalistic exploits in the 1920s. 
See Dallek, Lone Star Rising, 375-378; Conkin, Big Daddy, 125-7; and Kearns, Lyndon Johnson and the 
American Dream, 105.
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$4 billion). This law says to the industrialist, Johnson remarked, that he "shall not build a 
personal fortune out o f the misfortune and miseries o f this total war."181 In 1944 Johnson 
helped sustain President Roosevelt's veto o f a congressional tax bill that raised only 20% 
of the new revenues that the President had requested, and became, with Oklahoma's 
Mike Monroney, one of the two oil state senators to vote against the proposed 35 cents 
per barrel rise in crude oil prices.182 Informed by Paul Porter of the Office o f Price 
Administration that the increase was not necessary to spur increased supply and that it 
would only exacerbate other price control problems, Johnson helped defeat the proposed 
increase despite Sam Rayburn's and Secretary o f the Interior Harold Ickes' support for a 
modest price rise.183 In the congressional elections held later that year both Johnson and 
Rayburn were lambasted for their outspoken support o f "creeping socialism."
In 1947 Johnson found himself in the minority voting against a ceiling on federal 
expenditures—despite his well publicized views on government economy— and also 
voted, in the summer o f 1948, against Republican sponsored tax reduction bills weighted 
toward the nation's wealthiest citizens. When he moved to the Senate, after his narrow 87 
vote victory in the 1948 Democratic primary run-off, he continued to support liberal 
economic policy. In 1951 and 1952, for example, during the Korean War, Johnson voted 
for excess profits taxes and for the continuation of wartime rent and price controls.184 He 
always maintained that he was for "free enterprise," and much like the Populists o f the 
nineteenth century he never railed against capitalism in general, but he also believed that 
the federal government could and should compel American free enterprise to be freer, 
stronger, and more democratic. By the time he reached the Senate, having seen the nation 
move under an activist federal government from 25% unemployment to almost 1% 
unemployment in about ten years time, Johnson was no less the pragmatist than he had
181 Dallek, Lone Star Rising, 244, 258, 259.
182 Ibid., 258-259.
183 Miller, Lyndon, 101-102; Dallek, Lone Star Rising, 259.
184 Dallek, Lone Star Rising, 290, 404.
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ever been, but he was convinced that the federal government had a substantial role to 
play in a pragmatic political economy.185
When Johnson became the nation's youngest ever Minority leader in 1953, he 
strived to be a moderating influence on the newly elected and potentially reactionary 
Eisenhower administration, circumscribing the political consensus under which the new 
administration operated. He vowed to support Ike solidly on foreign affairs, to work 
actively to overcome the President's reticence toward civil rights reform, but to stand 
firm with liberal economic policies. On November 10,1953 Johnson wrote to 
Eisenhower's Secretary o f Labor James Mitchell, lamenting the concurrent appearance of 
price inflation and economic recession, a phenomenon that would curiously reappear in 
the 1970s under Richard Nixon, Eisenhower's Vice President in 1953. "It seems 
incredible," Johnson wrote, "that the cost o f living is the one rising factor in an economy 
that is declining in so many other respects."186 When Eisenhower's Secretary o f Defense 
Charles Wilson made his famous "what's good for General Motors is good for the 
nation" remark and his less widely quoted comment comparing the poor to "kennel-fed 
dogs," Johnson badgered Wilson unmercifully. In 1956, in a similar vein, Eisenhower 
and his U.S. Information Agency director Arthur Larsen began espousing the term 
"dynamic conservatism," suggesting that they were liberal in human affairs but 
conservative (hence more efficient and wise than their Democratic counterparts) in fiscal 
affairs. When Larsen attacked the Democratic party in an April, 1957 speech, referring to 
the New Deal and to Truman's Fair Deal as "alien philosophies," Johnson leapt to the 
defense. As chairman of the subcommittee responsible for the U.S.I.A. budget, Johnson 
engineered a substantial budget cut for the U.S.I.A. (from $144 to $96 million), and
185 Unemployment reached 24.9% in 1933 and had dropped to 1.2% in 1944. Source: Statistical Abstract 
o f  the U nited States.
186 Qouted in H. Scott Gordon, "The Eisenhower Administration: The Doctrine o f  Shared Responsibility," 
in Goodwin, Exhortation and Controls, 100.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
125
embarassed Larsen throughout the four day long budget hearings. Larsen "really stepped 
in with his chin wide open," recalled George Reedy.187
On other fiscal matters, principally the level o f federal income taxes, Johnson 
emerged in 1955 as the opponent o f Eisenhower's conservative,"trickle down" economic 
proposals. After Eisenhower's plan to cut taxes on corporations and the wealthy made 
little headway, thanks in part to Johnson's opposition, Sam Rayburn offered the first 
Democratic counter-proposal. When this failed too (a $20 across the board cut), with 
Eisenhower calling it "some kind of height in fiscal irresponsibility," Johnson introduced 
a substitute measure, his first major proposal as Senate majority leader. His bill called for 
a $20 tax credit for heads of household, and a $10 credit for dependents other than 
spouses, with the revenue loss offset both by increased excise and corporate taxes and by 
the elimination o f accelerated depreciation.188 Failing narrowly, 50 to 44, in the Senate, 
with Johnson hospitalized for much of the debate, this proposal— characterized by an 
offsetting revenue-neutral approach—revealed both Johnson's predilection for liberal, 
demand side policies and his more orthodox conception o f the overall federal budget. 
Proffering the same balanced budget, revenue neutral approach that his conservative 
counterparts had offered, Johnson remained wedded to much of the economic orthodoxy 
even as he sought to pass economic legislation with a liberal imprimatur. Moreover, his 
support for revenue neutral tax legislation, unlike his support for Taft-Hartley, came 
more as a result o f genuine conviction than political calculation. Although he had learned 
to live with unbalanced budgets during the Depression and World War II and saw little to 
be alarmed about when the federal government ran a deficit during an economic or 
military crisis, an intentional deficit, designed solely to spur economic growth, was by 
the 1950s not yet an accepted part of Johnson's economic policy repertoire. His personal 
frugality, his general lack of technical economic knowledge, and his growing awareness
187 Dallek, Lone Star Rising, 462, 516.
188 Miller, Lyndon, 176; Dallek, Lone Star Rising, 469.
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that Republicans were beginning to attack liberal legislation more on its cost than its 
merits, all combined to convince Johnson that balanced budgets made good political 
sense. In strictly economic terms, he was much closer to the Keynesian principles he 
would later espouse, principles that endorsed deliberate deficits during a period of 
economic recession. But in the 1950s, despite an almost instinctive willingness to use 
government economic levers, Johnson had yet to transcend the budgetary politics o f the 
economic orthodoxy. Even the call for tax cuts, a move loaded with revolutionary 
potential, was at this time largely a function of the popular and recurring "reduce the 
power o f government" theme. As a result, Johnson showed little enthusiasm in the 1950s 
for most tax cut proposals, even those weighted toward the working class, for he never 
wanted to encourage the anti-government bias that he believed to be excessive and 
oversold to begin with. Johnson was much more enthusiastic, however, and therefore 
much more successful, in engineering the passage of both a new public housing bill, and 
a minimum wage increase, both in 1955. The housing bill in particular, which provided 
for 135,000 public housing units over three years and which prominent Senate liberals 
had all but written off, showed Johnson to be a crafty and tireless supporter of 
unambiguous legislation designed to help the poor. When Johnson engineered the defeat 
of a Republican amendment, authored by Homer Capehart o f Indiana, designed to restrict 
the public housing initiative, few observers registered anything but shock, dismay, or 
unexpected delight. George Reedy recalled that the press gallery "nearly collapsed out of 
sheer shock, because they'd all written stories that morning predicting that this would be 
a major defeat for Lyndon Johnson as Democratic leader."189 An elated Paul Douglas 
told Johnson after the housing bill passed, "I didn't think you could do it, and I will never 
know how you did it, but you did it, and I'm grateful."190
189 Quoted in Miller, Lyndon, 178; and Dallek, Lone Star Rising, 482.
190 Quoted in Evans and Novak, The Exercise o f  Power, 151; and Dallek, Lone Star Rising, 483.
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Although Johnson could not yet envision the kind o f macroeconomic scheme his 
liberal persuasion seemed to call for, he had at least grown to understand the pervasive 
mythology and impractical character of conservative economics. It became apparent to 
him, for example, that the prices of the nation's most significant commodities often had 
little to do with genuine free market mechanisms. As a result, he began to understand the 
crucial difference between conservative predictions for price behavior—that were 
usually correct—and conservative explanations o f the same—that were usually 
erroneous. Though not an active participant in the proceedings, Johnson sat on the 
Senate's Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee as it considered the 1949 Basing 
Point Pricing Bill, debate which ultimately exposed a surprising degree o f price-fixing 
common to the steel and concrete industries.191 In 1951, as chairman of the Senate 
Preparedness subcommittee, Johnson secured a reputation favorable to conservatives 
who desired a strong military but at the same time exposed the inflationary and 
inefficient character of many Department o f Defense contracts. Price gouging by tin 
producers was but one example o f the abuses he uncovered.192 In April 1952, as a 
supporter of the Truman administration's Korean era price controls, Johnson witnessed 
the President's temporary seizure of the nation's steel mills. While the seizure was 
eventually nullified by the Supreme Court, and while Johnson angered some liberals by 
comparing the seizure to "practices that might lead to a dictatorship," Johnson did vote 
with only eleven other senators to give Truman the temporary power to seize the mills. 
The most significant part o f this case, however, was that it became apparent to Johnson,
191 Basing point pricing refers to the pricing system prevalent in certain industries throughout most o f  the 
twentieth century where a leading producer supplies the freight rate book, and where all rivals quote 
identical delivered  prices regardless o f  where the customer or seller is located. It is marked by identical 
and stable product prices throughout the industry, and reflects phantom freight charges in many instances 
and the absorption o f  freight charges in some other cases. While the FTC ordered the steel industry to 
abandon its "Pittsburgh Plus" basing point pricing in 1924, and while the World War 11 seller's market led 
to a temporary abandonment o f  the practice, it persisted on into the 1970s. See George W. Stocking, 
Basing Point Pricing an d  Regional Development (Chapel Hill: University o f  North Carolina Press, 1954).
192 Sam Houston Johnson, My Brother Lyndon, 81.
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as it had for most other observers, that the steel industry could pass on all or most o f its 
increased labor costs to consumers, even if  high profits and tight labor markets called for 
the steel makers to absorb these added costs.193 Neither productivity increases nor the 
assertion o f the steelworker's legitimate market power had much bearing at all on the 
industry's profit margin; that was determined by the industry itself. Bold as Truman's 
action had been, it ultimately forced only a temporary modification o f the industry's price 
demands, a development not lost on Johnson when he became President in late 1963.194 
When Johnson was compelled to oversee a more informal price control scheme in the 
late 1960s, this experience would provide him with valuable insight.
Lyndon Johnson had also become acutely aware o f how racial discrimination made a 
mockery of the persistent and still widely accepted Horatio Alger myth and the 
conservative economic policies that arose from its acceptance. This myth, which equated 
diligence and fortitude with success in the American marketplace, served as one o f the 
most significant buttresses o f the nation's supply side political economy. It implied that 
those who deserved success would receive it—automatically and without significant 
government intervention; only the traditional supply side efforts, by which already 
established fortunes were protected, could be sanctioned. But Johnson saw it, instead, as 
it was: a empty shell o f a theory that explained precious little about the actual workings 
of the American economy. His experiences at the Welhausen School in Cotulla, Texas 
taught him about the denial o f basic educational opportunities. And he remembered how 
his father's life had been threatened by the "Kukluxsonofabitch," as Sam Ealy Johnson 
called them, when Sam made a well publicized speech on racial tolerance. In 1960, in the 
middle o f his efforts to pass a second moderate civil rights bill, he carried in his coat
193 Dallek, Lone S tar Rising, 405; see also Maeva Marcus, Truman and  the S teel Seizure Case: The Limits 
o f  Presidential P ow er  (N ew  York: Columbia University Press, 1977).
194 The steel companies originally sought an increase o f  $10-12/ton. The administration and the Wage 
Stabilization Board believed that a $2.50-$4 increase was more than sufficient in the face o f  the 
recommended wage increases. The Truman administration eventually granted the industry a $5.65/ton  
increase.
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pocket a pamphlet distributed by White Citizen's Councils in Mississippi, Alabama, East 
Texas, and Northern Georgia.195 The pamphlet, which Johnson used to persuade reluctant 
supporters, read: "We intend to see that no negro who believes in equality has a job, gets 
credit, or is able to exist in our communities."196
Much o f what comprised Lyndon Johnson's economic philosophy, during his career 
in Congress and the U.S. Senate, remained indistinct and quite difficult to characterize. It 
could be said that he was a conservative, for he had consistently preached responsibility, 
frugality, and had yet to transcend the balanced budget orthodoxy that he would soon 
reject. It could also be said that he was little more than the stereotypical liberal, for he 
had often suggested the need for bigger government and greater economic intervention 
and had proved himself willing to make the corporate payoffs that permitted such an 
approach. Ultimately, he was neither of these, for his basic approach was anything but 
conservative and his legislative practices were anything but simple exercises in the 
aggrandizement o f corporate or governmental power. By 1960, partly because o f his 
consisent and unsurpassed efforts to seek consensus, he had not yet shed his reputation as 
a Southern conservative among the general public. At the end o f his enigmatic political 
career, when he more clearly carried the mantle o f American liberalism, Johnson recalled 
the absurdity o f this juxtaposition:
Sometimes I have been called a seeker of'consensus'— more often in criticism than 
in praise. And I have never denied it. Because to heal and to build in support o f 
something worthy is, I believe, a noble task. In the region o f the country where I 
have spent my life, where brother was once divided against brother, this lesson has 
been burned deep into my memory. Yet along the way I learned somewhere that no 
leader can pursue public tranquility as his first and only goal.197
195 The White Citizen's Councils, formed in the wake o f  the 1954 Brown desegregation ruling, were 
supposed to have been comprised o f  "respectable" Southern whites, and were indeed often outspoken in 
their contempt for the KKK. Applications for membership were available at places o f  business in most 
Southern towns. See Hodding Carter III, "Meanwhile in M ississippi— Solidarity Forever?" In Hoke 
Norris, ed., We Dissent (N ew  York: St. Martin's Press, 1962), 89-99; and Dan Wakefield, "Respectable 
Racism: Dixie Citizen's Council," The Nation , October 22, 1955, 339-341.
196 Quoted in Jordan and Rostow, editors, The G reat Society, 36.
197 Lyndon Johnson, Public Papers, 1968-1969: /, 482.
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By that time, Johnson had come to be judged in a different light, but on terms that were 
equally obtuse and incongruous. Because he sought to convince all, from the poor to the 
wealthy and reactionary, that he could help them, and that he could do so without 
robbing one to pay the other, Johnson's temperament and experience combined to 
prepare him uniquely for the liberalism of the Keynesian revolution and the reorienting 
of the nation's political economy. Relatively unencumbered by either the economic 
myths that guided the nation's conservative orthodoxy or the zero-sum politics o f the 
nation's more conventional liberals, Johnson could see, better than most, the real 
strengths and weaknesses o f the American economy. He had come to believe that the 
American economy never quite resembled the "free market" everyone seemed to think it 
had. He would have concurred with I.F. Stone who once remarked that, "American 
capitalism, like Russian communism, bears little resemblance to its idealized image."198 
It was indeed part free, part corporate, and part public, and to Lyndon Johnson it had 
always been that way. Secondly, since this understanding was derived largely from his 
efforts to help the poor and to attract the wealthy and everyone else in between, it drew 
Lyndon Johnson inexorably toward the political and economic center. Unlike the 
"center" of the late twentieth century, however, which appeared after the resurgence o f a 
latent supply side orthodoxy, and which came to be fashioned out of little more than 
electoral strategies and economic tactics, Johnson's came to embody a distinct and 
revolutionary economic strategy.
Like the National Recovery Administration of the first New Deal (in its theoretical, 
idealized form), Johnson sought an economic strategy that made the traditional zero-sum 
game an obsolete proposition. He certainly wanted to help the nation's corporations earn 
greater profits, and often reduced "free enterprise" to this in many of his economic 
speeches, but the Depression taught him that this could not be done at the expense of the
198 I.F. Stone, The Haunted Fifties, 1953-1963 (Boston: Little Brown, 1963), 214.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
131
poor or the working class. That kind of profitability was, to him, inherently unstable and 
self-destructive. Moreover, his Depression era experiences alone taught him that 
America's largest corporations prospered only with government assistance, guidance, and 
direct relief, and not in spite o f it as many had claimed. Government planning and 
government spending, as incoherent and inconsistent as they were under FDR, saved and 
invigorated American corporate capitalism during the Great Depression. Johnson 
realized that this happened, however, only because greater economic security was also 
provided for those who worked for and who purchased the products of America's 
corporations. He sensed, in other words, that the linchpin o f the nation's economy was 
this security and the demand for products and services that it engendered.
Long before Lyndon Johnson was introduced to Keynesian economic principles, 
largely at the hands o f President Kennedy's economic advisers, he was singularly 
predisposed toward an economic strategy that focused most squarely on the demand side 
of the economy and on the kinds of incentives to production that Keynes had deemed 
significant. Through January 1961, however, Johnson had little experience or access to 
advice that could have placed his instinctive and richly pragmatic economic philosophy 
into a more coherent, technically oriented system. Outside o f the irresolute and aborted 
attempts made during the administrations of Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman, no 
demand side economic strategy had ever been sold effectively to Washington 
policymakers, including himself. With the inauguration of John F. Kennedy, in January 
1961, and the appointment of Walter Heller, James Tobin, and Kermit Gordon to 
President Kennedy's Council of Economic Advisers, such a strategy finally came into the 
purview o f the nation's highest and most powerful office, a transformation Johnson was 
able to witness as the nation's Vice-President.
Kennedy ultimately failed, however, to begin the Keynesian demand side 
restructuring to which he seemed to be committed. Disposed toward such a change at the 
onset o f his administration—out of academic curiosity, political sagacity, and a practiced
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"keep up with the Russians" cold war facade—he was not attracted to it in any instinctive 
fashion, nor was he swayed by its syncretistic character. It did not fit logically with his 
own political and social experiences. Moreover, as the winner o f the closest presidential 
election in U.S. history, and as a president whose party would lose ground in the next 
mid-term election, Kennedy also struggled unavoidably with the nation's political 
compass. He sought and won a fair measure o f political leverage to be sure, but also 
groped for, with little recourse to precedent, a fulcrum upon which to turn the nation's 
political economy. Then, suddenly and tragically, on November 22,1963 these struggles 
were bequeathed to Lyndon Johnson. Johnson, who lacked much of Kennedy's academic 
curiosity, would, nonetheless, prove to be a formidable student o f the professors on 
Kennedy's Council o f Economic Advisers, and had, in fact, begun his schooling while 
serving as Kennedy's vice-president. Adding technical competency to a populist heritage 
and liberal outlook, Johnson became the first U.S. president to enter office attuned to, 
and wholly supportive o f a Keynesian economic strategy.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
Chapter 3.
Too Close to Appomattox
The man we owe the nomination to is Lyndon; he wants the same things for the 
country that I do. But it is too close to Appomattox for him to get the nomination.
- John Kennedy to Walt Whitman Rostow, August 1958
Johnson was quick, surprising in what he absorbed. It was always amazing what he 
would bring out in these head-to-head sessions with small business or big business or 
labor or university presidents. What he suddenly had at his fingertips was incredible. I 
don't think the country ever understood that.
- Walter W. Heller, Chairman President's Council of
Economic Advisers, 1961-1964
On May 7, 1960 Lyndon Johnson flew into Clarksburg, West Virginia to "stump for 
Hump" at the local Jefferson-Jackson dinner. This was to be Johnson's final effort at 
staving off John Kennedy's drive for the Democratic presidential nomination; an effort 
designed to boost not Hubert Humphrey's candidacy but his own. Johnson hoped to boost 
a third candidate— Humphrey in West Virginia, perhaps Adlai Stevenson elsewhere— so 
that he could have himself nominated at the party's convention later that summer. This 
remained a possibility, however, only as long as Kennedy could be prevented from 
locking up the necessary convention delegates before the convention opened. Kennedy 
had already beaten Humphrey in Wisconsin, and was clearly the front-runner for the 
party's nomination, but in Wisconsin most strategists agreed that he had benefitted from a 
heavy Catholic turnout and a substantial Republican crossover vote. West Virginia, on the
133
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other hand, had few Catholics, and Republicans there were prohibited from voting in the 
Democratic primary election. "If Jack wins West Virginia, the show's over anyway," 
Johnson remarked privately to Sam Raybum and others, though publicly he was much 
more optimistic.1
When Kennedy defeated Humphrey in the West Virginia primary, with Sam 
Giancana and Frank Sinatra allegedly funneling money to sheriffs throughout the state, 
Johnson fought on but realized at this point that his "sit out the primaries" strategy cost 
him a chance at his party's presidential nomination. Some who knew him well even 
doubted that he wanted to make a serious run at the presidency in 1960, suggesting that he 
only became enthusiastic about the office when it was forced upon him in late 1963. In 
early 1960, for example, James Rowe asked Johnson if he was running, for Rowe wanted 
to work for Hubert Humphrey if  he was not. With little hesitation Johnson told Rowe to 
join the Humphrey campaign.2 In January 1960 Johnson also told reporter Douglas Cater, 
later a Johnson assistant, that he would be the worst possible candidate. "Doug, every 
afternoon about this time my heart is like lead," Johnson told Cater. "I had a heart attack, 
and I'm not sure I've gotten over it."3 While this may have been little more than a 
convenient excuse for a politician who hated to lose, his health concerns undoubtedly 
made it easier for Johnson to accept Senator Kennedy's analysis, that it was "too close to 
Appomattox" for a Southern politician like himself to be elected to the U.S. presidency.
When the Democratic convention opened in Los Angeles on July 11, Johnson's 
troops were still eager to seize the nomination for their candidate, and tried to point out 
that legislative duties had prevented the Majority Leader from launching a more active 
campaign. Many promises, as they had hoped, were secured for second ballot support.
The nomination, however, went to John Kennedy on the convention's first ballot with
1 Dallek, Lone S tar Rising, 567; Miller, Lyndon, 238.
2 Quoted by Orville Freeman in Hardesty, The Johnson Years, 150.
3 Quoted in ibid., 41.
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remarkably little difficulty, and the outcome that Senator Johnson had expected since the 
May West Virginia primary was now made official.
At this point the only remaining drama at the convention would revolve around 
Kennedy's choice o f a running mate. Johnson was thought by many to have little role in 
the selection o f the party's vice presidential nominee, and even less of a chance at the 
nomination itself. Many were taken by surprise, then, when Johnson was chosen as 
Kennedy's running mate. Reports surfaced that both John and Robert Kennedy attempted 
to withdraw Johnson's selection, and that the liberal/labor wing o f the party was the 
primary source o f this indecision and renewed circumspection.4 Indeed, though it is either 
apocryphal or far less significant than commonly thought to be, one o f the most often 
repeated anecdotes from the convention weekend is Robert Kennedy's response to the 
Johnson nomination. "None of this would have ever happened," Kennedy supposedly 
lamented, "if we'd only gotten some sleep."5
With the exception o f Bobby Kennedy's sleepless and somewhat detached 
machinations, there seems to be little truth to most o f these reports, however, and 
comments from various liberal Democrats and labor leaders suggest that the situation was 
similar to Florida's secession crisis in 1861 where most o f the state's Democratic 
politicians said they were against secession but were merely "following the state" out of 
the union.6 While many of the Democratic party's youngest liberals and labor leaders were 
indeed prejudiced against Johnson's nomination, many of them did not know him well 
enough to judge him fairly. A great number o f the party's elders and insiders, on the other 
hand, responded enthusiastically to Johnson's nomination. David Dubinsky o f the
4 Thomas C. Reeves, A Question o f  Character: A Life o f  John F. Kennedy (N ew  York: The Free Press, 
Macmillan, Inc., 1991), 179; and Paul Henggeler, In His Steps: Lyndon Johnson and the Kennedy Mystique 
(Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1991), 45-46, are two recent works on Kennedy that stand by these reports.
5 See Molly Ivins, M oliy Ivins Can't Say That, Can She? (N ew  York: Random House, 1991), 187, for an 
example o f  this story's endurance.
6 Eric Foner, Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877  (N ew  York: Harper & Row, 
1988), 185.
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International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, when informed o f Johnson's selection, 
shouted "its terrific, its a winning ticket!"7 Anthony Celebrezze, a Kennedy delegate at the 
convention and later Kennedy's Secretary o f Health, Education, and Welfare, pronounced 
Johnson "a good choice."8 Stewart Udall, eventually tabbed as Kennedy's Interior 
Secretary thought Johnson as the vice presidential nominee represented "perfect ticket 
balancing," and remembered John Kenneth Galbraith comparing the ticket favorably to 
Roosevelt-Gamer in 1932.9 Galbraith himself, a Kennedy economic adviser who met 
Johnson in the early 1940s, remembered him as "a liberal's liberal" in the U. S. Congress, 
and was not moved by the allegations that Johnson was too much the southern 
conservative.10 Dubinsky also noted that with one phone call to each man and a brief 
meeting with Reuther, he was able to convince Alex Rose and Walter Reuther that L.B.J. 
was an excellent choice for the vice-presidency.11 Moreover, when Ted Sorensen and 
Myer Feldman had prepared separate lists of potential vice-presidential nominees in June, 
Lyndon Johnson was first on both lists.12 One week before the convention opened a group 
of the party's big city "bosses," including Carmine DeSapio o f New York City and Bill 
Green o f Philadelphia, met in Pennsylvania governor David Lawrence's hotel suite. After 
debating the merits of all the potential candidates they decided unanimously to urge 
Johnson as the vice-presidential nominee.13 Finally, when it surfaced that his brother 
Bobby was suggesting a reconsideration, the presidential nominee, himself, told publisher 
Phil Graham, "Well, Bobby's not up to date."14
7 Quoted in Miller, Lyndon , 259; David Dubinsky, Oral History Interview, Mr. Dubinsky's office, 201 W. 
52nd St., New  York,NY, interviewed by Paige Mulhollan, May 7, 1969, LBJ Library, 11.
8 Anthony J. Celebrezze, Oral History Interview, LBJ Library, interviewed by Paige Mulholland, January 
26, 1971, 1.
9 Stewart Lee Udall, Oral History Interview, LBJ Library,interviewed by Joe Frantz, April 18, 1969, 10-11.
10 John Kenneth Galbraith, A Life In Our Times (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1981), 447.
11 David Dubinsky, Oral History Interview, 11.
12 Leonard Baker, The Johnson Eclipse: A President's Vice Presidency (N ew  York: MacMillan, 1966), 56.
13 Ibid., 188-189.
14 Quoted in Miller, Lyndon, 261.
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On the other hand, there were real concerns that Johnson would not accept the 
nomination. Johnson's friend and mentor Sam Rayburn, for example, shared fellow Texan 
and former vice-president John Gamer's less than sanguine view of the vice-presidency, 
and initially scoffed at the idea o f Johnson accepting the nomination.15 He was equally 
skeptical o f John Kennedy's prowess as a politician, joining Johnson and others who 
referred to the Democratic presidential nominee as "the boy" or "young Jack." Two 
concerns, however, seemed to have allayed any doubts that Raybum or any other Johnson 
associate held. First and foremost, Congressman Hale Boggs says that he changed 
Rayburn's mind by suggesting that without Johnson on the ticket, Richard Nixon would 
become the next president, a thought that caused both Raybum and Johnson to recoil in 
horror. When the House Speaker changed his mind, Johnson was initially caught off 
guard. "Mr Raybum," he puzzled, "last night you told me not to take it?" Raybum replied 
quietly, thinking most likely of Boggs' premonition, "I'm a damn sight smarter [today] 
than I was last night."16
John Connally claims that he also convinced Johnson, perhaps after the latter had 
already listened to Rayburn's new found rationale, that he had no choice but to take it. If 
you take it and lose, Connally reminded Johnson, you are still the majority leader with 
influence (under a Republican president) and you won't be blamed for the loss. If you take 
it and win, you are the vice president. If you refuse the nomination, however, and 
Kennedy loses you will be blamed for the loss. If he wins, your influence as majority
15 Gamer was reported as saying that the vice-presidency was "not worth a pitcher o f  warm spit," though 
his original comment was probably a scatological one. It must be recalled, however, that unlike Kennedy 
and Johnson, Gamer and his running mate FDR were ideological opponents. By 1940 Gamer would lead 
opponents o f  the N ew  Deal within the Texas Democratic party, an insurgency that John Connally cited as 
the genesis o f  the modem Republican party in Texas. See Connally with Herskowitz, In History's Shadow ,
77.
16 Quoted in Miller, Lyndon , 257; Baker, The Johnson Eclipse, 184. Later Raybum would be an ardent 
Kennedy supporter exclaiming "My god, the things that boy knows!" after the second televised debate with 
Nixon. Quoted in Irving Bernstein, Promises Kept: John F. Kennedy's New Frontier (N ew  York: Oxford 
University Press, 1991), 228.
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leader will be greatly diminished.17 Since Johnson shuddered at the prospect o f a 
President Nixon, and loved political power and prestige as much as anyone, he had only a 
little difficulty accepting the vice presidential nomination.18
With the real campaign underway Johnson convinced most of the remaining skeptics 
that his selection had been a particularly wise one, and his relationship with John 
Kennedy, never as bad as the primary season led many to believe, began to improve and 
mature as well. The real thorny issues of the campaign—civil rights, Kennedy's 
Catholicism, and Johnson's conservative reputation—were confronted and defused by the 
vice-presidential nominee throughout the campaign. The Catholic issue, for example, 
utterly absurd and insignificant as it seems today, was a source o f great concern in 1960.
It was largely laid to rest, however, at Houston's Rice Hotel on September 12 with 
Johnson's operations team paving the way.19 There Kennedy confronted the Greater 
Houston Ministerial Association and turned a rather hostile welcome into respectful, 
almost enthusiastic, applause at the finish. Journalist William White called Johnson's role 
at the Houston convocation "an enormous contribution not only to decently effective 
politics but to national unity."20 In several areas, most noticeably Southern California, 
Johnson also did better than Kennedy in the cultivation of liberal audiences, convincing 
skeptics on the Eastern seaboard that the vice-presidential nominee was no "knee-jerk" 
Southern reactionary. And, in an episode at the Adolphus Hotel in Dallas on November
17 Connally with Herskowitz, In History's Shadow, 162. See also Valenti, A Very Human President, 16.
18 Johnson's ill regard for Richard Nixon probably dates from the latter's prominent Senate campaign in
1950 against Helen Gahagan Douglas. Ms. Douglas, a celebrated Broadway actress in the 1920s, film star 
o f  the cult classic "She," and insightful, progressive politician in the 1940s, was labeled "the Pink Lady" by 
Nixon in the 1950 race, was lambasted for her suggestions that communism was no threat to the U.S., and 
was effectively destroyed as a politician. Some have suggested that Johnson had a brief love affair with Ms. 
Douglas in the late 1940s, and that at the very least admired her political prowess and conviction. See Greg 
M itchell, "The Pink Lady's Revenge," review o f  Center Stage: Helen Gahagan Douglas, A Life, by Ingrid 
Winther Scobie, in The Nation, October 5, 1992, 373-374, for a brief summary o f  Nixon's tactics in the 
1950 Senate race.
19 Jack Valenti, A Very Human President, 18-20 (Valenti, an advertising executive and Johnson assistant, 
was perhaps most responsible for the Rice Hotel convocation arrangements); Miller, Lyndon, 265-266.
20 William S. White, The Professional: Lyndon B. Johnson (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1964) 25.
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4, just four days before the election, Johnson endeared himself to liberals throughout the 
nation, and to Southern moderates as well, and rescued Texas' 24 electoral votes for the 
Kennedy-Johnson ticket. When a phalanx of Dallas Junior League Republicans, organized 
by Bruce Alger, Texas' lone Republican congressman, confronted Senator and Mrs. 
Johnson outside o f and in the lobby of the Adolphus, one of the campaign's ugliest 
moments was recorded by television cameras. One Junior Leaguer grabbed Mrs.
Johnson's gloves and threw them into the street. Signs reading "LBJ Sold Out to Yankee 
Socialists" and "Beat Judas" were swung menacingly close to the Johnsons as they moved 
into the lobby, and the young Junior League ladies gnashed their teeth for the cameras as 
they hurled torrents o f vitriol toward the vice presidential candidate and his wife. "Nigger- 
lover" and "Commie" were the most frequently heard epithets, and at one point Lady Bird 
was even spat upon.21
Widely broadcast, this scene showed skeptical liberals throughout the nation what a 
Texas liberal was up against. Even Lady Bird was caught off guard. "If a whole bunch of 
Martians had suddenly dropped out o f the sky," she remarked, "I would not have been 
more surprised, because these were people we had been working for for twelve years in 
the Senate."22 As a result o f the confrontation, many midwestern and northeastern liberals 
now saw Johnson in a different light, for he was now being attacked—physically— for his 
liberal outlook. They began to see him for what he was: the liberal as conservative, 
fighting against scores o f reactionaries in his home state and for a consensus that was 
fundamentally more liberal than conservative. Milking the incident for all it was worth, 
Johnson instinctively slowed his step, put his arms around Lady Bird, and traversed the 
lobby in about thirty minutes instead o f the five or ten minutes it would have taken had he 
tried to flee. In the aftermath, shamed and sympathetic Southern moderates, and no small
21 Miller, Lyndon, 270-272, Baker, The Johnson Eclipse, 85. Future Republican senator John Tower was 
there as well, but he remained largely inconspicuous as the mob moved in on the Johnsons.
22 Quoted in Miiler, Lyndon, 2 7 1.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
140
number of Texas conservatives, most o f them ostensibly members of Johnson's 
Democratic party, undoubtedly found it less troubling, four days later, to cast their votes 
for their not so favorite son. In an election where the Kennedy-Johnson ticket won Texas' 
twenty-four electoral votes by a mere 46,233 popular votes (out o f 2,311,084), and South 
Carolina's eight electoral votes by 9,571 popular votes (out o f 386,688), this was 
significant.23 Journalist William White even concluded that "the sights and sounds in the 
lobby o f that hotel had made John F. Kennedy President and Lyndon B. Johnson Vice- 
President o f the United States."24 However one looks at the 1960 election returns, with the 
last o f three Eisenhower recessions, Kennedy's phone call to the wife o f jailed civil rights 
leader Martin Luther King, and the televised Kennedy-Nixon debates having great bearing 
on the outcome as well, Johnson's contribution was substantial and undeniable.25 Perhaps 
no one was more aware o f this than President-elect John Kennedy.
As inauguration day approached Kennedy began to realize how difficult it would be 
to "keep Lyndon happy," as he once remarked, and to utilize Johnson's talents as well. He 
was, however, determined to do both. A few days before the inauguration he spoke to 
some of his aides. "Just a few months earlier," the President-elect remarked, "you were 
clerks on Capitol Hill while he was the most important man there. Johnson's not going to 
enjoy having to deal with you and you should always take that into consideration."26 To a 
different constellation of staff members, at about the same time, Kennedy also felt 
compelled to note that "anybody in this administration who thinks he will promote 
himself with me by biting at Lyndon Johnson has a very large hole in his head."27
23 See Numan V. Bartley and Hugh D. Graham, Southern Elections: County and  Precinct Data, 1950-1972  
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1978), 244, 203.
24 White, The Professional, 7.
25 The phone call to Mrs. Coretta Scott King was publicized via a leaflet printed on blue paper and dubbed 
"the blue bomb."
26 Quoted in Baker, The Johnson Eclipse, 15.
27 Quoted in White, The Professional, 22-23.
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For Johnson's part, while he had no illusions about the pale record Kennedy had 
amassed in the Senate, he had more respect for the President-elect than most observers 
had imagined. After all, he had arranged for Kennedys' seat on the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee in 1953, Johnson's first year as party leader and Kennedy's first year 
in the senate all together. He had also nominated the young Massachusetts Senator for the 
vice-presidency at the 1956 convention, and during the same campaign, Adrian Spears, a 
prominent Texas Democrat, remembered Kennedy and Johnson's close relationship 
during and after a Stevenson rally in San Antonio. "I had the best suite in the hotel set 
aside for Kennedy and Johnson...." Spears remarked, "and the picture that stands out in 
my mind is John Kennedy sitting in a bathtub filled with hot water to ease the pain in his 
back, and LBJ sitting on the side o f the tub pouring water on his back."28
After the inauguration o f Kennedy and Johnson, on January 20,1961, with Speaker 
Rayburn administering the oath of office to the Vice-President-elect, Johnson remained 
less than sanguine about the Vice Presidency. "Your daddy," Johnson remarked to 
Franklin Roosevelt, Jr., "never let his Vice-Presidents put their heads above water."29 But 
the Kennedy-Johnson relationship continued to prosper. At the end of his first year as 
vice-president, Johnson exclaimed, "If I learned anything in the last year, its that Jack 
Kennedy's a lot tougher, and maybe a lot smarter, than I thought he was."30 As a sign of 
his commitment, Johnson threw himself into the fray over the confirmation o f the 
President's brother as Attorney General, in spite o f the early opposition from almost all 
Southern senators. "I want you to lead all our Southern friends in here by their ying yangs, 
and let me work on 'em," Johnson told Senate Secretary Bobby Baker. "We've got to 
smooth Dick Russell's feathers, and kiss of Jim Eastland's ass, and mute Strom 
Thurmond's brayin'."31 Johnson was particularly successful with Senator Russell, still one
28 Quoted in Miller, Lyndon , 230-231.
29 Quoted in Leuchtenburg, In the Shadow  o f  FDR, 133.
30 Quoted in Baker, "Wheeling and Dealing," 248.
31 Ibid., 250.
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of the Senate's major power brokers." I need to to start off good," he told the Georgia 
senator, "if I'm going to be any help to the South with our new president....I'm making a 
personal plea that you call off the dogs in your opposition to Bobby."32 And while Robert 
Kennedy's actions at the Los Angeles nominating convention had plainly irritated 
Johnson, he began to see the President's brother in a somewhat more favorable light as 
well. "It's a different matter if  some ol' boy hasn't got sense enough to pour piss out o f a 
boot," Johnson remarked, "but I don't think you can say that about Bobby Kennedy. He 
may be a snot-nose, but he's bright."33
President Kennedy lavished his vice-president with praise as well, and did all that he 
could to enlarge the scope o f Johnson's office. "Lyndon's job is the hardest one he could 
ever have," Kennedy told William White, "and he is performing it like a man, M-A-N."34 
Secretary of State Dean Rusk noted later: "I had long been used to the favorite indoor 
sport around Washington—making fun o f Vice-Presidents. But I never saw the slightest 
trace o f  that in John F. Kennedy."35
Despite ongoing frustration with his isolation from the sources of real political 
power, Lyndon Johnson performed his job as the nation's vice-president with a great deal 
o f determination, and strived to convince the public that he was now more o f a foot 
soldier than a commanding officer. "Where he leads me, I will follow," Johnson remarked 
shortly after the 1960 nominating convention, invoking the lines o f a traditional gospel 
verse.36 On his frequent diplomatic missions, for example, he always stuck to the policy 
statements formulated in advance by the President and his staff, though he frequently 
thumbed his nose at state department protocol where it prohibited him from mingling with 
crowds in Manila or fishermen in Senegal. And in the course o f his vice-presidency,
32 Gerald S. and Deborah H. Strober, Let Us Begin Anew: An O ral History o f  the Kennedy Presidency, 
(N ew  York, Harper Collins, 1993), 115.
33 Baker, "Wheeling and Dealing," 248.
34 White, The Professional, 79.
35 Quoted in Miller, Lyndon, 279.
36 Quoted inBaker, The Johnson Eclipse, 10.
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Johnson called no news conferences, for in his mind the President required the nation's 
undivided attention.
Most o f his tours were unequivocal public relations successes; some even provided 
President Kennedy with valuable, unparallelled advice. "I wish I could share more of the 
burden of such trips with you," Kennedy wrote to Johnson in September 1962, "as I know 
they must often seem a chore. But you're a prisoner o f your own success, and I hope I can 
count on you to take on more such travels when occasion demands."37 At the conclusion 
of the Fall 1962 sojourn, which included a visit to Iran, Nelson Rockefeller added his own 
plaudits, introducing the Vice-President to a New York City banquet audience as "the 
only American who could be elected mayor o f Teheran."38 In Southeast Asia from May 5 
to May 19, 1961, while the Kennedy administration's first racial crisis flared back in the 
U.S. (the May 14 fire-bombing and mob assault o f CORE "Freedom Riders"), Johnson 
warned the President that Premier Diem of South Vietnam was "remote from the people," 
and that "the momentary threat o f communism" was not the greatest danger facing the 
U.S. in Vietnam. It was instead "the danger that stems from hunger, ignorance, poverty, 
and disease."39 This was advice that cut to the heart o f a particularly thorny diplomatic 
problem, advice which ironically became obscured by the peculiar unfolding of military 
events during the adviser's own presidency.
Johnson was such a successful diplomat, particularly in less wealthy nations where he 
could mingle with farmers and artisans and talk politics with populist leaders, that Dean 
Rusk issued a standing order to state department officials wherever Johnson traveled: the 
Vice-President was to have the opportunity for face-to-face, one-on-one conversations 
with the political leaders o f any host nation, whenever it was possible. "There is no person 
in America," Rusk remarked, "that can equal Johnson in knee-to-knee conversation with
37 Quoted in White, The Professional, 232.
38 Quoted in Baker, The Johnson Eclipse, 65.
39 Quoted in White, The Professional, 241,242.
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another man."40 An associate also told President Kennedy once that "no man alive...ever 
entirely won any face-to-face argument with Lyndon Johnson; ever came out o f one 
feeling as sure o f his position as when he entered." With a broad grin, Kennedy replied: 
"How right! How right!"41
Johnson's willing deference to President Kennedy stemmed in part from his 
recognition that the President held him in high regard and struggled to keep him satisfied 
and plugged in to the administration's day-to-day agenda. He was frequently sent advance 
text o f forthcoming speeches, was given a six room suite at the executive office building 
(drawing him physically closer to the President than any previous VP), and was invited to 
all briefings o f the President before presidential press conferences and to all Tuesday 
morning breakfasts with Democratic congressional leaders. Kennedy also tried to 
establish a precedent by meeting with Johnson after each foreign trip, and then with the 
press immediately thereafter, to summarize and publicize the Vice-President's findings. 
"President Kennedy was very good to me," Johnson once remarked, "and tried to elevate 
the office [of the vice-president] in any way that he could."42 "It was a standing order of 
President Kennedy's," Kennedy assistant Larry O'Brien added, "that the Vice-President 
was a participant in all meetings involving the President and his program. And believe 
me, LBJ was involved."43
Both Kennedy and Johnson, though, found the task o f elevating the vice-presidency 
to be a frustrating one. Johnson was determined to be an activist Vice-President, but the 
office provided little opportunity for activism. "I don't know what to do with Lyndon, 
Arthur Krock of the New York Times remembers President Kennedy saying, "I've got to 
keep him happy somehow. My big job is to keep Lyndon happy."44 The upshot was that
40 Quoted in Miller, Lyndon, 282.
41 Quoted in White, The Professional, 44.
42 Quoted in Miller, Lyndon, 277.
43 Quoted in Hardesty, The Johnson Years, 74.
44 Quoted in ibid., 280.
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for all o f his success in the office, Johnson was still confounded by his relative 
impotence—often comparing the vice-presidency to a Texas steer or referring to himself 
as a "cut dog." Perennial Johnson assistant Harry McPherson recalled the less than 
favorable side o f Johnson's tenure as vice-president. "It was a time of deprivation," 
McPherson noted, "he grew very fat and drank alot. He took up golf some, I recall, but not 
with enthusiasm."45 Bobby Baker, Johnson's secretary as Majority Leader, recalled how 
Johnson also became frustrated in his frequent, and most often spumed, attempts to relax 
and talk politics with the President in the evening hours 46 One clear difference between 
Kennedy and Johnson, who otherwise shared a surprising number of character traits and 
political affinities, was that with Johnson "everything was work, and all work was 
politics," whereas Kennedy generally tried to separate his social life from his workplace 
and from politics in general.47 "When Kennedy was with daytime people," Elspeth 
Rostow recalled, "he was busy, on the job, charming, funny, but after hours he saw 
different people and lived differently. With Johnson it was a continuous web. Everybody 
was part o f the act. He'd bring secretaries to supper; there was no upstairs, downstairs."48
Moreover, it did not take Johnson long to understand the vice-presidency as a 
genuine exile from his power base in the U.S. Senate. Presiding over the first Democratic 
caucus in the Senate after his vice-presidential inauguration, Johnson watched as the 
Democratic senators extended an invitation to preside over future caucuses. But when this 
resolution passed with only 46 yeas and 17 nays, Johnson was genuinely surprised by the 
number o f senators in opposition. Partly concerned with the separation o f powers clause, 
but mostly chagrined by this less than unanimous show of support, he turned the gavel 
over to Majority Leader Mike Mansfield at the next caucus and did not preside over
45 Quoted in ibid., 305.
46 Hengeller, In His Steps, 59.
47 C. Vann Woodward, "The Return o f  LBJ," New York Review  o f  Books, December 5, 1991, 6.
48 Quoted in Miller, Lyndon, 344.
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another. "I now know the difference between a cactus and a caucus," Johnson quipped 
afterward. "In a cactus all the pricks are on the outside."49
Despite all this, Johnson's vice-presidency remains much more than a political time- 
warp or season o f whither for the ambitious Texas Democrat. When Johnson learned that 
President Kennedy shared his predilection for pragmatic, consensus politics, as well as his 
desire to change an economy that both believed to be managed against the poor and the 
disadvantaged, he was intrigued. Kennedy desired a genuine consensus as much as his 
Vice-President, and he was fascinated, for example, with the amicable relations between 
European businessmen and their governments; often wondering aloud why the U.S. could 
not foster similar attitudes and relationships.50 Like Johnson, Kennedy also became 
disturbed when chastised by liberals, but took conservative criticism in stride.51 And on 
economic policy, at the outset, Kennedy told his economic advisers to return to not just 
the letter but to the spirit o f the 1946 Employment Act.52 Indeed, before his assassination 
in 1963, Kennedy had made the Council of Economic Advisers, created by the 1946 
Employment Act, an integral part o f his administration, and for the first time, had elevated 
it to a notable position in the eyes o f the general public. "...I expect the CEA," Kennedy 
declared in December 1960, "to take its place as a key element within the Presidential 
office. I believe it can make a major contribution to the successful organization of the 
Presidency and by revitalizing the Council o f Economic Advisers we shall fill a gap in the 
services available to the President."53 Full employment, high demand, and greater
49 Quoted in ibid., 276; Baker, The Johnson Eclipse, 28.
50 Rowen, The Free Enterprisers, 285.
51 Jim Heath, John F. Kennedy an d  the Business Community (Chicago: University o f  Chicago Press, 1969), 
37. Paul H. Douglas, Oral History, LBJ Library, 9.
52 Walter W. Heller, "Kennedy Economics Revisited," in Joseph A. Pechman and N.J. Simler, eds., 
Economics in the Public Service: Papers in Honor o f  W alter W. Heller, 237.
53 Quoted by Charles Zwicker, "The President's Council o f  Economic Advisers," in James P. Pfiffner and 
R. Gordon Hoxie, eds.. The Presidency in Transition, 257. Because Truman had little econom ic knowledge 
and tended to distrust economists, and because Eisenhower had even less economic knowledge, the CEA 
had not fared w ell over the first fourteen years o f  its existence, despite the respect garnered by CEA 
Chairmen Leon Keyserling (1949-1953) and Arthur Bums (1953-1956). See Hugh S. Norton, The
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opportunity were clearly the benchmarks o f his economic policy, all priorities that 
Johnson deemed praiseworthy and significant. The utilization of pragmatic, consensus 
politics to achieve greater and more widespread economic opportunities was the signal 
challenge o f the Kennedy administration, even though it attracted far less attention than 
key foreign policy events.54 This implied both a willingness to experiment and an 
immersion into a genuine learning process—a process that ultimately provided Vice- 
President Johnson with an estimable challenge and with the tools to attempt a 
revolutionary shift in the American political economy when he suddenly and 
unexpectedly became the nation's next President.
In the end, what was perhaps most significant about the Kennedy-Johnson 
relationship was the way President Kennedy approached the tasks o f consensus-building 
and economic management. For here, as it was with his approach to his social life, he 
differed markedly from his vice-president. While their goals were nearly the same, 
Johnson had cultivated his economic philosophy in the working world and in government 
agency and legislative offices; Kennedy had little opportunity for the development of, or 
much interest in, an economic philosophy before he entered the White House. He was a 
virtual blank slate on economic issues. While Johnson seemed to be interested in 
economic issues at the beginning of and throughout his extensive legislative career, and 
eventually became the only post-World War II president to enter office with any hands-on 
experience making national economic policy, Kennedy seemed to be less concerned, and 
involved himself as a senator only when the Massachusetts textile and shoe industries 
began to take a nosedive in the 1950s. Known more for his interest in foreign policy,
Employment Act and the Council o f  Economic Advisers, 1946-1976  (Columbia: University o f  South 
Carolina Press, 1977), 120-148.
54 It is my contention that Kennedy historiography is dominated by two trends that obscure much o f  what 
his administration ultimately stood for: an over emphasis on foreign policy events that were partly beyond 
Kennedy's control, and not very malleable at all where he had a chance to make an impact; and a 
preoccupation with the debunking o f  the "Camelot myth," a myth easily destroyed by even the least 
perceptive viewers, but one also presented as the whole o f  the Kennedy revolution, even though it was an 
apparition created largely by journalists after the fact.
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Kennedy also had little experience in the world o f commerce, for his father's wealth had 
insured that he need not concern himself with personal finance. His political and social 
milieu was, indeed, quite far removed from the day-to-day economy; he had seldom even 
used cash, charging many purchases to his father's credit accounts instead.
What came of this contrast in background was a President who began a serious study 
o f economic principles as he prepared to take office, and a more politically seasoned 
Vice-President who gained his first real access to academic economic knowledge in the 
process. Like almost every other U.S. president, Kennedy came into office having to be 
briefed on economic principles o f the simplest order. "Now tell me again how do I 
distinguish between monetary and fiscal policy?" Kennedy asked Walter Heller during 
the first weeks of his administration.55 The questions continued throughout the Thousand 
Days o f the Kennedy presidency, though they grew in complexity and sophistication. 
"Gardner," Kennedy asked CEA member Gardner Ackley in 1963, "tell me again about 
the multiplier. I thought I understood it once, but now I can't reproduce the argument."56
Kennedy was, however, a voracious reader, and possessed an unwavering academic 
curiosity. M.I.T. professor Paul Samuelson, one o f Kennedy's most trusted economic 
advisers, referred to his quick mind and ability to read quickly as a "tremendous 
advantage," adding that "someone like Eisenhower, who just can't read, is blinded."57 And 
when this curiosity could be directed at precise and attractive goals, such as excelling in 
the world's most powerful political office, Kennedy exhibited an affinity for diligent effort 
and creative statesmanship. "He had more capacity for growth than any other President I 
knew," Clark Clifford recalled in his memoirs.58
55 Quoted in Richard Reeves, President Kennedy: Profde o f  Power (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993) 
295. According to Reeves, Heller reportedly answered Kennedy by reminding him that "monetary is 'M,1 
like Martin" (Chairman o f  the Federal Reserve William McChesney Martin, ostensibly the nation's key 
monetary policy official).
56 A ckley, Oral History Interview, in Hargrove and Morley, The President and the CEA, 223.
57 Quoted in Strober and Strober, Let Us Begin Anew, 106.
58 Clark Clifford with Richard Holbrooke, Counsel to the President: A Memoir (New York: Random 
House, 1991), 656.
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Consequently, while John Kennedy possessed little interest in and little knowledge of 
economic matters before his nomination as the Democratic candidate for the presidency, 
he began a serious and extensive pursuit of economic knowledge after that point. He had 
studied briefly under Harold Laski at the London School o f Economics, and under Russ 
Nixon at Harvard—both left-wing Keynsian economists— but neither had much impact on 
his thinking.59 He had conferred with Senator Paul Douglas (Economics PhD) and 
Professor Seymour Harris on economic issues while in the senate, but here as well he 
exhibited only a scant amount o f interest and learned even less. When he became 
President, however, the discipline in which he had shown only a passing interest, 
suddenly became a valuable and intriguing field. "Send me down some good economists," 
Kennedy told Harvard law professor Archibald Cox in August 1960, and Cox obliged, 
dispatching John Kenneth Galbraith o f Harvard, Paul Samuelson o f M.I.T., and Richard 
Lester of Princeton to Hyannis Port to begin Kennedy's tutorial.60 Found in the company 
of economics professors moreso than any other advisers until the April 1961 Bay o f Pigs 
crisis, Kennedy proved to be an eager student, working quietly behind the scenes to 
improve his grasp o f basic economic principles.
While some have implied that whenever Kennedy pressed others for information, as 
he did in this case, he was doing so only to "flatter and enchant;" his quiet diligence here 
suggests otherwise.61 Even Eisenhower, who ridiculed Kennedy's inexperience by calling
59 John Kenneth Galbraith referred to the Kennedy-Russ Nixon relationship in Strober and Strober, Let Us 
Begin Anew, 245; Seymour Harris referred to Kennedy's relationship with both Nixon and Laski in his own 
monograph, Economics o f  the Kennedy Years, A nd a Look A h ead  (N ew  York: Harper and Row, 1964), 17. 
See also Nigel Hamilton, JFK: Reckless Youth (New York: Random House, 1992), 142-143, for a brief 
appraisal o f  Kennedy's short tenure at the London School o f  Economics. "The simple truth was," Hamilton 
writes, "the London School o f  Economics didn't impress Jack as it had his brother [Joseph,Jr.]. He had no 
wish to sit at Laski's feet— or anyone else's. What he wanted was fun, which was difficult when he wasn't 
feeling well." It must be remembered, o f  course, that JFK was only 18 years old when he went to the LSE.
60 Quoted in Bernstein, Prom ises Kept, 119.
61 Thomas Reeves, A Question o f  Character, 169.
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him "Little Boy Blue," noted in his diary that as President, Kennedy became a "serious, 
earnest seeker o f information."62
The most significant o f all the economics professors who advised Kennedy (and 
Johnson as well) was a University o f Minnesota economist hurriedly introduced to 
Kennedy between campaign stops in October 1960. Eventually selected as the chairman 
o f Kennedy's Council o f Economic Advisers, Walter W. Heller was introduced to the 
presidential candidate by Hubert Humphrey as Kennedy was changing shirts in a 
Minneapolis hotel room. "Jack," Humphrey said as he interrupted Kennedy's preparations, 
"I want you to meet the finest economist west o f the Mississippi." Though Kennedy was 
an hour and a half behind schedule, he stopped, greeted Professor Heller, and began a 
brief interrogation. "Well now," the presidential candidate mused, "if you're such a good 
economist, tell me, can we really achieve the 5% rate o f growth we promised in the 
Democratic platform?" And then, immediately after Heller answered with a qualified 
"yes," Kennedy fired back: "You know, Paul Samuelson tells me that I can turn a $500 
billion economy around with about a $5 billion tax cut. How is that possible?"63 Heller's 
quick and dirty formulations captivated the presidential nominee, and for his part Heller 
was intrigued by the incisive and pertinent nature of Kennedy's questions. After the 
November election victory and Paul Samuelson's refusal o f Kennedy's first offer, 
Professor Heller was anxiously offered the CEA chairmanship.64
Once elected, Kennedy's interest in economics education refused to wane, and he 
tried to insure that his tutors take nothing for granted. Archibald Cox warned Professor 
Seymour Harris, at one briefing, just a few days after the inauguration, to pace the 
instruction so the new President would not miss a beat. "Wait a minute, Seymour," Cox 
beseeched Harris, "you're talking mile-a-minute. Make it Econ A."
62 Quoted in ibid., 221.
63 Heller, Oral History Interview, in Hargrove and Morley, The President an d  the CEA , 172-173.
64 Norton, The Employment Act and  the Council o f  Economic Advisers, 171, 177.
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"Jack had Econ A," Harris replied, to which Kennedy responded, "Yes, it's true. I had 
econ A, and I got a 'C' in it."65
Perhaps the most surprising thing about the economics education of President 
Kennedy was that his vice-president seemed, in the end, to have gotten the most out of it. 
Kennedy was, indeed, a more accomplished scholar than Johnson, and he, moreso than his 
vice-president, valued academic pursuits for their own sake; it was Johnson, however, 
who knew how to make the best use o f the technical knowledge, even if he absorbed it 
with more o f an eye for conclusions and policy implications than for the details o f exotic 
economic formulae. Arthur Okun, Johnson's CEA chairman in 1968 and 1969, compared 
Johnson's approach to technical advice, for example, to a patient who chooses to "look 
hard in the physician's eyes when he renders the judgement," instead o f asking to see the 
X-rays.66 A great reader o f personality and virtue, Johnson ultimately relied on advisers 
like Walter Heller more than John Kennedy had, but, at the same time, he had less 
difficulty connecting technical advice to real-life situations and to their political, as well 
as their economic, ramifications. While a great deal of this technical advice was showered 
upon Johnson after he assumed the presidency, his introduction to, and the development 
of his faith in, technical economic analysis began largely while he served as Kennedy's 
vice-president.
In fairness to President Kennedy, one must realize that he was hampered by many 
short-term political roadblocks, not least of which was the coalition o f Republicans and 
conservative Southern Democrats in Congress that served to stymie most liberal 
legislation. He, much more than Johnson, then, had to concern himself with the 
elimination of simple legislative inertia before he could even begin to weigh the potential
65 Quoted in Strober and Strober, Let Us Begin Anew, 244. Irving Bernstein noted, in Promises Kept, how 
Kennedy actually made a "B" in Econ A at Harvard.
66 Okun, Oral History Interview, in Hargrove and Morley, The President and the CEA, 271.
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effects o f new policy proposals. "Great innovations should not be forced on slender 
majorities," Kennedy often reminded his assistants, quoting Thomas Jefferson.67
The first two or three years o f the Kennedy presidency, then, had to be devoted to the 
spadework and to the education o f the public that public policy innovations required. His 
behind-the-scenes work with Sam Rayburn to enlarge the membership o f the House Rules 
Committee in early 1961 is a prime example o f the kind of foundation-building he had to 
undertake before embarking upon a more substantive legislative initiative.68 Indeed, even 
before the 1964 elections paved the way for the remarkable accomplishments o f the 89th 
Congress, Kennedy administration tactics had already begun to lessen the grip o f the 
Southern Democrat-Republican conservative coalition.69
Kennedy's difficulty forging a new economic policy, however, was not solely related 
to extant political factors. He also met with much frustration, as John Connally once 
described it, trying to convince business audiences that he did not have "horns and a tail;" 
and this stemmed as much from his unique political personality as it did from the myopia 
of the business world or from overwhelming conservative opposition.70 On one side, as 
Senator Gary Hart put it, Kennedy possessed an "almost Dionysian unpredictability."71 
While this tended to serve him well in the long run, and while it probably represented one 
of the only real components o f the Kennedy mythology, it was a source o f great unease 
for most U.S. business leaders. On the other side, due to his temperament and
67 Quoted in Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1965), 709.
68 When the House voted 217-212 on January 31 ,1961  to enlarge the Rules committee from 12 to 15 
members, to break the 6-6 chokehold the committee had previously exercised on all liberal econom ic and 
civil rights legislation, Rayburn, Speaker o f  the House since 1940 and only months away from his death, 
received a tumultuous standing ovation, (Though Democrats outnumbered Republicans 8 to 4 on the 
committee even before the expansion, conservative Democrats Howard Smith o f  Virginia and William 
Colmer o f  Mississippi had consistently voted with the Republican members on liberal legislation.)
69 See Bernstein, Prom ises Kept, 287; and Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 713, for a look at the 
surprisingly successful Kennedy legislative "scorecard."
70 Connally, In History's Shadow, 181.
71 Gary Hart, The G ood  Fight: The Education o f  an American Reformer (N ew  York: Random House, 
1993), 74.
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background, he lacked a fundamental understanding o f the motivations and prejudices o f 
most o f these corporate presidents and CEOs. Indeed, for much o f his administration, 
Kennedy was thoroughly confused by business response to his proposals and relied upon 
Lyndon Johnson as a bridge to the American business community. "Yesterday is 
yesterday," Johnson noted in February 1961 to a gathering o f  business executives, 
displaying the swagger and forthright speaking style that Kennedy generally struggled to 
adopt, "the idiom of yesterday's politics and yesterday's prejudices no longer applies—not 
even to the word 'Democrats.'"72 While Johnson's success in these kind o f gatherings was 
due, in part, to the mistaken assumption that he, as a Southerner, was naturally more 
conservative and more amenable to the wishes o f business and industry, it also flowed 
from the vice-president's keen understanding o f the business community and from the 
forcefulness o f his political vision. Johnson spoke the language o f the American business 
community, understood most o f its concerns and prejudices, and knew, accordingly, how 
to open it up to new schemes and ideas.
By 1963 there were strong indications that President Kennedy had begun to match his 
Vice-President's success in this area, even though the stated purpose o f his last two 
trips—to Florida and to Texas in November 1963—was to raise campaign funds and to 
prove to the powerful business interests there that he was not out to ruin them.73 Midway 
through his administration, for example, he had at least begun to understand his inability 
to reach the business community, noting that business continued to attack him not because 
he was anti-business, but because he was not anti-labor.74 Early in his administration, 
however, he was stumped. "Gentleman, I understand we're labeled anti-business," he
72 Quoted in Baker, The Johnson Eclipse, 61.
73 Connally, In History's Shadow, 181; Rowen, The Free Enterprisers, 275. Sylvia Porter, for example was 
moved to write in a 1963 article: "The Kennedy administration is cooperating [with] and trusting U.S. 
business to a degree unprecedented in modern times...To accuse Mr. Kennedy o f  being anti-business is 
almost akin to accusing Sen. Goldwater o f  being pro-Communist." Quoted in Heath, Kennedy and  the 
Business Community, 125.
74 Rowen, The Free Enterprisers, 118.
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noted at his first meeting with the presidents of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the 
National Association o f Manufacturers. "Why is that?"75
Had he been asked, Vice-President Johnson could have provided the answer to this 
partly rhetorical, mostly transparent question and to the dilemma it posed. Averell 
Harriman once suggested that the American business community had never forgiven 
FDR, and consequently the Democratic party, for having moved the nation's seat o f power 
from Wall Street to Washington.76 This was clearly not too far from Johnson's 
understanding of the situation, for he had risen through the political ranks a "liberal as 
conservative," making a conscious effort to appease the jealous conservatives who always 
held the balance o f the nation's political power, even after FDR and the New Deal had left 
an indelible mark on the nation's political economy. He also tried, wherever possible, to 
emphasize and accentuate the genuine conservative elements o f his own liberalism. 
Frugality, pride in the workplace, respect for the Constitution and for religiosity in general 
were among the political values that Johnson held, and they were, moreover, values not 
peculiar, in his mind, to a particular political persuasion. Even if  he disagreed with 
conservative policy prescriptions, in other words—as he most often did in the realm of 
economic policy—he could still identify with the basic motivation for such prescriptions. 
"...You don't need to start off by saying he's terrible," Johnson once advised fellow 
liberals out to assail a conservative opponent, "because he doesn't think he's terrible. Start 
talking about how you believe that he wants to do what's right and how you believe this is 
right, and you'll be surprised how many who want to do what's right will try to help 
you."77 When the business community asserted their traditional yen for a balanced federal 
budget, mostly out of concern for wastefulness and corruption, Johnson would affirm the 
propriety of that concern, yet use it to forge an explanation o f deficit spending practices
75 Quoted in ibid., 72.
76 Ibid., 128.
77 Quoted in Miller, Lyndon , 562. Emphasis in original.
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that appealed to the same sensibility. If  business leaders saw aid to the poor as equally 
pernicious and wasteful, Johnson would unfurl his "let's make tax-payers out o f tax- 
eaters" speech, and would soon have the whole crowd on their feet applauding. If  he felt 
that the business community was too ready to portray themselves as martyrs for the 
nation's economy, he would chide them for their narrow concerns and selfishness, letting 
them know, at the same time, that he understood both the importance and the complexity 
o f their roles as business managers. On top o f all this, Johnson's ranching and broadcast 
interests made him something of a businessman himself, unlike Kennedy who was simply 
the son o f a businessman.
All this helped Johnson tune in to the psychology of the business world where cliches 
and symbols were often every bit as important as genuine concern or substantive 
legislation. This was, moreover, an ability that would also be critical for liberal economics 
in the early 1960s, for that period coincided with the rise o f conservative groups like the 
John Birch Society that harbored deep prejudices against modem economics, New 
Deal/Fair Deal political activism, and government intervention in general.78 With the 
utmost respect for their power and influence, and the good sense to notice and accentuate 
what little common ground there was to be found, Johnson had learned how to disarm the 
most reactionary opponents; tactical capitulation, symbol and cliche comprised much of 
his approach. For his part, President Kennedy saw the wisdom in such a strategy but 
generally proved unequal to the task. Kennedy "would have choked on" some of 
Johnson's lines, Washington Post journalist Hobart Rowen noted in 1964, after listening 
to Johnson woo prominent members of the business community.79
78 See also Zygmund Dobbs, research director, Keynes at Harvard: Economic D eception as a  Political 
C redo  (Cambridge: Veritas Foundation, 1962), 39, 81, 106, where Alvin Hansen, Seymour Harris, and John 
Kenneth Galbraith were called "modem day Fabians o f  stealth and deception," the claim was made that 
Keynesians had "captured" the editorial staffs o f  the Book o f  the Month Club, the N ew York Times Book 
Review, the N ew York H erald Tribune Book Review, and the Saturday Review, thereby capturing "the minds 
o f  all Americans," and that "The basic terrain for communist depredations are furnished by the interlocking 
Keynsian-Socialist amalgam."
79 Rowen, The Free Enterprisers, 18.
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Almost from the beginning of the Kennedy presidency, then, Johnson came to be 
regarded as a valuable intercessor in this political game between the administration and 
the business community, though the President and many of his assistants quickly learned 
the ropes as well. After the 1962 steel crisis and stock market decline, for example, Ted 
Sorensen reminded the President: "any steps taken for the primary purpose o f pleasing the 
business community should be largely psychological, not substantive."80
By the time o f his assassination, Kennedy had, indeed, learned a great deal about the 
psychology o f  the U.S. political economy and the American business community, much 
o f it at the hands o f his vice-president. And for his part, Johnson had taken in just as much 
of the technical economics eagerly absorbed by the President and dispensed by his team 
o f economic advisers. While President Kennedy was heartened by the diminishing 
political chasm between his party and the American business community, clearly evident 
by late 1963, and saw, consequently, improved chances for the success o f a new 
economic strategy, Vice-President Johnson was able to see well beyond this relationship 
and its impact on the nation's legislative agenda. Already equipped with a profound 
populist or liberal economic faith before his tenure as Kennedy's vice-president, Johnson 
had gained, over the course o f his vice-presidency, the technical knowledge— or at least 
the awareness o f such knowledge—that transformed this faith into something more. What 
once made sense to him as a compassionate, morally correct, and affordable economic 
strategy now became a strategy for improved productivity and efficiency as well. What he 
once justified in terms o f need, Christian brotherhood, and improved character, he now 
supported with highly specific economic principles and with the promise o f an enlarged 
pie and greater wealth for all. And what he once envisioned as the capping off o f the 
"Roosevelt revolution"—a revolution that was as hard to define as it was to achieve—now 
became a much more definitive and genuine revolution that he could call his own.
80 Quoted in McQuaid, Big Business and Presidential Power, 211.
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Johnson truly envisioned "The New Economics," as the Kennedy-Johnson economic 
strategy came to be called, as the first presidential economic strategy based on a 
Keynesian demand side model, in spite of the persistent claims made by anti-Keynesians 
that this model had already been adopted and implemented with punishing effect since the 
time of Roosevelt's New Deal.81 He also envisioned it as the first presidential political 
strategy since the founding o f the Republic that carried a chance for the development o f a 
real society-wide consensus. Johnson commended and attempted to popularize the 
demand side orientation represented by the New Economics because his instincts told him 
that jobs and the elimination o f poverty were preeminent, and— after his vice-presidential 
tenure— because Heller, Samuelson, Galbraith, and other Kennedy advisers had 
convinced him that such an orientation manifested itself in a political economy that would 
provide the greatest good for the greatest number. Johnson also longed for a society-wide 
consensus because he knew well that political change, meaningful or not, always hinged, 
first o f all, on the consent o f the few before the many ever got a chance to offer their own 
appraisal.
O f the frail consensus that had already emerged in twentieth century America, 
Johnson was well acquainted. And he saw this consensus, one built around the image of 
laissez-faire capitalism and around the Cold War, much as Richard Hofstadter had when 
he wrote in 1967: "the consensus point of view is limited in that it is only an assertion 
about the frame or configuration o f history, and not about what goes on in the picture."82
81 The term "New Economics" was borrowed from a book o f  the same title, edited by Kennedy economic 
adviser Seymour Harris in 1952. See Seymour Harris, The N ew  Economics (N ew  York: Knopf, 1952). As 
Walter Heller noted in 1966, however, the "New Economics" was new  in only one sense: "today's talk o f  an 
'intellectual revolution' and a 'new economics' arises not out o f  startling dicoveries o f  new economic truths 
but out o f  the swift and progressive weaning o f  modem econom ics into the fabric o f  national thinking and 
policy." See Heller, The N ew Dimensions o f  Political Economy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1966), vii. Robert Solow, Nobel laureate and CEA staff member also noted that to economists the 
"New Economics" was "thoroughly middle-aged." See Robert Solow, "Fixed Investment and Economic 
Growth," in Walter Heller, ed., Perspectives on Economic Growth  (New York: Random House, 1968), 212.
82 Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition and  the Men Who M ade It (N ew  York: Random 
House, Vintage Books, 1974), xxix.
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Johnson, as one who always worried about "what goes on in the picture," believed that the 
New Economics, by hinging the fate o f entrepreneurs and managers to the economic 
demand of the working class (and the potential working class), was capable o f changing 
not only the orientation o f public policy-makers—as the Cold War had—but o f actors in 
the day-to-day commercial and social worlds as well. This would forge a consensus, he 
believed, that would truly evolve from the workings of American society itself, and not 
from a superimposed configuration designed only to give some direction to an otherwise 
rudderless, contentious nation. In 1948, Hofstadter had also written:
Although it has been said that we need a new conception o f the world to replace the 
ideology o f self-help, free enterprise, competition, and beneficent cupidity upon 
which Americans have been nourished since the foundation of the Republic, no new 
conceptions o f comparable strength have taken root and no statesman with a great 
mass following has arisen to propound them.83
Lyndon Johnson, quite simply, saw himself as the statesman who could propound, in the
name o f the New Economics, just such a revolutionary conception o f the world.84
Because the New Economics revolution exhibited a syncretistic character, borrowing 
from the concerns and the partial successes o f the New Deal/Fair Deal experiments, it also 
matched the political sympathies o f no nationally prominent politician as well as it did 
those o f Lyndon Johnson. While FDR's New Deal, or Truman's Fair Deal never meant to 
be revolutions in economic strategy, their concerns for justice, security, and the stability 
o f the mixed economy, and their demonstration o f full employment and its beneficent 
side-effects, all contributed to the forging o f a revolutionary strategy that was the New 
Economics. While this revolution required many catalysts—the cold war and the
83 Ibid., xxxvi.
84 Because I am suggesting that Johnson and the N ew  Economics was an answer to the "new conception" 
that Hofstadter was seeking, it may be instructive to compare Robert Dailek's conception o f  Johnson 
mentioned here ("the Liberal as Conservative") to Hofstadter's conception o f  Theodore R oosevelt ("the 
Conservative as Progressive") and Woodrow Wilson ("the Conservative as Liberal"). My contention, 
elaborated upon in later chapters, is that Johnson succeeded, albeit incompletely and without a resolute 
validation, primarily because he was the only twentieth century presidential reformer who could be 
characterized as "the Liberal as... [anything else]."
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economic competition it implied, the spell o f high finance machismo, the evenly matched 
partisan struggle in 1960 that led partly to a greater penchant for experimentation, and the 
innate academic curiosity o f the nation's youngest elected president—it was truly 
launched only when the Neo-Keynesian ideas of a small group o f America's brightest 
economists merged with the seasoned populist politics o f Lyndon Johnson.
That Johnson found the opportunity to adopt the teachings o f these economics 
professors was almost completely a fortuitous side effect of his party's political 
geography. Though a genuine liberal, and a proven friend of the emerging civil rights 
movement, Johnson had little chance at the Democratic presidential nomination in 1960; 
not because his Senate leadership responsibilities kept him from a full-fledged campaign, 
or because Kennedy was a more opportunistic politician than he, but because he was a 
Southerner, and therefore unacceptable to a great number of his party's constituents and 
tacticians. It was indeed, "too close to Appomatox."
Had he been nominated and elected, instead o f Kennedy, it is likely that he would 
have sought far less undiluted, professional economic advice, for he was more confident 
than the senator from Massachusetts that he already possessed a practical and compelling 
grasp o f the "dismal science." Because he was not the Democratic presidential nominee, 
however, he was exposed to more technical economic advice than he would have ever 
requested at the right hand o f a President who called for an abundance of this information. 
Johnson's vice-presidency, then, was a significant part of his presidency, in spite o f the 
exile from power politics, for it exposed him to his own need for technical economic 
advice, and it helped him find a more explicit economic strategy where he once sought 
and utilized little more than an assortment of loosely related economic tactics.
"We're rich, there's got to be something left over for the poor and the aged," is how 
Johnson would have characterized his economic outlook before 1961. In 1961 and 
beyond, however, when Kennedy's economic advisers showed him how he could end the 
zero-sum game he always detested but thought he would always have to live with, he was
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more apt to say instead: "if we help the poor and the disadvantaged, we'll grow richer 
doing so." It was this transformation, that revealed at once an opportunity for consensus, 
general prosperity, and the end of poverty, that drew Lyndon Johnson toward the 
economics advisers o f the Kennedy administration. He was, otherwise, quite the lost soul 
in the Kennedy White House; not in any real position o f power, and not even around 
much o f the time. In 1961 alone Johnson traveled 75,000 miles on three continents, and in 
the thirty-five months o f his vice-presidency he averaged a foreign trip every three 
months, logging 111,000 foreign air miles, and making 150 speeches in 30 foreign 
nations. And these figures exclude the numerous trips to his Texas ranch or to other 
locales within the United States. During the Bay of Pigs invasion week-end, for example, 
(April 15-16,1961) Johnson was in Norfolk,Virginia crowning his daughter, Lynda, queen 
o f the Azalea Festival, and in Texas hosting German chancellor Conrad Adenauer. 
Throughout the James Meredith/Ole Miss showdown (September 29-30,1962) he was at 
the LBJ ranch, and embarked upon a Western campaign swing on the second evening of 
the Cuban Missile Crisis (October 17, 1962).85
Though Vice-President Johnson was automatically intrigued by the boldness of 
Kennedy's early proposals and quickly recognized President Kennedy's emerging 
economic philosophy as one very much like his own, his continuing interest in Kennedy 
administration economic policy may still have lapsed had it not been for the influence of 
Walter Heller, Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers from 1961-1964. Johnson 
did make his presence felt at the beginning, rendering both solicited and unsolicited 
advice on economic policy, and Kennedy let it be known that he wanted to continue 
utilizing him as a liaison to the business community. When Johnson advised a hands-off 
approach to the Oil Depletion Allowance and a small tax rise to pay for the Berlin 
emergency in 1961, Kennedy took note, ultimately heeding his advice on the Oil
85 Baker, The Johnson Eclipse, 44, 45, 115, 121.
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Depletion Allowance.86 It took the wit and wisdom of Walter Heller, however, to retain 
Johnson's interest and to transform him into an economics student when he could have 
easily remained far more detached; content to play only the role o f  roving diplomat or 
host to visiting dignitaries, and having a part to play in economic policy only when a 
certain businessperson needed to be brought up to speed, or when a legislative course o f 
action seemed rocky and indeterminate. Of the Kennedy-Johnson economic advisers, 
Hobart Rowen recalled, "they were all brilliant, but Heller was special....His talent for 
blending economic with political advice, spiced with witty observations, was unique."87
No ivory tower economist, Heller was a U.S. Treasury Adviser during World War II, 
was the Chief o f Internal Finance from 1947-1948 for the U.S. Military government in 
Germany, and had served as a consultant to both the United Nations and the governor of 
Minnesota. His successor as CEA Chairman, Gardner Ackley, called Heller "the 
outstanding example" of an economist who served in government and remained informed 
from the outside at the same time.88 Heller also shared Johnson's affinity for barnyard 
humor and colorful anecdotes, once recommending that Fed Chairman William Martin be 
approached with monetary policy recommendations "the way a porcupine approaches 
making love."89
Because he was both a student of politics and a first-rate economist with a fine grasp 
o f the field's technical subtleties, Heller warmed quickly to Johnson, a man who struck
86 Johnson's contention regarding the Oil Depletion Allowance, a 27.5% tax credit for oil producers, was 
that it remained, in 1961, the linchpin o f  Democratic party campaign finance, and though it was an obvious 
and worthy target for reform its day o f  reckoning had not yet come. Leonard Baker adds that Johnson also 
felt that removal o f  the Oil Depletion Allowance would jeopardize other tax reforms and the tax cut 
proposal since quite a few members o f  the Congressional tax-writing committees hailed from oil producing 
states. See Baker, The Johnson Eclipse, 30. After listening to this political logic, Kennedy was evidently 
convinced o f  its soundness, telling Johnson and others to remind their "oil friends" that 10% o f  his trust 
fund was in oil, and that he would never preside over the destruction o f  his own wealth. See Baker, 
"Wheeling and Dealing," 250.
87 Hobart Rowen, Self-Inflicted Wounds: From LBJ's Guns and Butter to Reagan's Voodoo Economics 
(N ew  York: Times Books, Random House, 1994), 6.
88 Gardner Ackley, "Providing Economic Advice to Government," in Pechman and Simler, eds. Economics 
in the Public Service: Papers in Honor o f  Walter W. H eller, 205.
89 Quoted in Rowen, The Free Enterprisers, 155.
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him immediately as an artful, compassionate politician with high intelligence and a 
remarkable memory. "Johnson was quick, surprising in what he absorbed," Heller once 
recalled, "It was always amazing what he would bring out in these head-to-head sessions 
with small business or big business or labor or university presidents. What he suddenly 
had at his fingertips was incredible. I don't think the country ever understood that."90 On 
friendly terms with the Vice-President almost from the very beginning of the Kennedy 
administration, with both men operating out o f offices in the Executive Office Building 
where they often discussed economic policy, Professor Heller found an eager and 
captivated student in Lyndon Johnson.91 "Heller made it a habit," Hobart Rowen noted at 
the time, "to brief the Vice-President on important economic matters...In many ways 
Heller has been closer to Johnson than he was to Kennedy."92 At Kennedy's weekly 
briefing sessions Heller almost always sat next to the Vice-President and made a point to 
give him an advance copy of his briefing paper.93 Several years later [1978 interview], 
Heller recalled his relationship with Johnson: "He relied on us even more than Kennedy 
did, and LBJ and I had first-rate personal relations."94 When he left the C.E.A. and 
returned to the University o f Minnesota in November, 1964, Heller became the only 
outside economist Johnson regularly consulted, and he remained a friend and confidant 
even after Johnson left the White House in 1969. A visitor at the LBJ ranch only six days 
before Johnson's death in January 1973, Walter Heller clearly became o f Johnson's most 
significant political associates.
90 Heller, Oral History Interview, in Hargrove and Morley, eds., The President and the CEA, 177. Johnson 
speechwriter Robert Hardesty echoed Heller's judgement, calling LBJ "the President who sucked up ideas 
like a vacuum cleaner."
91 Heller's office (Room 314) was approached via the main stairwell that opened in front o f  Johnson's suites 
on the building's second floor. Heller and Johnson seemed to have engaged in numerous informal 
conversations as the former made his way to and from his third floor office.
92 Rowen, The Free Enterprisers, 166.
93 Evans and Novak, The Exercise o f  Power, 340.
94 Heller, Oral History Interview, in Hargrove and Morley, The President an d  the CEA, 178.
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Heller's instruction, Kennedy's newfound enthusiasm for modem economics, and 
Johnson's recognition o f the revolutionary potential in it all, combined to spark a 
momentous shift in the nation's political economy. By 1963, when administration 
lobbying for tax reform and for a tax cut hit stride, Kennedy and Johnson had devoted 
themselves to one simple, albeit revolutionary, idea: government economic intervention, 
derived from conservative, Hamiltonian roots in the 18th century, and previously 
deployed almost exclusively on behalf o f conservative business interests throughout the 
nation's history, should be utilized, finally and most efficiently, to expand the welfare of 
consumers and workers first. They sought nothing less than the creation o f the country's 
first demand side economic strategy, eschewing the more traditional supply side approach 
that had previously acknowledged demand only out o f concern for security or political 
stability, and not economic success.
While neither Kennedy nor Johnson hesitated in identifying this change with liberal 
politics, they hoped to exploit and to assert its fundamentally conservative character as 
well. Giving higher priority to workers, potential workers, and consumers, and 
envisioning increased government social spending as an offshoot o f economic growth and 
increased revenues, their plans bore the stamp of traditional liberalism. Hoping to do all 
this apart from, rather than within, the traditional zero-sum game, however, where helping 
business or helping the working class had always implied a hindrance to one for the sake 
o f the other, the Kennedy-Johnson political economy represented a novel approach and 
was anything but anti-business or anti-capitalist in its outlook. That the business 
community had a difficult time seeing this, always perplexed President Kennedy, even 
after it became obvious that he was judged an enemy or adversary simply because he was 
not anti-labor.95 While he and Johnson could understand quite readily the reason for this 
prevalent attitude— business interests, after all, had always brandished the anti-labor, win-
95 Rowen, The Free Enterprisers, 118.
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lose approach quite successfully—he had a difficult time understanding its resilience.96 
The incongruous, mythical nature o f this attitude, where freedom was somehow 
dependent on the active repression o f the masses, convinced President Kennedy that it 
could be dissolved easily. He was genuinely surprised, then, when much of the business 
community ignored his pleas to end the old zero-sum game and to forge a real consensus 
on economic policy.
Moreover, while Kennedy and Johnson sought an end to poverty and joblessness, 
perhaps more than anything else, they also sought to liberate and extend the free market 
mechanisms in the American mixed economy that always made it, almost intuitively, such 
an attractive alternative to its more rigid, statist counterparts. As Kennedy and Johnson 
began to see it, misallocation, inefficiency, and dilution of market forces stemmed more 
from the traditional supply side regime; expanding the demand of consumers and the 
working class would, on the other hand, bring American business closer to a real 
marketplace orientation and the economy closer to allocative efficiency. They saw greater 
opportunities, in other words, for stability and market clearing efficiency when business 
production responded to high and steady demand, rather than to the whims of preferential 
and politically volatile government incentives (tax breaks, tariffs, subsidies, single bid 
contracts,etc.). And they thought it ironic, and even absurd, that the business community, 
most strident in its call for the restoration of a "free market" that never really existed, also 
devoted itself blindly to the extension and perpetuation of policies that made real, existing 
market mechanisms function less well.
When President Kennedy asked Walter Heller, early in his presidency, to furnish a 
memo explaining why European growth rates were higher than current U.S. growth rates,
96 See Allen Dawley, Straggles fo r  Justice: Social Responsibilities and the Liberal State  (Cambridge: 
Belknap Press, Harvard University Press, 1991), for a persuasive rendering o f  this approach in the 1890- 
1940 period. Dawley regards the use o f  Pinkerton detectives, National Guardsmen, Prohibition, and the Red 
Scare, for example, to "impose the doctrine o f  minimal state intervention" as a "sign that the liberal state 
was not in tune with American society."
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Heller provided further justification for this demand side orientation. "They say— and 
they're right— " Heller reported, "that high levels o f demand and the confident expectation 
o f continued prosperity help to generate the optimism, the risk-taking, and the investment 
that produce rapid growth."97
To a seasoned populist like Lyndon Johnson this approach had even more 
significance and historical resonance, for he saw it as an answer to the historic conundrum 
that was the struggle for a more democratic political economy— a struggle so profound 
and so relatively fruitless that historians tend to speak of it today in terms o f "irrevocable 
loss" or "forgotten alternatives."98 Johnson saw in this new approach both an echo o f New 
Deal era managerial liberalism—with its focus on growth over redistribution— and a way 
o f explaining the failures o f earlier democratic insurgencies. Populists in 1896, radical 
worker's groups in the 1910s, left-wing New Dealers in the late 1930s, and automobile 
workers in the 1950s all failed to establish a more democratic political economy, as 
Johnson saw it, because they were either trapped within, or were not cognizant of, the 
limiting, self-defeating character o f prevailing zero-sum economic strategies. Even where 
their proposals were not characterized by a win-lose, zero-sum approach, Johnson realized 
that their rhetoric usually failed to match their plans, and that this enabled their opponents 
to attack these plans as costly, impractical schemes for redistribution.99 "The present day
97 Quoted in Rowen, The Free Enterprisers, 284.
98 See Lawrence Goodwyn, D emocratic Promise:The Populist Moment in Am erica  (N ew  York: Oxford 
University Press, 1976); Eldon J. Eisenach, The Lost Promise o f  Progressivism  (Lawrence: University Press 
o f  Kansas, 1994); Allen Dawley, Struggles For Justice', Christopher L. Tomlins, The State and  the Unions: 
Labor Relations,Law, an d  the O rganized Labor M ovement in America, 1880-1960  (N ew  York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1985), and "The New  Deal, Collective Bargaining, and the Triumph o f  Industrial 
Pluralism" in Meivyn Dubofsky and Stephen Burwood.eds., The Law and The N ew D eal (N ew  York: 
Garland, 1990); Karl E. Klare, "Judicial Deradicalization o f  the Wagner Act and the Origins o f  Modem  
Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941," also in Dubofsky and Burwood,eds., The Law an d  the N ew  Deal-, Martin 
Halpem, "Taft-Hartley and the Defeat o f  the Progressive Alternative in the U.A.W.," Labor History, 1986, 
27(2), 204-226; and Patrick Renshaw, American Labor and Consensus Capitalism, 1935-1990  (Jackson: 
University Press o f  Mississippi, 1991), for prominent examples o f  this. Goodwyn dates the point o f  
irrevocable loss as 1896; Eisenach, 1912; Dawley, 1920; Tomlins and Klare, 1937; Halpem, 1947; and 
Renshaw, the decade o f  the 1950s.
99 Ironically, Johnson's flair for a more effective rhetoric has been cited by David Zarefsky, in President 
Johnson’s War on Poverty, as one o f  the primary reasons for the ultimate failure o f  his econom ic strategy.
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liberals equate that persuasion with spending the public's money," Johnson noted in the 
late 1950s. "They've fallen into a trap set by the Republican party."100
The renewed effort to sway conservative political opponents, and to produce a 
commodious, yet revolutionary, political rhetoric, more readily identified with Johnson's 
presidency, did take root, however, in the Kennedy administration. Heller explained this 
effort by suggesting that Kennedy and Johnson's "responsibilities as national leaders did 
not permit them to wait until the economic intelligence gap had been closed."101 This 
effort, however, makes the Kennedy-Johnson macroeconomic strategy an easy one to 
misapprehend. Because Kennedy spent most o f his tenure as President convincing 
conservatives, and the business community in particular, that the New Economics was 
viable and not a threat to their well being, he is often mistaken for an economic 
conservative. Because Johnson dwelt more on the implementation of the New Economics 
and on a variety o f social programs designed to ease the transition to a new economic 
strategy, he is more often mistaken for a "free spender" or an old fashioned inflationist. 
Neither o f these characterizations, it turns out, are very appropriate.
To some extent both Kennedy and Johnson were dogged by accusations that they 
were "free spenders" in the realm of public finance, Kennedy far less today than he was 
while alive and in the oval office. Yet Kennedy introduced the first budget in fifteen years 
(for F Y 1962) with a reduced social spending component, and Johnson's first budget (for 
FY 1965) was the last one submitted with total outlays reduced from the previous year.
John Morton Bium in Years o f  Discord, 184, is even more critical: "Partly to compensate for his insecurity, 
partly out o f  lifelong habit, Johnson indulged in excesses o f  speech that promised more than anyone could 
deliver, and boasted more than anyone could believe." I concur partly with Zarefsky, in that the symbolism  
o f  a War on Poverty clearly exposed Johnson to greater political risks, but unlike Zarefsky, given the 
revolutionary aspect o f  this econom ic strategy and the urban unrest that would have manifested itself with 
or without a rhetoric o f  high expectations, I see no viable rhetorical alternative for President Johnson. 
Although the factors cited by Blum were real, they were really insignificant by 1964, and I do not see them 
playing much o f  a role at all in the War on Poverty. See also Johnson, Vantage Point, 74, for President 
Johnson's acknowledgement o f  this rhetorical liability.
100 Quoted in Goldman, The Tragedy o f  Lyndon Johnson, 25.
101 Walter W. Heller, N ew  Dimensions in P olitical Economy, 38-39.
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Moreover, Johnson's final budget (for FY 1969) remains the last one ever submitted with 
a surplus rather than a deficit. Both made concerted efforts against government waste and 
fraud, and though they were both millionaires they managed their personal finances with 
the utmost frugality.102 Kennedy was horror-struck, for example, when he saw what his 
wife's White House renovations were costing, and Johnson embarked on a well- 
publicized, yet sincere, campaign to reduce the White House electric bill as soon as he 
entered office.
Along with all of this, however, both Kennedy and Johnson called for increased 
government social spending. "Walter, first we're going to get your tax cut," Kennedy 
reminded Walter Heller only a few weeks before his assassination, "and then we're going 
to get my expenditure programs."103 Johnson stressed economy and surprised many when 
he presented a budget for fiscal year 1965 that was less than the previous year's budget, 
but he, too, called quickly for increased social spending, launching the War on Poverty in 
1964 and the Great Society in 1965. Though it serves to obfuscate their real ideological 
moorings, the reputations o f both men seem to hinge on the level of social spending that 
ultimately prevailed under their administrations. "Now that doesn't mean that he 
[Kennedy] can't be a liberal in other respects," Republican Secretary o f the Treasury 
Douglas Dillon once remarked, "but he's not a liberal in the sense of being a free 
spender."104 Though Dillon knew Kennedy well enough not to categorize him as an 
economic conservative, and though he proved to be an open-minded economic manager 
himself while a member of the Kennedy cabinet, his conservative background made it 
difficult for him to envision a liberal Democrat who did not fit the Wall Street stereotype. 
One recent analyst, in a study of investment tax subsidies, remarked that "Kennedy's 
negiect o f ideological debate led him to accept unquestioningly much of the established
102 See Theodore Sorensen, Kennedy  (N ew  York: Harper and Row, 1965), 464-465, for an insider's 
comments on Kennedy's scrutiny o f  agency expenditures and his search for expendable programs.
103 Heller, Oral History Interview, in Hargrove and Morley, eds., The President and the CEA , 177.
104 Quoted in Rowen, The Free Enterprisers, 177.
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orthodoxy..."105 This view is even more common than Dillon's, confusing political tactics 
with ideological orientation, and ignoring Kennedy's need to make political concessions 
to popular economic ideology. Democrat Budget Director David Bell, on the other hand, 
less prone to equating liberalism with "free spending," noted unequivocally that "The 
President [Kennedy] was in no way an economic or fiscal conservative."106
Unlike Kennedy, Johnson presided over substantial social spending increases, and the 
typical Johnson critic, who lamented in 1960 that Johnson was too conservative for a spot 
on his party's national ticket, suddenly termed Johnson a "free spender" who had 
somehow opened a Pandora's Box of political profligacy.107 John H. Makin and Norman 
J. Omstein declared that Johnson "was left with a tremendous growth bonus [after the 
1964 tax cut] that ended up squandered on the twin vacuums o f the Vietnam War and the 
Great Society."108
"Johnson wanted a monument o f his own," Herbert Stein surmised, "and his 
monument in economics was to be the big growth o f social expenditures."109 Though 
Stein qualified this statement somewhat by suggesting that Johnson did not intend to 
create a sinkhole for the Federal Treasury, but that he simply ignored the long run 
consequences of his spending priorities, the emphasis is nearly the same: Johnson's 
primary focus was on spending federal tax dollars to stave off economic recession, at any 
cost. "The program [LBJ's fiscal policy] reflected a misconception of the long-run budget 
situation," Stein declared, "if not a total neglect o f the long run."110 CEA Chairman
105 Ronald F. King, Money, Time, and Politics, 216.
106 Quoted in Strober and Strober, Let Us Begin Anew, 246.
107 This assumes an exclusive focus on domestic policy, which o f  course, with the Vietnamese War playing 
such a significant role, was never quite the case. My concern is not with LBJ's overall reputation, however, 
but only with his standing and reputation as an economic manager.
108 John H. Makin and Norman J. Omstein, D ebt and Taxes (N ew  York: American Enterprise Institute, 
Times Books, 1994), 135.
109 Stein, Presidential Economics, 113.
110 Ibid., 115. It is as if  Stein was suggesting that Johnson should have been able to predict a Nixon victory 
in 1968, and that the economy would nose-dive as a result, stripping the Federal treasury o f  billions in 
potential revenue.
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Arthur Okun (1968-1969) remembered a different outlook, however, one closer in spirit to 
the Johnson in 1964 who had everyone at the White House turning off lights to save 
money. "He[Johnson] privately expressed some quite reactionary views on welfare,"
Okun noted, "concern about disincentive effects, concern about creating a mentality of 
being on the dole."111 And as Eric Goldman, one time Johnson adviser recalled, President 
Johnson never forgot the fundamental political flaw of liberal legislation in the 1950s and 
early 1960s: that liberals allowed themselves to be pigeonholed by conservatives as 
economically naive tax and spend demagogues. According to Okun's and Goldman's 
characterizations, and judging from the policies eventually implemented by Johnson, 
social spending priorities, though significant companions to an overall strategy, were in 
no way tantamount to the Kennedy-Johnson economic strategy itself. Opponents o f the 
New Frontier/Great Society, however, always approached the debate over economic 
policy as if this really were the case. Walter Heller noted that "many an anti-Keynesian, 
who comes not to praise but to bury the 1960s, sees only a total preoccupation with 
demand management, with fine tuning, and with fiscalism."112
It was the political newness of the "New Economics" that made it difficult to see the 
Kennedy-Johnson economic strategy in any other light. Though government social 
spending was created in part by conservative businessmen in the 19th century, largely as a 
way to buy support for a regime of high tariffs, it did come to be championed, as well, by 
some not-so-conservative politicians looking for a way to promote a more widespread 
prosperity. This latter role surfaced, for the most part, only after 1913 when the Wilson 
administration ushered in the nation's first post-Civil War tariff reductions; accompanying 
them with the first federal income tax under the newly ratified sixteenth amendment.113
111 Okun, Oral History Interview, in Hargrove and Morley, The President and the CEA, 276.
112 Walter Heller, "Kennedy Economics Revisited," in Pechman and Simler, eds., Economics in the Public 
Service, 236.
113 The Underwood-Simmons Tariff o f  1913 reduced import duties on 958 items, raised them on 86, and 
left 307 the same, reducing the average duty from approximately 37 to 29%. The first income tax imposed a
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While many of these "progressive," "populist," or "liberal" plans were utopian— Huey 
Long's "Share Our Wealth" scheme for example—there was one common characteristic. It 
was assumed that the nation's fundamental economic strategy had to revolve around the 
maintenance o f investment opportunities and business profitability; all other concerns, 
including these plans, were tangential, and all social spending schemes, however radical, 
were necessarily part o f a "safety net" or political "grab-bag" used to stave off revolution 
or remedy some o f the externalities associated with a profit-centered political economy.
No other role would fit. Ultimately it was this orientation, and the limited social spending 
priorities consistent with such an approach, that both Kennedy and Johnson rejected.
It was largely the rejection o f a familiar but ideologically careless liberalism— 
equated only with greater social spending— along with the desire o f both Kennedy and 
Johnson for a gradual and compelling transition, that make it difficult to ascertain the 
ideological character o f the New Economics. Their rejection o f what often passed for 
liberalism and their adoption o f supply side remedies—to be used as political 
"convincers" or solutions to specific distributional or resource problems—simply made it 
difficult to see where the "old economics" left off, and where the "New Economics" 
began. Because the transition required, for political reasons, borrowings from older social 
spending plans and supply-side remedies alike, and because it was economically wise to 
fit them in as companions to the new scheme, anyway, the real ideological character of 
the whole approach is easily obscured. This character, based on a demand-first approach 
and the maintenance o f demand-led full employment, was, nonetheless, an integral and 
uncompromising part o f every Kennedy-Johnson economic policy formulation.
A CEA report, written largely by Robert Lampman early in the Johnson 
administration, stands as a good example of how all Kennedy-Johnson economic policies 
came to be placed under a more fundamental economic strategy umbrella. The Lampman
1% tax on all incomes over $3000 ($4000 for married couples) and added a surtax ranging from 1% on 
incom es around $20,000 to 6% on incomes above $500,000.
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report called for social spending to combat the effects o f widespread economic 
discrimination, inadequate educational opportunities, dual labor markets, oligopolistic 
product markets, and inefficient transfer payments slanted toward the wealthy, so that a 
strategy based on economic growth could better alleviate poverty.114 Federal government 
social spending, in other words, should address these problem areas so as to sharpen the 
nation's economic efficiency, but it should not be counted upon to direct or to drive the 
overall economy. That, according to the Kennedy-Johnson economic policymakers, was 
the province o f economic growth spurred by consumer demand in the marketplace. As 
Keynes himself once noted that the influence o f relief for the poor "evaporates as 
employment improves, so that there is a dead point beyond which this factor cannot carry 
the economic system."115 As Keynes also noted, "the important thing for government is 
not to do things which individuals are doing already, and to do them a little better or a 
little worse; but to do those, which at present, are not done at all."116
By the same token, orthodox supply side measures were rejected only as a 
fundamental strategy; they too, could play a significant role as catalysts or as tools for 
sharpening economic efficiency within the new demand side orientation. The need to 
replace obsolete plant and machinery, for example, or to remove rapidly shifting supply 
bottlenecks or restraints on the expansion of credit were problems the Kennedy-Johnson 
economic strategists hoped to remedy with supply side policies. "The Heller strategy of 
the 1960s," James Tobin noted in a 1982 publication, "was not a one-sided program of 
demand expansion.... Although there is some merit in some o f the 'supply-side' proposals 
so popular today, the danger is that they are considered a substitute for expanding 
demand."117 Equating Keynesianism exclusively with a fiscal approach to demand
114 Katz, The U ndeserving Poor, 91.
115 John Maynard Keynes to Franklin D. Roosevelt, February 1, 1938, in Zinn, ed., N ew D eal Thought, 
405.
116 John Maynard Keynes, Essays in Persuasion  (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Co., 1932), 317.
117 James Tobin, "Steering the Economy: Then and Now," in Pechman and Simler, eds., Economics in the 
Public Service, 37. Tobin, one o f  the original members o f  the Kennedy Council o f  Economic Advisers, and
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expansion, historians misinterpret the Kennedy economic strategy in two ways: it is not 
viewed as a revolution in political economy that it was, and it is often placed in a wholly 
misleading configuration, halfway between the "liberal" pseudo-Keynesian approach that 
suggested greater spending as a solution to any economic problem, and the perverse, 
reactionary "Keynesianism," such as that practiced by Ronald Reagan in the 1980s.118 The 
Keynesianism of the Kennedy-Johnson years embraced neither o f these approaches—  
which were never really Keynesian to begin with—nor was it simply a pragmatic 
combination of the two. Aggregate demand was indeed the key to the New Economics, 
but this implied neither a regime of unlimited taxing and spending nor an approach by 
which fiscal deficits, per se, could automatically remedy problems related to inequality 
and insufficient demand. Within the Kennedy-Johnson economic policy framework there 
was, as well, ample need for, and no reluctance to accept, both microeconomic and 
macroeconomic supply side measures. John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson became 
convinced that adequate demand was the single most significant element in a successful 
economic strategy, but they were equally convinced that some problems lay well beyond 
its reach. Representing an activist approach at least as old as the New Deal, the New 
Economics sought a sharpening of focus, not the political banishment o f pragmatic policy.
the member largely responsible for convincing the Fed to modify its "bills only" approach in 1961-1962, 
was rumored to be the prototype for the character "Tobit" in The Caine Mutiny having been in the Navy 
training class with Herman Wouk.
118 See David Burner and Thomas R. West, The Torch is Passed: The Kennedy Brothers and American  
Liberalism  (St. James, N ew  York: Brandywine Press, 1984), 182, and Katz, The Undeserving P oor , 94, for 
an example o f  this interpretation.
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Chapter 4.
Toward the New Economy
With want destroyed; with greed changed to noble passions; with the fraternity that 
is bom o f equality taking the place o f jealousy and fear that now array men against each 
other; with mental power loosed by conditions that give to the humblest comfort and 
leisure; and who shall measure the heights to which our civilization shall soar?
- Henry George, 1879
The economic transition o f a society is a thing to be accomplished slowly.... For it 
is o f the nature o f economic processes to be rooted in time. A rapid transition will 
involve so much pure destruction of wealth that the new state of affairs will be, at first, 
far worse than the old, and the grand experiment will be discredited.
- John Maynard Keynes, 1933
Inconspicuous and muddled as the New Economics appeared to be, Kennedy's 
strategy began to take shape, in mid-1962, around three distinct policy initiatives. 
"Wage-price guideposts" were established to check inflationary pressures coming 
largely from the supply side so as to make room for the non-inflationary expansion of 
demand; tax reforms were proposed so as to lessen or remove tax breaks utilized by the 
wealthy and paid for by the working poor and the middle class; and a substantial income 
tax cut was proposed to spur economic expansion led by the augmentation o f consumer 
demand. These initiatives all spoke plainly and unmistakably for the New Economics 
and the strategy revolution it implied, and perhaps even more significantly, they helped
173
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Johnson, after Kennedy's death, chart the course by which he would attempt to bring the 
revolution full circle.
Wary of a "seller's inflation" that would impose real economic instability and 
thwart the drive toward full employment, Kennedy adopted the principle o f a "wage- 
price guidepost." Designed to gear wage increases to productivity changes so that price 
rises would not automatically follow wage increases, the guidepost principle was 
introduced by Walter Reuther and the United Automobile Workers in 1948, advocated 
by Heller in 1961, and adopted by the Kennedy administration largely in the midst of its 
struggle with the steel industry in April, 1962.
The American steel industry had a long history of both volatile labor relations and 
disruptive price-fixing practices. In 1931, U.S. Steel became the first corporation to 
renege on promises made to President Hoover for the maintenance o f wages, leading 
what quickly became a general retreat from wage maintenance. The industry had bitterly 
resisted unionization throughout the 1930s, had evaded the Wagner Act after it was 
imposed in 1935 when American unions were first guaranteed the right to organize, and 
even after it finally recognized a steelworker's union in the 1940s, it fought union 
demands to the point where the first agreement had to be imposed by the National War 
Labor Board in 1942. In the ten negotiations between steel companies and the 
steelworker's union, from 1946-1959, five had resulted in strikes, and all ten had ended 
with price increases above the level o f the added labor costs, leading some observers to 
charge the industry with the imposition o f "cost-plus" fees during these labor contract 
negotiations.1 The 1959 negotiations, in particular, led to a costly 116 day strike. It was
1 Bernstein, Prom ises Kept, 140; see Daniel Bell, "The Worker's Search for Security," M onthly Labor 
Review, June 1963, 614-617; and Bell, "The Subversion o f  Collective Bargaining," Commentary, March 
1960, 185-197 (with comment by Arthur Goldberg and reply by author in July, 1960 issue), for an 
overview and analysis o f  this "cost-plus" pricing arrangement.
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brought to an end only after Eisenhower's Secretary o f Labor James Mitchell and Vice- 
President Richard Nixon secretly mediated the dispute against Ike's wishes.2
On the pricing front, the steel industry had clearly fixed prices since the tenure of 
Judge Albert Gary as Chairman of U.S. Steel (1901-1927). Gary had arranged a pricing 
scheme built upon an informal multiple basing point system, a system that evolved into 
the "Pittsburgh Plus" pricing scheme o f later years.3 More formal arrangements and 
accompanying price rigidities were created with the ill-fated National Industrial 
Recovery Act (1933). Though the NIRA was dissembled by the Supreme Court and by 
the acquiescence o f its most liberal supporters (who saw it evolve into an uneven 
arrangement favoring business over labor and consumer interests) the cooperation it 
engendered among steel companies lived on. Citing the steel industry's price increases 
in 1948, which he termed unjustifiable, even Republican Senator Robert Taft, usually 
known as a champion of conservative business interests, added his voice to the chorus 
of steel industry critics.4 And when the steel industry was implicated in 1949 for price- 
fixing, with duplicate bids matched to the fractional part of a penny (down to 5 decimal 
places), proposals to tighten the anti-trust laws were shelved only as the industry 
promised to act more responsibly in the future.5 In 1951, subsequent to further antitrust
2 Rowen, The Free Enterprisers, 90. The strike was costly to the steelworkers and to the public anyway; 
the steel companies, on the other hand, generally benefited by it, for they expected it, even w elcom ed it, 
telling their customers to stock up early in the year. Producing then at greater percentage o f  capacity 
(nearly 90%), it w as much cheaper for the m ills to run at a high rate o f  capacity for six months than at a 
much lower rate for ten. And to do the same thing without the strike would have required layoffs with the 
added cost o f  supplementary unemployment benefits. See l.F. Stone, "Lagging Labor Leaders," in The 
H aunted Fifties, 1953-1963  (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1963), 292-295.
3 These systems operated under the assumption that outlying companies would include phantom freight 
charges to avoid undercutting the industry prices established by U.S. Steel (Pittsburgh).
4 LBJ and Taft sat directly across the aisle from each other in the Senate chamber in 1953. According to 
William White, Johnson got into the habit o f  teasing Taft whenever one o f  his fellow  Republicans was 
making a particularly bone-headed oration or parliamentary maneuver, almost always forcing the 
Republican senator from Ohio to smile knowingly. Cited in White, The Professional, 27.
5 U. S. Congress, Senate Subcommittee o f  the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, A Bill to 
Clarify and  Formulate a  Consistent an d  C oordinated Policy with respect to Transportation Costs in 
Interstate Commerce..., U.S. Senate, 81st Congress, 1st session, January 2 4 ,2 5 , 26 and February 18,
1949 (Washington: U.S.G.P.O., 1949). Steel companies tried to induce union lobbying against this bill by 
suggesting that its passage would prompt layoffs and paycuts. See also Robert Mann, Legacy to  Power:
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violations, steel companies urged and signed a consent decree agreeing to keep prices 
stable below certain levels of capacity utilization. Senator Estes Kefauver led the charge 
against the industry in 1959 when it raised prices in violation of this agreement.6
With this history firmly in mind, the steel industry became a natural target for those 
in the Kennedy administration who wanted, more and more, to make a stand against 
rising prices and a potential wage-price spiral. If the public and much of the business 
world could be convinced, they reasoned, that inflation was not an automatic 
consequence o f increased demand, their overall strategy would be much easier to 
implement. In addition, Senator Albert Gore had brought to Kennedy's attention a 1959 
congressional study implicating the steel industry for much of the 1955-1958 inflation, 
and Walt Rostow had advised Kennedy as early as November 1960 to make a stand 
against creeping inflation in the auto and steel industries.7 "The inflation which marked 
our economy before 1958," Kennedy noted in a August 30,1961 press conference,
"was, I think, tied very closely to the increases in steel prices."8
As the existing steel labor contract approached its July 1,1962 expiration date, then, 
the Kennedy administration moved to arrange an early settlement, hoping to avert either 
a costly strike or an inflationary price hike. Kennedy wrote to twelve steel companies 
urging price maintenance, and Secretary of Labor Arthur Goldberg (former 
steelworker's union counsel) was dispatched in January 1962 to convince the 
steelworker's union to moderate its demands. "Many persons have come to the
Senator Russell Long o f  Louisiana (N ew  York: Paragon House, 1992), 107, for a brief summary o f  
Long's role in defeating the bill, commonly known as the "Basing Point Pricing Bill."(though Mann says 
"permit" where it should read "prohibit")
6 S. Prakash Sethi, Up Against the Corporate Wall: Modern Corporations and Social Issues o f  the 
Seventies (Englewood Cliffs, New  Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1971), 359. See also Theodore Philip Kovaleff, 
Business and Government During the Eisenhower Administration: A Study o f  the Antitrust P olicy o f  the 
Antitrust D ivision o f  the Justice Department (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1980), on 
Eisenhower's extensive use o f  the consent decree.
7 See Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Steel and the Postwar Inflation, Study Paper 2, prepared by 
Otto Eckstein and Gary Fromm, 86th Congress, 1st Session, 1959.
8 Cited in William J. Barber, "The Kennedy Years: Purposeful Pedagogy," in Goodwin, Exhortations and  
Controls, 158.
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conclusion," Kennedy noted in his letter to the steel companies, "that the U.S. can 
achieve price stability only by maintaining a substantial margin o f unemployment and 
excess capacity and by accepting a slow rate o f economic growth. This is a counsel of 
despair which we cannot accept."9
Relinquishing the right to strike by negotiating early, the steelworker's union 
responded to Kennedy and Goldberg's entreaties and proposed in early March 1962 a 17 
cents per hour job security package with no wage increase. Though this was precisely 
what the Kennedy administration was looking for—a package under Walter Heller's 3% 
target for a maximum non-inflationary increase in labor costs—the steelmakers 
complained, called it inflationary, and negotiations fell apart on March 2. Goldberg 
intervened once again, convinced David McDonald of the steelworker's union to work 
for an even smaller package, and both sides eventually agreed to a new contract that 
added only 10 to 11 cents per hour, all to improve pensions and ease unemployment. 
The contract was signed on April 6, 1962, well ahead o f the expiration date of the old 
contract, and was hailed as a major breakthrough for the administration in its fight for a 
non-inflationary agreement and stable prices.
It came as a shock, then, when U.S. Steel president Roger Blough arrived at the 
White House on April 10, 1962 to announce that his company was raising its prices. His 
company had already issued a press release, he told a stunned President Kennedy, 
announcing a 3.5% across-the-board increase in steel prices. Approved by the 
company's Operations Committee four days earlier, and validated by the Executive 
Committee just that morning, these increases were matched by five other steel 
companies on April 11, the very next day. And this came in spite o f Bethlehem Steel 
Vice President Edmund Martin's announcement, to a Bethlehem stockholder's meeting 
in Wilmington, Delaware on April 10, that the new labor contract should not warrant
9 Sethi, Up Against the C orporate Wall, 364.
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any price increases.10 "Dave, you've been screwed, and I've been screwed," Kennedy 
told David McDonald, calling him in Pittsburgh as soon as Blough left the White 
House. Then, only moments later, in a conversation leaked to the New York Times and 
published on April 23, Kennedy shared his appreciation o f Blough's surprise with 
Secretary Goldberg: "My father always told me that all businessmen were sons of 
bitches, but I never believed it until now." Calling the steel executives "pricks" in a 
subsequent reference not leaked to the press, Kennedy was truly surprised and incensed 
by Blough's announcement.11
What followed was a 72 hour campaign against the steel price increase led by the 
President himself, Heller at the CEA, Kefauver in the Senate, McNamara at Defense, 
Dillon at Treasury, and Mortimer Caplin at the Internal Revenue Service. Early the next 
morning, Kennedy convened a breakfast strategy session with Vice President Johnson 
and other key administration personnel where he and the others outlined a plan to force 
the rescission of the steel price increases. Though Johnson was given no specific role, 
he understood and concurred with all proposals, adding, only later, that he would have 
done it all in a more "conciliatory, quiet fashion."12
The upshot o f "the Battle of Blough Run," as many in the administration were 
calling it, was that U.S. Steel, and the five companies who followed its lead, eventually 
saw that they could not make the price increases stick. When McNamara threatened to
10 Sethi, Up Against the Corporate Wall, 369-370; Rowen, The Free Enterprisers, 90-98; Bernstein, 
Prom ises Kept, 141-142. James L. Parks o f  the Wilmington Evening Journal, John Lawrence o f  the Wall 
Street Journal, and Lee Linder o f  the Associated Press were all in attendance at the Bethlehem  
stockholders meeting and corroborated this story. See Rowen, The Free Enterprisers, 103.
11 Quoted in Bernstein, Promises Kept, 142-143; Burner and West, The Torch is Passed, 182; Rowen, 
The Free Enterprisers, 95-96; Barber, "Purposeful Pedagogy," 172. For his part, Roger Blough  
maintained through it all that he had done nothing wrong, and that he had not double-crossed the 
President. In fact, Heller had written a memo which arrived on Kennedy's desk at 10pm, April 10— after 
Blough's announcement and press release— which suggested that the steel industry was ignoring census 
data, and using faulty productivity figures in accounting for the cost o f  the new labor contract, warning 
Kennedy, in other words, that the industry was not as sanguine about the new labor settlement as the rest 
o f  the free world seemed to be. See Barber, "Purposeful Pedagogy," 171.
12 Baker, The Johnson Eclipse, 112.
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shift defense contracts to companies holding the line on prices (such as Inland and 
Kaiser); when Kefauver spoke o f renewed antitrust investigations; Caplin, inquiries 
into U.S. Steel's new stock option plan; and Dillon the cancellation o f proposals for new 
depreciation allowances, the unwinding had begun. Bethlehem was the first to cave in, 
announcing its rescission on Friday, April 13 in the mid-afternoon. Blough, in a meeting 
with Goldberg and Clark Clifford when the Bethehem rescission was announced, 
followed suit at 5pm, and the rest of the companies followed Blough like sheep, though 
all did so wringing their hands over poor profits, and maintaining that competition 
rather than the actions of the Kennedy administration had forced their collective 
surrender. On the "profit squeeze" issue, most o f the steel executives had followed 
Blough's lead as well—using "profit as a percentage o f sales" figures instead o f "return 
on net worth." The former was not quite as rosy as the latter and it helped the steel 
executives obscure the costs o f wasteful management, lucrative executive 
compensation, and the preference for liquidity over profit in their attempt to modernize 
the industry. Blough and the other steel company chairmen also used 1940 as a standard 
by which to compare other years' profits—a year marked by unusually high defense 
contract profits.13
When the crisis ended with a complete reversal o f the steel price increases,
Goldberg and Clifford reported that Blough had appeared "pale and shaken." Paul 
Samuelson added several years later that Blough "never recovered from that 
confrontation; he was a broken man. It is a very hard thing when your president
13 "They [Kennedy, Johnson, and their economic advisers] had some kind o f  an idea," Blough once 
remarked, ostensibly to justify the use o f  the profit to sales ratio, "that somehow or other there was a 
source o f  income other than the normal sales revenue, and there isn't." See Blough, Oral History, LBJ 
Library, 13. See also Blough, "My Side o f  the Steel Price Story," Look, January 29, 1963, 19-23, where 
Blough pulled out the crying towel to defend his "3/10 o f  1 cent per pound[!]" price rise; blamed much o f  
the episode on Senator Albert Gore and "other 'liberal' senators;" claimed that he would have never 
tipped his hand on price, one way or the other, so as to steer clear o f  any possible antitrust violation[!]; 
and also claimed to be defending the interests o f  his employees, U.S. Steel's shareholders an d  "those who  
suffered from the estimated $70 billion loss in the stock market crash... in the weeks shortly following  
President Kennedy's televised attack on the steel industry."
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crucifies you before the American people."14 Kennedy had indeed broken Blough and 
the other steel executives who followed his lead. There would be other similar 
confrontations, however, and few were convinced that Kennedy had acted in a 
disinterested, economically sound fashion.
Ultimately the steel crisis convinced President Kennedy of two things. He began to 
understand, first o f all, to a much greater extent than ever before, how oligopolistic 
industries administered prices and how they could create a "seller's inflation"— even 
during a recession, and certainly during a period of economic expansion. Walter Heller 
had highlighted this phenomemon in a "White Paper" produced explicitly for the steel 
crisis, a paper digested thoroughly by both Kennedy and Vice President Johnson. Thus, 
Kennedy and Johnson alike realized that the guidepost principle merited closer attention 
and further study; some tool would have to be fashioned, modeled on the guideposts or 
not, that would enable the government to better check the periodic outbreak o f a "seller's 
inflation." Secondly, Kennedy realized that success in the steel crisis, both for his 
administration and for the economy at large, hinged too squarely on the aggressiveness 
and vigilance o f the oval office. A lesser politician would have gloated; Kennedy was 
much more inclined, however, to follow the lead of his Vice-President, who had been 
the first to suggest a more conciliatory approach to their ostensible opponents in the 
business world. The steel showdown "reinforced the President's feeling," James Tobin 
recalled, "that he had to be more friendly toward them [businessmen]."15 This was by no 
means, however, a symbol o f "liberalism in retreat," as some have suggested, nor did it 
represent the recognition and encouragement o f "corporate hegemony."16 What it did 
represent, was a closely guarded search for the appropriate mix of rhetoric and policy—
14 Quoted in Rowen, The Free Enterprisers, 105-106; Strober and Strober, Let Us Begin Anew, 258.
15 Quoted in Strober and Strober, Let Us Begin Anew, 258.
16 See Matusow, The Unraveling o f  America, 4-5, 33, for this interpretation. He refers to Kennedy as "the 
quintessential corporate liberal...who never pretended to be otherwise and for whom the good opinion o f  
big business was the highest political priority." Ibid., 33.
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a commingling o f disparate but persuasive tactics—that would serve as an entering 
wedge for an emerging, and increasingly liberal, economic strategy.
Both Kennedy and Johnson realized, for instance, with crucial insights provided by 
Heller and the other economic advisers, that the steel companies could still raise prices 
in the near future, and that they could do so for reasons just as economically unsound as 
those which prevailed in April 1962. Advisers warned the President, for example, that 
selective, as opposed to across-the-board, price increases would most likely prevail even 
in the near future.17 Both men knew, as well, that if  they were truly going to transform 
the nation's political economy, they would obviously need the cooperation of the 
nation's business community. It was too prejudicial, too narrowly focused, and all too 
willing to portray itself as a martyr to the whims of "fuzzy-headed" politicians to do 
otherwise. Outright defiance would only encourage these traits, making it virtually 
impossible to change anything. Clark Clifford, Walter Heller, and James Tobin, in 
addition to Vice-President Johnson, all endorsed this line o f thinking. It became more 
apparent and more obligatory after the 1962 steel crisis.
Indeed, Kennedy moved immediately to assure the American business community 
that he was not the devil in disguise, beginning by ordering his assistants and cabinet 
members not to crow about the "victory" over the steel companies. Business Week even 
compared him to "Grant at Appomattox...letting the vanquished forces keep their horses 
and sidearms."18 Heller was instructed to bury the "White Paper," all investigations, 
with the exception o f Kefauver's in the U.S. Senate, were called off, and Big Steel 
retained its lucrative defense contracts. When business leaders began sporting S.O.B. 
buttons at conventions, and "Help Kennedy Stamp out Free Enterprise" bumper stickers 
on their cars, and when a stock market decline in May was blamed on Kennedy's
17 Exactly one year from the beginning o f  the 1962 steel crisis, W heeling Steel opened a round o f  
selective  price increases.
18 Quoted in Sethi, Up Against the C orporate Wall, 377.
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defiance of "free enterprise," the President and most o f his advisers were compelled to 
do even more to patch up relations with the business community.19 As a result, an 
investment tax credit bill was pushed through Congress, and the Treasury forged ahead 
with its plans to relax Bulletin F depreciation guidelines. Taken together, these policies 
immediately added $2.5 billion annually to corporate cash flow, at a time when most 
companies were already flooded with cash.20
The continued arrogance and contempt of this community, however, still mystified 
President Kennedy. "You know," Kennedy told Walter Heller, after his first post-steel 
crisis meeting with business leaders, "those bastards sat on their hands and didn't get up 
when the President o f the United States walked into the room."21 When he made a
19 While Kennedy never absolved him self politically o f  the blame for the M ay stock market plunge, 
stock P-E (Price to Earnings) ratios were then quite excessive (26 to 1 on the average), and John Kenneth 
Galbraith read the drop as a positive signal, suggesting that it implied public respect for the 
administration's inflation fighting efforts and the resulting recognition that common stocks would no 
longer appreciate forever for reasons o f  inflation. Walter Heller noted that Wall St. was, in this case, a 
victim o f  its own propaganda about a squeeze on profits. See Barber, "Purposeful Pedagogy," 177.
20 For an indication o f  the tremendous corporate cash flow o f  the period, and the histrionic reaction to the 
largely contrived "profit squeeze,"see comments from Roger Blough and other steel executives during the 
steel showdown (attacked by Walter Heller in his White Paper) on the financing o f  their modernization 
efforts. To Blough a profit squeeze was on because his company could no longer finance its capital 
improvement out o f  cash flow or issued capital alone. They were actually having to seek funds from 
commercial lenders for the first time, a genuine tale o f  woe, indeed. Blough and the others never mention 
why such large sums were necessary, either, for the steel companies had wasted millions in the 1950s 
upgrading low-grade ore deposits they owned, instead o f  seeking cheaper higher grade ores on the 
international market; and were making a belated, and therefore more expensive, move into basic oxygen  
furnaces from the more traditional open hearth designs. The company's new stock option plans for its 
executives, legally not a part o f  their official balance sheets, were also pinching them a bit. See John P. 
Hoerr, A nd the W olf Finally Came: The D ecline o f  the American S teel Industry (Pittsburgh: University o f  
Pittsburgh Press, 1988), 93-97, for an analysis o f  these management decisions. See also Paul A. Tiffany, 
D ecline o f  American Steel: H ow Management, Labor, and Government Went Wrong (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988). On the issue o f  the investment tax credit, used primarily to assuage recalcitrant 
business leaders, it should be noted that some have ignored the po litica l rationale for the I.T.C. entirely 
and cited it as evidence for a Kennedy supply-side economic philosophy (see King, Money, Time, and  
Politics, 195, where the author claims that long run concerns were synonymous in JFK's mind with 
regressive investment incentives!). The cash flow estimate is Hobart Rowen's. See Rowen, The Free 
Enterprisers, 47. On the issue o f  the accelerated depreciation allowance, it should be noted that this 
change entailed a more rapid write-off and  a simplification as well, allowing a business to apply a single 
figure to a whole class o f  assets rather than to a single item.
21HelIer, Oral History Interview, in Hargrove and Morley, The President an d  the CEA , 175. Hobart 
Rowen reports that Blough and Frederick Kappel o f  A,T& T were the only exceptions. See Rowen, The 
Free Enterprisers, 87.
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conciliatory speech at the 50th anniversary banquet o f the U.S. Chamber o f Commerce 
on April 30, he was again dismayed by the business response—a confrontational 
rebuttal delivered by Chamber President Richard Wagner. "Dictators usually come to 
power under accepted constitutional procedures," Wagner warned the banquet audience, 
making a less than subtle analogy between Kennedy activism and what one might call 
"creeping fascism."22 Some business representatives even considered Kennedy's 
predilection for Keynesian economics a Russian plot, citing Keynes' marriage to Lydia 
Lopokova, a Russian ballerina 23 And when the first indications o f economic growth 
were acknowledged in 1962, business writers and executives alike even began 
questioning the reliability o f GNP as a measuring device for economic growth. "Its hard 
as hell," Kennedy said, "to be friendly to people who keep trying to cut your legs off."24
Highlighting this seemingly intractable problem, Kennedy addressed the United 
Auto Workers convention in Atlantic City: "Last week, after speaking to the Chamber 
o f Commerce and the presidents o f the American Medical Association," Kennedy noted 
with mock bewilderment, "I began to wonder how I got elected. And now I 
remember."25 Kennedy continued to seek the support of conservative business groups, 
nonetheless, becoming the first President since William McKinley to address the annual 
convention o f the National Association of Manufacturers.26 Ironically, what little 
headway Kennedy made with the American business community after the steel 
confrontation, came partly as a result o f Roger Blough's own conciliatory efforts27 
However fruitless this courtship seemed in the summer o f 1962, however, Kennedy 
was ever mindful o f Walter Heller's advice offered in an April 14 memo entitled "Where
22 Quoted in Rowen, The Free Enterprisers, 114-115.
23 See Dobbs, Keynes at Harvard, 3, 45-54.
24 Quoted in Bernstein, Prom ises Kept, 146.
25 Quoted in Rowen, The Free Enterprisers, 121.
26 Heath, JFK and the Business Community, 66.
27 Thomas Watson o f  IBM, Henry Ford II o f  Ford Motor Co., Henry Kaiser o f  Kaiser Industries, and 
Frederick Kappel o f  A,T,&T were others who encouraged a rapprochement with the Kennedy White 
House.
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Do We Go From Here?" We must "emphasize the common interest between 
government and the steel industry," Heller wrote, "including the need for more profits— 
profits generated by a more fully employed economy rather than by premature price 
rises in a slack economy and a slacker steel industry."28 There would be no letting up, in 
other words, with the political course chosen at the very beginning of the Kennedy 
presidency: business would have to be won over to, and not steamrolled by, the New 
Economics. Kennedy's endorsement of a special tax break for Dupont stockholders 
(who received 63 million shares o f General Motors stock in a Justice Department 
agreement), and well publicized banishment o f prominent liberals John Kenneth 
Galbraith and G. Mennen "Soapy" Williams to less-than-significant diplomatic posts, 
was not enough.29 Nor was his appointment o f Republicans and conservative Democrats 
to numerous key positions in the administration. McNamara at Defense, Dillon and 
Robert Roosa—Undersecretary for Monetary Affairs—at Treasury, and Allen Dulles 
and John McCone at the CIA, were all Republicans; Postmaster General J. Edward Day 
(Prudential), and Secretary o f Commerce Luther Hodges, (a former textile company 
executive) were Democrats but former business executives. These efforts, made at the 
onset o f the Kennedy presidency, plainly had to be enlarged in 1962. Any reform, any 
substantive change in economic policy would be next to impossible without such an 
initiative.
28 Quoted in Barber, "Purposeful Pedagogy," 176.
29 For a detailed examination o f  the DuPont tax break, approved largely at the behest o f  Clark Clifford, 
w ho was paid between 1 and 2 million dollars by DuPont for his lobbying efforts, see Gerard Colby Zilg, 
DuPont: Behind the Nylon Curtain  (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1974), 393-399. Galbraith was 
appointed Ambassador to India; Williams, Assistant Secretary o f  State for African Affairs. Galbraith 
him self tells o f  the formation o f  the Galbraith Early Warning System (G.E.W.), devised by the CEA and 
the State Dept, so the CEA would not schedule too many meetings that he might attend. While Heller and 
company generally agreed with his assessments, they also knew that he had far less patience for the 
stroking o f  business leaders that they saw as a political necessity. His outspokenness and w illingness to 
raise hell, in other words, was deemed a political liabilty early in the game. See Strober and Strober, Let 
Us Begin Anew, 180, for Galbraith's comments.
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He had spoken of the need for a new Fed Chairman; now he decided to reappoint 
Republican William McChesney Martin when his term expired in 1963. He also 
reduced transportation taxes and announced his intentions to reduce transportation 
regulations as well. He handed over $500 million worth o f government developed 
satellite technology to A,T,&T. He reduced farm surpluses, protected the patent rights 
of private companies working on federal projects, and he submitted a budget for FY 
1963 with reduced domestic, non-military expenditures, broadcasting it loudly. He 
continued to press Lee Loevinger, head of the antitrust division o f the Justice 
Department, for a predominantly hands-off approach, and he was ultimately forced to 
jettison attempts to impose "truth in packaging" and "truth in lending" regulations as 
well as stricter regulations on the monopolistic marketing o f pharmaceuticals.30 In his 
attempt to win over the business community, few stones were left unturned.
Though Kennedy admired Dillon's integrity and openness, for example, and 
believed McNamara to be a thoroughly liberal Republican, many of these appointments 
and policy choices were truly made, in part, for their symbolic effect. In a similar vein,
30 This was the same Lee Loevinger who was left o f f  o f  a Justice Department study o f  antitrust laws in 
the 1950s because Warren Burger remarked that "Loevinger has been a borderline left-winger all his life;
I would have little confidence in his views on anything." See Kovaleff, Business and  Government During 
the Eisenhower Administration , 21. In May, 1963, in an apparent move to further appease the business 
community, Loevinger was transfered to the FCC, and replaced by William H. Orrick, Jr. This "hands 
o ff' approach occurred in spite o f  Kennedy's comment at a November 8, 1961 news conference where he 
answered a question about what he had to do to win the confidence o f  the American business community. 
"Well, if  to... stop them from saying we're antibusiness," Kennedy replied, "we're supposed to cease 
enforcing the antitrust law, then 1 suppose the cause is lost." See "The President's N ew s Conference o f  
Nov. 8, 1961," in Public Papers, 1961, 708. Failing to understand Kennedy's concern with price-fixing 
over corporate bigness in general, Allen J. Matusow regarded the choice o f  Loevinger (who did 
agressively pursue price-fixing cases at the beginning) as a puzzling one. Ultimately, Kennedy 
appreciated the economies o f  scale that came with some mergers and existing conglomerates, as long as it 
was not accompanied by blatant price-fixing. See Matusow, The Unraveling o f  America, 34. On 
Kennedy's attempt to reduce transportation regulations, the Transportation Act o f  1963, designed to 
remove inequities in interstate minimum rate regulations, was actually defeated by the lack o f  business 
support (railroads for, water carriers and trucking lines against). On the attempt to regulate 
pharmaceutical companies, though monopolistic pricing was considered to be the greatest abuse, only 
regulations covering the licensing o f  products was allowed to get by, largely because o f  the shocking 
Thalidomide controversy in 1962. The "truth in lending" proposals, perennially championed by Paul 
Douglas in the U.S. Senate, fell prey to business complaints, most prominent o f  which was the lament 
that listing all interest rates in terms o f  "annual percentage rate" was far too complex a requirement!
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in mid-July, for example, he requested the heads of departments and agencies to take 
careful note o f programs designed to help business, and he directed cabinet and 
subcabinet level officials to "avoid the wrong kind of speeches or press conference 
remarks," adding that there should be "no commentary now on the stock market, a tax 
cut, gold, business ethics, wage-price intervention or antitrust laws."31
If, in the wake o f the steel crisis, Kennedy felt the need to approach the business 
community in a more conciliatory fashion, he also became more confident in his ability 
to understand economic policy, and saw an equally pressing need to begin bringing his 
rhetoric into line with his economic philosophy. Heller noted simply that the steel crisis 
convinced Kennedy to drop the balanced budget posture he never liked in the first 
place.32 While certain topics had to be treated gingerly or avoided all together, so as to 
soften business opposition, this approach also implied that an effort be made to prepare 
the business community for the real and profound economic policy changes he 
envisioned.
To many of his advisers, Kennedy's commencement address at Yale University on 
June 11, 1962 marked the onset o f this effort. In a speech written partly by the President 
himself, after consulting Heller, Sorensen, the visiting French scholar Andre Malraux, 
and others, Kennedy noted that the greatest enemy of truth was not the lie but the myth. 
He then proceeded to assail the myths that he saw hampering the effective management 
o f the nation's economy: that government was too big and too bad; that debt or the 
deficit was a bad thing in and of itself; and that confidence in the government should be 
blamed for turns of the speculative wheel. Arthur Okun called the address "the key 
manifestation o f JFK's conversion to the New Economics." Heller went further, calling 
it "the first complete speech on economic policy—and modern economic policy at
31 Quoted in Barber, "Purposeful Pedagogy," 179.
32 Bernstein, Promises Kept, 145.
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that—that a President had ever made."33 While the response o f the Yale audience was, 
indeed, far less enthusiastic, President Kennedy and Vice-President Johnson alike knew 
that audiences o f any stripe seldom responded warmly to economic speeches. 
"Whenever a man makes any kind o f economic speech, to any kind of audience," 
Johnson once told John Kenneth Galbraith, "it's like pissing down your leg; it makes 
you feel warm, but your audience is colder than a Texas norther."34
The Kennedy legacy was beginning to take shape, and the New Economics was fast 
becoming a recognizable commodity. Moreover, Vice President Johnson's outlook on 
economic policy was also evolving, wedding his seasoned populism with the academic 
insights of the Kennedy CEA. He now recognized, for example, how technical 
economics could be the ally o f a populist politician; before he had ceded much of that 
ground to his conservative adversaries. He also recognized the continued need for 
"convincers," part o f a political approach to the clinching of a paradigm shift where 
economically critical policies— clothed in the comfortable garments o f economic 
orthodoxy— were combined with policies o f marginal economic impact to attract the 
reluctant support o f the business community; support that could make or break any new 
economic strategy. Most o f all, however, he came to realize just what kind of policies a 
demand side economic strategy required, no matter how they were to be presented. 
Inflation would have to be fought by containing, in a precarious, politically charged 
atmosphere, the administered prices of American oligopolies (and other more 
"competitive" industries who responded rapidly and perversely to noticeable wage 
increases). Aggregate demand would have to be expanded, at this point in time, by 
introducing a substantial income tax cut, while increased government spending on the 
nation's infrastructure and social well-being could only play this role sometime in the 
near future. And last of all, social equity had to be introduced to the federal
33 Okun, Oral History, LBJ Library, 14; Bernstein, Promises K ept, 148.
34 Quoted in Valenti, A Very Human President, 251-252n.
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government's fiscal practices; tax reform was required to place the poor and the middle 
class on a more equal footing with the wealthy, and large sums needed to be diverted to 
the health, education, and general welfare o f large numbers of America's poorest 
citizens.
If  carried off successfully, this regime would allow the government to avoid the old 
practice o f dampening price pressure with unemployment and economic stagnation, 
though the episodes o f "stagflation" in 1937, 1949, 1954 and 1957 suggest that the old 
method offered little in the way of positive results, even on the price front.35 Demand 
could be expanded without faltering, then, even during peacetime, to levels that would 
finally bring genuine full employment.36 Only this, Kennedy, Johnson and their 
economic advisers reasoned, would render the American social fabric fit enough and 
resilient enough to provide for a stable, fluid, and equitable marketplace—the hallmark 
o f  an economy Americans had almost always aspired to, but had never really 
encouraged.
When Kennedy announced his intentions to seek a tax cut that was not revenue 
neutral, in a June 7,1962 press conference, the course had been set for this type of 
demand-led economic expansion. To Johnson, the tax cut proposal became the single 
most critical component o f a demand side economic strategy— at least in terms of the 
circumstances that prevailed in 1963 and 1964.37 When President Kennedy announced
35 Many pretended that the stagflation o f  the 1970s was the first o f  its kind, allowing them to erroneously 
credit the problem to the Kennedy-Johnson administrations and the N ew  Economics. Mancur Olsen, on 
the other hand, cites Philip Cagan's view  that stagflation has emerged gradually since the N ew  Deal era. 
This is partly because successful government stabilization policies have created less severe business 
cycles making prices "stickier" with each new recessionary wave in the cycle. See Mancur Olsen, "An 
Evolutionary Approach to Inflation and Stagflation," in James H. Gapinski and Charles E. Rockwood, 
eds., Essays in Post-Keynesian Inflation (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979), 146-148.
36 See John Maynard Keynes, "The U.S. and the Keynes Plan," The N ew  Republic, July 29, 1940, 158, 
where he notes that "It appears to be politically impossible for a capitalistic democracy to organize 
expenditure on a scale necessary to make the grande experiment which would prove my case, except in 
war conditions."
37 One common assertion regarding the Kennedy-Johnson tax cut, as I noted previously with respect to 
Kennedy's overall economic policy, is that it represented a watered down "business Keynesianism" or a 
supply-side prototype. See Collins, The Business Resonse to Keynes', Matusow, The Unraveling o f
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his intentions to reform much of the existing tax code, he also let it be known that he 
wanted to water the economy at its roots, rather than at the top o f its uppermost 
branches. "The present patchwork of special provisions and preferences," Kennedy 
noted in a December 1962 speech, "lightens the tax load of some only at the cost of 
placing a heavier burden on others."38 Expense account living, mortgage deductions that 
mostly benefited the wealthy, and non-compliance with taxes on interest and dividend 
income were among the administration's most prominent targets.
When President Kennedy was murdered on November 22, 1963, all o f this seemed 
feasible and appropriate to Vice President Johnson, though tax reform and some o f the 
lower bracket tax cuts ultimately had to be sacrificed to win the support o f conservatives 
and of business groups in general. Business response to the tax reform proposals, for 
example, was especially hysterical and took most of the Kennedy administration by 
surprise. The U.S. Savings and Loan League inaugurated a exceptionally misleading 
and divisive campaign designed to convince the public that withholding taxes on
America-, Michael Harrington, "Reactionary Keynesianism," Encounter, March 1966, 50-52; and Leon 
Keyserling, Oral History Interview, LBJ Library, 30, for examples o f  the first view  and Richard Reeves, 
President Kennedy, 318-319; King, Money, Time, and Politics, 180-186; Makin and Omstein, D ebt and  
Taxes, 124-125; and Mann, Legacy to  Power, 210-211 for prominent examples o f  the second view  
(though King seems to straddle both views, suggesting at one point that the administration's "primary 
objective" was "augmenting productive capacity and output," and at another that the tax cut represented 
"a minimalist version o f  Keynesianism, stripped o f  the ominous forebodings and anti-investor overtones 
o f  The G eneral Theory") Tax cuts were chosen, however, over stimulatory spending for a variety o f  
reasons. That it more closely coincided with the wishes o f  some business groups (who still wanted a 
revenue neutral tax cut) was largely a happy coincidence. Seymour Harris points out, for exam ple, how  
Keynes him self would have pressed for tax cuts had rates been as high in the 1930s or early 1940s. See 
Harris, Economics o f  the Kennedy Years, 63. And Irving Bernstein records Heller's view  that Galbraith's 
criticism o f  the tax cut was correct, in that public investment had lagged behind private wealth, but that a 
tax cut would act more quickly and would make the transition to a more favorable spending program an 
easier task in the future. See Bernstein, Promises Kept, 150-151. Hobart Rowen adds, "Heller, as a team 
player, waters down some o f  his own ideas. But over the long run, he has been neither so timid, nor 
impotent as Keyserling implies," and points out, as well, how the tax cut, as opposed to a spending 
increase, was "the right antidote to a tighter monetary policy that might have to be adopted to stem the 
outflow o f  gold." See Rowen, The Free Enterprisers, 166, 231. It should also be noted that since 
Kennedy included the tax cut on his list o f  forbidden topics— to soothe business relations after the steel 
crisis— it seems unlikely that he would have chosen the cut just to please business.
38 John F. Kennedy, "Address and Question and Answer Period at the Economic Club o f  New  York. 
December 14, 1962," Public Papers o f  the Presidents, John F. Kennedy, 1962, 878.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
190
interest and dividend income would most adversely affect the poor.39 On June 7,1963, 
however, when Kennedy decided to postpone attempts at tax reform, Walter Heller 
conveyed his affirmation of the move. "As you know," Heller wrote, "I opposed 
cluttering up the 1963 tax cut by inclusion of tax reforms—and I never bought the 
argument that the vested interests, just because we fed them a high protein diet o f tax 
cuts, would be any less venal or voracious when we kicked them in their private parts. 
And they're not."40
The linchpin o f the whole strategy, however, that could not be bargained away, was 
the proposed tax cut and the demand stimulus it entailed. Even when Kennedy spoke to 
conservative audiences and spent much of his time stressing his frugality and his 
concern for business profits, as was the case when he addressed the Economic Club of 
New York on December 14, 1962, he still touted the expansion o f consumer demand as 
the key to his economic strategy. Hoping for both a rapprochement with the business 
community and a way to explain the often subtle differences between his economic 
approach and theirs, Kennedy was utterly unwilling, at the same time, to conceal the 
demand side focus o f his economic strategy. "When consumers purchase more goods,"
39 The administration proposal for a withholding tax on interest and dividend income was also met with a 
storm o f  protest that generally treated this as i f  it were a new tax! (Since many had evaded it in the past, it 
was, perhaps, the equivalent o f  a new tax). Though studies clearly showed the inequity and wastefulness 
o f  the existing mortgage deduction, realtor's and homebuilder's groups treated Kennedy's proposal to alter 
this as a stab at the nation's vital organs and an attack on the middle class. See Pete Dreier and John Atlas, 
"Reforming the Mansion Subsidy," The Nation, May 2, 1994, 592-595, for a brief but illuminating 
history o f  the mortgage deduction. See also James M. Poterba, "Tax Subsidies to Owner-Occupied 
Housing: An Asset Market Approach," Quarterly Journal o f  Economics, November 1984, 729-752;
James M. Poterba, "Tax Reform and Residential Investment Incentives," Proceedings o f  the N ational Tax 
Association-Tax Institute o f  America, May 1987, 112-119; and Harvey S. Rosen, "Housing Subsidies: 
Effects on Housing Decisions, Efficiency, and Equity," in M. Feldstein and A. Auerbach, eds., Handbook 
o f  Public Economics, Volume I (Amsterdam: North Holland, 1986), 375-420. The shrillest o f  all 
counterattacks came from the hotel and restaurant industries who went berserk over Kennedy's proposals 
to deny deductions for what were essentially living or social expenses. While all o f  these reforms were 
either postponed or shelved indefinitely, it seems that Kennedy was finally attempting that which FDR 
had tabbed Joseph P. Kennedy for when he appointed him chairman o f  the Securities and Exchange 
Commission. "It takes a th ief to catch a thief," Roosevelt exclaimed, appointing Kennedy to the SEC 
chairmanship over the objections o f  many who thought the notorious stock market operator to be the 
worst possible choice.
40 Quoted in Matusow, The Unraveling o f  America, 55.
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Kennedy noted on this occasion, "plants use more of their capacity, men are hired 
instead o f laid off, investment increases, and profits are high." At another point in the 
same address he added: "we need to increase consumer demand to make these measures 
[investment tax credit and liberalized depreciation allowances and other potential 
investment incentives] fully effective—demand which will make more use o f existing 
capacity and thus increase both profits and the incentive to invest."41 When he spoke to 
Heller the following day he recalled the success o f his carefully crafted address. "I gave 
them straight Keynes and Heller," Kennedy noted, "and they loved it."42 When Kennedy 
aide Ted Sorensen recalled the address, he remembered the subtlety and ingenuity o f its 
rhetoric above all else. "It sounded like Hoover," Sorensen remarked, "but it was 
actually Heller."43
With this frame of reference, the administration could certainly countenance the 
partial loss o f the tax cut package and o f the companion policies designed to augment its 
effectiveness, as long as this helped secure the cut itself. "To defend a good policy 
measure under the circumstances where the best is beyond the political pale," Walter 
Heller noted, "need not offend the conscience of the economist."44 When the steel 
industry raised its prices on April 10,1963—a conspicuous date to be sure— Kennedy 
and the CEA were forced to soft-pedal their anti-inflation efforts as well, also in an 
attempt to nail down business support for the tax cut proposal. Still refusing to sanction 
across-the-board price increases, the tax cut campaign forced them, however, to allow 
selective price increases that raised overall steel prices by approximately 1.1 %.45 These
41 Kennedy, "Address to Economic Club," 878.
42 Heller, New Dimensions, 35.
43 Quoted in ibid., 39.
44 Walter W. Heller, N ew  Dimensions, 22.
45 Barber, "Purposeful Pedagogy," 188. Those who see Kennedy's econom ic strategy as little more than 
"corporate" or "managerial" liberalism also tend to misjudge the import o f  the New York Economic Club 
speech. Allen J. Matusow is one, citing this speech, rather than the less equivocal June Y ale address, as 
the "turning point" in Kennedy's conversion to Keynesianism. See Matusow, The U nraveling o f  America, 
51.
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compromises caused little alarm largely because Kennedy and Johnson both operated 
under the assumption that success was the best teacher, and the tax cut was judged to be 
the single most critical element o f a successful economic strategy. It was assumed, in 
other words, that more secure and more extensive profits, along with fuller employment, 
would eventually translate into success at the polls and in the halls o f Congress, and into 
the future acceptance of less significant but still desirable tax reform and social 
spending policies. Even though Heller felt compelled to rebuke the American public for 
its misguided "puritan ethic," out o f its opposition (in 1962) to a tax cut, the cut itself 
was never the most difficult thing to sell. That honor, indeed, went to the deficit, and to 
the demand side economic strategy that Kennedy, Johnson and their economic advisers 
had linked inextricably to the tax cut proposal.
Because Kennedy stressed sacrifice, his own conservative prejudices, and 
pragmatic politics, and because he truly desired a new and genuine consensus, 
downplaying ideology as a result, it is too easy, perhaps, to regard him as little more 
than a pragmatist without a fixed ideological bearing. "His cause was not really clear," 
Johnson once told Doris Kearns, referring to the public perception of the martyred 
president's policies. "That was my job."46 Kennedy's ideological foundation, however, 
shrouded in political compromise and gamesmanship as it was, remained a significant 
part o f all that he sought and all that he accomplished. This was particularly true in the 
realm o f economic policy. That Lyndon Johnson understood and encouraged this, made 
it that much easier for him to adopt and embellish the Kennedy economic strategy when 
thrust unexpectedly into the Oval office.
If Kennedy and Heller had to water down their liberalism to convince the business 
community that a Democratic president was not its natural enemy, Johnson would have 
to transcend this rhetorical trap. He would, quite simply, have to teach the New
46 Keams, Lyndon Johnson and the American D ream , 178.
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Economics and the new consensus it implied to the American public, just as Kennedy 
tried to teach the American business community. Johnson's task, in other words, was to 
build upon both the economic success of the Kennedy years and upon the limited, 
somewhat mythical consensus that prevailed in 1963. He had to convince the American 
public and the American business community, once and for all, that a new consensus 
built on a high demand, full employment economic structure was far better than the 
limited one built on the "spirit o f ’76," laissez-faire economics, or steadfast anti­
communism. That Johnson was ultimately forced to rely upon at least a skeleton o f this 
old limited consensus—so as to transcend it—particularly the consensus that hinged 
upon visceral anti-communism, unfortunately proved to have tragic consequences for 
the new consensus.47 Pinning its hopes upon enlightened pedagogy and an elevated 
political and rhetorical style, but subject to the fickle politics of the American business 
community—where promised long-term rewards were of only marginal significance 
next to the more traditional short-term inducements—the fate of the New Economics 
was indeed precarious and uncertain as Lyndon Johnson flew from Dallas, Texas to 
Washington, D.C. on the evening of November 22,1963. He had much to build on, 
however, for Kennedy had plainly narrowed the gap between his administration and the 
business community, and the economy had been expanding since May 1961, with little 
inflation and both job creation and profits on the rise. "On that first night," Jack Valenti 
recalled, "he talked about the economy and how, above all else, he had to give it 
whatever sustenance the government could provide....With a robust economy, 
everything was possible."48
47 Though I do not subscribe here to the theory that the Great Society perished in the rice paddies o f  
South Vietnam (for economic reasons), I do acknowledge the almost insurmountable political difficulties 
that the war provided, and the ease by which opponents o f  the Great Society and the New  Economics 
exploited this obstacle.
48 Valenti, A Very Human President, 151.
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Chapter 5.
Setting the Stage: The 1964 Tax Cut
My impression of Lyndon Johnson is that, o f all the Presidents I've known since 
Hoover, he understood business problems better than any one of the other Presidents. 
And I'm including President Roosevelt, President Truman, President Eisenhower, and 
President Kennedy.
- Roger Blough, President, U.S. Steel
The myth persists that Federal deficits create inflation and budget surpluses 
prevent it....Obviously deficits are sometimes dangerous—and so are surpluses. But 
honest assessment plainly requires a more sophisticated view than the old and automatic 
cliche that deficits automatically bring inflation.
- John F. Kennedy, Yale Commencement Address, June 1962
Whisked from Parkland Hospital to Dallas' Love Field, less than an hour after 
President Kennedy's death, Lyndon Johnson had just entered the state room of Air Force 
One. "To old friends, who had never called me anything but Lyndon, I would now be 
Mr. President," Johnson noted. "It was a frightening, disturbing prospect."1 For many 
others, the world itself had become a frightening and disturbing place; turned upside 
down by the untimely death of an increasingly popular President. "Kennedy's death 
suggested something deeper and more sinister," Gary Hart recalled. "It suggested the 
presence of ominous dark forces just beneath society's veneer, forces that if  goaded by
1 Johnson, Vantage Point, 13.
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the threat of institutional change, could rise up to strike down anything or anyone."2 
Tom Wicker remembered the world after the Kennedy assassination as "a dark and 
malignant place."3 Jack Valenti described the assassination itself as "a nightmare so 
unimaginable that you could not believe it, an evil so monstrous you could not 
contemplate it."4And Norman Mailer marked the disappointment that often 
accompanied this fear and trepidation. "For a time we felt that the country was ours," he 
remarked somewhat cryptically. "Now it's theirs again."5 Prospects for the future 
seemed bleak, activism and reform seemed pointless, and the limits o f revolutionary 
change seemed to be defined and underscored by the bloodstains on the First Lady's 
pink dress.
Along with the numbness and frustration, however, came a resolve to rise above the 
confusion and to effect, at the very least, a seamless transition o f  power. Many were 
responsible, friends and professional assistants alike, but this resolve was best 
symbolized, perhaps, by the new President himself, Lyndon Johnson. "Any false step, 
any sign of self-doubt, could have been disastrous," Johnson noted in his presidential 
memoirs. "The times cried out for leadership."6
Sworn in as the 36th President at approximately 2:40 pm C.S.T., Lyndon Johnson 
returned immediately to Washington, and made his first public address as President at 
Andrews Air Force base at about 6:10 pm E.S.T.
2 Hart, The G ood Fight, 13-14.
3 Tom Wicker, quoted in The Johnson Years, edited by Robert Hardesty, 10.
4 Valenti, quoted in The Johnson Years, edited by Robert Hardesty, 18.
5 Norman Mailer, quoted in A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House, Arthur M. 
Schlesinger, Jr. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), 1027.
6 Johnson, Vantage Point, 18. Some, skeptical o f  Johnson's motives— filmmaker Oliver Stone for one—  
have judged this resolve and determination to be the product o f  Johnson's part in the assassination 
conspiracy. See Connally, In History's Shadow, 184-185 for comments on Stone's visit with Connally and 
his (Stone's) belief that LBJ was involved in the assassination (which Connally dismisses as 
phantasmagoria). Close examination o f  Johnson's actions on November 22, 1963, and the actions o f  
many Johnson and Kennedy assistants (which both supported and mirrored the Vice-President's actions) 
on the same day, show this claim to be baseless and highly speculative at best.
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This is a sad time for all people. We have suffered a loss that cannot be weighed. 
For me it is a deeply personal tragedy. I know that the world shares the sorrow 
that Mrs. Kennedy and her family bear. I will do my best. That is all I can do. I 
ask for your help— and God's.7
Arriving at the White House only minutes later, via presidential helicopter, Johnson 
spoke briefly to Defense Secretary McNamara and Undersecretary o f State George Ball. 
He then proceeded to his second floor offices at the Executive Office Building where 
chief assistant Walter Jenkins was already organizing Johnson's appointment book for 
the first full day in office on the 23rd. Johnson continued to use his Vice-Presidential 
office over the next few days for he had notified Robert Kennedy that he would not use 
the Oval Office until Bobby had time to organize and remove his brother's papers and 
other materials. Likewise, he encouraged Jacquelyn Kennedy to take her time moving 
out o f the White house living quarters; he would continue to live at his Vice- 
Presidential residence while she arranged the move.8 Once ensconced at his E.O.B. 
office, Johnson picked up a phone and spoke to Truman, Eisenhower, and Sargent 
Shriver, all before 8pm, stopping only once to greet a small delegation comprised of the 
House and Senate leadership. At 8 o'clock, he had some soup— the first food he had 
eaten since breakfast that morning.
Leaving the Executive Office Building at approximately 9:30 pm, Johnson then 
returned to his residence where Lady Bird was busy preparing food and the Secret 
Service were hooking up additional phone lines. Gathering his thoughts and focusing 
his attention on the awesome task before him, Johnson quietly saluted Sam Rayburn's 
portrait in the library with a glass of orange juice, ultimately retiring to the 2nd floor 
sleeping quarters around midnight with Jack Valenti, Bill Moyers, and Cliff Carter in 
tow. There, after watching television reports of the day's events and numerous analyses
7 Johnson, Vantage Point, 17.
8 Johnson would work out o f  the E.O.B. until the following Tuesday November 26, and live at "the 
Elms," his Vice-Presidential residence, until December 7, 1963.
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of his own political character, Johnson began talking about his plans for the next few 
days. Valenti, taking down only "the essence o f what he was saying," filled thirty pages 
within an hour, and the informal strategy session continued up to about 3 am. Valenti 
also recalled, in spite o f the intense concentration that Johnson displayed, that "there 
was not what one would call eagerness to greet the next day," but only "a studied 
appraisal of the weights and scales into which a hundred swift decisions must be 
fitted."9 "Now that I have the power, I aim to use it," is how he would later sum up 
Johnson's thoughts on the night of November 22, 1963.10 "That whole night," Bill 
Moyers added, "he[LBJ] seemed to have several chambers o f his mind operating 
simultaneously. It was formidable, very formidable."11
When the next day dawned, Johnson began showing the nation just where he 
proposed to aim the power of the presidency. Civil rights was one target. Speaking to 
Georgia Senator Richard Russell that day, Johnson declared, "Dick, I love you and I 
owe you, but I'm going to tell you something. I'm going to run over you if  you challenge 
me on this civil rights bill. I aim to pass this bill, Dick, only this time there is going to 
be no caviling, no compromising, no holding back."12 Indeed, though Johnson's 
friendship with Russell was an intimate one, and though his daughters called him 
"uncle," by the summer o f 1965 Johnson would say of Senator Russell: "Our opinions 
are so completely at variance we do not discuss what I regard as his extreme position on 
this issue."13
9 Valenti, A Veiy Human President, 9. This account o f  Johnson's first night as President is drawn from 
Valenti, A Very Human President, 3-10 ,44-57; and Johnson, Vantage Point, 10-17.
10 Valenti, quoted in The Johnson Years, edited by Robert Hardesty, 19.
11 Quoted in Miller, Lyndon, 325.
12 Quoted in ibid.
13 Mark Stem, "Lyndon Johnson and Richard Russell: Institutions, Ambitions, and Civil Rights," 
Presidential Studies Q uarterly, Fall 1991, 699. Stem also notes that Johnson did not attend Russell's 
funeral in 1971. Though Stern emphasizes Johnson's convictions on civil rights, he concludes, almost 
unexpectedly, by suggesting that Johnson was the "rational politician who would 'act solely in order to 
attain the income, prestige, and power which comes from being in office.'" He also says that he evolved  
from an "East Texas politician" to a "committed politician and President." Ibid.
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Just the morning before, in what amounted to his last conversation with John 
Kennedy, Johnson had also discussed civil rights issues with the late President. "We've 
got this civil rights thing whipped," Johnson told Kennedy and a small number o f his 
advisers and assistants, "They've quit blaming Kennedy for it. They think its going to be 
inevitable."14 When one assistant warned Johnson that "the presidency has only a 
certain amount o f coinage to spend," and that he should therefore hold off on some civil 
rights proposals, Johnson responded tersely: "Well, what the hell's the presidency 
for?"15 Indeed, over the first two weeks of his presidency Johnson met individually with 
civil rights leaders Roy Wilkins, Whitney M.Young, Jr., Martin Luther King, Jr., James 
Farmer, A. Philip Randolph, and Clarence Mitchell, and promised nothing short o f an 
all-out effort to attain a new and comprehensive civil rights bill.
The economy was clearly the other major area of concern for the new President. 
Like his predecessor, he saw economic policy as the umbrella under which all other 
policies and concerns would be subsumed— including civil rights. Senator Russell Long 
recalled, for example, how Johnson deliberated on the economy on the night of 
Kennedy's funeral, though the emotional weight of the event bore down upon him quite 
heavily.16 Joe Califano, who became Johnson's top assistant for domestic affairs in July, 
1965, noted that "Johnson considered a robust, non-inflationary economy so critical to 
his domestic program that he spent more time on economic matters than any other 
subject [including Vietnam] during my years at the White House."17 It was in no way a
14 Cited in Baker, The Johnson Eclipse, 263.
15 Cited in Miller, Lyndon, 337. Johnson's appraisal o f  this "presidential currency" theory paralleled his 
appraisal o f  monetary policy; in both cases he believed a powerful "multiplier" to be at work , and took 
little stock in the "crowding out" theory.
16 Mann, Legacy to Power, 217.
17 Califano, Triumph an d  Tragedy, 75. Califano was Johnson's top domestic policy adviser from July 
1965 until January 20, 1969.
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fleeting concern, confined only to election year strategy; economic policy would always 
occupy center stage in the Johnson presidency.18
Name___________________ Term____________________ Inst. Affiliation
Walter Heller* January 2 9 ,1961-November 15, 1964 Minnesota
Gardner Ackley* August 3 , 1962-February 16, 1968 Michigan
John P. Lewis May 17, 1963-August 31,1964 Indiana
Otto Eckstein September 2 , 1964-February 1,1966 Harvard
Arthur Okun* November 16, 1964-January 20, 1969 Yale
James Duesenberry February 2, 1966-June 30,1968 Harvard
Merton Peck February 1 6 ,1968-January 20,1969 Yale
Warren Smith Julyl, 1968-January 20, 1969 Michigan
* Chairman
Fig. 1. The Johnson Administration Council of Economic Advisers.
When Eisenhower drove in from his Gettysburg farm on November 23, he and 
Johnson launched into a discussion of the nation's economy, speaking of the budget and 
the proposed tax cut in particular. Ike went to McGeorge Bundy's office afterward and 
dictated a memo to Alice Boyce on these issues, instructing Ms. Boyce—former 
secretary to Ike's friend General Andrew Goodpaster—to deliver it to President 
Johnson. The memo read, in part:
18 Ann Mari May's essay "Economic Myth and Economic Reality," in The Presidency and D om estic  
Policies o f  Jimmy Carter, edited by Herbert D. Rosenbaum and Alexej Ugrinsky (Westport, Connecticut: 
Greenwood Press, 1994), for example, pointed out how there have been only two occasions since WWII 
on which a President has not embarked upon an expansionist econom ic strategy during an election year: 
Eisenhower in 1960; and Carter in 1980. She did not generally try to distinguish, however, between an 
expansionist policy initiated during, and created for, the election year only, and a more continuous 
program o f  expansion that covered election and non-election years alike. (Except for the case o f  Ronald 
Reagan, where she does point out how the growth o f  the Reagan years was packed almost entirely into 
the election years 1984 and 1988.) See Ibid., 664, 658.
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One matter o f immediate and urgent impact is the possibility o f a prompt tax cut. 
On the necessity o f such an act you believe we all agree. In order to make even 
more firm the basis for such a cut, it will be your purpose to reduce the 
expenditures o f fiscal year 1964— so far as may be profitable but consistent with 
our nation's security. It will be your further purpose to present the budget for 1965 
in connection with any subsequent expenditures so that they will not exceed those 
o f 1964 except in the case o f unforeseen emergency.19
Before Eisenhower left, he recommended that Johnson seek out the advice o f his former
Secretary of the Treasury, Robert Anderson—a conservative Texas Democrat with
whom Johnson was familiar. Ike had included this suggestion in his memo as well.
"Because o f your known competence [y/c] in the judgement and integrity of Robert
Anderson," Eisenhower wrote, "I would suggest that in the near future you send for him
to confer on general subjects, and particularly those o f a fiscal and financial
character."20
At 7:40 pm Johnson met with CEA Chairman Heller who had been en route to 
Japan with Dean Rusk and several other Kennedy cabinet officers when the news of the 
assassination broke. Though Heller and Johnson would soon be preoccupied with efforts 
to guarantee passage o f the tax cut proposal, Heller chose to brief Johnson, that evening, 
on Kennedy's late breaking plans for an all-out attack on poverty, plans that were 
distinct from, but ultimately hinged upon, the administration's macroeconomic policies 
designed to do much the same thing. When Heller asked Johnson if  he too would give a 
green light to such a program, Johnson responded enthusiastically. "I'm sympathetic," 
Johnson replied. "Go ahead. Give it the highest priority. Push ahead full tilt."21 Heller 
and Budget Director Kermit Gordon would soon find themselves cloistered at the LBJ 
Ranch— over the Christmas holidays— sketching out the first plans, and creating the
19 Quoted in Johnson, Vantage Point, 32. For a brief, cogent analysis o f  Eisenhower's balanced budget 
concerns see Iwan W. Morgan, "Eisenhower and the Balanced Budget," in Reexamining the Eisenhower 
Presidency, edited by Shirley Anne Warshaw (Westport,Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1993), 121-132. 
Morgan says o f  Eisenhower: "At best Eisenhower was a passive and half-hearted Keynesian who mainly 
relied on automatic stabilizers— in other words, falling tax receipts and increased payouts for 
unemployment insurance— to counteract economic decline." Ibid., 122.
20 Johnson, Vantage Point, 31.
21 Ibid., 69-71.
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title for, Johnson's "War on Poverty." Bill Moyers and Jack Valenti also joined the two 
economists for the working vacation. "We're going to abolish poverty in this country," 
Johnson challenged the four assistants, "and I'm going to lock this door and you guys 
can't come out until you bring me a plan to do just that."22 Reminiscent of the New Deal 
crusades Johnson had once relished, the War on Poverty struck him immediately as a 
fitting and indispensable challenge. "...In talking privately o f the program," Washington 
reporter Joseph Kraft noted later, [Johnson] repeatedly cited the work o f Roosevelt's 
Secretary o f the Interior, Harold Ickes."23
On Sunday, November 24th, as Eisenhower had advised, Johnson met with Robert 
Anderson. Anderson told Johnson to dump the tax cut proposal and to cut the budget at 
the same time. Though Johnson saw instant merit in cutting the budget—mostly for 
political reasons, but also in an effort to root out waste— he was not about to heed 
Anderson's advice on the tax cut. Anderson's opposition to the tax cut, however, was 
significant in and o f itself, for it revealed much about American conservatives' approach 
to the fiscal strategy behind it. If the tax cut did not imply a permanently diminished 
budget and role for the federal government, it had no place in their orthodox paradigm. 
When Arthur Okun warned Johnson, several years later, that Anderson held economic 
views at variance with his own and that he should be careful not to heed too much of his 
advice, Johnson's reaction brought both his relationship with Anderson, and his 
rejection of Anderson's advice on the tax cut, into clearer focus. To Okun's warning, 
which came after Johnson sought out Anderson's view on another more recent economic 
proposal, Johnson responded knowingly. "You're telling me he's a goddamn 
reactionary," Johnson began. "I know that. That's exactly why I called. I wanted to find
22 Quoted by Jack Valenti in Hardesty, ed„ The Johnson Years, 20.
23 Joseph Kraft, Profiles in Power: A Washington Insight (New York: New  American Library, 1966), 
13.
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out what the views of a sophisticated and thoughtful goddamn reactionary are and that's 
what I use Bob Anderson for."24
Before the day ended, Johnson had visited with 11 others, including Ambassador to 
South Vietnam Lodge who had just returned from Saigon. He also made 32 phone calls, 
urging a rapid upgrade o f the White House phone system afterward. Evans and Novak 
wrote that "Johnson's capacity for work in those first few days after he became President 
was superhuman."25 Joe Califano, who would eventually become Johnson's top 
domestic policy adviser, then working for McNamara at the Department o f Defense, 
found out quickly that this whirlwind was not a passing thing. Like many others, the 
Kennedy assassination had deflated his outlook on public service in general and he told 
Cyrus Vance that he intended to leave government. "This town has never seen a 
President like Lyndon Johnson," Vance replied. "Stay around for a while. You're going 
to see things move."26
On Monday, the 25th, in an off-the-record session after President Kennedy's 
funeral, Johnson met with 40 o f the nation's governors. Stressing the need for consensus 
and for an effort to "get to the root of hate," Johnson entwined his economic strategy 
with a call for the eradication o f "poverty, disease, and illiteracy;" all problems he 
identified as "the roots o f hate." Urging on the Republicans in the group with his call for 
a consensus effort on economic policies, and for the achievement o f greater prosperity, 
Johnson told the assembly of governors that he "never questioned the capacity or the 
ability of any man because he belonged to a different political party."27 Princeton 
historian Eric Goldman, hired as a Johnson assistant, only weeks later in December, 
1963, recalled how Johnson continued to press this theme. In their very first meeting, 
for example, Johnson "lectured" Goldman on bipartisanship, consensus, and rising
24 Arthur Okun, in Hargrove and Morley, The President and the CEA ,2 7 1 .
25 Evans and Novak, The Exercise o f  Power, 347.
26 Califano, Triumph and Tragedy, 13-14.
27 Johnson, Vantage Point, 28-29.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
203
above too sharp divisions so as to lead the nation forward.28 To Johnson, consensus was 
not just a slogan, but the key to most o f the nation's past successes. "LBJ was really 
concerned about national unity," Goldman added, "and not just as apolitical ploy 
typical o f most new entrants to the White House."29
Tuesday, November 26, as financial markets opened for the first time since the 
assassination, the Dow Jones Average soared 32.03 points—the largest single day 
advance up to that time (an ascent of approximately 4.3%; roughly equivalent to a 160 
pt. advance in 1994). Most analysts read this as an affirmation of Johnson's prevailing 
reputation for conservatism; Johnson himself, however, seems to have read it as a 
harbinger of success for a new consensus and at least a partial affirmation o f the New 
Economics. "Four days after assuming office," Johnson recalled, "we witnessed one of 
the first evidences that we were gaining the support and confidence o f the American 
people."30
On the 27th, Johnson spoke to a Joint session of Congress where he emphasized his 
commitment to the policies o f his predecessor. "No words are strong enough," Johnson 
noted, "to express our determination to continue the forward thrust of America that he 
began." Later in the address, as he alluded to Kennedy's inaugural and his reknowned 
"let us begin" summons to renewed governmental activism, Johnson spoke even more 
succinctly. "Today in this moment of new resolve," he declared, "I would say to all my 
fellow Americans, let us continue." He then finished by asking Congress to deliver both 
the tax cut and a civil rights bill. "No act o f ours," Johnson added, "could more fittingly 
continue the work of President Kennedy than the early passage of the tax bill for which 
he fought all this long year....This is no time for delay. It is a time for action."31
28 Goldman, The Tragedy o f  Lyndon Johnson, 5-9.
29 Ibid., 170.
30 Johnson, Vantage Point, 40-41.
31 Public Papers, Lyndon Johnson, 1963-1964:1, 8-9. According to Evans and Novak, Johnson asked 
Ted Sorensen and John Kenneth Galbraith to collaborate on the speech, a request to which both men
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Alluding to Johnson's pledge for genuine civil rights reform, comedian and civil rights 
activist Dick Gregory recalled that "as soon as Lyndon Johnson finished his speech 
before Congress, twenty million o f us started unpacking."32
Renaming Cape Canaveral for President Kennedy the following day, Johnson 
established a precedent in his own administration by setting out to honor the late 
president as best he could, hoping to tap the nation's growing admiration and sympathy 
for the recently martyed President. This, he reasoned, would help pave the way for 
previously stalled Kennedy proposals that he now hoped to enact on his own. "President 
Kennedy fought hard for this," he would often say.33 Indeed, over the course o f the next 
few months, particularly with the tax cut and the civil rights bill, Johnson would invoke 
Kennedy's name on numerous occasions—in both public and private situations. "It was 
very clear," Clark Clifford recalled, "that after the assassination, President Kennedy's 
popularity grew all the time; he was revered in a manner after his death that perhaps 
didn't exist before his death."34 While the image of the late President plainly helped 
Johnson overcome some o f the general legislative inertia that plagued Kennedy's 
domestic program, Johnson realized that the economic proposals o f the New Frontier, 
which he now believed in more strongly than ever, would require a great deal more.
First and foremost in Johnson's mind when he entered office was the tax cut idea. "Sold 
with it all the way along," according to Joseph Barr, Johnson felt that the tax cut 
proposal needed more than even the soaring popularity o f his martyred predecessor and 
that it would simply not pass without a reduced budget for FY 1965.35
Having received a memo from Heller on November 23, on the terms of the 
upcoming budget proposal, Johnson met with the CEA Chairman two days later to
complied, and submitted it to Abe Fortas afterward who "corned it up a bit." See Evans and Novak, The 
Exercise o f  Power, 348.
32 Quoted in Miller, Lyndon, 340.
33 Quoted in Goldman, The Tragedy o f  Lyndon Johnson, 29.
34 Ibid., 330.
35 Joseph Barr, Oral History Interview, interviewed by Joe Frantz, August 25, 1969, LBJ Library, 18.
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discuss budget politics and its implications for the tax cut proposal. Agreeing with 
Heller that budget cuts made little economic sense, Johnson convinced him, however, 
that they simply had to be offered to ensure the success o f the tax cut. "Tell them to lay 
off, Walter," Johnson beseeched Heller after Orville Freeeman and Willard Wirtz 
complained o f his plan to reduce the budget. "I'm for them. I know they have good 
programs and the economy needs to have money pumped in. I want an expanding 
economy, too, and I'd like a budget at 108 billion dollars."36 But conservative members 
o f the Senate Finance Committee, Johnson informed Heller, simply made a budget over 
$100 billion a virtual impossibility. "Unless the budget fell below $100 billion," 
Johnson told his chief economist, "you won't pee one drop."37
Emboldened by Heller's assurance that he was taking the right approach after all, 
particularly after Johnson compared himself to Eisenhower who "talked economy, and 
then spent," Johnson tried to convince the Executive Council of the AFL-CIO, on 
December 4 at the White House, that the tax cut proposal should take precedence over 
any marginal and temporary budgetary changes. "The tax cut bill now pending in 
Congress," Johnson noted, "is the most massive single attack we can make on this 
problem [of joblessness]."38 Repeating the persuasive rhetoric provided by Walter 
Heller, after Heller had become convinced of the political need for budget cuts, Johnson 
had little difficulty convincing George Meany and the other AFL-CIO leaders o f this 
approach. When it became clear that budget cuts were a political necessity, that his 
economic advisers understood the validity o f his approach, and that he could sell it to
36 Quoted in Evans and Novak, The Exercise o f  P ow er, 371. Freeman and Wirtz were Kennedy and 
Johnson’s Secretary o f  Agriculture and Secretary o f  Labor, respectively.
37 LBJ to Heller, quoted in Blum, Years o f  Discord, 143; and Evans and Novak, The Exercise o f  Power, 
372.
38 Public Papers, Lyndon Johnson, 1963-1964:1, 21. Allen J. Matusow suggested that "Heller's 
strenuous objections" to the budget cuts remained largely unaffected by Johnson's pleading. See 
Matusow, Unraveling o f  America, 56. That Heller immediately launched an effort to help Johnson 
explain the budget cutting exercise to liberals who would oppose it, suggests otherwise. See Heller's 
memo to LBJ, December 3, 1963 (in preparation for Dec. 4 meeting with AFL-CIO leaders) Personal 
and OrganizationalPapers o f  Fred Panzer, LBJ Library, Box 472.
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outside groups like the AFL-CIO, Johnson immersed himself in practically every detail 
o f the budget-making process. "I studied almost every line, nearly every page," Johnson 
recalled, "until I was dreaming about the budget at night."39
To achieve substantial budget cuts, Johnson looked in several directions at once. 
McNamara was encouraged to continue his cost-cutting efforts in the Department o f 
Defense, heads of all agencies were instructed to "strip work to its essentials," 
government use of limousines was cut by 75%, and Johnson even began a campaign to 
conserve electricity in the White House.40 A number of Republicans, looking for a way 
to criticize a Democratic President who had seemingly stolen the "economy" issue, 
began badgering Johnson for having turned off the spotlights on the White House and 
for trying to save "pennies." This was a disgrace, they suggested, to a symbolically 
important national monument. Some even lampooned Johnson's efforts by 
ostentatiously passing the hat to help pay for the White House electric bill. "A 
Republican inspired campaign," Johnson remarked later that Spring, "to collect pennies 
to help pay the White House light bill has so far netted $1.50. That's about the way most 
Republican [charity] campaigns operate."41
While this kind of efficiency-minded campaign appealed to Johnson regardless of 
the prevailing political climate, and while it continued long after the passage of the tax 
cut, the Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, Harry Byrd of Virginia, made it a 
virtual necessity during the tax cut campaign. Byrd was simply not going to allow the 
tax reduction bill to reach the floor of the senate without accompanying budget cuts. It
39 Johnson, Vantage Point, 35, 36.
40 Memo from LBJ to Heads o f  Depts. and Agencies, "Administrative History o f  the General Services 
Administration," Vol. I, Part II, Box 1, LBJ Library, 496. See also Johnson's "Letter to Defense 
Contractors On the Need for Cost Reduction," in Public Papers, Lyndon Johnson, 1963-1964: /, 
December 1, 1963, 16; and Harvey C. Mansfield, Sr., Illustrations o f  Presidential Management: 
Johnson's Cost Reduction and Tax Increase Campaigns (Austin: LBJ School o f  Public Affairs and the 
University o f  Texas, 1988), 9-10. Among other things, Mansfield points out how Johnson aimed to 
reduce the White House electric bill from $5000/month to $3000/month.
41 Quoted in Bill Adler, The Johnson Humor (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1965), 84.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
207
was of little consequence to him that the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the National 
Planning Association, and the Committee for Economic Development—all fairly 
conservative, business oriented groups—had already endorsed the tax cut idea. To Byrd, 
and undoubtedly to many of their members as well, these groups had really only 
endorsed the tax cut itself and not the deficit finance, production gap economics that 
Kennedy, Johnson and the CEA had attached to it.42 It was this extra baggage, rather 
than the notion o f cutting taxes, that made Byrd and many other conservatives resolute 
opponents.
Knowing that some cuts were certainly feasible, Johnson told his CEA that they 
"might be able to sell me on the New Economics, but not Harry Byrd," and immediately 
went to work on the senior senator from Virginia, a man known by many to be the most 
conservative member o f the Senate from either party.43 On December 5, 1963, he 
invited Byrd to the White House for lunch and a one-on-one conversation. After hearing 
Johnson's pitch, Byrd still opposed the tax cut but he also agreed to release it to the 
Senate floor if  the budget for FY 1965 came in at under $100 billion. Anything at or 
over that figure, Byrd maintained, and the tax reduction bill was sure to remain bottled 
up in his all important committee. "Get Kermit Gordon (Budget Director and former
42 See the papers o f  the National Association o f  Manufacturers, Series I, Box 97, Box 215, Hagiey 
Library, for testimony favoring tax cut legislation in a more conservative, revenue-neutral setting (the 
Sadlak-Herlong and Herlong-Baker bills o f  the late 1950s and early 1960s in particular). While it is true 
that a small number o f  business leaders, prodded somewhat by the professional economists who advised 
them, began to subscribe to selective Keynesian economic principles, and therefore professed to accept a 
tax cut and a deficit, they seldom digested the whole o f  Keynes, nor were they ever able to bring the bulk 
o f  their corporate associates around to anything more than a pure and simple tax cut. See Collins, The 
Business Response to Keynes for a cogent and illuminating view o f  this progressive business leadership 
and a study that credits business groups with a greater impact. "At the very least," Collins says, "the 
development o f  a sophisticated Keynesianism by even a relatively small segment o f  American business in 
the years immediately after World War II calls into question the common belief that the N ew  Economics 
was somehow imposed on a reluctant business community by antibusiness liberals." Ibid., 1 4 2 .1 contend 
that it was largely imposed, though by liberals who were in no way antibusiness. (It is perhaps significant 
that Collins ended his study in 1964 with the passage o f  the tax cut, thereby ignoring the eventual 
unfolding o f  an economic strategy, in the 1964-1969 period, that would confound his claims for an 
unbroken, only slightly altered business hegemony.)
43 Johnson, Vantage Point, 36.
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CEA member), in here," Johnson told Jack Valenti once he had Byrd's promise. He and 
Budget Director Gordon, Johnson figured, ought to be able to find enough budget cuts 
to satisfy Harry Byrd, even enough to bring the whole package in at under $100 
billion.44 As soon as Gordon showed up, the two men launched a laborious line-by-line 
effort to find additional cuts and to resume the cost-saving plans already set in motion.45 
Within a few days, the task would be relatively complete, and Johnson would attain a 
budget that was low enough to safeguard the tax cut bill ffom the chairman of the 
Senate Finance Committee.
Though budget gimmicks played a significant role in this attempt to satisfy Harry 
Byrd— a rational response in light o f Johnson's desire to pump more money into the 
economy and his fundamental disagreement with Byrd's economic philosophy —much 
of the savings he and Gordon effected were real and substantive.46 Insisting on a 
"dollar's worth for a dollar spent," Johnson made a genuine effort to cut wasteful 
spending even if he still believed in the need for greater spending in a number of key 
areas.47 In the Department of Defense, for example, McNamara and Johnson agreed to 
close 26 bases in 14 states, and 7 overseas bases as well. Civilian employment in the 
DoD was also reduced to approximately 997,000— the first time it had been reduced to 
under one million since the Korean War.
Many of these cost-cutting measures, of course, were already planned before 
Johnson and Harry Byrd had hatched any agreement. Byrd's compromise on the tax cut, 
however, impelled them further and faster. The General Services Administration 
realized several million dollars in additional savings, as well, mostly by switching the
44 The initial budget outline for FY 1965, submitted earlier by President Kennedy, called for 
expenditures o f  approximately $102 billion.
45 Valenti, A Very Human President, 197.
46 Some o f  the "gimmicks" utilized by Johnson were the use o f  seignorage profits (by switching from a 
silver to a sandwich currency), and the use o f  participation certificates (loan financing) over direct 
outlays.
47 Johnson used this phrase in his January 8, 1964 "State o f  the Union" address. See Public Papers, 
Lyndon Johnson, 1963-1964: 1, 112-118.
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sites o f government office buildings to government owned land. While this paled in 
comparison to the several billion dollars saved at the DoD, it proved to be even more 
substantial over the next few years. Moreover, following the lead o f McNamara at 
Defense, all agencies and departments began to realize substantial savings (several 
billion dollars in the aggregate) through large volume buying, new supply standards, 
transfers of excess real and personal property, and even by switching to a new size 
envelope ($300,000 in savings over the 1964-1968 period).48 Because Johnson was 
more interested in trimming waste from the budget than in reducing the total level of 
federal outlays (which he believed had to grow over the next few years), even small cuts 
were deemed important, and they were pursued with great vigor. "I've never seen 
anyone," Joseph Barr insisted, "who was better with the budget process, who 
understood it more thoroughly than President Johnson."49
When Johnson and Gordon wrapped up their surgery on the 1965 budget, they had 
surpassed even Harry Byrd's expectations. On January 8, 1964, in his first State o f the 
Union address, Johnson unveiled their handiwork. Watching her husband deliver the 
address, Lady Bird Johnson noted that she searched for Harry Byrd "every time the 
word 'budget' was mentioned..."50 But even the archconservative Finance Committee 
chairman was pleased, despite Mrs. Johnson's anxiety. With expenditures set at $97.9 
billion, the budget for FY 1965 met with Byrd's approval, paved the way for the tax cut, 
and even represented a decrease from the previous year's outlays (of $98.4 billion). At 
the time of writing, this was the last budget to accomplish such a reduction, yet it also 
included small increases for health, labor, education, space research and technology, and 
welfare, and entirely new outlays for the "War on Poverty."
48 "Administrative History o f  the General Services Administration," Vol. I, Part II, Box 1, LBJ Library, 
531.
49 Barr, Oral History, LBJ Library, 29.
50 Lady Bird Johnson, A White House D iary  (New York: Holt, Rhinehart, and Winston, 1970), 35.
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"But it is not a standstill budget," Johnson announced as he presented it to Congress 
and the American public, "for America cannot afford to stand still. Our population is 
growing. Our economy is more complex. Our people's needs are expanding."51 Indeed, 
this budget and the tax cut that it enabled, were only the first, and certainly not the final, 
steps o f an economic revolution envisioned by Johnson and his economic advisers. "I've 
got a surprise for you Harry," Johnson announced later that month when the budget was 
made official, "I've got the damn thing down under $100 billion...way under. It's only 
$97.9 billion. Now you can tell all your friends that you forced the President o f the 
United States to reduce the budget before you let him have his tax cut."52
As he had promised, Byrd allowed the tax cut bill to reach the floor of the Senate, 
and told Johnson that "I'm going to have to vote against the bill, but I'll be working for 
you behind the scenes."53 Despite Byrd's assistance it fell into jeopardy once more in the 
Senate Finance Committee. Trouble began there when Russell Long of Louisiana 
introduced a surprise amendment repealing excise taxes on a variety o f luxury items. 
Long's amendment, introduced on January 23, threatened a potential avalanche of other 
special amendments that would surely unbalance the final bill. Richard Goodwin called 
it "an augury o f disaster."54 Tipped off by a phone call from Senator Smathers of 
Florida, also a member o f the Senate Finance Committee, Johnson quickly organized an 
effort to save the bill from the barrage of amendments. He immediately dispatched 
Henry Fowler and Joseph Barr, newly sworn in as Undersecretary of the Treasury and 
FDIC Chairman just that morning, to Capitol Hill to straighten things out.55 Within 
hours he spoke on the phone to most of the seventeen members o f the Finance
51 Public Papers, Lyndon Johnson, 1963-1964: /, 112-118.
52 Quoted in Richard Goodwin, Remembering America: A Voice From the Sixties (Boston: Little, Brown 
and Co., 1988), 262. Though LBJ introduced the budget proposals during his "state o f  the union" 
address— the first o f  its kind to focus on domestic issues since WWII, according to Eric Goldman— the 
official budget message was not delivered until January 20, 1964.
53 Quoted in Evans and Novak, The Exercise o f  Power, 375.
54 Goodwin, Remembering America, 262.
55 Barr, Oral History, LBJ Library, 20.
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Committee. When Johnson spoke to committee member Vance Hartke o f Indiana, for 
example, Hartke explained that his attempt to eliminate the excise tax on musical 
instruments was particularly dear to the good folks from the Hoosier state, and that he 
would have a difficult time backtracking. "What's important," Johnson replied, "is the 
big credit to the Democratic party. The goddamned band and musical instruments, they 
won't be talking about them next November. They're going to be judging us by whether 
we can pass a tax bill or not, and whether we got prosperity." When Johnson spoke to 
Abraham Ribicoff of Connecticut, Ribicoff said that he would like to help, but that one 
o f the amendments, "something for my home state," had already been announced. "I 
know it," Johnson replied. "But it's the same for everyone....You save my face this 
afternoon, and I'll save your face tommorow."
Using a similar approach with nearly all 17 members, and organizing a motion to 
eliminate all excise tax repealers, Johnson appealed to Chairman Byrd last o f all.
"Listen Harry, they're going to offer a motion this afternoon to take all these excise 
repealers out. I hope you can help them, because it will throw everything out o f 
caboodle if we lose 450 million on this thing." To Johnson's relief, The Finance 
Committee convened again in the afternoon, and voted 9-8 to expunge all o f the excise 
tax cuts they had introduced that morning. By doing so, the committee avoided a vote 
on any one repealer, saved face, and narrowly averted a derailment of the general tax cut 
bill at the same time.56 To further speed things along at this point, Johnson called 
"startled officials" from the Government Printing Office and told them to expect the 
Finance Committee report, after which he phoned chief Finance Committee clerk, 
Elizabeth Springer, to tell her that the GPO was "on alert waiting for the manuscript of
56 Quoted in Goodwin, Remembering America, 262-265. Goodwin recounts on these pages a more 
detailed and complete version o f  this episode.
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the report." No President, Evans and Novak remarked, had ever been "quite so familiar 
with the minutiae o f the legislative process."57
When it reached the senate floor, Johnson convinced Byrd to let Russell Long act 
as the bill's floor manager, despite Long's previous role in the excise tax amendment 
fiasco. "Like a kid who has gone fishing for the first time and caught a whale," was 
Long's response to the assignment.58 Even though he was the Finance Committee 
member who first threatened the bill's existence in committee, Long was a logical 
choice to carry the ball on the senate floor, for Johnson surmised, correctly, that he 
would not be as willing to allow a command performance. "In the senate everybody was 
his own boss and, my lord, it was the awfulest thing, Joseph Barr once observed. "You 
got to the floor o f the senate and every law firm in town would rush through their files 
and drag out every specious argument that they had ever heard of....you just fought off 
one cruddy amendment after another."59 Indeed, when debate began on February 3, 
Senator Albert Gore succeeded in passing an amendment to the tax cut bill (increasing 
the tax on income earned by Americans living abroad) that threatened to reopen 
Pandora's box. On February 4, however, with Long leading the way, one amendment 
after another was rejected, and the bill emerged very much as it was presented by the 
administration. This was deemed to be particularly crucial since the administration's 
version o f the bill had already undergone a series of changes, most of them adopted to 
appease conservative opponents.50 Long's leadership was so effective, and so 
exasperating to opponents of the tax cut, that William Proxmire, one such opponent, 
suggested that if Long were to defend a man who murdered a "crippled, enfeebled
57 Evans and Novak, The Exercise o f  Pow er , 374.
58 Quoted in Mann, L egacy to  Pow er, 218.
59 Joseph Barr, quoted in Am ong Friends o f  LBJ, October 1987, 12.
60 Accompanying tax reform, as previously mentioned, had already been dropped by the Kennedy 
administration; the lowest bracket under the new bill (14%) was changed to affect only the first $500  
instead o f  the first $1000 as planned; and the top corporate rate cut to 48% instead o f  the 49% originally 
planned (22% regular rate plus a 26% surcharge for income over $25,000).
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orphan at high noon on the public square in plain view o f a thousand people" the man 
would be found innocent and awarded one million dollars on the grounds that he was 
provoked.61
When the final vote was taken, the Revenue Act o f 1964, now known as the 
Kennedy-Johnson tax cut, passed the senate 71-21, and Johnson signed it into law on 
February 26, 1964.62 In remarks broadcast on TV and radio, Johnson called it "the 
single most important step that we have taken to strengthen our economy since World 
War II."63 He and Lady Bird then went directly to 3017 N Street N.W. where they 
presented pens to Jacquelyn, Caroline, and John Kennedy, Jr.
The passage o f the tax bill accomplished three things at once. First of all, when the 
regular withholding rate was changed from 18% to 14% in March 1964, the take-home 
pay o f millions o f Americans increased immediately, igniting a real surge in the nation's 
economy.64 While the full two-stage corporate tax cut (from 52% to 50% to 48%) would 
not be realized until January 1, 1965, and while the reduction o f personal tax rates (from 
a range o f 20-90% to a range o f 14-70%) would also come in two stages (retroactive to 
January 1, 1964 and January 1,1965), the change in the withholding rate would have an 
immediate and profound impact.65 In fact, the estimated total reduced withholding for
61 Ibid., 219-221.
62 It passed in the House on September 25, 1963 by a vote o f  271-155, mostly along party lines 
(Democrats for; Republicans against), and in the Senate on February 7, before going to the House-Senate 
conference, by 77-23.
63 Public Papers, Lyndon Johnson, 1963-1964: /, 311.
64 Though the lower withholding rate was originally designed to be instituted in a two-step process, from 
18 to 15 to 14%  by Jan. 1, 1965, Johnson urged Sen. Byrd to forego this in favor o f  a single-step  
reduction, from 18 to 14%, so as to compensate for the delay in the enactment o f  the bill itself. See 
"Letter to Senator Byrd Urging Further Reduction in Tax Withholding Rate," January 9, 1964 in Public 
Papers, Lyndon Johnson, 1963-1964: /, 118-119.
65 See "What the Tax Bill Will Do," Time, February 28, 1964, 21, for a brief, but nicely detailed 
summary o f  the Revenue Act o f  1964. Other significant provisions: A  new standard deduction ($300 for 
the short form plus $ 100/dependant instead o f  the old 10% o f  gross income which remains an option); the 
maximum deduction for child care expenses was raised from $600 to $900; large capital losses can now 
be carried forward indefinitely, as opposed to the old 5 year maximum; dividend credits against taxable 
income were doubled from $50 for a single tax payer and $100 for a married couple to $100 and $200  
respectively; and stock options granted em ployees may no longer be priced below market value, they
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1964, o f $8 billion, exceeded the overall first year reduction in personal income tax 
liabilities by approximately $1.3 billion.66 This was earliest and perhaps the most 
obvious impact of the Kennedy-Johnson tax cut.
Secondly, it convinced Johnson, as its economic impact began to be measured and 
evaluated, that his inclination to rely heavily upon Walter Heller, the CEA, and his other 
economic advisers, had been a mark o f shrewd and perceptive statesmanship. His 
relationship with these advisers would continue to flourish as a result. "LBJ encouraged 
us to keep sending him a maximum amount of information on economic questions," 
CEA member Gardner Ackley recalled. "We often sent him three or four a day, 
certainly fifteen a week, on the average, maybe twelve at the minimum."67 "Over 300 
economic memoranda went to President Kennedy in the thousand days o f his 
presidency," Walter Heller remarked in 1966, "and the volume has risen under President 
Johnson."68 Johnson also became much more outspoken about his growing faith in, and 
reliance upon, his economic advisers. At the induction of James Deusenberry to the 
CEA, for example, Johnson declared: "Dr Deusenberry, as we all know, is one o f the 
nation's leading economists. When I was growing up, that didn't seem to mean very 
much, but since I grew up we have learned the error of our ways."69
Last of all, the political success o f the bill—though derived from a number of 
disparate sources—convinced these economic advisers that President Johnson was a 
political leader they could count on to deliver reforms and policy changes fundamental 
to the liberalism of the New Economics. A year after the tax cut had been implemented 
James Tobin declared:
must be exercised within 5 years instead o f  the old 10 year limit, and they must be held 3 years or more, 
instead o f  the old 6 month minimum, to qualify any profits for the lower capital gains tax rate.
66 Arthur Okun, "Measuring the Impact o f  the 1964 Tax Cut," in Walter Heller, ed., Perspectives on 
Economic Growth  (New York: Random House, 1968), 30.
67 Gardner Ackley, quoted in Hargrove and Morley, editors, The President and the CEA, 227.
68 Heller, New Dimensions o f  Political Economy, 29.
69 Quoted in Heller, New Dimensions o f  Political Economy, 3. Deusenberry was sworn in as a member o f  
the CEA on February 2, 1966.
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Liberals should give credit where it is due...at long last a planned deficit is 
accepted to gain economic strength, satisfaction with this victory should not, I 
think, be appreciably dimmed by the evident fact that tax reduction has been 
supported for a mixture o f motives and justified by a variety of arguments. There 
is not a Keynesian majority in Congress, and conscious deficit financing is still 
not respectable. But actions speak louder than words. The country and the 
Congress accepted the view of Presidents Kennedy and Johnson that the economic 
pump needed priming, and that a tax cut was the way to prime it.70
To his economic advisers, both in and outside o f the administration, Johnson was
virtually unsurpassed in the ability to achieve a fragile consensus based on the highest,
rather than the lowest, common denominator. That the tax bill emerged almost wholly
intact and void o f any cumbersome amendments or crippling compromises was ample
evidence of this. More and more confident that Johnson shared their basic beliefs and
economic philosophy, and that he knew how to translate them into effective legislation,
these advisers were now more willing than ever to provide him with the "quick and
dirty" formulations he so often desired.71
That the tax cut spawned the ensuing prosperity of the mid to late 1960s is certainly 
a debatable point. To suppose that it worked, solely because the cut was followed by a 
period o f burgeoning prosperity, relies on a post hoc, propter hoc form of logic, for 
example, that should invite considerable skepticism. Indeed, when Arthur Okun set out 
to measure the impact of the tax cut in 1965, this was one o f the first conclusions he 
rejected.72 While the nation's GNP rose 6.5% in 1964, and the unemployment rate 
dropped from 5.5% to 5.0% over the same period, and while this conformed almost 
perfectly to the forecasts of the CEA, this was not, in and o f itself, undeniable proof of 
the tax cut at work.
70 James Tobin, "The Tax-cut Harvest," in Arthur M. Okun, ed., The Battle Against Unemployment (New  
York: W. W. Norton, 1965), 153.
71 Arthur Okun once noted that "the ability to do quick and dirty" was an important prerequisite for CEA 
staff members (one could not take a week, for instance, to formulate a memo). See Okun's comments in 
Hargrove and Morley, eds., The President and the CEA, 282.
72 Okun, "Measuring the Impact o f  the 1964 Tax Reduction," 28-29.
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While Okun eventually concluded that the tax cut had considerable positive impact, 
others ignored (though never refuted) Okun's calculations and carried their skepticism 
much further. Fashioning what has become the orthodox analysis of both the tax cut and  
the New Economics, some of these skeptics suggested that the post-tax cut expansion, 
as well as the improved jobs picture that accompanied it, had little, if anything at all, to 
do with the Kennedy-Johnson tax cut. The tax cut, they argued, while significant 
politically, was largely an irrelevant economic policy change.
Allen J. Matusow—following the lead o f Milton Friedman—was one such critic.73 
This new found prosperity was necessarily a fleeting one, Matusow claimed, and had 
little to do with the tax cut, for it was based not on the simple expansion of aggregate 
demand, as Johnson, Heller, Okun and others claimed, but on the accompanying (and 
preceding) expansion of the nation's money supply instead. "If despite that effect [the 
tax cut], interest rates didn't go up," Friedman once asserted, "monetary policy must 
have been doing something."74
Constructed, then, on what Friedman called a "money illusion," where workers and 
consumers, indeed, had more money to spend, this prosperity was destined to vanish, 
however, when these workers and consumers "woke up" to see accelerating inflation 
offset the positive effects o f the added money. This inflation was produced, o f course—  
in the Matusow-Friedman scheme of things—by the increased number o f dollars that 
had been pumped into the economy. Produced by deliberate Federal Reserve action, 
these dollars presumably chased after a more static supply of goods, thus introducing
73 Herb Stein, one-time CEA chairman under Richard Nixon, is another who posits this analysis. 
Furthermore, his 1984 publication Presidential Economics, where one will find his analysis, remains a 
popular and frequently assigned or cited work on the general subject suggested by the title.
74 Milton Friedman, quoted in Friedman and Walter W. Heller, M onetary P olicy vs. F iscal Policy: A 
D ialogue, the 7th annual Arthur K. Saloman Lecture, the Graduate School o f  Business Administration, 
N ew  York University, Nov. 14, 1968 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1969), 56. Friedman, the 1976 recipient 
o f  the Nobel Prize for Economics, said when informed o f  the award, that he was "delighted" but would  
not have chosen "the particular seven people who make these awards as the jury to which 1 would want to 
submit my scientific work," and added when accepting it that it did not represent "the pinnacle o f  my 
career." Quoted in Rowen, Self-Inflicted Wounds, 390n.
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price inflation, and as Matusow put it, letting the "genie out o f the bottle."75 Market 
forces, in other words, insured that this monetary action produced positive short-term 
effects, but medium and long-term effects as well that were at best irrelevant, and at 
worst destructive. When the "money illusion" dissolved, unemployment returned, and it 
returned with a vengeance, bringing with it both a higher level o f inflation and the 
means by which the New Economics would allegedly self-destruct.76 "The resurgence of 
neo-classical pre-Keynesian macroeconomics in the guise o f monetarism," one 
economist noted in the early 1980s, "can be linked in part with the increased rates of 
inflation in capitalist economies from the 1960s onward."77
Implicit in Matusow's and Friedman's critique o f the Kennedy-Johnson tax cut, was 
an additional, more general critique o f the New Economics that came to the fore after 
Johnson had departed the White House and the New Economists had been given their
75 Matusow, The Unraveling o f  America, 159.
76 Ibid., 53-54. Matusow also posited an additional criticism that is largely irrelevant, but thrown in 
anyway to emphasize the hopelessness o f  the Keynesian strategy he purports to analyze. If the Fed does 
not allow an increase in money supply (which it did), Matusow contended, then additional federal 
borrowing would be necessary to finance the tax cut, borrowing that would only absorb private money  
that would otherwise be spent or loaned out (this is what Friedman was referring to when he said "if 
interest rates didn't go up..."). Even though this is not the case (a major part o f  Keynes' work served to 
explain why these funds would often lay idle instead), Johnson's advisers were  aware o f  potential 
financial bottlenecks (though they saw less o f  a "crowding out" effect, as Matusow and Friedman did, 
than an unnecessarily expensive but temporary skirmish for loanable funds), and chose to encourage the 
expansion o f  money supply instead. Matsow also suggests that one-time CEA member James Tobin was 
particularly concerned about this "crowding out" effect, (p. 52) and that, in large measure, he left the 
CEA because o f  differences with administration strategy (Matusow has Tobin counseling a budget 
surplus in 1962). In reality, Tobin was concerned about investment (as Heller, Kennedy and Johnson 
were), but was also investigating issues Keynes had raised in his 1930 publication, Treatise on M oney, 
that showed how aggregate investment decisions could be substantially independent o f  prior aggregate 
saving. Followed by Alan Blinder, Benjamin Friedman and others, who showed that the increasing 
velocity o f  money enabled the financial system to create as much credit as it needed, Tobin was hardly 
endorsing the "crowding out" thesis. See the British government's 1959 Radclijfe Committee Report for 
an early analysis o f  the potential for change in the velocity o f  money, and Gary Dymski and Robert 
Pollin, "Introduction," in Dymski and Pollin, editors, N ew Perspectives in M onetary M acroeconomics: 
Explorations in the Tradition o f  Hyman Minsky (Ann Arbor: University o f  Michigan Press, 1994), 5-7, 
for this analysis o f  Keynes, Tobin, Blinder, et ai. From 1960 to 1989 the velocity o f  money rose from 
3.67 to 6.64 (where, in the latter case, each dollar o f  currency and transaction accounts produced $6.64 o f  
GNP).
77 Malcolm C. Sawyer, with Sam Aaronovitch and Peter Samson, Business Pricing and Inflation (N ew  
York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), 3.
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walking papers. While this analysis o f the Kennedy-Johnson economic regime was even 
less rigorous and more politically oriented than the monetarist critique o f the tax cut, it 
was also infinitely more compelling. Tapping the nation's most resonant political 
mythology, Friedman and his followers created a counter-revolutionary critique o f 
Keynesian political economics built upon but easily outdistancing their more limited 
and abstruse critique o f the 1964 tax cut. To Friedman and his followers, Kennedy, 
Johnson, and their economic advisers had erred in thinking that an activist government 
could, through its own devices, create full employment without inflation. Because there 
existed a "natural rate of unemployment," according to Friedman, beyond which an 
economy could not be driven without triggering a case of counter-productive inflation, 
the Kennedy and Johnson administrations were simply wrong to assume that they could 
ignore or remove this barrier.78
Friedman also contended that the Kennedy-Johnson strategy implied an added 
threat, for their approach ordained an increasingly large role for the federal government, 
both in terms o f economic regulation (derisively called "fine tuning") and government 
spending. As revenues increased under this strategy, for example, presumably out of the 
artificial money-driven expansion, and if the government remained true to its Keynesian 
countercyclical strategy, a situation would naturally arise, then, where this government 
had to spend more, and therefore grow larger, simply to avoid economic contraction. As 
a threat to basic democratic liberties and an inefficient, wasteful way to conduct the 
nation's economic affairs, this strategy was, to Friedman, both misguided and harmful. 
To Friedman basic democratic liberties and laissez-faire economics were inseparable, 
and government exhibited a natural tendency to be captured by special interests and a 
wasteful, parasitic bureaucracy. Built upon the mistaken assumptions that the Johnson 
administration sought spending increases alone (and not additional tax cuts as well) and
78 See footnote #1 in chapter 6.
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that government is inherently less efficient than the private sector, these views 
practically define the current American political economy; since Lyndon Johnson left 
the White House, they have seldom even been questioned.
As much as Friedman and his followers were correct about the unusually rapid 
increase in the nation's money supply during the 1960s, and as much as he seemed to 
prophesy events that really took place in the 1970s (rising inflation and stagflation), 
their critique of the 1964 tax cut and the New Economics suffered from the same post 
hoc propter hoc logic Okun rejected when he analyzed the tax cut. On an even more 
significant level—at its most critical points—this critique also suffered from a variety of 
profound conceptual errors.
On the issue o f money supply and the "money illusion," for example, Friedman 
drew upon two assumptions that clashed quite clearly with historical reality. He 
assumed, first o f all, that the nation's stock of money was determined only from the 
supply side, that is through the actions of the Federal Reserve—actions that also 
determined final demand, and in turn, the prices o f a stable supply of goods and 
services. Friedman and his followers, however, had it backwards. Though the powers of 
the Federal Reserve board are quite substantial, it was not, and is not, the only 
mechanism by which the nation's money supply is changed. "Money does not enter the 
system like manna from heaven—or from the sky via Milton Friedman's helicopter," 
one economist noted. "Nor is it simply the creature of the centra bank's policies."79 
Throughout the 1960s, for example, private banks, and many non-bank coiporations as 
well, acted to increase the nation's supply of money without prodding from the Federal 
Reserve bank.80 Moreover, they did this largely in response to, rather than as a way of 
creating, the increased demand for and the profitable production o f new goods and
79 B. Moore, quoted in Sawyer, Business Pricing and Inflation, 9.
80 This became quite noticeable in 1965, when in spite o f  a less expansive monetary p o licy , exceptionally 
strong business demand for credit caused money supply to advance faster than it had in 1964. See 
Administrative History o f  the Federal Reserve System , Volume I, Box 1, LBJ Library, 32.
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services. Commercial bank participation in Eurodollar, commercial paper, and 
municipal securities markets, in addition to the non-bank use o f various forms o f trade 
credit and flexible liability management, all played a role in the vast expansion o f 
money supply in the late 1960s.81 As Walter Heller once pointed out, that is why with 
M l rising 6%, and M2 rising 12%, both in 1967, there was still a sharp increase in 
interest rates (as corporations strove to build up liquidity cushions).82 Money supply 
raced ahead in 1967 as corporations geared up for a renewed flurry o f production, but 
inflation ebbed and prices rose less fast than they had in the previous year.
Recognizing only a stable, historical relationship between money supply and 
inflation, when real output remained relatively constant, Friedman ignored both the 
special circumstances o f this relationship, and the capitalistic nature o f the nation's 
credit markets.83 Expansion o f the nation's money supply had, in the past, a direct and 
predictable effect on inflation, largely because it had always followed periods o f money- 
limited deflation, and because changes in the velocity o f money (the relative willingness 
or unwillingness to hold money balances) remained either very stable (during the most 
commonly exhibited periods o f deliberate demand suppression) or very predictable
81 See Leonard Rapping, "The Domestic and International Aspects o f  Structural Inflation," in James H. 
Gapinski and Charles E. Rockwood, editors, Essays in Post-Keynesian Inflation (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1979), 36-37, and Antonio Kandir, The Dynamics o f  Inflation: An Analysis o f  the 
Relations Between Inflation, Public Sector Financial Fragility, Expectations an d  Profit M argins (South 
Bend, Indiana: University o f  Notre Dame Press, 1991), 30, for an extended analysis o f  this phenomenon.
82 Walter W. Heller, quoted in Friedman and Heller, Monetary vs. F iscal Policy, 21. It is also worth 
noting that the GNP price deflator for 1967 was sm aller than it was in 1966, though 1967 is plainly the 
year o f  "easier money," a point emphasized by Kenneth Boulding in his essay, "Inflation as a Process in 
Human Learning," in Gapinski and Rockwood, editors, Essays in Post-Keynesian Inflation, 16. (1966  
M l: +2.5%, 1966 M2: +5.5%) M l=  demand deposits plus currency in circulation; M 2= M 1+ savings 
accounts, money market funds, and dollar balances abroad.
83 See Friedman's comments in Friedman and Heller, Monetary vs. F iscal Policy, 59, where he claims 
that you can get a better picture o f  price behavior during the Civil War, World War I, and World War II 
by looking at money supply, not fiscal policy. See also Boulding, "Inflation as a Process in Human 
Learning," 24, for a alternate view o f  the relationship between money supply and inflation (Boulding  
points out that there is a very direct relationship between M l and the Consumer Price Index until the m id  
1960s when the CPI begins to lag behind M l. Boulding holds this to be surprising evidence that there 
may have been a drop in the velocity o f  circulation; I hold it to imply, instead, that demand led growth, 
coupled with a fairly effective incomes policy— discussed in Chapter 6, unhinged this relationship for the 
first time in U.S. history).
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(during those wartime periods o f obvious demand expansion). Post World War II 
economic policies, however, had effectively uncoupled the deflation-inflation 
relationship by removing the deflationary precursor, and effective countercyclical 
economic policies, led primarily by the New Economists o f the 1960s, made the 
willingness to hold or spend money more a product o f speculative investment decisions 
than o f deliberate government action.84 That this outcome was too ironic, or at least too 
surprising, to the nation's economic orthodoxy, helps to explain, perhaps, why it was not 
clearly apprehended. What this ensured, nonetheless, was that the creation o f  money, 
created by central bankers and commercial lenders and investors alike, would have less 
o f an impact on price, and more o f an impact on quantity (as a prerequisite for the 
production o f  new goods and services) than ever previously witnessed.85 The "quantity 
theory of money" which suggested that only prices would be affected by changes in 
money supply, was one o f the basic premises o f classical economics undermined by 
both Keynes's theories and the empirical results of the New Economics. As James Tobin
84 The nature o f  money velocity did, however, begin to revert to the older pattern somewhat as Vietnam 
spending became a more significant econom ic factor. I contend that it was this transformation, rather than 
the increase in the absolute level o f  demand induced by the Vietnamese War, that makes a real and 
significant economic impact. Guns and  Butter were possible without significant or accelerating inflation, 
as long as this transformation, and its impact on corporate pricing and investment, were properly 
ascertained and regulated.
85 Friedman's conception, often referred to as the "quantity theory o f  money and prices" does make 
eminent good sense, o f  course, when describing a period o f  hyperinflation and predictable change in the 
velocity o f  money. The German inflations o f  1923 and 1947, still considered by many to be the classic 
models for government led inflation crises, are good examples o f  this. In 1923, when the government 
financing o f  passive resistance to French occupation o f  the Ruhr valley signalled a clear intent to impose 
no limits on deficit financing, money velocity increased quite predictably, and hyperinflation emerged. In 
1947, when the scarcity o f  some products, the hoarding o f  others, government rationing, and government 
reformulation signalled a temporary hiatus from any rational, permanent economic system, money 
velocity slowed also quite predictably, and hyperinflation emerged. See Otto Pfeiderer, "Two Types o f  
Inflation, Two Types o f  Currency Reform: The German Currency Miracles o f  1923 and 1948,"
Zeitschrift fu r d ie  Gesamte Staatswissenschaft, September 1979, 353-363. See also Richard H. Day and 
Wayne Shafer, "Keynesian Chaos," in Jess Benhabib, ed., Cycles and  Chaos in Economic Equilibrium  
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 340, where the authors point out how interest rates are 
shown to depend "not on som e kind o f  government interference, but on precisely the non-linear 
properties economists have thought were intrinsic to the demand for money and investment goods." In 
addition to supporting the notion that money supply is demand driven, thereby exerting demand related 
effects on interest rates, Day and Shafer also imply that the absence o f  consistent, high demand alone 
introduces chaotic instability exaggerated by the mere passage o f  time.
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noted, "Keynes himself would suggest that both prices and output would rise" with a 
theoretical increase in dollar spending. In a deep recession the adjustment would fall 
more upon output; in a tight economy with no reservoirs of idle labor or productive 
capacity, it would fall more readily upon price. These two scenarios, however, as Tobin 
also noted, are "special cases o f the genuine Keynesian prediction, which stemmed, 
after all, from a 'general' theory."86 When Kennedy asked Walter Heller to study 
European growth rates o f the 1950s, to find out why they were increasing faster than 
those in the U.S., Heller came to the same conclusion. More money did not chase fewer 
goods in the 1960s, but chased, instead, an ever increasing supply, much of it sparked 
by the decade's consistent rise in demand.87
With respect to Friedman's "natural rate of employment," hypothesis, part o f the 
attack on the New Economics that came largely after the Johnson presidency, one only 
has to look back at the years o f the Great Depression to see that it is a neatly packaged, 
logically ordered theory that describes, nonetheless, little more than an imagined 
scenario. This hypothesis reiterates the misleading suggestion that expanding demand 
can only push on a relatively finite supply o f goods and services (thereby causing 
inflation above a specified level), and cannot independently influence the growth of that
86 Tobin, "Keynesian Economics and its Renaissance," 114, 115.
87 For the period 1 9 6 4 :1 to 1969: IV, industrial production increased 39.6%  while money supply 
increased 32.5% . Source: Board o f  Governors, Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve Bulletin, 
various issues. Money was significant to the New  Economics, despite rumors to the contrary. Kennedy, 
Johnson, Heller, et al simply came to see it as it was— more a lubricant for the economy than the engine 
driving it. Recognizing that its availability in too large quantities could exacerbate dangerous tendencies 
on the supply side  (when capital investment booms fed on themselves, for example), the Johnson 
administration, in 1968, even recommended greater  powers for the Federal Reserve (and closer 
coordination between the Fed and the White House). Where Friedman was right, then, to Johnson and his 
advisers, his way o f  thinking implied greater, rather than less, government intervention, continuing the 
trend established since the creation o f  the Federal Reserve system in 1913 (including the 1935 
assumption o f  exclusive control over the open market trade o f  federal government securities, and the 
1951 Fed-Treasury accord whereby the Fed discontinued its role as a guarantor o f  low interest borrowing 
for the federal government). See Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom  (Chicago: University o f  Chicago 
Press, 1962), 51 -55, where he discusses "Rules instead o f  Authorities." This is his classic explanation o f  
how money supply should be manipulated, an explanation that truly ignores the capitalistic nature o f  the 
banking system and the way money is actually created.
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supply. It also suggests, however, that the only way to reduce unemployment without 
inflation is for hiring firms to realize a decrease in real wage costs. Presumably, this 
would improve the employment picture without a corresponding diminution of buying 
power because profit-maximizing firms would then decrease their prices as their labor 
costs dropped and their profits rose. A.C. Pigou used a form o f this argument to counter 
Keynes' claim in the 1930s that real wage cuts would only reduce consumption, income, 
and demand, thereby offsetting any positive impact of the increased demand for cheaper 
labor.
Empirical evidence from the 1930s, however, suggests that Friedman and Pigou 
imagined a market pricing mechanism that did not usually exist. While prices fell 
in i932 and 1933, for example, they rose quite precipitously in 1934, and did not fall for 
the rest of the decade—in spite of constant unemployment rates o f 10% or higher (and 
20% or higher, for half of the decade). If the natural rate hypothesis had much validity, 
these rates (of 10% or better) would have represented that natural rate, then, below 
which price inflation could not be avoided.88 The history o f price and unemployment 
trends in the twentieth century clearly refutes this notion. Moreover, the price stickiness 
o f the 1930s replicated itself during recessions in the 1940s and 1950s as well.
88 Henry Aaron, Politics and  Professors: The G reat Society in Perspective (Washington: The Brookings 
Institution, 1978), 125. While the price-fixing or price supporting mechanisms o f  the National Recovery 
Administration had much to do with this effect, these mechanisms only extended or embedded the price 
stickiness and the administered prices that already prevailed in many key industries; they did not create 
them. This was one reason why the success o f  the NRA was so lopsided and problematic, for while it was 
supposed to support prices in exchange for other concessions to labor and consumers, corporate leaders, 
with very few exceptions, were the only participants to catch on quickly and win real concessions. See 
Ellis W. Hawley, The N ew D eal and the Problem o f  Monopoly, for an illuminating study o f  the NRA and 
industry (in chapters 1-7); and Martin J. Sklar, The C orporate Reconstruction o f  Capitalism, 1890-1916: 
The Market, The Law, and Politics (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1988), fora  richly 
detailed history o f  the transition o f  American capitalism from its "proprietary-competitive" stage to its 
"corporate-administered" stage. From 1900-1974, despite numerous recessions and the Great Depression, 
there were only 13 years when general prices registered any drop at all, and many o f  these years saw  
general prices decline only as drastic declines in the prices o f  some commodities skewed the overall 
average (usually agricultural products).
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Perhaps the most compelling argument made by Friedman and his followers, 
largely because it relied less on economic formulae than abstract political philosophy, 
was that basic democratic freedoms were dependent upon laissez-faire economics. 
Because economic liberty and political liberty had indeed risen in tandem in the United 
States, and because they had risen, moreover, from the same constitutional liberalism, 
this connection seems quite unassailable.89 As Loren Okroi pointed out, however, this 
does not imply that these liberties are necessarily dependent upon one another. 
Capitalism had indeed provided a necessary precondition for political freedom, Okroi 
suggested, but it was by no means the only decentralized economic system with that 
potential. Even classical liberals, Okroi hastened to point out, held other freedoms and 
rights to be just as significant as "those that were strictly economic." They judged the 
vote or one's self, for example, as things people should not be free to sell. And when 
certain economic freedoms were proscribed, as was the case with the first child labor 
laws, it was difficult to argue, he contended, that employers were "less free in any 
meaningful political sense because o f this."90
John Kenneth Galbraith isolated an additional problem with Friedman's conception 
o f political and economic freedom. "It is the unfortunate habit," he declared, "of those 
who speak of the effect of government on freedom, that they confine their concern to 
the loss of freedom for the affluent. All but invariably they omit to consider the way 
income creates freedom for the indigent."91 Adding to Galbraith's critique, Okroi also 
highlighted the often contradictory side of this restricted definition. "Concrete and 
disturbing evidence o f the conflict between economic and political liberalism," he 
added, "is seen in the open hostility to active democratic participation and even to basic
89 See Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, especially 7-21.
90 Loren Okroi, Galbraith, Harrington, Heilbroner: Economics and Dissent in an A ge o f  Optimism  
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 252-254.
91 John Kenneth Galbraith, "The Conservative Onslaught," New York Review o f  Books, January 22, 1981, 
31.
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political equality and freedoms evinced by the remarks of many business executives in 
interviews and discussions."92 At another point Galbraith is even more succinct. 
"Professor Friedman's belief," he suggested, "that liberty is measured, as currently in 
New York City, by the depth o f the uncollected garbage is...deeply questionable."93
Despite the rumored clash between Galbraith and Walter Heller over the tax cut 
campaign, Heller also identified the New Economics with this Galbraithian critique. "As 
to the individual," he noted in 1966, "abundance enlarges his options, his meaningful 
freedom to choose among goods and services, among jobs, and between work and 
leisure....Prosperity extends economic freedom more deeply, creating jobs and enabling 
a President to battle the tyranny o f poverty for some without wrenching resources away 
from others."94 The New Economists were clearly the heirs to economic philosophers 
such as Henry George and Herbert Croly who believed that the limited state failed, in 
the modem age, to serve the interests o f the common people as it once had. To 
Kennedy, Johnson, Heller, and their fellow economic strategists, the strong Hamiltonian 
state was now necessary to carry out the Jeffersonian ideal. Friedman, on the other hand, 
ignored even Jefferson's America, where the notion of laissez-faire economics crumbled 
quickly in the face o f increasingly complex economic challenges.95
Friedman's negative critique of Keynesian government finance is also rooted in 
persuasive and enduring historical myths that are always quite difficult to isolate. 
Stressing, for example, what he sees as the inherent tendency o f government to become 
riddled with fraud and corruption, alongside the virtues of laissez-faire liberalism, he
92 Okroi, Galbraith, Harrington, Heilbroner, 254. And, one might add, by politicians "sponsored" by 
corporate interests. Frank Hague, leader o f  the Jersey City political machine from 1917-1948, sponsored 
chiefly by area building contractors once said, "Whenever I hear a discussion o f  civil rights and the rights 
o f  free speech and the rights o f  the Constitution, always remember you will find him with the Russian 
flag under his coat, you never miss." Quoted in John Hutchinson, The Imperfect Union: A H istory o f  
Corruption in American Trade Unions (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1972), 49.
93 Galbraith, "The Conservative Onslaught," 31.
94 Heller, New D imensions, 13.
95 See Frank Bourgin, The G reat Challenge: The Myth o f  Laissez-Faire in the Early Republic (New  
York: Harper and Row, 1989), for a persuasive exposition o f  this point.
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ignores one elusive yet critical factor: government has no special claim to bureaucratic 
inefficiency and corruption. In fact, because o f the historical role played by quasi-public 
commmercial elites in American governance, and the traditional American practice of 
"dealing in" private interests on public business, the weaknesses o f government may 
simply be less obscure reflections o f the same tendencies in private life.
Though Sinclair, Tarbell, and Nader, are notable exceptions, history also 
documents far less scrutiny of the nation's private, as opposed to its public, affairs. 
Because they are seldom judged by the same standards or to the same extent, public 
inefficiencies are notorious while those in the private sector are largely hidden from 
view. Even among those "muckrakers" who unearthed a sordid record o f corporate 
corruption and exploitation in the early twentieth century, the less glamorous issue of 
simple inefficiency almost always took a back seat to the broader, more compelling 
issues o f public and worker safety and oligopolistic price-gouging. Befitting this 
approach, one common analysis o f oil companies during the crisis years o f the 1970s, 
for example, suggested that no consumer exploitation occurred then simply because 
company profit margins witnessed only a small, barely discernible rise throughout the 
decade. Substantially rising profit margins were deemed to be the only genuine 
indicator of oil company exploitation; no complicity could be established without their 
presence. All company costs at a fairly stable level o f profitability, in other words, were 
typically assumed to be legitimate and a function of "normal" business practices. 
Government agencies, on the other hand, partly because there is no profit margin 
scorecard to divert one's attention, are more typically analyzed at every point, from 
salaries all the way down to the cost of their Pink Pearl erasers. Alternating employment 
between Time Inc. and the federal government at one point, John Kenneth Galbraith 
compared private and public bureaucracies and found that it was the private, rather than 
the public, version which evinced the greatest inefficiency. "It took more people," 
Galbraith noted, "to do less work in New York than in Washington....Expense account
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writing at Time was a small creative art, so discussed."96 The recent experience o f the 
American Express corporation, in its attempt to market a revolving charge card, also 
illustrated the same tendency. In the 1980s, AmEx marketed the "Optima" card 
exclusively to existing AmEx cardholders, thinking that these customers—whose 
annual fees were generally paid for by their companies—would be good credit risks.
The card flopped, however, precisely because the opposite was true. On their own, 
conditioned perhaps by corporate largesse, these customers proved to be the worst credit 
risks imaginable.97
Friedman's view, however, suggested instead that the opposite had to be true, and 
that this was made certain by the relative absence of market forces in government 
bureaucracies. That the political marketplace may remain more open and far less 
regularly compromised than its counterpart in private industry is seldom considered. In 
projecting a powerful self-fulfilling prophecy, where conservative, anti-government 
corporate bureaucrats are often relegated to the government service they imagine to be 
ridden with imperatives of waste and inefficiency, Friedman's critique itself becomes a 
prominent factor in the debate. Americans would not typically entrust a daycare center 
to directors who exhibited a profound contempt for children, yet we readily do the 
equivalent with government agencies, and the consequences are as tragic as they are 
ironic. Throughout U.S. history, whenever government corruption and inefficiency have 
reached intolerable heights—on local, state, and federal levels—the prescription for 
reform has typically been a massive infusion of the very elements that often led to the 
problem in the first place {private interests previously entangled in public affairs).98
96 Galbraith, "The Conservative Onslaught," 33.
97 "American Express Extends Grace Period," USA Today, September 7, 1994, C l . See also Michael 
Lewis, "Leave Home Without It: The Absurdity o f  the American Express Card," in The M oney Culture 
(N ew  York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1991), 11-20.
98 See Seymour J. Mandlebaum, Boss Tweed's New York (New York: Wiley and Sons, 1965), for a 
persuasive analysis o f  this phenomenon as it occurred in New  York in the 1860s and 1870s. Mandlebaum 
is seconded by Mark Wahlgren Summers in The Era o f  G ood Stealings (N ew  York: Oxford University 
Press, 1993), who assays this phenomenon from a national, rather than regional, perspective.
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Governments everywhere are troubled, indeed, with inefficiency and corruption. 
Contrary to Friedman's conception, however, these problems seldom arise in a vacuum 
from within, but often emanate, instead, from that strange American (though fast 
becoming a worldwide) admixture of government and private enterprise. To the genuine 
efficiency expert, government bureaucracy may even be preferable to its counterpart in 
private industry.
However weak the monetarist criticism of the New Economics may have been, this 
did not imply that the New Economists wanted a growing government bureaucracy 
simply because they did not believe in its inherent corruptibility. In many ways, 
knowing the history o f private bureaucracy and realizing that this history did not 
suggest, at the same time, the impossibility o f constructive change, Kennedy, Johnson 
and their economic advisers sought to change the "marketplace" as much as they did the 
political apparatus by which it was governed. Just because private institutions allowed 
for great corruption and inefficiency in the past, they surmised, was no reason to assume 
that this situation must always prevail. Indeed, Keynes's General Theory suggested a 
need for institutional changes that involved private economic actors quite deeply. "His 
[Keynes's] message was plain," Will Hutton observed. "If we are to enjoy the benefits 
the market can deliver, we must understand the dynamic of the market economy, 
understand it has no tendency to stability, and attempt through our collective institutions 
(for there are no other) to make up for the market's proven inability to coordinate the 
actions of economic agents in the present and in the future."99 Indeed, the New 
Economics worked partly because it encouraged private as well as public efficiency, 
much as Herbert Hoover had hoped to do in the 1920s. If laissez-faire economics was 
self-destructive, inefficient, and often the source o f great social and economic 
instability, the private sector could still be counted on to effect positve change even if it
99 See Hutton, The Revolution That Never Was, 142-143.
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had to come at the hands o f enlightened government policy and persuasive government 
pedagogy. Summing up the political economy o f the 1960s, Walter Heller recognized 
both the remaining weaknesses o f the unfettered marketplace and the increasing 
efficiency and public mindedness o f private industry:
The political economist is well advised to recognize that a key factor, not only in 
the length and strength, but particularly the balance o f the great expansion o f the 
1960s, has been the impact o f effective private policies—better inventory and cost 
control, less speculation, better matching of plant capacity to markets, and more 
restrained wage-price policies than we have had in any previous expansion in our 
history.100
That much o f this impact depended upon government prodding and presidential 
leadership— largely in the form o f the wage-price guideposts—as well as a more 
balanced and predictable fiscal and monetary approach, was certainly not lost on 
Professor Heller. Couching this observation midst further comments on the pedagogic 
role o f Presidents and presidential economic advisers, Heller suggested implicitly that 
this transformation came largely as a result of the New Economics and the leadership of 
Presidents Kennedy and Johnson. "Experience o f recent years," he noted, "has 
demonstrated that education—of the President, by the President, and for the President— 
is an inescapable part o f an economic adviser's function."101 To Heller, Johnson's 
leadership in particular had a direct, and not insubstantial effect on the management of 
the nation's corporations. Writing in 1966, he noted:
The education and consensus process has undergone some change in President 
Johnson's hands. He too [like JFK] has achieved remarkable internal consensus on 
policy, but has gone beyond this to externalize it....And the results are counted on 
not only to benefit but to educate the country. As I perceive i t , then, this method 
combines presidential persuasion and education of hundreds of the country's 
'movers and shakers' in person in small White House meetings and large with 
public persuasion of millions o f citizens by performance under the resulting 
policies and legislation.102
100 Heller, New Dimensions, 25.
101 Ibid., 17.
102 Ibid., 37.
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While some o f these "movers and shakers" were clearly not business managers, 
accounts o f significant White House meetings suggest that many were. Johnson clearly 
sought a close and amicable relationship with the nation's business community, 
surprising many business executives with his candor and ability to understand their 
perspective and convincing just as many that they played as significant a role in the 
pursuit o f full employment and prosperity as did his still essential fiscal and monetary 
policies. Although the abject failure o f Herbert Hoover's "associational" planning in the 
1920s and FDR's National Recovery Administration in the 1930s— directives designed 
to sway corporate executives in similar fashion—suggested that this approach held little 
promise, Johnson possessed two vital resources that both Hoover and Roosevelt lacked. 
Armed with the logic o f the Keynesian revolution and a rhetoric that was an amalgam of 
populist sensibility and modem economics, Johnson could establish among his 
corporate allies the salience o f what Hoover called the "purchasing power theory." 
Armed, as well, with a macroeconomic approach that developed around purchasing 
power and the demand side o f the economy, Johnson could also present the corporate 
community a thriving and predictable market for their products and services. With 
Keynesian economics as yet undigested by the American political economy— even in a 
bastardized form—and with Andrew Mellon and Henry Morgenthau presiding over the 
Treasury department, demand-side economics stood little chance o f surviving in the 
nation's pre-World War II corporate boardrooms.103 With a Keynesian in the White 
House and Douglas Dillon and Henry Fowler appointed to manage the Treasury
103 See Ellis W. Hawley, "Herbert Hoover and Economic Stabilization, 1921-1922," in Hawley, ed. 
H erbert H oover as Secretary o f  Commerce, 1921-1928: Studies in N ew Era Thought and Practice  (Iowa 
City: University o f  Iowa Press, 1981), 43-79; Robert K. Murray, "Herbert Hoover and the Harding 
Cabinet," in ibid., 17-42; and Hawley, "Herbert Hoover, the Commerce Secretariat, and the Vision o f  an 
'Associative State,' 1921-1928," Journal o f  American History, June 1974, 116-140, for analyses o f  
Hoover's approach and activities that Hawley briefly refers to as being "intermixed with the policies o f  
Mellon and Daugherty [Harding's thoroughly anti-labor Attorney General]..." Cited in Hawley, "Herbert 
Hoover as Secretary o f  Commerce," 66. See also Brinkley, The End o f  Reform, 26-28, for a concise 
analysis o f  Secretary Morgenthau's power and prejudice.
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department, its chances improved considerably. Among the business community, 
Johnson always wanted to educate much more than he wanted to please; his confident 
grasp of economic principles and his practiced liberalism allowed him to do just that. 
Departing from the Johnson White House in early 1964, where he and his colleagues 
had been invited to preview the upcoming State o f the Union address, one business 
executive (and Business Council member) described his feelings toward the new 
President and his economic outlook: "I am not sure that I like everything he does, but he 
understands my problems, and he is smart as the devil, and I think I'll go along with 
him."104 Roger Blough of US Steel recalled that Johnson understood business problems 
better than "any one o f the other Presidents" he had known since Herbert Hoover.105 
From his first courtship of business support only days after the Kennedy assassination, 
to the formation o f the National Alliance o f Businessmen in March 1968, Johnson 
maintained close contact with the nation's business community and continued to insist 
that his economic strategy was as good for business as it was for the nation's 
unemployed or working poor. President Johnson was "the first Democratic president 
since Grover Cleveland to have won the full confidence o f business," economist 
Seymour Harris noted in 1965.106
The shortcomings o f the monetarist critique also do not imply that the tax cut 
single-handedly lifted the American economy out of recessionary doldrums. Neither 
President Johnson, nor any o f his economic advisers believed this. "Like most 
legislative proposals," James Tobin noted in 1965, "the tax cut has probably been 
overadvertised."107 In 1966, Walter Heller also called for an end to the tax-cut-as-
104 Quoted in Valenti, A Very Human President, 200.
105 Blough, Oral History Interview, 3.
106 Harris, Economics o f  the Kennedy Years, 261. After acknowledging the increased responsiveness o f  
private enterprise to "the needs o f  the times," () Johnson launched the National Alliance o f  Businessmen, 
appointing Ford vice-president Leo Beebe as executive director o f  the organization designed to obtain 
jobs, and on-the-job training, for the nation's hard core unemployed. See Johnson, Vantage Point, 332- 
333.
107 James Tobin, "The Tax-cut Harvest," 157.
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manna-from-heaven orientation. "Not that it didn't work, or that it wasn't wonderful," 
Heller remarked. "But I think we have overdone the tax cut story a bit."108 Applying this 
concern to future economic policy as well, Heller added, "I would hope that the tax cut 
lesson of the past few years has been learned wisely, but not too well. The on target 
success of the 1964 tax cut should not blind us to the special circumstances that made 
massive tax cuts the clear choice over more rapid expenditure increases at that time—  
circumstances that may not repeat themselves in the future."109 Future economic 
circumstances, Tobin added, "may require either higher or still lower rates than those 
now enacted. The history o f this legislation indicates that we in the United States still 
have much to learn in making taxation a flexible and responsive instrument of economic 
stabilization."110
The best, as yet unrefuted, measurements of economic growth and change in the 
1960s do suggest, however, that the tax cut led a significant demand side economic 
expansion. Heller pointed out, for example, that however you sliced it, consumption 
spending, up by an average of $4.4 billion per quarter in the three quarters preceding the 
tax cut, jumped ahead by $8.4 billion per quarter in the three quarters following the tax 
cut.111 However profound Heller's misgivings were, they were not directed at the 
income producing effect of the tax cut, only at its general applicability. "With consumer 
spending boosted by the tax cut," Tobin noted, alluding to the most critical feature of 
the tax cut legislation, "demand may rise enough in 1964 to cut down excess capacity. 
This will add the strategic investment incentive that has so far been missing throughout 
much o f American industry, the need to build new capacity to meet expanding 
demand."112
108 Heller, New Dimensions, 70.
109 Ibid., 112. It is my contention that, with respect to the F ederal income tax, they have not.
110 Tobin, "The Tax-cut Harvest," 159.
111 Walter W. Heller, quoted in Heller and Friedman, Monetary vs. Fiscal Policy, 68.
112 Tobin, The Tax-cut Harvest," 156.
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Arthur Okun's analysis, conducted in 1965, remains the most accurate and thorough 
appraisal of the tax cut and its effect on the American economy. Okun found that one 
dollar o f the tax cut produced 1.82 dollars of national income, and determined that the 
bulk o f the consumption gain produced by the cut resulted from the personal tax 
reduction (approximately $18.2 billion, with the corporate tax reduction contributing 
approximately $3 billion). Citing the smaller contribution made by the corporate tax 
cuts and the lag time associated with corporate dividend adjustments, Okun noted that 
"this is not a great performance as a consumption stimulus, but corporate tax cuts have 
never been expected to star in that respect."113
When it came to recognizing induced investment, where corporate tax cuts have 
been expected to shine and where supply side theorists—then and now— saw the 
greatest economic potential, Okun was forced to admit that the choice o f an equation 
was "exceedingly difficult." No single factor proved to be a reliable indicator o f the 
propensity for business investment. "Sales, utilization measures, and cash flow 
variables," he reported, "all have excellent claims for appearing in the equation. But 
when all o f these are allowed to compete in equations fitted from time-series data, chaos 
results."114 Essentially what Okun had confirmed here was that supply side decisions in 
the marketplace were always more speculative in nature than those on the demand side, 
and they became less chaotic and unpredictable only as demand increased— both in 
terms o f its relative strength and overall consistency. It could be said that Okun had also
113 Okun, "Measuring the Impact o f  the 1964 Tax Reductions," 40. Okun's measurement o f  the economic 
impact o f  the 1964 tax cut was based on a two equation system for the impact on consumption, plus a 
separate equation for induced business investment. An equation for marginal consumption told him how  
much added consumption resulted from the added income, and a second equation relating marginal 
income to GNP expressed the amount o f  further gains in disposable income derived from the added 
consumption. For induced investment, he used a cash flow  equation, determining that an extra dollar in 
after tax corporate profits raised investment by 75 cents (compare to the .949 marginal propensity to 
consume derived from the personal tax reduction). He also found that inventory investment, associated  
with a maintained one dollar increase in GNP begins to decline after three quarters, eventually turning 
negative and oscillating around zero.
114 Ibid., 41.
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reasserted what Friedrich Hayek had admitted to Walter Lippmann in 1959 when 
Lippmann expressed puzzlement over Hayek's general lack o f reference to corporate 
policy. "I'm afraid you are right," Hayek wrote, "and the reason is that there is not much 
in the field o f corporation policy which can be derived from general principles."115 As 
Hyman Minsky would note nearly a decade later:
The empirical estimation of short-period changes in investment has not been one 
o f the outstanding successes o f econometric work. Many o f the models that are 
used have given up on estimating investment from functional relations presumed 
to capture economic regularities; instead, they rely upon survey data— 
questionnaires to businessmen—for their estimates.116
Herb Stein, a moderate conservative who subscribed to Milton Friedman's views, 
and who also disparaged the New Economics as 1960s "radical chic," still endorsed this 
part o f Okun's analysis. Noting that some supply side benefits were claimed for the 
1964 tax cut, Stein suggested that these claims were largely unfounded, pointing out 
that the change in output per person employed actually grew slower after the tax cut 
than before. "One would have expected the reverse," Stein wrote in 1984, "if the supply 
side effects were dominant."117
By the second quarter of 1965, Okun estimated that the 1964 tax cut had produced 
added federal revenues in the amount o f $7 billion, and added state and local revenues 
o f approximately $1.5 billion. While the tax cut clearly did not pay for itself, and while 
none o f Johnson's advisers had ever claimed that it would, the income producing effects 
o f the cut were substantial enough to pay for at least a major portion o f the tax cut. As to
115 Quoted in Barry D. Riccio, Walter Lippmann— O dyssey o f  a  Liberal (N ew  Brunswick: Transaction 
Publishers, 1994), 204.
116 Minsky, John M aynard Keynes, 31 -32.
117 Stein, Presidential Economics, 110. The belief that the 1964 tax cut was a supply side tax cut still 
persists. At a May, 1990 symposium at the LBJ Library, for example, Charls Walker, Deputy Secretary 
o f  the Treasury under Nixon, and therefore a colleague o f  Stein's (Stein was on the Nixon CEA), called 
the 1964 tax cut a "true supply side tax cut." Reagan's misreading o f  history— intentional or not— when 
he sought a different kind o f  tax cut, is probably responsible for most o f  this. (Walker, whose mother 
gave him the unusually spelled first name, campaigned for LBJ in 1941, and served as the ch ief lobbyist 
for the American Bankers Association before signing on with the Nixon administration in 1969.)
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the contribution o f monetary policy, touted by Friedman and his followers as the real 
reason for the expansion, Okun termed it a "passive supporting force." Money did 
matter, but simply not that much as long as it did not choke off the demand-led spurt in 
economic activity. "The monetary authorities," Okun added, "supplied a good, sound set 
of tires for the economy to roll on, but they did not contribute the engine."118
If there was any doubt that Lyndon Johnson saw the tax cut as an economic and 
political springboard, rather than a climactic, crowning achievement, his subsequent and 
immediate immersion into other economic policy initiatives eliminated it. "Tax 
reduction will not by itself solve all our other economic problems," James Tobin wrote 
in 1965, reflecting the approach of the Johnson administration.119 In March 1964, for 
example, just as the income tax withholding changes were being implemented, Johnson 
submitted his "War on Poverty" program to Congress, an initiative presaged by remarks 
made during his January State o f the Union address. Also in March, he began to focus 
more attention on the concept of the wage-price guideposts, the policy tool developed, 
but never fully extended by the Kennedy administration. Targeting the American 
automobile industry as a test for the guideposts that he hoped to strengthen, Johnson 
began a careful and rigorous search for a way to expand and deepen American 
prosperity without price inflation. And in April, attempting to enlarge his appeal for 
economic consensus and to convince the public that he was a "hands on" President 
when it came to the economy, he played an active and very public role in the 
negotiations between the nation's railroads and their employees. Even Norman Thomas, 
79 year old icon of the American Socialist party, mustered subdued approval after the 
successful completion of these negotiations.120 Clearly, President Johnson was not 
going to stand still when it came to the management of the nation's economy. It also
118 Okun, "Measuring the Impact o f  the 1964 Tax Reductions," 44.
119 Tobin, "The Tax-cut Harvest," 157.
120 Goldman, The Tragedy o f  Lyndon Johnson, 96.
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became clear, in a departure from the norm, that he would act as his own policy 
coordinator. Though Joseph Califano came to play an increasingly large role in the 
formulation o f domestic economic policy, and though the CEA achieved its greatest 
influence under the Johnson administration, President Johnson himself made all o f the 
key economic strategy decisions.121
Blessed with a group o f economic advisers who were willing to work as long and as 
hard as he was, Johnson found ample opportunity to exercise his penchant for economic 
activism and political revolution. Though he had already demonstrated an attraction to 
economic issues, the energy and commitment of advisers such as Walter Heller and 
Arthur Okun, helped intensify Johnson's focus, even as the war in Vietnam became a 
significant distraction. "I like the way you write memoranda," Johnson wrote to Heller 
in December 1963, "crisp, to the point and concise. Work-think-work-think hard....I 
depend on you."122 By this time Heller had already written to President Johnson 
informing him o f the CEA budget ($615,000), staff composition (17 members in 
December 1963), and willingness to work long hours. On December 1, 1963 he 
concluded one memo by noting that their work weeks were typically 80 hours in length 
"with 100 hours not unheard of," and that they stood "at your service" ready and willing 
to work even longer and harder.123 Whether Heller sensed this or not, this was the kind 
o f commitment that Lyndon Johnson readily responded to. Johnson's blustery 
temperament and growing penchant for secrecy aside, he saw himself first and foremost 
as a public servant, and to him public service always implied a regimen of hard work 
and long hours.
121 As James E. Anderson and Jared Hazleton point out in Managing M acroeconomic Policy, Johnson 
did not create a coordinating body similar to Gerald Ford’s Economic Policy Board or Jimmy Carter's 
Economic Policy Group, nor did he choose a single coordinator as Nixon had done with Arthur Bums, 
John Connally, or George Shultz. Nor did he coordinate policy via memo as Richard Nixon tended to do. 
With Johnson almost all economic coordination came from the oval office and it was done with frequent 
face-to-face meetings. See Anderson and Hazleton, Managing M acroeconomic Policy, 228, 236-237.
122 Quoted in Anderson and Hazleton, Managing Macroeconomic Policy, 195.
123 Administrative H istory o f  the Council o f  Economic Advisers, Volume 1, Box 1, LBJ Library.
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"Johnson's capacity for work in those first few days after he became President," 
noted Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, "was superhuman."124 With much o f his 
energy directed toward the tax cut struggle and the emerging plans for a war on poverty 
at the onset, it was economic policy that served, more conspicuously than any other 
challenge, to pull Johnson from the doldrums o f the vice-presidency and to launch what 
would truly become a whirlwind administration. The typical Johnson workday, the 
legend o f numerous histories and commentaries, was virtually unparalleled in 
presidential history. Few if  any presidents worked as hard as Johnson but none had 
come into the White House as determined to change or as capable of changing the 
nation's political economy. Endless meetings, frequent chain-telephoning sessions, the 
constant monitoring of news, and the twenty hour work-days were as much a product o f 
Johnson's resolve to change the American economy and the lot o f the nation's poorest
125citizens as they were an almost irreducible part o f his personality. His day was
usually capped off the same way every day, with a handful o f phone calls and a sheaf o f
memos and government documents earmarked for reading in bed, many o f which
126involved economic policy matters.
124 Evans and Novak, Lyndon B. Johnson: The Exercise o f  P ow er, 347. How "superhuman" this effort 
w as has to be qualified, o f  course, to the extent that Lady Bird, Zephyr Wright (the Johnson family cook), 
and the trappings o f  the Presidency itself, freed Johnson from the drudgery o f  child care, food  
preparation, and general household maintenance. Moreover, "mechanics" always seem ed to be on call 
ready to jump start the LBJ engine with massages, enemas, or whatever else it took to energize this larger 
than life Texan. Johnson's intensity and willingness to work long hours were still exceptional but were 
more a function o f  his genuine interest in the work at hand than his possession o f  "extra glands." Jack 
Valenti, trying to describe Johnson's drive and personality to the Advertising Federation o f  America in 
Boston on July 3, 1965, jokingly suggested the "extra glands" explanation.
125 Though he broke the routine on many occasions, the long days were made possible, in part, by 
Johnson's w illingness to take a thirty minute mid-day nap. "The only way to relax," Johnson once 
remarked, "is to peel o ff  all o f  your clothes and make believe you're going to bed for the evening." 
Quoted in Califano, Triumph and Tragedy, 28. See also Hugh Sidey, "The Presidency: How Not to Take 
it Easy," Time, January 24, 1964, 12.
126 Robert Dallek pointed out that this habit o f  stretching the work day with reading in bed began with 
Johnson's first days in Washington when he worked as an assistant to Texas congressman Richard 
Kleberg from 1931 to 1935. See Dallek, Lone Star Rising, 100.
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Even when hospitalized or convalescing afterward, Johnson adhered to a furious 
regimen of political duties. In 1948, after checking into Minnesota's Mayo Clinic to 
have a kidney stone removed without an incision, he became known as the clinic's 
"leading pain in the ass," having three phones installed in his hospital room. One nurse 
counted 64 calls having been made in a single day.127 A few years later, after his 1955 
heart attack when his blood pressure dropped to zero over forty, Johnson received so 
many visitors calling to keep him abreast of affairs back at the Capitol that his doctors 
had to remind him constantly o f his quota for visitors. Reaching his quota on one 
occasion, Lyndon pleaded with the vigilant physician on duty: "Oh now look, doctor," 
he said, "you're not going to count Republicans are you?" Hospitalized three times while 
serving as President, Johnson kept a similar regimen in each case.128 His late 1965 gall 
bladder operation proved to be the one exception to the norm and the late 1965-early 
1966 period was, accordingly, the one time during his presidency when economic policy 
seemed to veer temporarily off course.129
Requiring that his assistants and cabinet officers work similar protracted schedules, 
often without reliable holidays or weekend breaks, Johnson pushed many to their 
physical and mental limits. But most of Johnson's economic advisers proved resistant to 
the ferocious regimen, partly because they were motivated by a President who placed 
great significance upon their work and partly because this focus exempted many of 
these assistants from the harassment to which Johnson often subjected his other 
advisers.130 CEA member (and eventual chairman) Arthur Okun was one of the few who
127 Ibid., 302.
128 Ibid., 486. Johnson was hospitalized October 8-21, 1965 for gall bladder surgery, Novem ber 16-19, 
1966 to repair a defect in an incision made during the 1965 surgery, and December 18-22, 1968 with a 
severe case o f  the flu.
129 See Chapter 8 on the struggle for the tax surcharge, a struggle that began somewhat inauspiciously 
during this period o f  convalescence. When one aide handed Johnson a lengthy memo that required a 
detailed response during this period, Johnson replied by scrawling in inch high letters, "I'm sick." Cited in 
Evans and Novak, The Exercise o f  Power, 561.
130 See, for example, Wilbur Cohen's comments recorded in Mr. Social Security: The Life o f  Wilbur J. 
Cohen, 189-190. Cohen claimed that his association with Social Security, aid to the elderly, and the New
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could withstand the long hours. "I concluded," Okun recalled, "that some of my success 
as a staffer [on the CEA] came because I was the only one who could stay awake as 
long as Walter [Heller]."131 Others got into the habit of celebrating holidays a day or 
two in advance, grabbing the chance whenever it presented itself. Joe Califano recalled 
telling Abe Fortas in 1966 that Johnson was ruining his Thanksgiving by making him 
work on the Penn-Central merger case. Fortas, acknowledging a shared predicament, 
replied, "Years ago, after I started working for this man, I began celebrating 
Thanksgiving on the day before. He ruins every Thanksgiving Day."132 Secretary of 
Commerce and former Merck CEO John Connor, relied upon as an integral part of 
Johnson's various entreaties toward the business community, was one administration 
official frequently overwhelmed by the L.B.J. regimen. Before being replaced by 
Alexander Trowbridge in 1967, after what some describe as a falling out with Johnson, 
it was not uncommon to see the President phoning Connor on the weekend ordering him 
off o f Burning Tree Golf Course and back to work.133 Connor's reluctance to conform to 
the demands o f the LBJ regimen, unlike most o f Johnson's economic policy team, 
would prove, indeed, to have a profound impact on the direction and efficacy o f 
Johnson's economic policy.134
Deal "exempted him from much o f  the harassment and humiliation to which Johnson often subjected 
subordinates."
131 Arthur Okun, Oral History Interview, in Hargrove and Morley, editors, The President and the CEA , 
284.
132 Califano, Triumph and Tragedy , 162.
133 Ibid., 26. Johnson always believed that there was enough work to fill everyone's schedule, even  
without specific assignments in mind, and Connor's g o lf outings never took precedence. While 
additionally concerned here in this case, like his predecessor Kennedy, that an "Ike g o lf  image" not be 
created, the only really accepted form o f  leisure in the Johnson White House was the political dinner or 
cocktail party, formal or not, where a significant amount o f  business could stiil be conducted. Without the 
benefit o f  portable cellular phones, a round o f  g o lf simply meant being out o f  touch with much o f  the 
day's business for at least three or four hours. This was something President Johnson almost always 
refused to tolerate.
134 See Chapter 6, pp. 262-263 for a brief appraisal o f  Connor's critical role in the implementation o f  the 
administration's wage-price guideposts.
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Most o f Johnson's economic advisers or Cabinet members with economic policy 
responsibilities, unlike Connor, responded to Johnson's demands on their time with 
tempered enthusiasm, for they always understood that he worked as hard and as long as 
any of them and most witnessed the kind of progress that generated real enthusiasm. 
Johnson's fondness for storytelling, off-color jokes, dancing, and music also served to 
lighten the impact o f his temper and the pace o f his otherwise unrelenting schedule. 
"We've got to get it written into history," Special Assistant to the President, Douglass 
Cater once remarked, "that it was a hell of a lot of fun working for this man."135 Johnson 
also made it a habit to combine reprimands with clearly exaggerated defiance to make 
them seem, perhaps, more contrived than they really were, and therefore less onerous or 
spiteful. One weekend afternoon, trying to track down White House speechwriter 
Richard Goodwin, then sailing off the coast o f Martha's Vineyard, Johnson called the 
Coast Guard, hung up the phone, and muttered to Joe Califano with mock contempt:
"We ought to blow up that goddamned island."136
If it seemed that this obsession with work was designed only to project an image of 
diligence or a sense o f mission, many of Johnson's associates would emphasize his 
overriding concern for efficiency and the production of tangible results. Policy 
objectives produced the long hours and the frenetic pace. Accordingly, the telephone 
became one of President Johnson's primary economic policy tools. The War on Poverty, 
the 1964 tax cut, and the wage-price guideposts all succeeded in part due to Johnson's 
creative and persistent use o f the telephone. Key representatives and senators, labor 
leaders, and corporate executives alike were often plugged into the New Economics via 
the console on President Johnson's desk. Assistant to the President Jack Valenti recalled 
Johnson telling him on several occasions, "If you use the phone right, you can save a
135 Douglass Cater, quoted in Hardesty, ed., The Johnson Years, 131.
136 Ibid., 62.
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couple hours everyday."137 Apparently, as Valenti also recalled, using the phone right 
frequently meant being awakened by a Johnson phone call at 530am. "Well, what are 
you doing?" was the invariable Johnson salutation as described by Valenti.138 When 
Johnson called even earlier he would ask then, in the gracious tones reserved for 3am 
phone calls, if  he had indeed awakened the party on the other end. "Why no, Mr. 
President," Wayne Hays once responded, "I'm just lying here hoping you would call."139 
At his Austin home early in the 1950s, Johnson even had a backyard tree wired for a 
telephone.140 Joe Califano recalled the POTUS (President O f The U.S.) phone lines that 
were installed in his office and in the offices o f other Johnson assistants. Emitting a 
single, continuous ring until picked up, these special phones insured that the President 
did not have to wait long to have his intra-White House calls answered. Califano also 
recalled the time sculptor Jimilou Mason came to the White House to have President 
Johnson sit for a planned Presidential bust and became frustrated by her inabil ity to get 
the President to sit still or get off the phone. Mason eventually did a piece depicting 
Johnson at a dead run, with the base o f the phone in one hand and the receiver stuck in 
his ear.141 Logging approximately 100 phone calls per day throughout his presidency, 
President Johnson clearly transformed the telephone into an economic policy tool o f 
great significance.142
As his first full year in office wound down the tax cut began to impact the U.S. 
economy, Johnson began to apply his vast energies and whirlwind style to other 
economic policy initiatives, and he seemed to be playing to increasingly more receptive 
audiences of all political persuasions. Heller suggested that the tax cut itself had led to
137 Jack Valenti, A Very Human President, 64.
138 Valenti, quoted in Hardesty, ed., The Johnson Years, 165.
139 Wayne Hays, quoted in Hardesty, ed., The Johnson Years, 37.
140 Dallek, Lone S tar Rising, 407.
141 Califano, Triumph and Tragedy, 25.
142 T. Harry Williams, "Huey, Lyndon, and Southern Radicalism," 221; Kraft, Profiles in Power, 9.
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"rapid changes in public thinking and acceptance of active fiscal policy."143 Business 
publications and newsweeklies were hailing Johnson as the "prudent progressive," and 
referring to his "person to person" approach and his "romance" or "love feast" with 
business.144 "Of late," Eisenhower economic adviser Arthur Bums noted grudgingly in 
1965, "many businessmen have even become optimistic about the trend and character of 
federal economic policies, and not a few speak with admiration o f the economic 
thinking that emanates from the White House."145 After the end o f Johnson's first full 
year in office, Time magazine reported:
The old 'trickle-down' theory...was never a very realistic proposition. And it is the 
hallmark o f the U.S.'s present prosperity that the nation's wealth has been 
distributed more evenly than ever before. Johnson has made it clear that he will 
use tax policies and the leverage o f the federal budget to head off any recession 
that might threaten. This is a proper, limited role...and Johnson's appreciation of it 
may yet enable the amazing U.S. economy to defy even the law of physics: what 
goes up need not necessarily come down.146
As Johnson launched his effort to contain prices in the automobile industry, in 
March 1964, he would need all of this good will and more. Though the tax cut seemed 
to be an instant hit with most Americans, too many economic problems lay clearly 
beyond its reach. Moreover, Johnson fully expected other worthy economic policy 
changes to come at greater political expense than did the tax cut. "Virtue is so much 
easier," Kermit Gordon noted when sizing up the 1964 tax cut, "when duty and self- 
interest coincide."147 Seldom, in the months ahead, would such a happy coincidence 
emerge among the imperatives and responsibilities o f the nation's economic 
policymakers.
143 Heller, New Dimensions, 36.
144 See "Business and Johnson Savor a Love Feast," Business Week, Jan. 18,1964; "LBJ's Brand G oes on 
the Economy," Business Week, Jan. 25, 1964; "How to Cut a Budget," Newsweek, Jan. 20, 1964; "As 
Business Leaders Sum Up President Johnson," U.S. News and World Report, May 18, 1964; and "LBJ's 
Romance with Business," Fortune, September 1964.
145 Arthur Bums, "The Federal Tax Cut and the Economy," in Arthur Okun, ed. The Battle Against 
Unemployment (N ew  York: W. W. Norton, 1965), 149-150.
146 " jhe Nation," Time, February 5, 1965, 19.
147 Quoted in Johnson, Vantage Point, 440.
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Chapter 6.
Wage-Price Activism: Guideposts and Beyond
Business cannot consistently have it both ways: to use market power in recessions, 
and act like barefooted little competitors in booms. If price maintenance is justifiable in 
recessions, in violation of the laws of supply and demand, then price restraint is called 
for in booms.
- Henry Wallich,
CEA member, Eisenhower administration
Improved guideposts, Presidential authority to raise or lower taxes within specified 
limits and , finally, monetary policy working in tandem with fiscal policy, could give us 
full employment and reasonable price stability. In the meantime, let us not blame our 
inflationary pressures on the New Economics.
- Alvin Hansen, 1966
Lyndon Johnson's entry into the wage-price struggle was immediate. Though many 
have suggested that he and his economic advisers were naively riding up the Phillips 
Curve, and that inflation caught them by surprise, only the emergence o f inflation itself 
really suggested such indifference and misapprehension.1 All in all, Johnson was
1 Allen J. Matusow maintained, for example, that "one o f  the curiosities o f  the period [the 1960s] was the 
indifference o f  Keynesian economists to [Milton] Friedman's two scenarios— crowding out on the one 
hand, inflation on the other." See Matusow, The Unraveling o f  America, 54. "Given their indifference to 
money supply," Matusow added, "it is not surprising that inflation would catch the Council o f  Economic 
Advisers by surprise." Ibid., 58. Introduced in 1958 by Professor A. W. H. Phillips o f  the London School 
o f  Economics, the Phillips Curve expressed the view that there was a significant relationship between the 
percentage change o f  money wages and the level o f  unemployment— the lower the unemployment rate, 
the higher the rate o f  change o f  money wages. This relationship has come to imply that the aims o f  low  
unemployment and a low rate o f  inflation may be inconsistent; indeed, Phillips's original contention is 
now usually discarded and "inflation" is used instead o f  "money wages," as if  the two were one and the 
same. Milton Friedman and other conservatives have attacked the validity o f  the Phillips curve,
243
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perhaps more mindful o f potential inflation than any other president in recent U.S. 
history. To members of his Consumer Advisory Council, in December 1963, Johnson 
declared:
Like our late President, I do not believe that the Federal government should not be 
a meddlesome busybody, sticking its nose into every aspect of private 
decisionmaking. But I am deeply aware o f the fact that a renewal o f the price- 
wage spiral would endanger our domestic expansion and our international balance 
o f payments....I believe that all of us—as prudent men and women—realize the 
urgency of this matter. I also believe we all realize it would be a tremendous 
mistake to become complacent because at this point the record is good.2
Johnson established an active anti-inflation policy at the onset of his administration and
remained committed to it throughout his presidential term. "The stakes are enormous in
our efforts to combine high employment and price stability," he noted in his final
Economic Report in January 1969. "We can sacrifice neither goal."3
His vigilance and heightened concern regarding inflation were largely a product of 
two basic concerns. Johnson knew, first o f all, that excessive inflation usually took the
suggesting that real wages, rather than money wages, count in this relationship (as they do, o f  course), 
and that while the relationship can be true for a short period, as the higher money wages lead to higher 
prices, real wages return to the original level (taking employment levels with them) and do so at a higher 
price level as well. This view  takes for granted, however, that increased demand will produce inflation at 
any  level o f  economic activity, and that when it does, government is the source o f  this demand. It also 
assumes that the tendency  for a price rise is the same as the necessity for one; businesses will not or 
cannot absorb higher real wages at full employment even though this full employment also produces 
other significant savings for the same businesses. All o f  these assumptions, however, are questionable. 
Attempting to discredit the potential for government induced full employment, Friedman et al were 
additionally motivated by the assumptions that Lord Keynes was in many ways the "Father o f  the Phillips 
Curve" and that in introducing Phillips' concept to American economists, and substituing American 
statistics for British statistics (in a 1959 article with Robert Solow ), the neo-Keynesian Paul Samuelson 
was thereby endorsing it and all o f  its implications without reservation. Keynes' "Phillips curve," 
however, was o f  a flat, cost-push variety with an accent on collective bargaining and the passing on o f  
marginal costs, and Samuelson and most o f  the other neo-Keynesians harbored considerable reservation 
about the Phillips curve, particularly its assumption that higher money wages automatically lead to higher 
prices. See A. W. Phillips, "The Relation Between Unemployment and the Rate o f  Change o f  Money 
Wage Rates in the United Kingdom, 1861-1957," Economica, November 1958, 283-299, for the original; 
and "Schools Brief: A Cruise Around the Phillips Curve," The Economist, February 19, 1994, 82-83, for 
a recent explanation o f  the conservative viewpoint.
2 Johnson, "Remarks to the Members o f  the Consumer Advisory Council," December 13, 1963, Public 
Papers, 1963-1964: /, 54.
3 Johnson, "Annual M essage to the Congress: The Economic Report o f  the President," January 16, 1969, 
Public Papers, 1968-1969: II, 684.
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greatest toll on the least wealthy Americans, and he certainly opposed that. Secondly, he 
also knew that it remained always the greatest threat to the new regime even as it 
remained somewhat distinct from his administration's macroeconomic policies. To 
Johnson the Phillips Curve, which suggested a trade-off between employment and 
inflation, was simply an idea masquerading as a strategy. Although conservative 
economists were also among the most vocal detractors o f the Phillips Curve idea, 
conservative politicians had always acted as if it were a valid construct, blaming 
inflation on the federal government's past and present efforts to construct a full 
employment economy. Seeking nothing less than steady full employment, Johnson was 
compelled, then, to be especially mindful of this most politically insidious provocation, 
even if  it made little economic sense to focus vast energies upon it.4
If  he seemed less mindful o f potential inflation at first, this was not the result of 
presidential (or CEA) indifference. The earliest inflation-fighting activities, every bit as 
forceful as those that followed, were simply out of the limelight, notable only for the 
quiet confidence with which they were enacted. Johnson was also keenly aware o f 
Federal Reserve Chairman William McChesney Martin and his critical, if somewhat 
overwrought, role in the fight against inflation. Martin, after all, had been sounding the 
inflation alarm since the first uptick in the economy in 1961. Though the CEA had 
scoffed at him then, and had proven him wrong, quarter after quarter, Martin continued 
to watch interest rates and money supply closely, and the Johnson CEA considered his 
actions a factor in all o f their calculations.
The Wage-Price Guideposts, first implemented by the Kennedy administration, and 
popularized during the 1962 steel crisis, became the principle means by which the 
Johnson administration sought to curb price inflation. According to Walter Heller,
4 Keynes' biographer D.E. Moggridge pointed out that the Phillips Curve, though created after Keynes' 
death, was typical o f  the kind o f  econom ic assumption o f  which Keynes was always wary. See D.E. 
Moggridge, John M aynard Keynes (N ew  York: Penguin, 1976), 24.
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Johnson immediately latched on to the guidepost concept, finding it both appropriate 
and useful, and taking it even further than President Kennedy would have allowed.5 
Because the guideposts relied heavily upon persuasion and education, they were well 
suited to Johnson's political personality. Because they represented a response to 
entrenched corporate (and labor union) practices that had always goaded him to action, 
they were equally well suited to Johnson's populist-cum-liberal economic philosophy.
The 1964 Economic Report of the President, issued only weeks into the Johnson 
presidency, enunciated Johnson's faith in the guideposts, and also served as the almost 
inadvertent source o f the eventual guidepost target figure (3.2%).6 The concept itself 
was quite simple: if wage gains in a given industry could be held to a percentage less 
than, or equal to, the increase in the nation's economic productivity, then there would be 
no legitimate cause for increased prices originating with the increased labor costs. 
Though all o f the CEA economists agreed that an exact figure would be impossible to 
ascertain and that exceptions would ultimately have to be made, a 3.2% productivity 
figure was eventually adopted (representing the average annual increase in output per 
man-hour for the last five years) as a suitable, and relatively accurate, target. CEA 
member Gardner Ackley explained the purpose of the guideposts by suggesting that 
they were a way to make price changes "a matter of private conscience," and to "create 
an informed public opinion" on the issue o f corporate price policy.7 Designed more in 
the mold of Herbert Hoover's New Era economic policies than those of Franklin 
Roosevelt's New Deal, but with the Keynesian macroeconomic support to make them 
both effective and important, the guideposts remained a tool by which the Johnson 
administration sharpened, rather than dulled, market impulses and market signals.8
5 Cited in Cochrane, "Moral Suasion," 203n.
6 The 3.2% figure was not included in the text o f  the report, but only in an accompanying table.
7 Memo, Ackley to Walter Heller, December 11, 1963, CEA History, Volume II, Documentary 
Supplement, Part II, LBJ Library.
8 See Robert K. Murray, "Herbert Hoover and the Harding Cabinet," in Ellis W. Hawley, ed., Herbert 
H oover as Secretary o f  Commerce, 17-42; and Ellis W. Hawley, "Herbert Hoover and Economic
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Although Heller, Ackley and others saw President Johnson as the ideal guidepost 
"enforcer," adherence was always designed to be voluntary and the price objectives 
were neither arbitrary nor punitive but conformed to real marketplace imperatives that 
were otherwise hidden or ignored. Especially at full employment, many companies had 
been inclined to ignore those market signals that suggested stable or even declining 
prices (such as increased worker productivity, higher capacity utilization, or a more 
stable and reliable customer base) while taking great care to heed only those which 
suggested the opposite (such as the higher cost o f increasingly scarce skilled labor). The 
guideposts were designed then to give credence to a much more inclusive array of 
market impulses than had previously been recognized or utilized and to persuade 
corporations, labor unions, and the public at large to adapt market signals to a full 
employment economy. Harvard economist and CEA consultant (and later CEA 
member), Otto Eckstein, suggested only weeks after the Kennedy assassination that 
wage-price policy take into account "Johnson's persuasiveness on the telephone."9 
Ultimately, this persuasiveness and the wage-price policy to which it became affixed 
would serve to liberate, rather than obscure or vanquish, much of the "free market" that 
more conservative actors had often hesitated to accept. At the same time, Johnson and 
his advisers became acutely aware of their own pedagogic limitations. Gardner Ackley, 
CEA chairman from November 1964 to February 1968, expressed a continual 
reluctance, for example, to use certain high pressure tactics against the targeted 
corporations. To threaten anti-trust action in the middle of price negotiations, despite 
Joe Califano's willingness, was one such tactic Ackley and Johnson proved reluctant to 
accept.10
Stabilization, 1921-22," in ibid., 43-79, for analyses o f  the New Era political economy which inform this 
analogy.
9 Quoted in Cochrane, "Moral Suasion," 200n.
10 Ackley, Oral History Interview, in Hargrove and Morley, editors, The President and the CEA , 261.
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Though they were administered cautiously and selectively, the guideposts clearly 
became the primary weapon in the struggle against price inflation and represented the 
revolutionary side o f the New Economics. This was the case because they implied a 
belief in two unorthodox propositions: that high demand automatically triggered 
inflation only on those rare occasions when it became excess demand—a level seldom if 
ever seen by the U.S. economy; and that most prices were set not by market forces 
alone, but by a combination o f oligopolistic pricing power and a concern for customary 
profit margins, along with those isolated and fairly unrepresentative market impulses 
that called for price inflation. This is one of the reasons why many observers 
categorized Johnson's guardianship of aggregate demand as either naive or reckless. 
Most simply believed that Johnson saw the situation as they did, where demand had 
presumably reached levels high enough to trigger price inflation automatically, 
concluding, therefore, that he also charged ahead anyway, hoping to win acclaim for 
low unemployment rates in spite o f the inevitable and quite hurrendous price 
consequences that lay ahead.11 While Johnson never concluded that high demand had no 
bearing on price inflation at all, he and the CEA saw it more in terms of temporary 
bottlenecks, structural imperfections, and institutional power, than overstimulated 
demand. While Heller and many of the other Johnson advisers had disagreed with the
11 There are several other significant explanations for this characterization. Johnson’s genuine efforts at 
curbing demand, in 1967 and 1968 in particular, (discussed at greater length in Chapter 8) seemed to 
betray him, for example, as one who actually believed the charges levelled by his critics. As it was, 
however, with Kennedy's tax reform proposals, and to a lesser extent, the 1964 tax cut as w ell, the ideal 
policy course was never politically feasible. While the high demand o f  the Johnson years, in other words, 
never had to trigger inflation automatically, some was bound to com e anyway through the administered 
pricing mechanisms Johnson hoped to tame. Since any inflation deemed excessive would destroy the 
political econom y he was trying to erect, and since this new approach would only succeed after several 
more years o f  conclusive evidence, he had no choice but to use som e o f  the old medicine, inadequate and 
misleading as it was. The quite formidable political task before President Johnson, as I see it, was to use 
enough o f  this "old medicine" to blunt inflation, therefore enabling the survival and the continued 
promotion o f  the New  Economics, but not so much that it would be declared, once again, the correct 
remedy for the emerging price inflation. A second additional explanation lies in Richard Nixon's 
w illingness to jettison key aspects o f  the N ew  Economics (namely the guideposts) in 1969, and to pass 
him self o f f  as a victim o f  econom ic inertia. Blaming Johnson for the inflation spurred by his own 
administration was simply too easy an option to be avoided entirely.
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structuralist explanation o f unemployment in general, seeing it more in terms of 
insufficient aggregate demand, they did agree that structural deficiencies and supply 
side bottlenecks became a critical factor as the economy approached full employment 
(at or just under the 4% unemployment level).12 Most o f the critical demand pressure o f 
the 1967-1969 period, after all, came not from consumer purchases but from factory 
equipment orders, or in other words, from attempts to expand the nation's productive 
capacity. "Investment had balooned to levels," Walter Heller remarked late in 1966, "at 
which its longer-term help in cutting costs and generating growth was more than offset 
by its short-term mischief in intensifying demand pressures and inflationary forces."13 
Since high demand only becomes a catalyst for serious inflation when it accompanies 
limited or curtailed productive capacity, it was obviously not the sole, or even the most 
significant, cause of inflation in the late 1960s; productive capacity then was expanding 
rapidly. As Gardner Ackley pointed out in late 1966, where capacity was an issue, 
skilled labor, rather than capital goods, was the basic limiting factor on increased 
production.14
While "moral suasion might restrain the greed of corporations and unions;" Allen J. 
Matusow contended in his critical examination o f the wage-price guideposts, "it could 
not repeal the law of supply and demand."15 The point that Johnson and his economic 
advisers were trying to make, however, was that a government "incomes policy" was 
necessary precisely where supply and demand had little bearing. As John Kenneth 
Galbraith once pointed out, "no market principles are violated when the state moves to 
fix those prices that, as a product of industrial concentration, are already fixed."16
12 Unemployment dropped to 4%  by the end o f  1965. See Gardner Ackley's remarks, October 26, 1966 at 
Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, IL on structural deficiencies and price inflation; Robson-Ross 
Papers, Box 9, LBJ Library.
13 Heller, New Dimensions, 100.
14 Notes o f  speech, Gardner Ackley, National Industrial Conference Board Luncheon, Waldorf-Astoria 
Hotel, N ew  York City, Robson/Ross Papers, Box 9, LBJ Library.
15 Matusow, The Unraveling o f  America, 158-159.
16 Galbraith, "The Conservative Onslaught," 36.
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Though Johnson's guideposts represented nothing close to a "price-fixing" 
mechanism, and were at most only an attempt to influence corporate price-making 
decisions, Galbraith's logic remains an appropriate defense of the guidepost approach to 
price stability. More prices were likely to rise, Johnson believed, as a result o f corporate 
discretion than as a result o f growing demand, particularly that demand represented by 
the spending power of the nation's middle class. Corporate pricing decisions, then, were 
an appropriate target for a President who desired both a wealthier and enlarged middle 
class, an end to poverty, and relative price stability. There were, quite simply, few, if 
any, viable alternatives.
In February o f 1964 Johnson selected the automobile industry, where three 
companies accounted for 95% of the nation's production, as the first test for the 
Johnson-era guideposts. Heller, having already spoken to Walter Reuther o f the United 
Auto Workers in December 1963, was pressed by Johnson to develop a strategy for 
negotiations with both the UAW and the "big three" automakers. He met first with 
Secretary of Labor Willard Wirtz and Secretary o f Defense Robert McNamara to seek 
out the probable labor and management positions. As a former Ford executive who was 
once responsible for that company's pricing decisions, McNamara would serve, here, as 
a source of great insight. Indeed, Johnson, who was clearly an admirer o f the DoD 
"Whiz Kid," encouraged his participation in most o f the auto pricing negotiations.17
On March 23, Heller also traveled to Ford headquarters to collect data, and 
afterward met, once again, with Reuther on April 9, and with Henry Ford II and Ford 
president Arjay Miller on April 10. The upshot of the administration's information 
gathering efforts was that adherence to the guidepost principle suggested an auto 
industry price cut, as long as the UAW could be convinced to settle for a wage increase
17 Heller, Ackley and other CEA members also placed great faith in McNamara's abilities and outlook. 
"LBJ used to try out many o f  his ideas on Bob McNamara," Gardner Ackley recalled. "We were always 
delighted to have him do so because McNamara almost invariably supported our views..." Ackley, Oral 
History Interview, in Hargrove and Morley, editors, The President and  the CEA, 224.
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at or below the 3.2% figure. As he did in the late 1950s, Reuther had encouraged this 
approach, and suggested that such action would also incline his union members to 
moderate their wage demands. "If the coiporations refuse to share their productivity 
gains with consumers in reduced prices," Reuther warned later, "and the Council [of 
Economic advisers] is unable to persuade them to do so, there is no basis injustice or 
morality to stand in the way of workers who seek to share in them."18 Reuther also 
informed Heller, however, that he would not treat the proposal for a price cut as a 
bargaining issue, for he hoped to avoid being charged, as he had in the past, with "trying 
to run the industry."19
For their part, the auto manufacturers expressed a reluctance to reduce their rate of 
return on investment, a reduction that everyone, including the CEA, acknowledged to be 
a consequence of reduced prices. They also suggested that the industry's productivity 
gains were close enough to the 3.2% figure to justify stable rather than decreased 
automobile prices. And this held only if union wage increases came in at or under 3.2%; 
higher wage increases would justify higher prices. On May 29, 1964, however, CEA 
member Gardner Ackley penned a memo to LBJ summarizing the findings of an 
administration task force on auto prices (headed by CEA member John Lewis). Citing 
recent industry productivity trends, estimated to be between 4.9 and 7.4%, and that a 
10% price cut would result in an 11% increase in the number o f cars sold (price 
elasticity of demand = -1.1), Ackley recommended a $60 dollar per car wholesale price 
reduction (for General Motors, with slightly smaller reductions warranted for Ford and 
Chrysler who generally sold smaller, less expensive cars). "Taking account of standard 
markups," Ackley wrote, "this would mean cuts in manufacturers' suggested retail
18 Walter Reuther, Policies and Priorities fo r  Progress: The Economy in 1967: Statement o f  Walter 
Reuther to the Joint Economic Committee o f  the Congress, February 20, 1967  (Detroit: United Auto 
Workers, 1967), 24. For a brief overview o f  Reuther's stance in the late 1950s see I.F. Stone, "The 
Inflationary Spiral," September 9, 1957 in The Flaunted Fifties (Boston: Little, Brown, 1963), 214-216.
19 Memo, Heller to LBJ, "Meeting with Walter Reuther," April 9, 1964, White House Central Files, Ex 
BE 4/Auto, LBJ Library.
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prices ranging from about $50 on Corvairs, Ramblers, Valiants, to about $150 on the 
bigger Cadillacs, the Continental, etc."20
Even when automaker profits for the first half o f 1964, however, registered a 28% 
increase over the first half of the previous year, the CEA realized that price cuts would 
only become a reality if  General Motors' chairman, Frederic Donner, allowed them. 
"Pricing is Donner's baby," Lewis advised Heller.21 Though Heller, Wirtz and others 
had succeeded in opening up several GM executives and outside directors to the idea of 
an auto price cut, everyone came to the conclusion that Donner could be moved only by 
the President himself. Donner might respond to the "Johnson treatment," the President's 
advisers reasoned, and he was the key to the whole effort.
With the 1964 election looming on the horizon, and Johnson telling everyone that 
he wanted to be "President of all the people," he was ultimately unwilling to press 
Donner very hard.22 While this, his first attempt at guidepost enforcement, may have 
been the most critical one of all, Johnson gambled on the assumption that a 
conspicuous, well-played consensus building effort, far more tenable and much more 
easily comprehended by the American public, would pay even greater political and 
economic dividends. Johnson decided, then—against the advice o f Walter Heller and 
others— not to press Donner for a price cut. To no one's surprise, no price cuts were 
announced, and with industry profits soaring for the third year in a row, union wage 
contracts came in with increases above the 3.2% guidepost figure. At 4.3 to 4.7 %, 
beginning with the Chrysler settlement on September 9, these increases made price rises 
a distinct possibility, even though they came in under the most conservative estimates of 
advances in the industry's productivity. In the end, however, no price rises were issued,
20 Memo, Ackley to LBJ, "The Case for Auto Price Cuts," May 29, 1964, Ibid.
21 Quoted in Cochrane, "Moral Suasion," 210.
22 Eric Goldman noted Johnson's concern for bipartisan support by recalling his eagerness to bring his 
campaign to a conspicuous halt for a day when he heard that Herbert Hoover was dying. See Goldman, 
The Tragedy o f  Lyndon Johnson, 234.
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and the "Big Three" opted to increase revenue instead only by selling larger standard 
engines at greater cost to the consumer.23 While this was certainly a less than auspicious 
start for the Johnson guideposts, and while it seemed clear, unfortunately, that they 
would depend quite heavily on presidential persuasiveness, prices did stick where, in 
similar circumstances, they had not before.
In 1965 and 1966, Johnson would press chairman Donner, however, revealing in 
the process both the strengths and the weaknesses of the Johnson guideposts. In 1965, 
Johnson believed he had made progress in his quest for a new consensus. The National 
Independent Committee for Johnson/Humphrey, for example, had enlisted the support 
o f some 3000 CEOs (headed by Republican businessman and Merck CEO John Connor) 
most o f whom were members of the Republican party.24 While Barry Goldwater carried 
Arizona and five deep South states handily, there were thirty-two states where he failed 
to carry a single congressional district. While Johnson insisted that his support was still 
"like a southwestern river, broad but not deep," and that a true consensus formed slowly 
and almost imperceptibly, rather than in the aftermath o f a single election, he did see the 
1964 landslide victory as an auspicious beginning. With seventy-one new, mostly 
liberal, Democrats added to the U.S. House, after all, the conservative Southern 
Democrat-Republican coalition was, as Eric Goldman put it, "seriously weakened for 
the first time in the twentieth century."25
With the June, 1965 reduction o f excise taxes on automobiles (and phone service, 
televisions, jewelry as well), enacted partly to continue the work o f the 1964 tax cut, 
and automaker profits up again, the Big Three found themselves, perhaps, in a position 
where it was relatively easy to be magnanimous and public spirited. Johnson did
23 Cochrane, "Moral Suasion," 213.
24 Speaking to this group in the middle o f  the 1964 campaign, Johnson told them that "our American 
system was not intended to be controlled by the rigid discipline o f  party." Quoted in Gould, "Never A 
Deep Partisan," 25.
25 Goldman, The Tragedy o f  Lyndon Johnson, 282-283.
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pressure Donner at GM, however, and GM responded with small but clear price 
decreases. While Chrysler had already nudged prices up a bit, by switching standard for 
optional equipment as they added required safety features, Ford followed GM with price 
decreases o f their own. After the reductions were announced, Ackley wrote to Johnson:
The opinion is widely held in business circles that the new GM prices are the 
direct result of your influence on Fred Donner. The story is vague whether you 
intervened directly on the specific matter o f GM's prices, or whether the prices 
merely reflected the respect that Donner paid to your well-known views on price 
stability. In any case, you get the credit.26
The 1966 auto wage and price decisions, however, showed that the guideposts still 
took a backseat to corporate short-term profits and rate of return on investment. With 
the guideposts coming under increasing attack from business and labor, with Ted 
Sorensen's law firm acting as legal representative for GM, and LBJ friend and former 
Under Secretary of State Thomas Mann heading the Automobile Manufacturers 
Association, Chrysler, Ford, and GM announced price increases.27 Using mandated 
safety features as an excuse, Ford announced increases of $107 per vehicle, and 
Chrysler $92, even though the industry's return on equity was still well above 20%, and 
trend productivity showed an increase from 3.2 to 3.6% without an accompanying 
adjustment in the guidepost target. Chrysler chairman, Lynn Townsend, had also 
informed Gardner Ackley (then CEA chairman) that the entire 1967 safety package 
would cost "less than $20."28
The Big Three were clearly swimming in cash, and Ackley told Johnson that they 
could easily absorb the added costs o f the new safety equipment. GM alone had earned
26 Memo, Ackley to LBJ, "GM's Prices," September 24, 1965, Papers o f  LBJ, White House Central Files, 
Ex BE 4/Auto, LBJ Library.
27 Sorensen spoke to Ackley on September 16, 1966, informing him that his law firm was now  
representing GM, and that he disagreed with the government position which regarded "no price increase" 
as the only acceptable option. See memo, Gardner Ackley for personal files, September 17, 1966, 
Robson-Ross Papers, Box 9, LBJ Library. See also the Wall Street Journal, September 6, 1966, 1, and 
September 9, 1966, 1, for stories on Mann's hiring and connection to LBJ.
28 Cochrane, "Moral Suasion," 243-4, 250; Memo, John Robson to Joe Califano, August 31, 1966, 
Robscn-Ross Papers, Box 9, LBJ Library.
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approximately $2 billion the previous year, a figure that translated into a phenomenal 
26% return on equity. When Ackley forwarded these numbers to President Johnson, he 
termed this rate o f return "a figure more reasonably associated with a newly opened 
gold mine."29 Calling on Donner again at GM, Johnson was, in this case, however, only 
able to force smaller increases. When GM announced a $56 increase, both Ford and 
Chrysler scaled back their previously announced price rises, giving Johnson some 
consolation. "We had hoped," Johnson was quoted in the Journal o f  Commerce, "that 
these businessmen could forego the necessity of increasing prices. We asked them to do 
that. But they were free to make their own prices, and that's what they've done."30
In late November 1966, several weeks after these increases were announced, Walter 
Reuther wrote to Johnson's Advisory Committee on Labor-Management Policy and 
suggested a "new incomes policy" to replace the "broken down" wage-price 
guideposts.31 "The guideposts are wearing thin," Stan Ross added, writing to Joe 
Califano in June 1967.32 In the auto industry, however, they had an impact on prices, 
and they had arguably changed, as well, the way labor and management created 
company wage and price policy. What became clear, in 1965 and 1966, on the other 
hand, was that the guideposts were still too dependent on both Johnson's persuasiveness
29 Ackley, cited in Cochrane, "Moral Suasion," 248. Reuther also pointed out that in 1947 a GM worker 
would have received $3,009 if  employed for 52 weeks, and a GM stockholder with 1003 shares would  
have received the same amount in dividends. By the end o f  1966 the worker would have received a total 
o f  $110,000 in wages while the investor would have received $278,000 in cash dividends and the market 
value o f  his investment would have increased by $345,000. For Ford Motor Co., a fully employed worker 
would have earned $3,536 in 1949 and a total o f  $ 106,000 by 1966, while the investor who held $3,536  
worth o f  Ford stock in 1949 would have received $309,000 in dividends by 1966 and witnessed a 
$475,000 increase in the book value o f  his stock. See Reuther, Policies and  Priorities fo r  Progress, 31.
30 Johnson, quoted by Sidney Fish in the Journal o f  Commerce, September 22, 1966, clipping in Robson- 
Ross Papers, Box 9, LBJ Library.
31 Memo, Reuther to All Members o f  the President's Advisory Committee on Labor-Management Policy, 
November 28, 1966, Robson-Ross Papers, Box 9, LBJ Library.
32 Memo, Ross to Califano, June 29, 1967, Robson-Ross Papers, Box 9, LBJ Library. Stanford G. Ross 
was hired in early 1967, ostensibly to replace Illinois Republican John Robson as the administration's 
organizer o f  inflation-fighting information, even though a specific Robson post never existed. Robson, 
who would later serve in the Ford and Bush administrations, was a Harvard Law classmate o f  Califano's, 
while Ross was an associate o f  Califano's in Thomas Dewey's law firm in New  York.
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and the acquiescence o f labor. As Ackley had pointed out, no one knew for sure whether 
Donner had acted on behalf o f the guidepost principle or on behalf o f the man in the 
oval office. And with respect to labor, it was becoming clear that Reuther and others 
like him were finding it more and more difficult to act in "the public interest," finding 
themselves pinched in a tightening political and economic vise. On one hand Jimmy 
Hoffa and union leaders in the building trades were pushing inflationary wage increases 
with impunity, and on the other, even more significantly, companies were not 
demonstrating much of a willingness at all to share their increased profits with the 
public in the form of stable or even decreased prices.
AFL-CIO president George Meany even went so far as to suggest that profits and 
productivity were so great, many companies could simultaneously raise wages and cut 
prices without impairing their cash flow, all to the benefit o f the entire economy.33 
Others pointed out that the so-called "wage-price spiral" should more properly be 
termed the "price-wage spiral." In most cases, wages were, indeed, following rather than 
leading higher prices, particularly in the oligopolistic manufacturing sector. Eisenhower 
CEA member Elenry Wallich contended that "the evidence is on the financial pages 
every day. Profits have been rising rapidly, faster than the GNP....and are now 
provoking excessive wage demands. Thus, though it is labor that is most ostentatiously 
turning its back on the guideposts, it is business that has done a large part o f the 
damage."34 Reuther clearly found himself hemmed in by these circumstances in the auto 
industry; it would hold true in other industries as well.
How did the Johnson guideposts fare in other industries? In steel, aided by 
Kennedy's earlier confrontation, and the public perception that steel prices were basic to
33 George Meany, "Wage and Price Policies and Trends," in George Meany, Roger Blough, and Neil 
Jacoby, Government W age-Price G uideposts in the American Economy, The Charles M oscowitz 
Lectures, School o f  Commerce, N ew York University, 1967  (New York: School o f  Commerce, N .Y .U ., 
1967), 14.
34 Henry Wallich, "Desert Guideposts," Newsweek, August 22, 1966, 82.
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the whole economy, they fared well—at least until 1967. Though steel executives 
lamented the "profit squeeze" endlessly, and prattled on about how the guideposts 
favored labor over management, they tended to follow them anyway. Acutely aware of 
the industry's special circumstances and its relative compliance, Inland Steel chairman 
Joseph Block, addressing labor leaders, administration officials, and other CEOs at a 
June 1965 White house dinner, sang the customary steel industry lament:
Last December my company raised its price on a relatively minor steel product— 
galvanized sheets. We did this because the cost o f coating material—zinc— had 
gone up considerably and we regarded our profit as inadequate. It was in reality a 
minor matter, yet based on government reaction, one would have thought that we 
had dropped an atom bomb. We were told that we might trigger inflation. We 
were told that we might induce Mr. Abel here, or Mr. McDonald [leaders o f the 
steelworkers union], to increase their wage demands. We were told that we would 
lose business to foreign steel. Now all this would seem to indicate that we must 
have been thought pretty dumb not to have considered such matters in advance of 
our action. And perhaps we were. But Mr. President, I know you are a strong 
believer in our free enterprise system. As such, Sir, my request is that you permit 
us the freedom o f making our own mistakes without scolding us.35
Roger Blough of U.S. Steel, though somewhat less critical of the guideposts in 
general, also complained publicly in 1965 about the industry's woeful financial position, 
and Johnson's newly appointed Secretary of Commerce, John Connor, seemed to be 
endorsing the industry's view. Tabbed for the post largely as a reward for his work in 
the 1964 campaign, Connor began hinting that selective price increases were both 
justifiable and acceptable. When Clark Clifford, unofficial adviser to President Johnson, 
and official legal council to Republic Steel, echoed Connor's analysis, Johnson told Joe 
Califano—now the administration point man on guidepost activity—that he wanted "no 
price increase. Zero. None." Johnson then instructed Califano to tell Connor and 
Clifford "to give that message to Roger Blough in a tough way," and to "turn him 
upside down and shake him before he makes an ass out o f himself again."36
35 Notes from White House speech, June 22, 1965, Papers o f  Joseph Block, AC 77-1, LBJ Library.
36 Quoted in Califano, Triumph and Tragedy, 92.
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Despite all the sound and fury, however, and the additional threat o f Connor's 
acquiescence, when Johnson brought steel management and labor representatives 
together for five days o f intense negotiations in August and September, a new labor 
contract was signed that conformed to the guideposts and resulted in no price change.37 
The steelmakers, Block and Blough included, had responded to Johnson's appeals. Since 
this came only days after the first substantial escalation in the nation's Vietnam war 
effort, with Ackley warning Johnson on August 9 o f the potential for an "inflationary 
psychology among businessmen," Johnson was particularly pleased with the outcome.38
On New Year's Eve 1965, however, Bethlehem Steel announced a $5 per ton 
increase in the price o f structural steel. Catching the administration at a time when they 
judged steel prices to be a very small and fading concern, the Bethlehem announcement 
incensed President Johnson. "They probably thought we would all be out partying 
somewhere," he told Joe Califano. "I want to call these bastards war profiteers. That's 
exactly what they are."39
Though he ignored the administration's first request—an White House invitation 
extended by CEA chairman Gardner Ackley—Bethlehem president Edmund Martin 
eventually agreed to a meeting with Joe Califano on New Year's day. When Califano 
briefed Johnson on the meeting, where Martin seemed to offer no apology or 
justification, Johnson told Califano to make sure that the government "did not buy one 
Goddamn ounce o f steel from Bethlehem or any company that raised its price."40
37 The administration, particularly the departments o f  Commerce and Labor, was so intimately involved 
in these around the clock negotiations that Secretary Connor and Labor Secretary Willard Wirtz came to 
be known as "the housemothers." See John Connor, Oral History Interview, June 22, 1988, interviewed 
by Michael Gillette, LBJ Library, 37.
38 Memo, Ackley to LBJ, August 9,1965, LBJ Handwriting File, Box 9, LBJ Library. Ackley prefaced 
this warning, however, with a significant qualifying clause: "While there was no evidence that the 
Vietnam buildup will subject the U.S. to severe short term inflationary pressures..."
39 Cited in Califano, Triumph and Tragedy, 103.
40 Ibid., 103-104.
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Though Joseph Block notified Johnson on January 3, signalling Inland Steel's 
desire to follow Bethlehem— "we do not believe the arguments advanced by your 
economic advisers are sound," Block noted—Johnson knew that Blough and U.S. Steel, 
rather than Bethlehem or Inland, would ultimately be the key player in any steel price 
arrangement.41 U.S. Steel was clearly the "bell cow" of the industry, chairman Blough 
understood well the connection between government contracts and industry profits, and 
they had not yet responded to the Bethlehem increase. With this in mind, Johnson 
arranged a meeting between Blough and Defense Secretary McNamara. If Blough 
needed any help making a sound judgement, Johnson reasoned, then McNamara, 
Pentagon purchase orders in hand, would be the ideal consultant.
When U.S. Steel announced a lesser ($2.75/ton) increase on its structural steel 
products, just after the Blough-McNamara meeting, and offsetting reductions in another 
line, Bethlehem and Inland lost no time rescinding their earlier increases. Johnson had 
once more rescued the guideposts from an aggressive attack, though, in this case, it was 
a rear-guard offensive, and there was less to crow about in the end. "It almost seemed," 
Califano recalled, "as if LBJ could hold down prices and wages by the force o f his 
presence and personality."42 Not until August 2, 1966, when Inland Steel announced a 
$3 per ton increase in strip and sheet steel products, were the Johnson-era guideposts 
compromised in the steel industry. Even then, increases were avoided in all but two of 
the industry's product lines.
Not long after the conclusion o f the 1965 steel negotiations, in late October, the 
aluminum industry issued its first challenge to the Johnson guideposts. Ormet, jointly 
owned by Olin Mathieson and Revere, initiated the challenge on October 29 with a 
proposed 'A cent per pound increase in both primary and fabricated aluminum (from
41 Correspondence, Joseph Block to LBJ, January 3,1966, Papers o f  Joseph L. Block, AC 77-1, LBJ 
Library.
42 Califano, Triumph and Tragedy, 105.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
260
24.5 cents to 25 cents per pound for primary stock). Reynolds and Kaiser followed 
immediately with identical increases. As it was with steel, however, pricing in the 
aluminum industry was typically set by one company, with the others merely following 
the leader. While some 200 fabricating companies had emerged by the mid 1960s, 
thereby bringing some competition to that field, three producers— Alcoa, Reynolds, and 
Kaiser— still manufactured approximately 90% of the nation's primary aluminum, with 
Alcoa leading the way by a substantial margin.43 Alcoa, like U.S. Steel in the steel 
industry, was clearly the industry's pricing leader. Since Alcoa president John Harper 
was in Japan when the Ormet, Reynolds and Kaiser announcements were made, and 
Johnson was at the LBJ ranch in Texas recovering from gall bladder surgery, Johnson 
ordered CEA chairman Ackley not to respond until "Alcoa dropped the other shoe."44
When the shoe dropped, with Alcoa's price rise announcement on November 5, 
Johnson instructed the CEA to continue their usual forays into the industry's balance 
sheets and recent historical record.45 Otto Eckstein, appointed to the CEA in September 
1964, had already cabled Johnson on the evening of the Ormet announcement, pointing 
out that the industry was witnessing near record after tax profits— disguised extensively 
by accelerated depreciation allowances—with spare capacity and heavy cash flow to 
boot. The aluminum companies, Eckstein informed Johnson, should be cutting prices, 
not raising them. He concluded by recommending the use of the government's 
aluminum stockpile as a way to force guidepost compliance.46
43 Even with the appearance o f  marginal competition among fabricators, the larger producers o f  primary 
aluminum continued to have much more effect on their prices than any competitive forces possibly could 
since they set the price o f  both the alumina and bauxite ores and the aluminum ingots purchased by the 
smaller independent fabricators. Moreover, the primary producers were also fabricators, and they 
customarily initiated primary price changes only when they were accompanied by fabricated price 
changes (leaving a margin for the independent fabricators).
44 Quoted in Gilbert Burck, "Aluminum: The Classic Rollback," Fortune, February 1966, 224. Ackley 
was also recovering from a recent surgery.
45 Alcoa matched the Ormet, Reynolds, Kaiser increases on primary aluminum, and added even larger 
increases on fabricated aluminum products.
46 Califano, Triumph and Tragedy, 98; Cochrane, "Moral Suasion," 229-231.
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Though the most recent industry wage agreements had fallen very close to the 3.2 
guidepost figure (estimates ranged from 3.2 to 3.5%), and while the industry's rate o f 
productivity increase for 1965 was approximately 5%, the guideposts themselves came 
to be used here more as a public relations device than an explicit administration policy 
tool. Indeed, all public pronouncements on the aluminum price change emanating from 
the administration suggested that President Johnson hoped to force a price rollback 
simply by invoking the wage-price guideposts. While this proved to be a useful 
approach, insofar as the need for guidepost publicity went, this was simply not 
indicative o f the real measures eventually taken by the administration. It is somewhat 
misleading, in other words, to regard the simple application o f guidepost arithmetic as 
the whole of Johnson's microeconomic anti-inflation policy, for it was not. The 
guideposts were the preferred tool, however, within this realm, and the administration 
also hoped that it could rely on them more completely in the future. Because they were 
so widely misunderstood— even by Washington insiders—so relatively unknown to the 
general public, and yet such an indisposable part of price stability at full employment, it 
behooved Johnson to invoke the guidepost principle wherever he could, even if  he could 
effect a price rollback without it.47 Such was the case with the 1965 aluminum price rise 
where Johnson eventually heeded Eckstein's advice and used the federal government 
aluminum stockpile instead as the chief means o f attaining an industry price rescission. 
That this also entailed the industry's de facto  compliance with the guideposts, was a 
most welcome, and politically indispensable side-effect.
When the New York Times characterized Johnson as "sputtering mad" over the 
aluminum price rise, President Johnson, according to Joe Califano, tore into acting CEA 
chairman Otto Eckstein. "That sonuvabitch sends a cable down here that would make
47 See "Guidelines for the Guidelines," Newsweek, August 22, 1966, 79-80, where it is suggested that 
many thought the guideposts allowed for 3.2% increases in wages and  prices. Note also that the 
N ewsweek  editor repeatedly refers to the guideposts as the "guidelines,"a trivial error to be sure, but one 
also indicative o f  how obscure and misapprehended the guideposts really were.
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any President see red," Johnson complained to Califano. "Then when I do what he 
wants, he goes around bragging about how mad he got the President."48 Johnson was 
upset, however, with the New York Times characterization, not Eckstein's analysis and 
prescription. He clearly wanted to be forceful with the aluminum industry, even if much 
of the action was to take place behind the scenes and off the record. Fortune magazine 
speculated that Johnson's approach to this situation derived largely from his experience 
in the 1950s as chairman of the Senate subcommittee responsible for oversight o f the 
nation's aluminum stockpile. There, Fortune suggested, he became convinced o f the 
industry's greed and malice, as they wracked up stupendous profits at government 
expense 49
For a variety o f reasons, then, Johnson had decided to flood the market with 
government stockpile releases so as to break the aluminum price increase. Though his 
administration had already planned a series o f releases prior to the industry price rise 
(the government had plainly stockpiled an excess amount throughout the 1950s), now 
he wanted to do it with a little more abandon and fanfare so as to remind industry 
officials o f their real dependence upon federal government largesse. As opposed to the 
provisions of the already planned releases, there would now be no limit placed on the 
amount released, and the government aluminum would be sold at prices below the
48 Quoted in Califano,Triumph and Tragedy, 99-100. Califano suggests that Johnson's temper flared here 
for a number o f  reasons: his recovery from surgery was not going well; he was being subjected to ridicule 
for showing the world his surgical scar when he was simply trying to reassure the world that he had not 
had another heart attack; he was on a bland, strict diet that made him feei even worse; his 18 year old 
daughter Luci, whom he thought too young to marry had just announced her intentions to do so; a map- 
plotting error led two American pilots to destroy a friendly Vietnamese village that day; and he had just 
seen Peter Hurd's portrait o f  him self which he absolutely hated.
49 Burck, "Aluminum: The Classic Rollback," 224. See also Newsweek, December 3, 1951, cover, 19-23, 
for an interesting analysis o f  Johnson's chairmanship o f  the Senate Preparedness subcommittee in 
question. The cover sports a businesslike portrait o f  the Texas senator above the label, "Lyndon Johnson: 
Watchdog-in-Chief." The "teaser" on the magazine's cover is also notable for its irony— "Senate Report 
on Rearmament: Too Much Butter, Not Enough Guns". Between 1951 and 1963 Aluminum producers 
sold the federal government's General Services Administration approximately 2 million tons o f  
aluminum. In 1957 and 1958 sales to the government (stockpiles only) comprised 20% o f  all production.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
263
newly established industry figure.50 When he called Secretary o f Commerce John 
Connor and asked him to inform industry executives o f plans for the first release and 
urge them to rescind their price increases, Connor refused, telling Johnson that the 
aluminum companies "needed price increases to get back on the profitable side o f the 
ledger," and that he [Johnson] did not have "the dictatorial authority" to order price 
reductions.51 Having read Eckstein's cable carefully, particularly where it cited the 
industry's high cash flow and hidden profitability, Johnson growled at Connor and 
slammed the phone down. This would virtually explode the already widening rift 
between Johnson and Connor, an often disregarded but economically significant rupture 
that would conclude with Connor's resignation on January 18, 1967. Never enamored of 
the guideposts, Connor simply refused to help enforce them time and time again, 
undercutting administration efforts throughout his tenure—a period (January 1965- 
January 1967) of utmost significance to the overall Johnson inflation fighting effort.52
50 When McNamara publicized the first release o f  200,000 tons, he noted that 85,000 tons would be sold 
"at market prices." When he was asked if  this meant the new price established by the industry he replied, 
"Not necessarily. Many transactions take place at other than the published price." Quoted in Cochrane, 
"Moral Suasion," 234. Much o f  the industry price was dependent on the stockpile purchases. When the 
federal government ceased stockpile purchases, for example, in 1959, even without releases, the price o f  
primary aluminum slid from 26 cents per pound to 22.5 cents per pound.
51 Connor, Oral History Interview, 41; Califano, Triumph and Tragedy, 99. Johnson had the authority to 
release as much as 770,000 tons o f  stockpiled aluminum in a given year without congressional approval.
52Arthur Okun also noted that Johnson was not very close to Connor's successor, Alexander "Sandy" 
Trowbridge, though Trowbridge was much more willing than Connor to pursue inflation fighting 
remedies. Only with the appointment o f  C.R. Smith in 1968, Okun contended, did Johnson develop a 
close working relationship with his Secretary o f  Commerce. See Okun, Oral History Interview, in 
Hargrove and Morley, editors, The President and the CEA, 272. In an address to the Economic Club o f  
New York, on March 15, 1965, Connor made a number o f  telling comments on the administration's 
wage-price guideposts. Referring indirectly to recent and pending auto price negotiations, Connor called 
the suggestion to reduce prices just before going to the bargaining table with labor "quite unrealistic." He 
also cited and seconded industry complaints regarding the 3.2% figure as a "starting point" for wage 
increases, rather than an upper limit, and maintained that he supported "the use o f the guideposts," but 
then suggested that "not nearly enough businessmen" have gone to Capitol Hill to express opinions on 
them (undercut them and render them harmless to industry profit margins, in other words). In his 
concluding remarks Connor took a swipe at Johnson's economic advisers, John Kenneth Galbraith in 
particular (with whom he had been engaged in a rancorous debate over the balance o f  payments 
problem), and warned, "If I lose my job, one o f  you had better be prepared to take it on, that is, if  one o f  
the professors isn't already sitting in the chair [to laughter and applause]." See Secretary o f  Commerce 
John Connor, "Address to the Economic Club o f  New York City, March 15, 1965," Sound Recording
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Ultimately, however, Johnson had the ability to roll back the aluminum price 
increases even without Connor's assent. After huddling with Califano and McNamara, 
he ordered the release of 200,000 tons of aluminum on November 6. When this failed to 
move the industry, he followed it with the release o f an additional 100,000 tons. With 
Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach applying additional pressure (reminding the 
aluminum companies o f a pending anti-trust suit and the possibility o f treble damages if 
they challenged rather than settled the price-fixing charges), the second release began to 
work its magic. On November 10, 1965, Secretary McNamara convened a press 
conference where he announced an Alcoa price rescission. As expected, the other 
producers then followed Alcoa with reductions of their own.
Much like Kennedy in the wake of the 1962 steel showdown, however, Johnson 
was determined, here, to play down the aggressive nature of the price rollback. He 
wanted to emphasize, instead, the continued applicability of the guidepost principle, and 
also hoped to prevent the further erosion of relations between the aluminum companies 
and his administration. When he and his advisers entered into subsequent negotiations 
with the aluminum industry on the issue of future stockpile releases, Fortune magazine 
noted that the "negotiations went very well for the aluminum companies."53 Limits were 
placed on releases, and arrangements were made for orderly, evenly-timed transactions, 
thus removing most o f the threat that the Johnson administration might ever again use 
the stockpile as a lever to ratchet down industry prices.
"Probably no industry owes more to the the government than aluminum," Gilbert 
Burck noted in Fortune magazine. "The government has helped it with loans, tax
SRT 1017, LBJ Library. See also Evans and Novak, The Exercise o f  P ow er , 488, for a brief note on the 
Connor-Galbraith debate.
53 Burck, "Aluminum: The Classic Rollback," 229. McNamara did gloat a bit in private, show ing up at a 
costume party for Averell Harriman a few days later with his head wrapped in aluminum foil. Cited in 
Cochrane, "Moral Suasion," 236n.
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incentives, accelerated write-offs, and profitable orders..."54 After the 1965 aluminum 
price rollback, industry executives saw Johnson as one who would not fail to remind 
them of this connection. Partly as a result, primary aluminum prices remained stable 
through mid 1967.
The use o f the aluminum stockpile in 1965 signalled President Johnson's 
willingness to use a variety o f tools and methods in his efforts to combat what he saw as 
administered price inflation. While he never ignored or underestimated genuine market 
forces when it came to corporate pricing decisions—forces that he was less inclined to 
subvert— he was convinced that market imperatives were often the least persuasive 
factor in the determination of most prices. Whether companies were really aware o f 
their marginal production values and marginal profits or not, Johnson sensed that their 
prices were typically a product o f decisions where government policies and special 
favors had a great deal o f bearing. All o f these policies and accomodations, then, were 
fair game for Johnson and his inflation fighting asssistants. In large measure, what the 
guideposts and the other inflation fighting tools were all about—though conservative 
opponents either failed or refused to understand the rationale— was the encouragement 
of price levels associated with a truly competitive market had it actually existed. Where
54 Ibid., 107. If anything, Burck was conservative in his estimate o f  aluminum industry reliance upon the 
federal government. In addition to the ongoing  assistance he cited, the industry also benefitted richly 
from past government assistance that provided it with much o f  its working capital and protected it from 
real competition. Arthur Davis o f  Alcoa received state department assistance in the 1940s, for example, 
in his attempt to discourage the creation (government funded) o f  Reynolds Metals' aluminum production 
facilities. While this attempt fell short, he was successful in getting the government to ignore or pigeon­
hole offers from foreign companies to build U.S. aluminum production plants (one prominent Swiss 
company was kept out this way). Alcoa's contract with the federal government during World War II was 
also written and approved by Alcoa's legal counsel Oscar Ewing; the company had the final say on both 
prices and production levels. And when the new government owned plants (purchased by Reynolds and 
Kaiser after the war for pennies) starting producing aluminum, Alcoa was able to delay production, to 
convince the government to pad costs there so as to avoid competition, and to maintain total control over 
the alumina and bauxite precursors. They also used a Canadian affiliate to evade U.S. antitrust law and 
had veto power over the site selection process for any new plants, successfully canceling one Olin project 
for example. See I.F. Stone, "Their M onopoly— Right or Wrong," May 24, 1941,65-68; "Making 
Defense Safe for Alcoa, I," September 27, 1941, 78-82; "Making Defense Safe for Alcoa, II," October 
18, 1941, 83-87; and "Alcoa in Wonderland," March 24, 1945, 263-267, in The War Years, 1939-1945  
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1988).
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
266
genuine hardship or market difficulties actually prevailed, as was the case with gypsum 
manufacturers in mid 1967, the Johnson administration had no qualms about moderate 
price rises. "We decided not to send letters to producers o f gypsum products," Gardner 
Ackley wrote to Johnson in July 1967. "Prices and earnings are clearly depressed, and 
we did not think we could make a good case for restraint."55
In many, if  not most cases, however, Johnson and his economic advisers found 
ample reason to intervene. They almost always possessed, as well, a fair number of 
tools with which to fight price increases. Stockpile releases, for example—as warranted 
and utilized in the 1965 aluminum case—were also used to dampen price pressure on 
grains, dairy products and oils, and on industrial commodities such as tungsten, copper, 
vanadium, and rubber. "Orville Freeman [Secretary o f Agriculture] has moved out quite 
well on the food price situation," Joe Califano wrote Johnson in January 1966. The 
agricultural commodity stockpile sales, he pointed out, were already having a positive 
impact. "Excellent!" Johnson scrawled in return.56 When Climax Molybdenum Co. 
raised their prices by 6% on July 8, 1967, Johnson discovered that in this case he only 
had to threaten the use o f stepped up stockpile releases; there were simply too many 
other, more effective and equitable price fighting options available. Because Climax' 
parent corporation, AMAX, was currently receiving government aid and assistance in its 
Australian and Zambian ventures, was asking for an extension of the existing 30 cents 
per pound import duty on Molybdenum, and was the subject of ongoing anti-trust 
investigations, the Johnson administration possessed, as James Cochrane noted, "an 
almost embarassing surfeit o f levers it could use."57
55 M emo, Ackley to LBJ, July 29, 1967, "Weekly Price Report," Robson-Ross Papers, Box 13, LBJ 
Library.
56 M emo, Califano to LBJ, January 24, 1966, LBJ Handwriting File, Box 11, LBJ Library.
57 Cochrane, "Moral Suasion," 247. 70% o f  the U.S. supply o f  Molybdenum came from one AMAX  
owned mine in Climax, Colorado; 80% o f  the world's supply came from the U.S.
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With respect to the use o f anti-trust policy, Johnson largely continued the hands-off 
approach initiated by the Kennedy administration. Because a Democratic president had 
a more difficult time winning the support of the business community, and because 
Johnson, Heller, Ackley, and others believed corporate bigness to be, in many ways, an 
asset to the American economy, they seldom carried out the threats implied by their 
numerous anti-trust investigations. They did, however, despite Ackley's reluctance, use 
the threats extensively, more as a reminder o f government favors that the targeted 
companies enjoyed than as an expression of arbitrary power. Only in a few cases were 
prosecutions deemed necessary, such as the early 1967 price-fixing suit against 
publishers of children's books bought by schools, libraries, and government agencies, 
and the late 1967 conviction of three major drug companies after their attempts to fix 
the prices of certain antibiotics.58
Government procurement policies were also used extensively, by themselves or in 
combination with other levers, to combat various price increases. Margarine was 
substituted for butter, for example, in 1967 contracts with the Army, Air Force, and the 
federal school lunch program, with price dampening effect on butter and other cream 
products. Also in 1967, the Department o f Defense began purchasing medium rather 
than large eggs with favorable price effects in the egg market.59 The DoD began, at the 
same time, coordinating its purchases of food with the Department of Agriculture, in 
order to avoid buying during seasonally tight supply situations. The Pentagon was 
especially mindful o f its impact on the beef and veal markets, for they discovered that 
beef and veal accounted for one third of all military food takings in 1966, and 25% of
58 Memo, Ackley to LBJ, "Weekly Price Report," April 22, 1967, and December 30, 1967, Robson-Ross 
Papers, Box 13, LBJ Library.
59 This action was reinforced by concurrent announcements from the U.S. Surgeon General on the 
cholesterol hazard in eggs and egg products, announcements encouraged by Johnson the price fighter and 
heart attack victim.
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the consumer price index "food at home" component.60 There was, indeed, ample room 
for the tightening of government procurement policy in general and military 
procurement policy in particular. Because these purchases had such a salutory effect, in 
and o f themselves, on business profitability, most businesses were more than willing to 
suffer the slightly offsetting effects of efficiency-minded procurement reform. 
Department of Commerce official Rodney Borum even saw the administration's 
handling of Vietnam procurement as "the most obvious bright spot" in its relations with 
business.61
Government procurement policies were also utilized to drive down hardwood 
lumber prices when they rose in the fall o f 1966. Johnson simply ordered the GSA to 
cease buying hardwood lumber for government projects, and to buy softwoods such as 
spruce and yellow pine instead. At the same time he encouraged the Small Business 
Administration to help small Appalachian mills expand their production somewhat, and 
worked with the Interstate Commerce Commission to speed the delivery o f boxcars to 
the western U.S. where a boxcar shortage had stymied mill deliveries o f already 
harvested and processed timber.62 Within weeks of these changes, hardwood lumber 
prices had dropped to their earlier, non-inflationary levels. Similar forays, meeting with 
equal success, were carried out by the administration in the cotton textile and sulfur 
markets.
In 1966, Johnson discovered that import and export controls were also, in certain 
markets, useful inflation fighting tools. In early 1966, for example, the administration 
used export controls to depress the price of hides. It was hoped that less expensive hides 
would ease the cost-push price pressure on leather goods in general, and shoes in
60 Memo, J.P. Cavin, USDA Director, Economic and Statistical Analysis Division to Califano, October 
14, 1966, Robson-Ross Papers, Box 9, LBJ Library. U.S. military purcases o f  food were up to $1.3 
billion in FY 1967, from $1,225 billion in FY 1966, and $875 million in FY 1965.
61 Rodney Borum, Oral History Interview, interviewed by Dorothy Pierce, October 16, 1968, LBJ 
Library.
62 Anderson and Hazleton, M anaging Macroeconomic Policy, 169.
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particular. When the administration succeeded in driving down the price o f  hides with 
the tightened export controls, however, the shoe manufacturers underscored the 
voluntary, "good will" component o f any o f these actions, thanking them for the 
decreased leather costs, but raising shoe prices by 2-7% anyway.63 Banking on an 
emerging inflationary psychology that was in large measure a self-fulfilling prophecy, 
businesses like the shoe industry were more easily seduced by the prospect o f higher 
short term profits (and quite possibly higher medium term profits as well) even if  it 
implied the onset o f an inflation that would impair long term economic prospects by 
itself, and medium term economic prospects by serving as a catalyst for economic 
policy changes (deflationary fiscal and monetary policies). Since mild inflation also 
reduced business' borrowing costs, it was simply easier for the business sector o f the 
economy, moreso than any other, to devalue the cost o f inflation and ignore its long 
term consequences.64 This stumbling block became an increasingly significant factor as 
the Johnson administration moved its fight against inflation to center stage.
Import controls were utilized as well in 1966, especially in the oil and sugar 
refining industries where strict import quotas had supported price levels for decades. 
Fuel oil and sugar prices responded positively as a result, even though Senators 
Jennings Randolph and Robert Byrd, both West Virginia Democrats, prompted a 
temporary countermand o f the fuel oil decontrol. Concern for the West Virginia coal 
industry and for Appalachian unemployment in general, forced Randolph and Byrd— 
along with AFL-CIO president George Meany—to discourage a too vigorous attempt at 
making petroleum products less expensive.65 In spite of this, Johnson did encourage the 
expansion of domestic supply, largely by getting Interior Secretary Udall to work
63 Ibid., 163.
64 Nobel laureate (1985, Economics) Franco Modigliani's studies suggest that this debt-repudiating effect 
is surprisingly large, particularly at or near full employment when the incentive to invest is high.
65 Stewart Udall, Oral History Interview, 35. Until the 1967 oil crisis, Johnson largely acceded to the 
w ishes o f  Randolph, Byrd, and Meany.
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closely with Texas Railroad Commisioner Ben Ramsey, and by urging the Bureau of 
Mines—upon whose reports the Texas Railroad Commision relied—to give "generous 
estimates o f needs" for domestic oil products.66
There were also a few cases where the U.S. government's ties to a given industry 
were less direct, and therefore less capable o f influencing that industry's pricing 
strategy. Such was the case in the copper industry, where prices were largely set in the 
world market. Chile had the greatest influence on this market, even though production 
there was only about 60% as extensive as that in the U.S. This was largely because the 
Chilean government, beginning in 1965, controlled 51% of the nation's mining interests. 
The U.S and Zambia produced more, but there production remained completely in 
private hands. The Soviet Union also produced more, but their production was geared 
almost exclusively toward domestic consumption, and had little if any impact on the 
world market. Moreover, The U.S. imported 40-45% o f its copper needs, relying on 
Chile for about 25-30% of this total. Copper income was (and is) also a chief source of 
revenue for the Chilean government, and was the mainstay o f the nation's fiscal system
66 Quoted in Anderson and Hazleton, M anaging M acroeconomic Policy, 164. Despite its name, and the 
intent o f  its founders (est. in 1891 by Texas governor Jim Hogg to assert populist control over the 
railroads), the Texas Railroad Commission was most notable for its control o f  domestic production 
allowables in the nation's oil industry. Operating under the guise o f  a mandate to prevent "physical 
waste," where low-producing "stripper wells" would be shut down if  supply was too great and price too 
low, the commission actually concerned itself more with cutbacks in supply to keep prices and profits 
artificially bloated. See Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest fo r  Oil, Money, and P ow er  (N ew  York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1991), 248-259, for a brief overview o f  the Texas R.R. Commission, its origins and 
customary practices. It is also interesting to note how little attention was paid to oil production and prices 
by Johnson and his econom ic advisers, even after the 1967 crisis. This seem s to be a function o f  their 
confidence (not unwarranted at the time) in the ability o f  domestic producers to expand their supply quite 
rapidly. When senator Fred Harris contacted the administration about the possibility o f  buying cheap 
imported oil and storing it underground, Assistant secretary o f  the Interior Cordell Moore wrote to Harris 
on July 20, 1967: "This proposal has been studied by government agencies and found to be impractical 
for several reasons. 1) Have to use expensive pumping equipment. 2) Econom ics unfavorable— using 
$2/barrel for Mideast oil... and $ 1/barrel as the cost o f  storage facilities, then the 500,000,000 barrels... 
mentioned represents a one and one half billion dollar investment. For comparison, the oil industry in 
1965 spent in the U.S. $675 million and discovered 583 million barrels o f  new reserves plus 6.5 trillion 
cubic feet o f  natural gas. 3) Probably the overriding factor discouraging underground storage o f  
emergency supplies o f  crude oil is the productive capacity o f  our domestic wells. This capacity is about 
equal to our total consumption and slightly greter than the capacity o f  our refineries." Correspondence 
from Cordell Moore to Senator Fred Harris, July 20, 1967, Papers o f  Cordell Moore, Box 4, LBJ Library.
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even before the partial nationalization o f Chilean copper companies in 1965.67 Even 
here, however, Johnson was able to find suitable government leverage once he 
understood the vagaries of the market.
When the Anaconda Company raised its copper prices on November 8, 1965, just 
as the aluminum crisis was ending, Gardner Ackley cabled Johnson at the LBJ ranch 
suggesting that some action be taken, especially when "copper companies are far more 
profitable than the aluminum companies."68 Even after Califano assembled the CEA and 
the usual inflation "firefighters"—including Washington lawyer David Ginsburg, an 
unofficial Johnson adviser who had served in the Office of Price Administration during 
World War II—they realized that they were, in Califano's words, "woefully 
uninformed" about the copper market.
When Califano shared this information with Johnson, the President instructed him 
to track down a "Joe something or other" who had worked on the staff of the Senate 
Preparedness subcommittee in the 1950s and who knew, according to Johnson, "more 
about copper than any living being."69 Califano ran down senate staffers and eventually 
discovered that he was looking for a Joseph Zimmerman who was now a metals trader 
living in Manhattan, and still a genuine expert on the world's copper market.
Zimmerman was flown to Washington on November 13, only hours after Califano had 
first spoken to him, "astonished," as Califano recalled, "that the President [even] knew 
he existed."70
67 The Chilean copper companies were essentially U.S. companies, the four mines (Chuquitamata, 
Potrerillos, El Salvador, and Africana) o f  the Anaconda Company's Andes Copper Mining Company and 
Chile Copper Company being the most prominent. See Isaac Marcosson, Anaconda (New York: Dodd, 
Mead, and Co., 1957).
68 Quoted in Califano, Triumph and Tragedy, 101.
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid.
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Citing growing demand, unrest in foreign producing countries, and the importance 
o f the Chilean companies (and government), Zimmerman helped the administration 
patch together a plan that would help them roll back the world price o f copper.71
On November 17 the Zimmerman plan was enacted. McNamara announced a 
200,000 ton stockpile release, the suspension of the import duty on copper, and a 
tightening of copper export controls. The New York Commodities Exchange was also 
asked to increase the margin requirements for copper trading to halt inflationary 
speculation. These changes were capped off by sending Averell Harriman to Santiago, 
Chile to forge a price agreement with Chilean president Eduardo Frei. "Find out what it 
will take to get Frei to roll the price back," Johnson had instructed Califano.72
With Harriman on his way, Califano informed Anaconda of the Chilean mission not 
long after McNamara's public announcement. Two days later, on November 19, the 
metals giant rescinded its price increase, and was followed immediately by the smaller 
copper producers that had previously matched their November 8 price rise. The 
administration had won another price victory and American business leaders began to 
speculate openly about which industry would next fall prey to the government's 
stockpile leverage. "We're very happy that the Government doesn't stockpile 
automobiles," joked General Motors President James Roche.73
71 The "unrest in foreign countries" referred primarily to a Chilean strike and to political unrest in the 
Congo (follow ing Mobutu overthrow o f  Lumumba in 1961) that led to production problems in both 
cases.
72 Califano, Triumph and  Tragedy, 102. When Califano suggested that such a strenuous mission might be 
too difficult for the 74 year old Harriman, Johnson dismissed Califano's concern. "You just call him up 
and get a car over to his Georgetown house. 01' Averell likes women. You just tell him what the 
President wants him to do. And tell him we'll put a couple o f  pretty nurses on the plane and they'll start 
working on him as soon as [the] wheels are up and by the time he gets to Santiago he'll have it up!" 
Eduardo Frei, one-time professor o f  Labor Law, shared Johnson's predilection for consensus politics, and 
was the head o f  a progressive center party (Christian Democrats) in a country known for its chronically 
polarized politics. He was also the recipient o f substantial U.S. CIA assistance (alleged to be $20 
million) during his 1964 campaign for the Chilean presidency.
73 Quoted in "Governing by Guideline," Time, November 26, 1965, 89. Time pointed out that the federal 
government was then stockpiling 77 different commodities.
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While these victories, at the hands o f the guideposts or other more tangible levers, 
became less common in 1967 and 1968, by the end o f 1966, business publications had 
begun to label President Johnson a "major economic force," and "an economic variable 
that every forecaster must program into his computations."74 The business community 
had also, at that point, exhibited a fair amount o f sensitivity to Johnson's many and 
varied imprecations. As James L. Cochrane once suggested, Johnson succeeded with the 
wage-price guideposts partly because they made sense to the nation's business 
community. Many o f its members were simply too dependent upon government 
reinforcement—if not special favors—and their cost-markup pricing schemes typically 
lacked a great deal o f precision.75 Johnson's efforts with metals' prices, then, were 
typical o f his inflation fighting initiatives in general—and the business response to 
them— in 1965 and 1966.
The guideposts, however, never relinquished as the centerpiece o f the 
administration's anti-inflation policy (as long as macroeconomic policies remained 
within suitable parameters), came in for heightened criticism in 1966, and were 
increasingly difficult to enforce thereafter. While much o f this came at the hands o f 
labor leaders such as George Meany, who had opposed the guideposts from their 
inception, only with the highly publicized negotiations— in mid 1966— between the 
nation's major air carriers and the International Association of Machinists, did the
74 Heller, New Dimensions, 90.
75 Cochrane, "Moral Suasion," 289. On the precision o f  company pricing schemes, Henry Aaron noted 
that one o f  the primary reasons economists have not rejected the idea that businesses were "profit 
maximizers aware o f  marginal cost and marginal revenue," (and were not using less tightly knit pricing 
schemes instead) was that they could "employ calculus in drawing inferences that were subtle, 
suggestive, and only occasionally refuted." Close analysis, however, o f  actual corporate behavior tended 
to show firms that only "acted" as if  they had such information; firms that failed to approximate this 
behavior closely enough, whether by intention or accident, were often bankrupted or taken over, 
therefore skewing the empirical evidence through their absence. When Robert Heilbroner declared that 
"mathematics has given economics rigor, but alas, also mortis," he may have had this example in mind. 
Aaron suggested, as an alternative explanation, that most firms simply sought to sell as much as they 
could as long as their profits were satisfactory, and that for many, in addition, profit was only one o f  
several key motives (social status, executive perquisites, high salaries and/or bonuses, political clout,etc.). 
See Henry J. Aaron, Politics and the Professors, 129.
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guideposts attract the kind o f criticism that ultimately proved to be troublesome and 
debilitating.76
The 1966 airlines case came after President Johnson had already weathered 
prominent guidepost-breaking labor contracts— in 1964 and early 1966— in the 
automobile industry and in the New York City transit worker's strike. Wage increases in 
the building trades had also begun to exceed the 3.2 guidepost figure, averaging 
approximately 4.6% in 1965. Yet, while these were truly sources of some concern for 
the administration, they saw them primarily as cautionary signs with little or no impact 
on overall price stability.77 In October 1966, for example, Gardner Ackley noted that,
Weather conditions for farming can hardly be worse, and may be considerably 
better....Capacity in key industries is increasing rapidly and labor skills are being 
upgraded. On the other hand...an acceleration in wage increases in manufacturing 
must be realistically expected, but its total impact on the overall price level should 
not offset the favorable factors, provided the pace o f aggregate demand remains 
within bounds.78
The administration felt, in other words, that it could rationalize and dismiss the few 
wage settlements that exceeded the guideposts during the first two years o f the Johnson 
presidency. The first case was warranted by the auto industry's high productivity and 
profitability, and Johnson blamed the second on the ineptitude and political concerns of 
New York's newly elected Republican mayor John Lindsay. In the case o f the building 
trades, Johnson and his advisers knew all too well how that industry's companies and 
unions operated. Beset with powerful and often corrupt labor unions, the construction
76 When Johnson told George Meany, "I see you kicked my guideposts around the other day," Meany 
replied, "Mr. President, they're your guideposts and not mine." See George Meany, Oral History 
Interview, interviewed by Paige Mulhollan, August 4, 1969, LBJ Library, 14.
77 In a July memo to LBJ, Joe Califano outlined "excessive" and "moderate" wage increases affecting 
large numbers o f  workers since late 1963. Four settlements (in autos, aerospace, NY transit, and western 
lumber) affecting a total o f  715,000 workers were deemed "excessive." Twenty-one settlements affecting 
approximately 4,900,000 workers were deemed "moderate" (highest "moderate" settlement = 4.0%; 
lowest "moderate" settlement= 2.5%). Papers o f  LBJ, White House Central Files, Gen LA 6, Box 20, LBJ 
Library.
78 Memo, Ackley to LBJ, "Answers to Questions Submitted by the IMF," October 20, 1966, Robson- 
Ross Papers, Box 5, LBJ Library.
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industry found itself paying disproportionately high wages as the 1960s wore on, and as 
labor markets began to tighten. As John Hutchinson pointed out in his history o f trade 
union corruption, however, this situation tended to prevail in industries like the 
construction industry because o f their highly competitive nature, naturally small profit 
margins, small business units, and high proportional labor costs.79 Corruption and 
unusually high wage rates, in other words, functioned as a way to promote less 
competition and higher profit margins, and as such, were typically encouraged more by 
employers than the unions themselves.80 Until the 1960s, union corruption had usually 
benefitted employers with higher profits and  lower relative wage rates. There was 
almost no pecuniary reason, then, for employers to oppose it.81 By the 1960s, however, 
the affected unions had become so powerful that "sweetheart contracts" gave way to 
increasingly larger wage packages. Tightened labor markets, anti-discrimination 
statutes, and more extensive and valuable public contracts encouraged this trend as well. 
Johnson and his advisers saw guidepost-breaking wage agreements in the construction 
industry, then, as a problem more closely associated with government contract reform 
and antitrust law than with the guideposts themselves. Unfortunately, since these areas 
had been disregarded intentionally, as a way to win the support o f a reluctant business
79 John Hutchinson, The Imperfect Union, 380.
80 In some cases the same individuals represented both workers and employers. Jimmy Hoffa, for 
example, owned the Test Fleet Corporation (in his wife's name), a company that leased trucks to the same 
commercial carriers Hoffa squared o ff  against in his capacity as Teamsters Union leader. See Hutchinson, 
The Imperfect Union, 260. It is no small wonder, then, with the deck stacked as it was, that Hoffa often 
encouraged employers to "act" more combatively, and urged a return to the pre-Wagner Act days when 
unions were not protected by federal law. See Ralph and Estelle James, Hoffa and the Teamsters 
(Princeton, NJ: Van Nostrand, 1965), 31, 192.
81 The 1959 McClellan hearings (on union corruption) found this to be especially true in the restaurant 
industry. See Hutchinson, The Imperfect Union, 210. Hutchinson also points out how corruption in the 
garment industry was temporarily opposed by employers when the National Recovery Administration 
assumed the price-fixing, competition-regulating function previously served by union-employer 
collusion. Only at that point, Hutchinson notes, did the corruption come to be seen as "pure extortion." 
(Ibid., 90)
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community, they would continue to be shunted aside, especially as the 1966 midterm 
elections approached.82
The 1966 negotiations between the airlines and their machinists, however, could 
not be ignored or explained away quite so easily. First of all, it became a very well 
publicized fight—a point Johnson and his CEA eventually came to regret. "The 
mistake...was," Gardner Ackley recalled, "in building that up as a big issue. After all, it 
was a handful o f workers, and it didn't make a damned bit o f difference in itself. We 
would have been so much better off if  we had not entered into a public fight."83 When it 
surfaced, however, Ackley told Johnson that "the airlines dispute is exactly the kind o f a 
situation for which the guideposts are intended. On the one hand there is a strong union; 
on the other a (regulated) monopoly which could successfully pass the cost of an 
excessive settlement along to consumers."84
Secondly, in the airlines case, the nation's business community suddenly 
encouraged the use of, and helped publicize, the wage-price guideposts. In the face of 
soaring corporate profits, and a revised "trend productivity" o f 3.6%— estimated in early 
1966— American corporations now saw the guideposts as a means to lower unit labor 
costs and higher profits.85 They became popular, then, though only for a very brief 
period of time, with the one group that had most often fought their implementation, and 
had not long ago decried their use in the name o f a pandemic "profit squeeze." The 
guideposts were less than fair, business leaders had always declared, for they implied 
that workers should receive all the gains from productivity increases; only employers 
were expected to sacrifice. Faulty arithmetic and slightly skewed vision aside, however,
82 Johnson contemplated, but ultimately decided against, the use o f  federal building contracts in order to 
discipline Newark, New  Jersey labor leader Peter Weber, business agent for a Newark construction local 
(Union o f  Operating Engineers, Local 825) who was sanctioned by most o f  the area contractors. 
(Surprisingly, the Jersey City/Newark area was approximately 80% open shop until the late 1930s.)
83 Ackley, Oral History Interview, in Hargrove and Morley, eds., The President and the CEA , 262.
84 Memo, Ackley to LBJ, April 20, 1966, "Arguments For and Against Appointing an Emergency Board 
in the Airline Case," Papers o f  LBJ, White House Central Files, Gen LA 6, Box 20, LBJ Library.
85 "Trend productivity" was equal to the average annual productivity advances based on a five-year  trend.
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much of the nation's business community now sang a different tune, eschewing this 
critical approach in favor of a ringing endorsement.86 When Johnson announced that the 
guidepost target would remain at 3.2%, in spite o f the revised "trend productivity," 
business groups cheered and the U.S. Chamber o f Commerce hailed the move as "an act 
o f economic statesmanship."87
This effort to promote the guideposts, launched by many o f the nation’s leading 
corporations, was clearly self-serving and duplicitous, but it also succeeded in 
convincing much of the American public that took an interest in such matters. There 
was little sympathy, then, no matter what the circumstance, for high wage increases, and 
for the few that noticed, this implied strict adherence to the 3.2% guidepost figure.88 
Schooled for generations on the great financial impact o f labor costs, and relatively 
immunized to the concept o f productivity increase as it related to overall cost, and to the 
various other factors (liquidity versus profitability, executive perquisites, etc.) that
86 The faulty arithmetic is found in the persistent belief that an increase in w age rates in the same 
percentage as the increase in productivity does not, somehow, yield an increase o f  profits in that same 
percentage. Careful analysis, o f  course, shows this belief to be false. See Paul Samuelson, Economics: An 
Introductory Analysis, 7th edition (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), 774. The overall employer-side 
vision o f  the guidepost formula is "slightly skewed," because the conclusion is only partly wrong, even if  
the explanation is based on faulty arithmetic. Kenneth Arrow pointed out, for example, that one also had 
to take into account the cost o f  labor relative to capital. Since his calculations showed that a 3% increase 
in labor costs would result in only a 2% increase in the capital-labor ratio (a so-called elasticity  o f  
substitution  o f  2 /3), the ultimate profit share o f  labor w ould  increase somewhat in the long run. Arrow 
hastened to add, however, in concurrence with Johnson administration philosophy, that w hile the 
constancy o f  relative income shares was not therefore obtainable under the guideposts, this was 
ultimately an economically desirable  transformation (i.e., a slow  movement o f  the econom y at full 
employment toward a position where wages comprise an increasingly larger share o f  the national product 
implies greater econom ic stability and less aversion to risk-taking investment decisions). Cited in 
Cochrane, "Moral Suasion," 201-202n.
87 Quoted in Cochrane, "Moral Suasion," 244. Part o f  the rationale for this announcement was political, 
for the administration clearly believed that employers had to take the lead on price stability; it was 
designed to win them over to the administration's wage-price goals. Part o f  the rationale was economic, 
as w ell, for the CEA predicted actual productivity advances in 1966 lower than the trend rate (from the 
use o f  older, standby equipment and less-skilled labor as markets tightened).
88 "We believe that the guideposts have a certain educational v a lu e ," the National Association o f  
Manufacturers noted in September, 1966, "reminding the public o f  the necessary relationship between 
real wages and productivity." (NAM Statement submitted to the Subcommittee on Executive and 
Legislative Reorganization Committee on Government Operations, U.S. House o f  Representatives, 
September 15, 1966, NAM Papers, Series IV, Box 160, Hagley Library.
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impinged upon a given company's profit margin, the American public was indeed used 
to equating price stability with wage stability. As previously noted, Newsweek magazine 
even felt compelled to explain how a 3.2% wage increase suggested no price rise, rather 
than an increase o f up to 3.2%, as most o f the public had imagined.89 In the public mind, 
there were simply no exceptions to this simple and direct wage-price relationship.
When the airline mechanics strike began, then, in mid-summer 1966, corporate 
support for the guideposts spawned enough public sympathy and interest to force 
President Johnson's hand. While he realized the impossibility, and even, perhaps, the 
undesirability, o f a 3.2 % settlement here, he was compelled, nonetheless, to defend the 
guideposts as vigorously as possible.90 Government departments and agencies were 
directed to curtail air travel, alternate methods of transportation were used to move the 
mail, and military personnel on leave were handled by military transport instead of 
commercial airlines.91 Johnson had also imposed a 60 day no-strike period, beginning in 
late April, and had appointed Wayne Morse, David Ginsburg, and Richard Neustadt to 
an Airline Emergency Board, urging them to find a suitable wage increase package 
close to the guidepost target. When Walter Heller wrote to CEA chairman Ackley on 
July 19, 1966 he expressed great concern over the position of the machinists' union, but 
also urged Ackley to convince the airlines that the Civil Aeronautics Board would
89 "Guidelines for the Guidelines," Newsweek, August 22, 1966, 79.
90 One o f  the ironies o f  the 1966 airlines case was that the airline industry was more capital intensive 
than most, with relatively low labor costs. The purchase o f  planes, related borrowing costs, depreciation, 
and fuel costs comprised much o f  their operating expenses. In a table prepared for President Johnson, for 
example, listing the wages and revenues lost per day during the airline machinist's strike, Civil 
Aeronautic Board chairman Charles Murphy noted that United Airlines lost an average o f  $2 ,906,000/day 
in revenues while its employees lost $518,000/day in wages and salaries. For TWA the figures were 
$2,573,000 and $406,000 respectively; for Eastern, $1,234,000 and $308,000; for Northwest, $939,000  
and $98,000; and for National, $528,000 and $70,000. Memo, Charles Murphy to LBJ, July 22, 1966, 
Papers o f  LBJ, White House Central Files, Gen LA 6, Box 20, LBJ Library.
91 Memo, Califano to Heads o f  Departments and Agencies, July 8, 1966, and Cyrus Vance to LBJ, July 
8, 1966, Papers o f  LBJ, White House Central Files, Gen LA 6, Box 20, LBJ Library. Joseph Ramsey o f  
the IAM accused Northwest Airlines in mid-July o f  soliciting paying passengers under the guise o f  
military charters (flights continued by mutual agreement during the course o f  the strike). Vance estimated 
the defense requirements for "official duty travel normally provided by the 5 struck airlines" at 100,000 
passengers for July alone.
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continue seeking lower airfares, even in the event of a high wage settlement. "I am 
sure," Heller told Ackley, "that the regulatory authorities will ask for rate cuts as needed 
to hold average returns on capital to reasonable levels— indeed, they would be remiss if  
they are not constantly on the watch for excessive profits."92 Ackley relayed this 
suggestion to Califano who immediately called airline executives and reminded them of 
the administration position on rate cuts and CAB persistence.93
When the airline machinists and their employers began negotiating a new wage 
package in the late Spring o f 1966, however, and the first numbers began to emerge, 
Johnson did not hesitate to endorse a settlement somewhat above the 3.2 guidepost 
figure. "We hoped that they would keep their increases as low as possible," he declared 
at a White House news conference, "but they could not be kept within 3.2."94 Airline 
company profits were simply rising too fast to expect otherwise, and since the top rated 
airline mechanic earned only $3.52/hour—quite a bit less than comparably skilled 
machinists in other industries—an exception to the guidepost formula was almost 
certain to be granted.95 Up 72% from 1964 to 1965, airline profits even made it difficult 
for the Civil Aeronautics Board (by urging or mandating lower fares) to have much 
impact on the case, for the machinists' unions maintained that the air carriers could 
simultaneously decrease fares and increase wages without impairing their profitability.96 
Unfortunately, for the Johnson administration, business lobbying efforts, and the high 
profile nature o f the industry, had turned this exceptional case into a referendum on the
92 M emo, Heller to A ckley, July 19, 1966, Papers o f  LBJ, White House Central Files, Gen LA 6, Box 20, 
LBJ Library.
93 Cochrane, "Moral Suasion," 261.
94 Quoted in ibid. Johnson endorsed a 4.3% wage increase that was subsequently voted down by the 
machinists union.
95 Memo, Califano to LBJ, "CEA Fact Sheet Prepared for LBJ," July 7, 1966, Papers o f  LBJ, White 
House Central Files, Gen LA 6, Box 20, LBJ Library.
96 Report, CEA to OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development), "U.S. Economic 
Situation and Outlook in Mid 1966," September 20, 1966, Robson-Ross Papers, Box 5, LBJ Library. 
James L. Cochrane notes that if  the common stock o f  the 5 struck carriers were bought at their 1962 
highs and sold at their January-June 1966 lows, capital gains would have ranged from 190 to 442%. 
Cochrane, "Moral Suasion," 2 6 In.
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general applicability o f the wage-price guideposts. This made it difficult for Johnson to 
downplay the eventual outcome and to adequately explain what was certain to be a 
wage increase well above the 3.2 guidepost figure.
Union politics also made the airlines wage negotiations particularly nettlesome. 
Secretary o f Labor Willard Wirtz wrote to Johnson in April:
The union will never, under any circumstance, settle here for 3.2%. P.L. Siemiller, 
the I.A.M. president, has been one of the two or three most bitter public critics of 
the guideposts. Although he pretends to be an administration supporter, his public 
comments have come closer to personal criticism of the President than any other 
labor leader.
Wirtz added that the I.A.M. and the Transport Workers Union (representing TWA and 
Pan Am mechanics) were strong competitors, and that Joe Ramsey, I.A.M. vice- 
president in charge o f the airlines division, must be accounted for. He "is a strong and 
outspoken Republican," Wirtz noted. "He is a capable and tough bargainer. He is 
retiring later this year and considers this case his monument."97 On July 1, after the end 
o f the 60 day no-strike period and the beginning of the strike, Under Secretary o f Labor 
James Reynolds wrote to Joe Califano: "Siemiller, I.A.M. president, encouraging 
militant position— is not helpful."98
Even before the final guidepost-breaking settlement was announced, the airline 
machinists managed to embarass the President and strike a blow to the guideposts. As 
Emergency Board member and presidential adviser Richard Neustadt explained it, 
Johnson's eagerness for a moderate settlement here served, in large measure, to betray 
his sense o f political reality. When President Johnson brought negotiators together at the 
Executive Office Building on July 29, and prodded both sides toward an eventual 
agreement, he was, perhaps, all too willing, then, to believe that this agreement would
97 Memo, Willard Wirtz to LBJ, April 20, 1966, Papers o f  LBJ, White House Central Files, Gen LA 6, 
Box 20, LBJ Library. The Transport Workers Union, then headed by Mike Quill, represented N ew  York's 
transit workers when they achieved their guidepost-breaking settlement in January, 1966.
98 Memo, Jim Reynolds to Joe Califano, July 1, 1966, Papers o f  LBJ, White House Central Files, Gen LA 
6, Box 20, LBJ Library.
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be approved by the full union membership when they voted two days later on the 31 st. 
AFL-CIO president George Meany promised as much, telling Johnson that he would 
use his considerable influence to guarantee that a majority approved the settlement. As 
he had, then, with the 1964 railroad industry settlement, Johnson dashed off to 
Washington's WTOP television studios so that he could announce (and boast of) the 
favorable settlement (with wage increases estimated at 4.3%). He then left for Camp 
David where he hoped to relax for the next two days. On Sunday, August 31, however, 
the news came o f the machinists' vote. Whether Meany intended to mislead Johnson or 
not, he quite simply failed to deliver, and the union voted down the tentative agreement 
by an overwhelming three to one margin. Though Neustadt maintained that he and 
others expected such a vote, it still left President Johnson with a considerable amount o f 
egg on his face."
When James Reynolds finally announced an agreement that all parties endorsed, 
two weeks later on August 15, the situation had hardly improved. While the strike was 
now over, the new contract also contained wage increases over a three year period that 
averaged 4.9% annually. Johnson was reasonably certain that he could have legitimized 
the earlier 4.3% agreement; this one would be more difficult. I.A.M. president Siemiller 
even boasted o f having destroyed "all existing wage and price guidelines now in 
existence."100 Moreover, while Johnson's price-fighting team assured him that this 
settlement would still have very little impact, in itself, on the overall economy, they 
were more deeply concerned about its psychological impact in general, and its impact 
on future wage settlements in particular. If  it were to set a pattern for other industries, as 
it was likely to, then the guideposts were clearly dead or dying. On July 27,1966, even 
before the first ill-fated agreement was announced, Gardner Ackley wrote to President 
Johnson on the long run implications of the airlines case.
"  Richard Neustadt, quoed in Miller, Lyndon , 457.
100 Quoted in Califano, Triumph and  Tragedy, 146.
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Every free industrialized country which tries to maintain full employment faces 
this problem: strong unions have the power to push up wages faster than 
productivity and thereby inflate costs and prices; and semi-monopolistic industries 
have the power to push up prices even if  costs are stable....This is not a problem 
for the next six months or two years but for the decade. The end of the war won't 
solve it. A tax increase won't solve it (though it could help). It will have to be 
approached head on. Sometime, somewhere, we will have to find a way to 
convince the unions they cannot continually push wage costs up, and to convince 
business that profit margins cannot continually rise.101
How, then, did Johnson respond to this memo? Did he, as Ackley suggested, meet 
the problem "head on?" Or did the breakdown of the wage-price guideposts necessarily 
leave him without an equitable or reliable wage-price policy? Barring its obvious and 
significant psychological impact, did it also render the administration helpless in its 
more general struggle against a rising inflationary tide? Some have suggested, indeed, 
that Johnson simply gave up the fight against inflation at this point, that significant 
macroeconomic adjustments were his only remaining option, and that he was quite 
unwilling to make the sacrifice (political and economic) implied by a different 
macroeconomic course (spending cuts or a tax increase or a combination of the two).
One prominent scholar of the decade even suggested that Johnson and his advisers 
found 3 to 5% inflation to be an acceptable rate.102
Even after the guideposts were compromised and seemingly discarded, however, 
Johnson continued to apply steady pressure against administered price inflation—the 
primary objective of the guideposts in the first place. Labor was, of course, less and less 
willing to practice restraint afterward, and was therefore less a part of the whole
101 M emo, Ackley to LBJ, "A Longer Run View o f  the Airlines Case," July 27, 1966, Papers o f  LBJ, 
White House Central Files, Gen LA 6, Box 20, LBJ Library.
102 Matusow, The Unraveling o f  America, 176. Matusow cited Arthur Okun's and James Tobin's tacit 
endorsement o f  4 or 5% inflation, but erred in linking their statements (made in 1970 and 1971 
respectively) to the New  Economics and to Johnson  administration policy options. In 1970 and 1971 
neither Okun nor Tobin saw 4 or 5% inflation as acceptable in itself— or even with full employment as 
Matusow implies— but only as a preferable alternative to the economics o f  austerity (through forced 
monetary contraction) and rising unemployment introduced by Nixon's policy changes in the 1969-1971 
period.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
283
operation, but their behavior was largely considered derivative rather than basic to the 
price problem anyway. While many unions were continuing to make a mockery o f the 
3.2 guidepost target figure, for example, Johnson and his advisers often justified the 
higher wage settlements. "Some temporary add-on to the 3.2% seems inevitable," Otto 
Eckstein wrote to Joe Califano just a few days after the airlines settlement, "since labor 
has good cause to complain about higher prices."103 President Johnson clearly 
understood both the sacrifice he and President Kennedy had urged upon the nation's 
labor unions, and the difficulty o f asking them for more. In his quest for a consensus 
among labor and management, for example, Johnson had always tried to influence the 
behavior of one group with that o f the other. He knew that long term union behavior had 
to be hinged upon the willingness of corporations to keep prices relatively stable; no one 
could expect union leaders to temper wage demands in the face o f galloping price 
inflation. Likewise, Johnson also realized how voluntary corporate compliance would 
be much more easily effected if  unions exhibited good behavior and a willingness to 
sacrifice. This had been a big factor, after all, in Kennedy's successful stand against the 
nation's steel companies in 1962. What this implied, however—more often than not— 
was a concerted push for wage settlements at or under the 3.2 figure even where the 
guidepost principles (or the historical standing of certain occupations) warranted or 
allowed higher rates o f increase.104
A push for price decreases was, of course, the other available option. It was not 
resorted to as often or as readily, however, simply because Johnson hoped to teach price
103 Memo, Otto Eckstein to Joe Califano, August 23, 1966, Robson-Ross Papers, Box 9, LBJ Library.
104 Paul Samuelson explained these variations when he defined the wage-price guideposts in his 
introductory econom ics text: "The average money-wage increase is to be no higher than the average 
national increase in physical productivity [roughly 3.2% throughout much o f  the 1960s]; but the increase 
in each industry is to be divorced from the increase in physical productivity in that industry itself, the 
difference to be taken up by price reductions to consumers o f  items with unusually high productivity 
growth (wheat? autos?) and by price increases to industries with unusually slow productivity growth 
(teaching?). Departures from the common wage increase are to be permitted primarily where an industry 
needs to raise wage rates to attract new labor entrants and where a declining industry needs to lower 
wages in order to expedite labor exit. See Samuelson, Economics, 774,
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restraint first and believed that he could tread only lightly in the jealously guarded arena 
o f corporate pricing policy. He hoped, in other words, to reach first base with some 
regularity before he started swinging for the fence. Seeing labor, rather than 
management, as his more natural constituency, and as the group that required less 
prodding or pecuniary inspiration, Johnson was also more inclined, as a result, to ask 
the former rather than the latter for sacrifice. Ironically, because this was typically done 
with little fanfare (since wage contracts had definite expiration dates, wage demands 
were usually softened in advance rather than with publicity generating rollbacks after 
the fact), many corporate executives maintained and convinced the public that a great 
sacrifice on the part o f Labor had simply never taken place. "While the administration 
has used its 'moral suasion'," Roger Blough lamented in 1967, "to prevent or curtail 
price increases in some highly visible industries...I am aware of few similar instances of 
success in respect to rising wages."105 The great publicity accompanying the various 
campaigns to roll back corporate price increases simply made it easier to ignore the 
pivotal role o f the corporation and to scapegoat unions, often the very group most 
willing to sacrifice and to act in the public interest.
Johnson and his advisers, however, knew better. Gardner Ackley, reflecting the 
general position of the Johnson administration, cited "an unprecedented six year rise in
105 Roger Blough, "Guideposts— A Business View, or Can Good Economics Be Good Politics," in 
Meany, Blough, and Jacoby, Government W age-Price Guideposts in the American Economy, 30. Blough, 
o f  course, only had to look at the past pressure applied to the steelworker's union to see that this was just 
not the case. Johnson was also aware o f  two other somewhat less significant considerations here: 
productivity increases, which allowed for non-inflationary wage increases, were the result o f  investment 
in new technology as well as greater skill or effort on the part o f  labor; and while the frequent exclusion  
o f  the price reduction option seemed to forsake consumers at the expense o f  labor and management, 
Johnson's full employment goals caused him to treat comsumers and workers as if  they were one and the 
same. At a conference on the Wage-Price guideposts in 1974, at Boston University, Roger Blough said 
that he showed up to show the conferees "what a sacrificial lamb looked like" even though he had always 
been one o f  America's most highly paid corporate executives. In 1968, for example, Blough earned 
$298,750 in salary plus 27,372 shares o f  US Steel common stock. See Crauford Goodwin, "A Report o f  
the Conference," in Goodwin, editor, Exhortations an d  Controls, 390, for Blough's "sacrificial lamb" 
comment.
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profits," as the real source o f the guidepost breakdown.106 Having scorned the role o f 
both labor and management in the current inflation, Ackley clearly felt, however, as did 
his boss in the oval office, that semi-monopolistic pricing had led the way into the 
morass; it, therefore, should be held responsible for a way out. Significant as they were, 
"unreasonable" wage demands had in most cases only followed  equally unreasonable 
expectations for profit and the semi-monopolistic price markups that accompanied 
them. University o f Minnesota economist George Perry discovered, for example, that 
for fifteen consecutive quarters (1962 IV-19661), wage rate gains actually fell below  the 
predicted, hypothetical market rates for such a high profit, tight labor market 
economy.107 In 1966 and 1967, as profits continued to soar, unit wage costs were just 
beginning to catch up to previous highs established late in the Eisenhower 
administration. Even then, in the nation's largest, heavily unionized industries, wages 
seldom, if ever, rose faster than industry prices. Where corporations could do so with 
impunity, they almost always raised prices to cover and often surpass any wage 
increases, creating a collective bargaining environment in the process that did little to 
discourage guidepost-breaking wage settlements.108
Even without much labor participation then, helpful as that would have been, 
Johnson still possessed a wage-price policy that could be directed profitably and 
efficaciously at the pricing strategies o f the nation's leading corporations. This also 
implied, much to his liking, that drastic macroeconomic adjustments were not his only 
remaining option in the struggle against price inflation. Though fiscal and monetary 
policy remained the most significant economic policies in general, microeconomic tools
106 Transcript o f  speech, Ackley to the Annual Meeting o f  the Society o f  American Business Writers, 
"The Death o f  the Guideposts," May 2, 1967, Robson-Ross Papers, Box 9, LBJ Library.
107 George Perry, "Wages and the Guideposts," American Economic Review  57, September 1967, 897- 
904. See also Perry's "Reply to Critics," American Economic Review 59, June 1969, 365-370.
108 Arthur Okun termed this phenomenon, "the invisible handshake." See Okun, The Invisible Handshake 
and the Inflationary Process, Brookings G eneral Reprint 356  (Washington: The Brookings Institute, 
1980).
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reigned supreme in the battle against inflation. "You'd be surprised," Gardner Ackley 
once noted, "at how much of the time o f the Council [of Economic Advisers] went into 
micro matters, certainly if you take account o f the staff work."109
Psychology, however, often had as much to do with inflation as economic reality, 
and the American business community still needed all the inveigling and coaxing 
Johnson could muster to continue its flirtation with the New Economics. As a result, 
Johnson made it abundantly clear that he would also use fiscal and monetary changes to 
obtain greater price stability. Although small adjustments were always considered, by 
the administration and the Federal Reserve Board, large ones were simply not 
necessary, despite all the furor over guns and butter and a strained economy. The whole 
point o f the New Economics, after all, was that tight labor markets and high capacity 
utilization were good for the economy. What was a strain to some analysts was to 
Johnson little more than an economy and a marketplace come to life. Yet, while 
macroeconomic restraint was in large measure theoretically superfluous, it was also, to 
some extent, a rhetorical and political necessity. To treat it as something less than the 
primary tool most Americans and conservative politicians still believed it to be, would 
be to add a dangerous psychological component to the current inflation that the 
administration could well do without. Macroeconomic adjustments did not strike at the 
heart o f the problem (administered prices or administered profits), but they certainly 
helped buy more time for Johnson's economic experiment. "His [Johnson's] idea," 
Walter Heller pointed out, "was that the success o f the measure would itself be the 
education device."110 And no one was less willing than Johnson to consider the New 
Economics a success in 1966 or 1967, even as he constantly extolled its virtues.
Success, after all, was an unemployment rate of 3.7% (reached in February, 1966), and 
increasing profitability, but it was also the process by which numerous skeptics tied this
109 A ckley, Oral History Interview, in Hargrove and Morley, eds.. The President and the CEA, 241.
110 Heller, Oral History Interview, in ibid., 181.
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rate and this profitability together. Elusive and difficult to attain as that may have been, 
it was, nevertheless, the kind o f success that Lyndon Johnson hoped for.111
On the microeconomic wage-price front, Johnson wasted little time brooding over 
the so-called "death o f the guideposts." Gardner Ackley had already, early in 1966, 
called upon Saul Nelson to head up an administration price staff; its efforts continued 
unabated. A veteran o f the Korean War price controls, as was Ackley, Nelson chaired a 
three man committee that met every Thursday and passed on their findings to the CEA. 
Ackley and Califano had also begun meeting every Friday to go over these findings, and 
had begun issuing "Weekly Price Reports" to President Johnson as a result. When the 
Nelson committee stopped meeting in mid-1966, Califano then recruited one o f his 
Harvard Law classmates, John Robson, to head up a less formal, but even more rigorous 
fact-finding group linked to the administration's inflation fighting policies. "I need you 
more than I need a company of Marines," Johnson told Robson when he joined the 
administration in July 1966.112
Johnson continued to wire and telephone corporate executives, combining, as 
always, personal pleas with tangible government levers, and in many industries his 
success continued, unaffected by the dissolution o f the wage-price guideposts. In 
February 1967, for example, Johnson rolled back a gasoline price rise attempted by
111 Johnson seemed to realize the difficulty and the time consuming nature o f  his econom ic experiment 
(revolution?) from the beginning o f  his presidency. In late February or early March, 1964 (by his 
account) Bill Moyers found Johnson scribbling on a notepad, measuring his projected time in office, 
comparing it to FDR’s tenure, and adding a specific note next to each year. Next to 1964 was the word 
"win." Next to 1965 and 1966, "propose and pass;" 1967, "hold gains;" 1968, "win again;" and 1969- 
1972, "consolidate." While Johnson told Moyers on this occasion that he really intended "to finish 
Franklin Roosevelt's revolution," its interesting to note how much o f  this achievement was dependent, in 
Johnson's mind, on time he never had (the 1969-1972 "consolidate" period). See Moyers, quoted in 
Hardesty, ed., The Johnson Years, 65. See also Chapter 8 for a more detailed analysis o f  the f isca l and  
m onetary  adjustments made in the struggle against price inflation.
112 Quoted in Califano, Triumph and Tragedy, 139-140. Robson, an Illinois Republican, officially 
became an employee o f  the Bureau o f  the Budget where he was hired ostensibly to use government 
procurement policies to influence corporate price decisions. He later served in the Ford administration as 
chairman o f  the Civil Aeronautics Board and in the Bush administration as Deputy Secretary o f  the 
Treasury.
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Phillips Petroleum. While Johnson was never enthusiastic about putting pressure on the 
oil industry—a traditional cash cow for the Democratic party— and while he never 
pushed for the price cuts that certainly could have been sustained by the industry, he 
was adamant about oil price stability. Phillips attempted price rise, after all, was only 1 
cent per gallon. In late 1968, Johnson also succeeded in getting Humble Oil to rescind a 
fuel oil price rise. In both cases, suggested changes in oil import quotas were more than 
enough to force industry compliance and to maintain stable prices.
Notable price rollbacks were also achieved in the auto industry, in late 1967 and 
early 1968, when that industry attempted increases based on new safety features 
(shoulder harnesses) and greater labor costs. Auto industry contracts with the federal 
government totaling over $1 billion (including things like military trucks and cannon 
shells) continued to give Johnson a significant lever in these negotiations, and while the 
early 1968 (January) repricing was indeed a disturbing and largely unprecedented sign, 
Johnson succeeded in keeping prise rises then to a minimum (approximately $20 per 
vehicle).113
His efforts on behalf of price stability were so substantial and unrelenting, even late 
in his term, that some of his advisers even questioned the perspicacity o f such a focus. 
"When you think of all the problems that the world had at that time," Otto Eckstein 
recalled, "including...civil rights and the beginning of the Vietnam War...that all o f this 
good talent and presidential leadership was being applied to chop two or three tenths off 
the [price] index may well have been a misallocation of resources."114 To President 
Johnson, however, it was clearly not; price stability was, as he saw it, the key to his 
entire domestic agenda. While there could potentially be much short term social and 
economic success without it, Johnson was convinced, nonetheless, that price stability
113 This was unsettling because it represented a break in the traditional auto industry practice o f  limiting 
sticker price changes to a once-a-year phenomenon.
114 Quoted in Goodwin, "A Report o f  the Conference," 396.
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was an absolute prerequisite for political success and for the longer term acceptance of 
his as yet vulnerable economic strategy. Benign neglect was simply not feasible, and no 
one was more aware of this than Lyndon Johnson.
If  there was any lull at all in Johnson's struggle against price inflation, it came in 
late 1967 and early 1968, when price advances did recede somewhat, and when more 
effort was directed toward securing the tax surcharge he originally hoped to enact 
sometime late in 1967. Urging Johnson to renew his efforts against unwarranted 
corporate price rises, on July 15, 1968, Arthur Okun remarked: "Our record o f activity 
here is considerably below any other period of the Kennedy-Johnson era."115 
Administration price fighting had slowed, indeed, but it is not often remembered that 
inflation was less severe in 1967 than it was in 1966.116 However problematic price 
inflation had become at that time—mostly for its less than certain impact on 
expectations—the 1967 Consumer Price indexes suggests that it was not yet part of an 
"inflationary spiral." Ultimately, the low level of price fighting activity, however, was 
more the result o f the tax surcharge debate and a number of key administrative changes 
than it was a surrender to an even moderate inflation. Asking bankers and corporate 
executives for help passing the surcharge simply made it more difficult to pressure them 
on price increases at the same time. And while the administration's personnel changes 
eventually constituted a move toward a more vigorous and capable inflation fighting
115 Memo, Okun to Califano, July 15, 1968, Papers o f  LBJ, White House Central Files, LA 8, Box 33, 
LBJ Library.
116 The Consumer's Price Index for all items signalled only a small change, from +2.5% in 1966 to 
+2.4% in 1967, but the wholesale price index went from +1.2% to +0.9% over the same period, and both 
food prices and wholesale prices actually dropped in the first two quarters o f  1967. Source: U.S. Bureau 
o f  Labor Statistics, "Consumer Price Index," and "Wholesale Prices and Price Indexes." Looking at it 
from the perspective o f  trend changes that did not necessarily correspond to the beginning or end o f  the 
calendar year, the annual inflation rate for the June, 1965-September, 1966 period was 3.4%, but only 
2.3% between September, 1966 and June, 1967. See Johnson, Vantage Point, 445. Public polls taken in
1966 and 1967 also reflect this trend. In 1966 92% o f  those polled though inflation was rising; in 1967, 
68%. Cited by Donald Kettl, "The Economic Education o f  Lyndon Johnson: Guns, Butter, and Taxes," in 
Robert Divine, ed., The Johnson Years, Volume Two: Vietnam, The Environment, and Science 
(Lawrence: University Press o f  Kansas, 1987), 66.
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effort, in the short run they also served to break the inertia associated with the already 
stunted but still somewhat effective guidepost activity.
One o f the most notable administrative changes made at this time was the removal 
o f the intransigent Secretary o f Commerce, John Connor, in January 1967. While the 
1965 Aluminum price fight had already damaged Connor's reputation with the 
President, Johnson may not have considered his removal until Gardner Ackley began 
questioning Connor's performance in early 1966. "Unless Jack [Connor] is willing to do 
some of the no-saying," Ackley reminded Johnson, "every case will wind up either in 
the White House or in the Council— or with a price rise. I have no objection to being the 
bastard; but in the long run, it may weaken the effectiveness of the Council to you."117 
While Johnson had learned how to circumvent Connor's opposition to some extent, 
Ackley's lament reminded him that Connor's office was simply too important to neglect 
completely. Less than a year later, Connor was out, and Alexander "Sandy" Trowbridge 
was in.
While Trowbridge never developed a close relationship with Johnson, according to 
CEA member Arthur Okun, he was by all accounts a much more willing participant in 
the administration struggle against corporate price rises.118 When American Airlines 
executive C.R. Smith replaced Trowbridge in 1968 the office became even more 
significant. With Smith, Johnson finally had a Commerce Secretary with whom he had a 
close personal relationship and who became a key player in the administration's 
guidepost activity at the same time.119 When Treasury Secretary Henry Fowler, for
117 Quoted in Cochrane, "Moral Suasion," 245.
118 Okun, Oral History Interview, in Hargrove and Morley, eds.. The President and the CEA , 272.
119 Smith was appointed on February 16, 1968 when Trowbridge left the administration for health 
reasons. See Richard H. K. Vietor, C ontrived Competition: Regulation and Deregidation in America  
(Cambridge: Belknap Press, Harvard University Press, 1994), 8, 2 3 -3 0 ,4 1 , for a glimpse o f  Smith's role 
at American working closely with the federal government. Smith took control o f  the fledgling American 
Airways in 1934 after rising through their accounting department, and transformed American into the 
nation's leading air carrier by the late 1940s. He was, perhaps, a more w illing participant in Johnson's 
price fighting crusade because he recognized, moreso than many other corporate executives, the 
importance o f  the various levers Johnson deployed as the primary tools in this struggle. Many o f  these
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example, asked Secretary o f Labor Wirtz and Smith whether they opposed the 
reestablishment o f firmer wage, price, and profit guideposts (in January 1969), Smith 
seemed irritated by the suggestion that he would be an instinctive opponent, and evinced 
no opposition— even to guideposts for profits. "Hell no," he replied. "Just come up with 
the right number."120 On this front, throughout Johnson's last two years in office, the 
administration clearly strengthened its inflation fighting machinery and stepped up its 
battle against price inflation, even though much o f the improvement came as Johnson 
prepared to leave office.
Arthur Okun's ascension to the chairmanship of the CEA, on February 16,1968, 
was also a notable change. While Gardner Ackley had been an energetic and capable 
chairman, and very much admired by President Johnson, he was beginning to show 
signs o f fatigue in late 1967.121 While Okun had been a member (the youngest ever at 
age 35), and integral part of the CEA since 1964 (replacing Walter Heller), he was 
especially well suited to the demands of the chairmanship, particularly as Johnson 
entered his last year in office. Okun was, as Ackley himself put it, "the best empirical 
economist I know, with surpassing skills as a forecaster."122
levers, after all (subsidies, lucrative government contracts, government regulation o f  competition, etc.), 
had truly enabled Smith's industry to survive the Great Depression and to prosper afterward. Sustained by 
the Kelly Air Mail Act o f  1925, and the McNary-Watres Act o f  1930, which provided subsidies o f  $7 
million per year by 1930, rates based on miles instead o f  volume, and a system o f  monopolized routes, 
commercial aviation had still barely survived until it came under the regulatory authority o f  the Civil 
Aeronautics Board in 1938 (at industry request). Smith knew this history intimately, and he had also 
witnessed the industry's spectacular growth and increased profitability during the Kennedy-Johnson years 
(18% average annual increase in air traffic from 1965-1968). He was a business executive, then, who 
believed that the federal government could exercise a powerful and beneficial role in the nation's 
economy, and whose industry had profited mightily by the New  Economics.
120 Quoted in Cochrane, "Moral Suasion," 288.
121 Ackley suggested that one reason Johnson may have confided in him so readily is that he (Ackley) 
attended a small teacher's college in Michigan and was not an Ivy Leaguer (Ackley was teaching at the 
University o f  Michigan when he joined the CEA in August, 1962, replacing James Tobin). See Ackley, 
Oral History Interview, in Hargrove and Morley, eds., The President and  the CEA, 225.
122 Quoted in Roland Turner, editor, "Arthur M. Okun," The Annual Obituary, 1980 (N ew  York: St. 
Martin's, 1981) 182.
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Okun was also something of a legend in economic circles for his literary and 
oratorical talents. "He had a great gift for the presentation of ideas," Ackley added on 
another occasion, and, in the words o f Nobel laureate and Kennedy CEA member James 
Tobin, "an unparalleled command of the facts o f real world business fluctuations."123 
These attributes were clearly in great demand when Okun became the CEA chairman in 
1968, for Johnson had lost much of his hold on the Congress and the American 
people— largely due to events in Southeast Asia—and the New Economics was drawing 
heavy fire from those who desired a return to a more conservative strategy and who 
blamed current inflation on excess demand. If anyone could help guide Johnson out of 
this foreboding political landscape, it was Arthur Okun.124
When Ackley decided to retire from the CEA—accepting the Italian 
ambassadorship from Johnson—he had put in motion, however, a key administrative 
change that would postpone somewhat the impact of Okun's emergence as CEA 
chairman. In October 1967 Ackley proposed the formation of what came to be called the 
Cabinet Committee on Price Stability. Though the CEA chairman, and the CEA in 
general, would become an active participant in the CCPS, it was clearly an attempt to 
move much of the actual price fighting out of the Council's jurisdiction. Johnson 
announced its formation in his 1968 Economic Report, and then in April named Federal
123 A ckley, Oral History Interview, in Hargrove and Morley, eds., The President an d  the CEA , 229; 
James Tobin, "Okun on Macroeconomic Policy: A Final Comment," in Tobin, ed., M acroeconomics, 
Prices, and Quantities: Essays in M emory o f  Arthur Okun (Washington: The Brookings Institution,
1983), 299.
124 Okun was one o f  the first to construct a "fixed-price" microeconomic analysis and fit it to an 
aggregate analysis where fixed-price assumptions had more typically been adopted— at least since the 
time o f  Keynes' G eneral Theory. Okun stressed, through his empirical observations and knack for seeing 
through misleading technical analysis, that demand and supply often have very little effect on price in the 
real world (that there are sound financial reasons for price and wage stickiness), and that the control o f  
inflation by demand restraint will then have very high costs. See Arthur Okun, Prices and Quantities: A 
M acroeconomic Analysis (Washington: The Brookings Institute, 1981). Okun's sudden and unexpected 
death o f  a heart attack in March, 1980 (at age 51) was truly an incalculable loss. Washington Post 
econom ics reporter Hobart Rowen (who spoke often to Okun in the 1960s and 1970s) told me in a May 
1993 phone conversation that seldom had a day passed since Okun's death that he had not wished for 
Okun's response to a pressing, particularly intractable, economic question.
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Trade Commission chief economist Willard Mueller as its executive director. Focusing 
initially on studies and proposals for new price fighting initiatives such as improved 
controls on government procurement and cost containment measures for government 
expenditures on health care (Medicaid and Medicare), the CCPS moved only slowly 
into actual price fighting activities.125 By mid year (1968) it had begun the practice of 
sending letters—termed "pre-sin sermonettes" by Okun—to companies and unions 
about to engage in important negotiations. This gave Okun his first real opportunity, as 
CEA chairman, to exercise his much lauded gift of persuasion. According to Stanford 
Ross, who had replaced John Robson in early 1967 in another key administrative 
change, the CCPS was just becoming "workable and useful" when Johnson's term came 
to an end.126
Once the CCPS solidified its routine, the wage-price guideposts also reemerged as 
an important inflation fighting tool. Rumors o f their death, it seems, were clearly 
premature. Stressing their utility as an educational device, Ackley had once compared 
them to roadway speed limits, suggesting that the key was "to get society to agree that 
the standards, although containing an element o f arbitrariness, should be used as a guide 
to responsible behavior."127 For his part, Johnson, too, had always affirmed the 
voluntary nature of the guideposts, rebuffing attempts by congressmen Henry Reuss (D- 
WI) and Emmanuel Celler (D-NY) to institute the guideposts in either antitrust law or 
Joint Economic Committee procedure.128 "Are the guideposts really dead?" Ackley
125 Rising health care costs quickly became an area o f  great concern for Johnson. A s early as April 1966 
James Deusenberry (CEA) and John Douglas (HEW) conducted a joint CEA-HEW study o f  medical 
costs. Inflation figures for the following month (May, 1966) suggest that it was a critical problem for 
medical costs had risen by 0.5% (a 6.0% annual rate) while the overall consumer price index had risen 
then only by 0.1% (a 1.2% annual rate). See Memo, Ackley to LBJ, June 17, 1966, LBJ Handwriting 
File, Box 11, LBJ Library. See also chapter 8 for further discussion o f  the impact o f  rising health care 
costs on the overall price trends o f  the period.
126 Cited in Anderson and Hazleton, Managing Macroeconomic Policy, 173.
127 Cited in Cochrane, "Moral Suasion," 291.
128 Even the National Association o f  Manufacturers supported Johnson on this, opposing the Reuss and 
Celler amendments - to no one's surprise - but also professing their belief "that the guideposts have a 
certain educational value." See NAM Statement submitted to the Subcommittee on Executive and
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queried in May 1967. "I believe," Ackley noted, answering his rhetorical question, "that 
voluntary restraint in the exercise of private discretion will continue because the natural 
leaders o f labor, business and Government know that it must.... And I believe that this 
continuing system of voluntary restraint must be based on the productivity principle 
because no other makes economic sense."129 This was the approach continued by Okun 
and the CCPS in 1968 through the end of Johnson's term in January 1969.
While Gardner Ackley once said that the "jawboning" process inherent to the 
application o f the guideposts was like "telling children not to put beans up their noses," 
it was, nonetheless, a process that Johnson continued to see as an absolute necessity.
The reemergence o f an inflationary psychology (and with it, real inflation) in late 1967 
clearly compelled the recourse to other devices (spending cuts in some categories, less 
rapid increases in others, and the tax surcharge— a proposed 6% at first, then 10%), but 
the guidepost principle, rather than significant macroeconomic changes, remained the 
key to long term price stability at full employment. Moreover, Johnson and his advisers 
remained convinced that the guideposts were still capable o f influencing responsible 
corporate behavior—the key, in many ways, to the whole economic struggle before 
them. Profits were still rising, capacity was still growing, and where tightening labor 
markets were working their redistributional magic on a very small scale, the relative 
gains were still coming out of an enlarged economic pie. Johnson had truly avoided the 
zero-sum game that he had always abhorred.130
Legislative Reorganization Committee on Government Operations, U.S. House o f  Representatives, 
September 15, 1966, NAM  Papers, Series IV, Box 160, Hagley Library. While this signified, in large 
measure, their realization that effective guideposts would help modify wage  increases more than anything 
alse, and that labor's failure to comply would only help them justify new price increases, such rhetoric 
also suggested that the guidepost principle was as yet a potentially useful tool.
129 Ackley, to Society o f  Business Writers, May 1967, quoted in Norton, The Employment Act and  the 
CEA, 205.
130 Critics suggested that the expanded capacity was only temporary and was based on misperception by 
the sellers o f  the nation's products, services, and labor (Rational Expectations with Misperception theory). 
When these sellers realized that their higher nominal profits (or wages) were eaten up by higher 
replacement costs (for management), or by higher consumer prices (for labor) then the expansion o f  
capacity and labor supply would cease or contract. If corporations were committing such decision­
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Contemporary opponents o f the New Economics, however (and most historians of 
the period, as well), interpreted the economic data to mean that the zero-sum game had 
already made its ignominious return, perhaps as early as 1965. Johnson's choice for 
"guns and  butter," they contended, had created excess demand along with rapidly 
advancing wage levels, and a full-fledged profit squeeze was the obvious and 
unfortunate result. While most o f Johnson's contemporary critics blamed the Great 
Society and its concomitant social spending (butter) for this predicament, most 
historians of the period have been somewhat more judicious, blaming military 
expenditures in Vietnam (guns) instead. The social spending numbers themselves, they 
reasoned, were simply too small to have much of a macroeconomic impact.
Excess demand, however, was almost always taken for granted, and the end result 
o f either economic analysis was the same: overall spending was pushed up too far, too 
fast, creating a profit squeeze and an unavoidable inflationary spiral. In The Unraveling 
o f America, described as the "outstanding critical overview of the liberal Democratic 
party agenda in the 1960s," Allen J. Matusow noted:
Among the war's losers might be counted the nation's businessmen. The war 
brought an end to the spectacular profits of the decade's first half, as rising costs, 
especially labor costs, cut into profit margins. Labor's share o f aftertax national 
income grew from 72.2 percent in 1966 to 77.5% in 1970; the share going to 
corporate profits fell from 10.6% to 7.2%.131
making errors, as Arthur Okun put it, why did their income statements continue to look so good? See 
Okun, "Rational-Expectations-with- Misperceptions As a Theory o f  the Business Cycle," Journal o f  
Money, Credit, and Banking, November, 1980, Part Two, 817-825. "When sellers are price makers," 
Okun maintained, "they necessarily act as quantity takers. And then, any surprise in demand (even one 
that is correctly perceived as soon as it happens) must initially alter quantities and leave prices 
unchanged."
131 Appraisal o f  Unraveling by David Farber, "Introduction," in Farber, editor, The Sixties: From  
M em ory to H istory (Chapel Hill: University o f  North Carolina Press, 1994), 7; quotation in Matusow, 
The Unraveling o f  America, 176. This quotation comes at the end o f  a chapter entitled "War, Inflation, 
and Farewell to Keynes" and relies upon an article by Frank Ackerman and Arthur MacEwan entitled 
"Inflation, Recession, and Crisis, Or, Would You buy a N ew  Car From This Man?" The R eview  o f  
R adical Political Economics, August 1972, 4-37. It should be noted that this article was written in a 
slightly different form one year earlier, and was a response to the unveiling o f  Nixon's N ew  Economic 
Policy that year. While Ackerman and MacEwan clearly indict the Vietnam War, in general, and not just 
Nixon's policy for the economic mess o f  the early 1970s, and are animated by their opposition to the war
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This analysis, however, which purports to incriminate the Johnson administration 
and the New Economics in particular, and not just the decision to fight the Vietnamese 
War, blurs the real trajectory of the period's economic forces by omitting or overlooking 
a number o f critical qualifications. Its errors are threefold.
It is, first, dependent upon a conflation o f late Johnson administration statistics with 
those o f the early Nixon administration. Many histories o f the period commit this same 
pernicious error. While the numbers related to Nixon's first year in office (1969) do 
have much to do with plans made during the Johnson administration (most o f its fiscal 
priorities were set then), the key statistics cited here were clearly tied to either policy 
decisions o f a non-fiscal nature (the decision to use or not to use the wage-price 
guideposts), or to others set not so far in advance (monetary policy). Even if one uses 
the same statistics as Matusow (see figure 2)—generated by the Nixon administration 
(see source note, figure 2), with profits used instead of cash flow (profits plus 
depreciation)— one notices a sharp break only in 1969, and not before. The marked 
change cited by Matusow, was in fact limited almost exclusively to the last two years of 
the period he surveyed (1969 and 1970).
It is, second, lacking in the recognition of the positive, welfare enhancing effect, of 
the slight gains made by wages at the expense of profits in the 1967-1968 period. 
Coming largely as a result of a genuine market impulse (a tightening market for skilled 
labor), this change also carried with it the potential for greater and more readily assured 
long term profits, for it clearly indicated stronger markets for the national product just 
as it indicated slightly increased costs. Because it followed a period o f "spectacular 
profits," this change, as long as it remained slight and the result of enhanced rather than 
diminished marketplace demand, could not possibly have resulted in an insufficient
(and therefore some Johnson policies), their focus is still placed largely on Nixon's new policies; the 
inclusion o f  Johnson and the New  Economics (no relation to Nixon's NEP, as I will contend in chapter 9) 
is largely Matusow's construct.
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level o f corporate cash flow needed to sustain the relatively non-inflationary economic 
expansion. This slight dip in the share o f national income going to profits, in other 
words— in 1967 and 1968—was an auspicious rather than a foreboding development, 
and was in fact, something the Johnson administration hoped to see. Only a return to a 
restrictive fiscal or monetary policy would confound this otherwise favorable outcome. 
It is, third, too willing to assume that increasing wages were the only significant factor 
weighing upon corporate profit margins in the late 1960s. A number of relatively new 
managerial and accounting practices came into prominence during this period to make 
this assumption especially misleading. Wage costs were still the most significant factor 
for most businesses, but in the realm o f national product redistribution—where
Y ear GNP Growth Rate 
o f  GNP
CPI Growth Rate 
o f  CPI
Unemploy. Govt. Surplus Real Real Inc. 




Corp. W ages 
Profits & Salaries 
as %  o f  as %  o f  
Nat. Nat. 
Incom e Income
1950 417.8 72.1 5.3 +9.1 36.1 189.2 12.8 68.2
1955 515.0 80.2 4.4 +4.0 35.1 240.0 10.4 71.4
1960 573.5 2.5 88.7 1.6 5.5 +3.5 31.3 275.6 8.4(26.2)* 73.8
1961 584.7 1.9 89.6 1.1 6.7 -3.8 31.5 281.1 8.3 73.5
1962 623.0 6.6 90.6 1.1 5.5 -3.8 35.9 295.4 8.9 73.1
1963 647.9 4.0 91.7 1.2 5.7 +0.7 37.7 305.6 9.1 73.2
1964 683.3 5.4 92.9 1.3 5.2 -3.0 43.3 329.6 9.6 73.0
1965 726.5 6.3 94.5 1.7 4.5 +1.2 51.2 348.6 10.6(28.6)* 72.2
1966 773.9 6.5 97.2 2.9 3.8 -0.2 53.6 367.0 10.6 72.2
1967 794.0 2.6 100.0 2.8 3.8 -12.4 49.1 380.4 9.5 73.3
1968 830.4 4.6 104.2 4.2 3.6 -6.5 49.1 397.7 9.2 74.8
1969 852.2 2.6 109.8 5.4 3.5 +7.3 44.2 407.7 8.2 76.3
1970 846.6 -0.6 116.3 5.9 4.9 -13.6 39.4 415.9 7.2 77.5
1971 869.6 2.7 121.3 4.3 5.9 -23.3 43.6 427.9 7.7 77.2
Figure 2. Data on the National Economy (values in billions of dollars)
Source: Frank Ackerm an and Arthur M acEwan, "Inflation, Recession, and C risis, or W ould 
You Buy a  New Car From This Man?"7'/;e R eview  o f  Radical P olitical Economics, August, 1972,
Table I, p.28.
All figures com puted from The Econom ic Report o f  the President, 1972,all price indices based on 1967 prices 
* figures added to chart representing corporate profits p lu s  depreciation (from G. Ackley's testim ony to Congress, 
in 1966; sec Hobart Rowen, S e l f  Inflicted Wounds: From U IJ's G uns and  Rutter to Reagan's Voodoo Economics  
(New York: Tim es Books, Random House, 1994) 17.
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several tenths o f one percent represented a marked change— other factors also held great 
significance.
What is certain, particularly with Fortune 500 companies where many o f the 
period's key price and wage decisions were made, is that real profits were significantly 
eroded by several non-market, non-wage factors, even as overall profits soared. While 
some o f these factors were actually beneficial to the firms in question and to the nation's 
overall economic health as well, several were not. All have gone virtually unnoticed, 
however, by historians o f the 1960s economy largely because they were initially 
submerged within a larger trend toward widening profit margins.
In the realm of economic forces that helped erode profit margins and that were not 
beneficial to either individual firms or to the economy in general, most Fortune 500 
firms of the period began to offer increasingly valuable stock option bonuses to their 
executives.132 The problem with this behavior, which was supposed to place the 
executive on the same footing as the investor, was that it not only failed to do that, 
but—after 1950— it also failed to become a required part o f any corporate balance sheet. 
In 1950 the Accounting Standards Board (predecessor to today's Financial Accounting 
Standards Board, established in 1972), in what had to be a temporary flight from either 
logic or responsibility, ruled that stock option grants would not be charged to company 
earnings at the market price or at the strike price (alternatives on which a furious debate 
had centered), but would be counted instead as if they simply did not exist at all 
(zero).133 Substantial corporate outlays, then, that served to inflate costs and erode
132 Stock options gave the recipient the right (option) to buy a predetermined number o f  shares o f  a given  
company's stock at a predetermined (strike) price, a price usually lower than the stock's current market 
value.
133 See Graef S. Crystal, In Search o f  Excess: The Overcompensation o f  American Executives (New  
York: W.W. Norton, 1991), 230-235. Crystal points out why these options failed to make CEOs more 
responsible: the strike prices are commonly revalued ( if  the market dives and they end up being higher 
than market price); they are typically sold quickly, for the original strike price is almost always below the 
then prevailing market price (many companies do not even bother with the issuance o f  stock, but simply 
cut a check for the difference between market and strike prices); and they often carry a "reload" feature 
which pays the CEO the top price attained over a 10 year period if  he happens to miss it. Crystal also
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reported profits, went wholly unreported themselves—and therefore unacknowledged— 
in the debate over cost-push inflation. A similar phenomenon, even more prevalent in 
the 1960s, occurred as businesses charged research and development costs only to future 
years rather than to the year that the costs were incurred.134 As Kenneth Boulding once 
noted, economic profits and accounting profits are often best characterized as 
"uncongenial twins."135
It is difficult to say, then, just how much impact these stock option grants carried. 
Former compensation consultant Graef Crystal did attempt an educated guess, however, 
and estimated that, on the average, each long term incentive plan (of which stock 
options were, and still are, the most popular and expensive variety) reduced corporate 
earnings by 1.43%.136 While Crystal's figures include the more lucrative and varied 
compensation packages o f the 1970s and 1980s, stock option grants were quite 
prominent and lucrative even in the 1950s. President Kennedy used his knowledge of 
the stock option game, for example, in his attempt to fight the April 1962 steel price 
rise. When he threatened an IRS investigation into US Steel's new stock option plan, 
opponents called it a "fishing expedition," but US Steel responded in part because the 
President had, indeed, cast his line in well stocked waters.
One of the supreme ironies of the period is that more and more executives found 
themselves complaining of a "profit squeeze" while they energetically sought out an
notes that when FASB threatened to rethink this policy in the late 1980s, company CEOs threatened to 
pull their company contributions to the board - a major source o f  FASB funding. See also Pattie Joy, 
"FASB Change," USA Today, June 9, 1994, B l, where she notes a postponement o f  the long awaited 
change. FASB "is letting companies o ff  the hook for now," Joy noted, by postponing a requirement that 
companies disclose the effect o f  executive stock options on net income and earnings per share on 1994 
financial statements. "The board may require it for 1995 statements," she added.
134 FASB required that this practice cease in a 1975 ruling.
135 Cited by Kenneth G. Elzinga, "Pricing Achievements in Large Companies," in Arnold A. Heggestad, 
editor, Public P olicy Toward Corporations (Gainesville: University o f  Florida Press, 1988), 173. See also 
comments by Leonard Spacek o f  Arthur Anderson ("My profession seem s to regard a set o f  financial 
statements as a roulette wheel to the public investor...") and Alan Greenspan ("Profits are only a product 
o f  accountants... you never really know what they are.") in Thomas Redburn, "Accountants: Those 
Wonderful People Who Gave You Maurice Stans," Washington Monthly, February, 1975, 7-8.
136 Crystal, In Search o f  Excess, 76.
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ever expanding assortment o f perquisites like the stock option grant. Fully paid health 
insurance (also not originally included on company balance sheets), private dining 
rooms, country club memberships, chauffeurs, and corporate jets were fast becoming 
the norm for executives in the nation's largest companies. Yet these same executives 
continued to trumpet the theme of excessive wage increases, to the exclusion o f all other 
factors, even convincing themselves that it was the sole reason for inflated costs. 
"Businessmen really do worry about this," Gardner Ackley reminded Johnson, "even 
though it is largely nonsense because prices will go up to cover all labor increases."137 
To the extent that the lack o f customary productivity increases became a real problem in 
the 1970s, it was a problem associated with white-collar rather than blue-collar 
employees. "The American factory works," Lester Thurow declared in 1987; "the 
American office does not." Even the office automation revolution, which was 
theoretically supposed to increase office efficiency, has done little in the way of 
improved productivity. Computers, Thurow added, were used not to decrease the 
number of accountants, but to increase, almost perversely, the frequency and types of 
accounting instead.138 Moreover, as far as the public was concerned, never having 
developed much of a yen for the corporate cost accounting that was becoming more and 
more difficult to follow, the mechanic who succeeded in getting a raise from $3.50 to 
$3.75 per hour, rather than the executive dining, golfing, flying, faxing, or calling the 
accounting office on an ever increasing stream of corporate dollars, remained the real
137 M emo, Ackley to LBJ, July 25, 1966, Papers o f  LBJ, White House Central Files, Gen LA 6, Box 20, 
LBJ Library.
138 Lester C. Thurow, "Constructing a Microeconomics That is Consistent With Keynesian 
Macroeconomics," in Reese, ed., The Legacy o f  Keynes, 183-190. Quotation from ibid., 184. Thurow 
pointed out how in the 1978-1985 period blue-collar productivity advanced  22% (2.9% annually) while 
white-collar productivity declined  by 5%. Noting also that in 1987 there were approximately 58 million 
white-collar workers in the U.S. workforce and only 30 million blue-collar workers, Thurow suggested 
that the decline in white-collar productivity wiped out much o f the gain in blue-collar productivity. See 
ibid., 183.
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culprit in the late 1960s cost-push inflation scenario.139 While Ford executives received 
a new car every four months, had these cars washed and filled with gas free o f charge 
every day, and traveled exclusively first class on all airlines, they, and the public, 
persisted in blaming their machinists and technicians for all cost control problems.140
In the realm of economic forces that were beneficial, but also a significant source o f 
diminished profit margins, many companies—including those outside of the Fortune 
500—found themselves in the late 1960s choosing liquidity over profitability precisely 
because their market positions were so fundamentally sound. Profitable, expanding 
businesses with secure markets, after all, were wise to increase their investment (and 
interest) expenditures, and to incur larger than normal outlays for raw materials to 
expand future profitability and to take advantage o f quantity discounts. Indeed, as 
shown by a layer cake diagram of the distribution o f national income in the 1960s, the 
share o f profits declined at the expense of greater interest costs before unit wage costs 
ever become much of a problem (late 1965 or early 1966).141 While this behavior 
decreased short term profit margins, it also represented a tremendous expansion of 
corporate assets (and greater depreciation allowances), it increased the likelihood of 
greater future profits, and was, at the very least, a weak rationale, in and of itself, for 
increased prices.
There were also a number of somewhat less significant accounting and managerial 
changes that lowered reported profits even as real economic profits continued on a
139 Thomas Redbum, writing for The Washington Monthly, commented on the public's lack o f  interest in 
corporate accounting standards and noted that "even Ralph Nader hasn't investigated accounting, 
presumably because the subject is too boring, even for him." See Redbum, "Accountants: Those 
Wonderful People," 6. In retrospect, what is even more surprising is how fervently American companies 
pushed the "profit squeeze" theme even in the early  1960s when they were literally flooded with cash and 
record profits. A brief perusal o f  most newsweeklies o f  the period will reveal an assortment o f  
advertisements featuring the "profit squeeze" theme. A commonly occurring one, for example, is one 
produced by Bell Telephone with the slogan, "Selling by Long Distance is Our Best Answer to the Profit 
Squeeze."
140 Paul H. Weaver, The Suicidal Corporation: How Big Business Fails Am erica  (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1988), 96.
141 Boulding, "Inflation as a Process in Human Learning," 19.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
302
historically upward or stable trajectory. The switch from first in, firs t out (FIFO) cost 
accounting to last in, first out (LIFO) cost accounting was one o f the most significant 
changes in this regard.142 FIFO accounting, the traditional choice largely because many 
firms were FIFO price makers (adding set markups to inventory as it arrived, rather than 
when it was sold), and because it regarded historical costs as more important than 
replacement costs (most likely closer to a given industry's actual costs), gave way 
slowly to LIFO accounting in the late 1960s as businesses first sought a way to account 
for inflation, and later (in the mid to late 1970s) when these same businesses sought tax 
relief to ameliorate the alleged profit diminishing effects of inflation.143 While only an 
estimated 15% of the nation's stock was valued along LIFO lines before the 1973-1974 
inflationary explosion, until the late 1960s the percentage was closer to zero. Certainly 
small in comparison to the later shift in the 1973-1981 period, when the number of 
LIFO valued stocks approached 50%, this change alone does explain, however, at least 
some of the profit erosion reported in the 1967-1971 period.144
The trend toward more lucrative executive compensation also had an additional 
residual effect on corporate accounting practices and profit margins, particularly after 
the Nixon recessions in the 1969-1970 period changed company expectations and 
performance standards. In short, when profits as well as company stock prices exhibited 
steady increases as they had in the mid 1960s, executives and their compensation 
consultants all wanted pay for performance. When recession hit in 1969, however—the
142 Under FIFO cost accounting a given company's stock is valued by the purchase price when it entered 
that company's inventory; while it still relies on actual billings to the firm and not up to the minute 
market price, LIFO accounting values the same stock closer to its replacement cost (by using the most 
recent "last in" purchase price, obviously higher during inflationary periods).
143 See Weaver, The Suicidal Corporation, 155-159, on the adoption and eventual abandonment o f  
inflation accounting. On the push for the tax cut Weaver noted: "With the tax cut o f  1981 firmly in place, 
business quietly dropped inflation accounting.... N o more companies converted from FIFO to LIFO." 
Ibid., 158.
144 Percentages cited by Arthur Okun in Prices and  Quantities, 159. As Paul Weaver noted in The 
Suicidal Corporation, 158, while this accounting change effectively lowered reported profits, no change 
was implemented to account for the way inflation lessened the cost o f  borrowing by making it easier to 
repay previous loans (thereby inflating actual profitability).
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
303
first o f its kind since early 1961—this "pay for performance" credo came at least partly 
unhinged. More compensation packages as a result featured bonuses that paid off even 
when company performance plummeted. The upshot o f this change was a slightly less 
prominent interest in artificially bloated profit margins. While this phenomenon 
(artificially high accounting profits) was probably never as popular as it has often been 
assumed—taxes, after all, have to be paid on the artificial profits— lax enforcement of 
accounting standards helped it prevail in many businesses, and it was often utilized in 
situations where companies were desperate for investment capital (Lockheed, Chrysler). 
To the small extent that changes in executive compensation also changed this behavior, 
profit margins, again, were affected— albeit to a very small degree—by changes in 
accounting practices rather than changes in real performance.
As mergers became more and more popular in the late 1960s, partly because bigger 
companies tended to offer more lucrative executive compensation (for the executives 
engineering the takeover), this behavior was replicated in a slightly different fashion. 
Executives in targeted companies often sought lower reported, or lower actual profits, to 
avoid the takeover and the subsequent loss of their lucrative pay packages (or jobs). 
Armco Steel, for example, changed their depreciation accounting in 1969 to lower 
reported profits and ward off a takeover.145 Here, a perverse rationale for 
conglomeration joined with defensive, self-destructive behavior to lower corporate 
profit margins also for reasons that had little, if anything, to do with rising unit wage 
costs.
The situation rapidly developing, then, in the late 1960s, which led to the higher 
than average inflation in the 1966-1968 period, was not o f the government deficit- 
induced, demand pull variety, as is often assumed. A quick look at the diminishing, 
rather than widening, federal deficits o f the period should at least partly dispel this
145 Redbum, "Accountants: Those Wonderful People Who Gave You Maurice Stans," 13.
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notion.146 Nor was it, on the other hand, simply a case of oligopolists trying to wring 
higher and higher profits out o f a bewildered and defenseless American public. 
Oligopolistic industries, after all, partly because they tended to have more persistent, 
unnaturally wide profit margins to begin with, have historically shown less of a 
tendency to increase prices in high demand situations than their more atomistic 
counterparts.147 Because success often breeds success, this is, in part, why Johnson 
focused the guideposts most squarely on oligopolistic industries like steel, aluminum, 
and automobiles.
The inflationary phenomenon that was taking shape, however, came instead as a 
result o f forces that were subject to a substantial amount o f corporate managerial 
discretion. Business compulsion for customary profit margins; rapid, but temporary 
advances in customary profit levels; followed by the cessation o f these advances at the 
hands of forces that were either intentionally disavowed (cost overruns due to corporate 
discretionary spending) or generally misapprehended (cost increases due to labor market 
tightening and the need for added capital investment) did more to create the inflationary 
psychology and rising prices o f the late 1960s than anything else.
Because the economic expansion o f the Kennedy-Johnson years was so long (a 
record 102 months, from March 1961 to November 1969) and because both Kennedy 
and Johnson found themselves having to "purchase" business support for a liberal 
reform agenda, profits rose to record levels by the mid 1960s and remained there for an
146 The deficits (-) or surpluses (+) for 1967 through 1969 are 1967: -$12.4 billion; 1968: -$6.5 billion;
1969: +$7.3 billion. Source: Economic Report o f  the President, February, 1972. Senator Gary Hart, a 
self-proclaimed anti-Keynesian, New  Democrat, who ran in 1974 suggesting that "we don't need any 
more Hubert Humphreys," said o f  these deficits: "In retrospect, obsession with fiscal deficits at such 
relatively paltry levels seem s quaint and almost touchingly naive." See Hart, The G ood Fight, 122.
147 Numerous studies have also shown that a general price stickiness prevails to a slightly lesser extent 
among "competitive" businesses. See Yoram Weiss, "Inflation and Price Adjustment: A Survey o f  
Findings From Micro-Data," and Alan S. Blinder, "Why Are Prices Sticky? Preliminary Results From an 
Interview Study" in Eytan Sheshinski and Yoram Weiss, editors, Optim al Pricing, Inflation, and the Cost 
o f  Price Adjustment (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993), for recent microeconomic analyses anticipated by the 
work o f  Arthur Okun in the late 1970s.
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uncommonly long period o f time. Prepared more for the kind of politics and economic 
practices that seemed to be coalescing during the 1962 stock market plunge, American 
corporations accepted this development only grudgingly and with a trained pessimism 
attuned to partisan rather than consensus politics. Besides making Kennedy and 
Johnson's political struggle that much more profound, this development also blurred the 
distinction between normal (or even deficient) profits and those more commonly 
associated with oligopolistic windfall during a sustained economic recovery. 
Oligopolistic industries, and even a great number of more competitive businesses, who 
had expected higher than normal profits over short periods of time, sustained these 
profits in the 1960s over a considerably longer span of time but largely refused to 
recognize them for what they were.148 Kennedy and Johnson, both keenly aware of this 
unprecedented situation, as well as business intransigence and pessimism, expected it to 
bear fruit, nonetheless, in two distinct ways: greater corporate acceptance o f the liberal 
reform agenda that did much to create the steady stream of profits; and a greater 
willingness on the part o f these same corporations to share future economic gains with 
workers and consumers by keeping prices relatively stable. Though he was clearly 
accommodated by other special factors (Goldwater's extremist views and fallout from 
the Kennedy assassination), the 1964 presidential election showed that Johnson had 
done much to achieve the first objective; rising inflation over Johnson's last two years in 
office showed the second objective to be much more elusive.
It is true, however, that inflation had become noticeable before this development 
manifested itself in 1966 and 1967 (as the nation neared full employment).149 The first 
alarms, after all, both within and outside of the administration, had been sounded as
148 See Arthur Okun, Prices and Quantities, 139, for an explanation o f  how "competitive" businesses 
tend to mimic oligopolistic price setting behavior (shopping costs for the consumer, and the prevalence o f  
a substantial number o f  products and services purchased too infrequently to trigger the spread o f  
information and the convergence o f  prices).
149 Unemployment dropped below 4% for the first time since the early 1950s in February, 1966 (3.8%).
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early as the summer o f 1965 (curiously close to the first big escalation o f U.S. 
involvement in Vietnam). Most o f this inflation, however, could be explained by four 
largely benign factors: positive changes in the quality o f products and services 
(accounting for an estimated 1% annual inflation rate); service sector "catch-up," where 
there was a real need for changes in relative wages; the growing predominance of 
"positional" versus "material" goods as general prosperity increased; and the presence of 
temporary supply bottlenecks (food and physicians were two prominent examples of 
this during the mid 1960s).150
It was only after the nation reached relatively, and seemingly persistent, full 
employment, in late 1967 (after an early 1967 inventory adjustment and slight economic 
slowdown) that the nation's price setting environment began to reflect a fundamental 
change.151 It was also precisely at this point, however, where President Johnson 
expected corporations to temper their pricing decisions, to realize that their recent high 
profit levels were anything but customary, and to share willingly a greater percentage of 
the increased (and increasing) national product with workers and consumers.152 A 
sacrifice only to the extent that it would impact short term profitability— already at peak
150 See Alan S. Blinder, "Why the Costs o f  Services is Soaring," Business Week, November 16, 1992 ,22 , 
for a discussion o f  the tendency for service sector prices to rise faster than those in the manufacturing 
sector (due to limitations on productivity advances); and Omar F. Hamouda and Lorie Tarshis, 
"Stagflation for Our Grandchildren," in Omar F. Hamouda and John N. Smithin, eds., Keynes and  Public 
Policy after Fifty Years, Volume 2, Theories and Method (New York: New  York University Press, 1988) 
205-208, for an explanation o f  the "positional" versus "material" goods phenomena. Hamouda and 
Tarshis suggest that "positional" goods, the supply o f  which is relatively demand inelastic (these are 
goods that cannot be easily reproduced, like a designer gown or choice building site on a scenic beach), 
tend to price increases whenever general economic welfare is increased. "Material goods," on the other 
hand, tend to be produced in greater quantity and reflect little or no price increases in the same situation.
151 1967 was the only year duing the Johnson administration in which unemployment rose from one 
quarter to the next, moving from 3.7% in 1966-IV to 3.8% in 1967-1, sustained over the next two 
quarters, to 3.9% in 1967-IV. Source: Bureau o f  Labor Statistics, Employment and Earnings, quarterly 
averages o f  monthly statistics.
152 It is interesting to note that July 1966 was the last month in the 1960s where unit labor costs remained 
at or below their 1960 averages, and where the spread between unit labor costs (on the low side) and 
wholesale prices o f  manufactured products (on the high side) reached its highest poin t since 1951. See 
Reuther, Policies an d  Priorities fo r  Progress, 17; and Meany, "Wage and Price Policies and Trends," 10-
11.
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levels— this expectation also carried with it, through its effect upon the depth and 
predictability o f sales, great potential for sustained savings in capacity utilization, 
inventory costs and production scheduling. Its positive impact on long term 
profitability, in other words, would have clearly produced added benefits far 
outweighing the fractional short term profit loss associated with relatively stable prices 
amidst rising wages.
Had there truly been a rational, frictionless, free market—that cleared as effectively 
as many monetarists or supply siders imagined it to— this favored response would have 
been produced automatically. Because the U.S. economy even has a difficult time, 
however, approximating this kind of rational, market clearing behavior, this was not 
going to happen without a great deal o f pushing and shoving and presidential 
persuasion, designed in Johnson's case to remake the entire, profit-centered paradigm 
that so thoroughly dominated the U.S. political economy. That is why Johnson devoted 
so much energy tu the struggle and why, as Walter Heller once noted, "he gave the 
guideposts [such] a bear hug."153
U.S. firms had encouraged the use o f a relatively fixed (but inertia packed) cost 
standard, however, as opposed to a more reactive, profit-maximizing one based on 
marginal values, precisely because it was obscure enough to be useful and, at the same 
time, the only fair means to a price rise according to the relatively ill-informed general 
public. "The firm leans on a cost standard for pricing," Arthur Okun noted, "using 
customer ignorance about costs to lift its prices above the standard without creating 
waves o f antagonism."154 Johnson's almost insurmountable task, then—which he hoped 
to mitigate with the guideposts, corporate good will, and corporate sensitivity to 
political favors— was to educate the public on the vagaries o f this cost standard and to 
convince business that it should not abandon it but only use it less selfishly. By all
153 Quoted in Crauford Goodwin, "A Report o f  the Conference," 389.
154 Okun, Prices an d  Quantities, 154.
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indications, he had convinced many business leaders that he was a seeker o f genuine 
consensus, and had become, therefore, a president they were often willing to follow.
The guideposts had also knocked several tenths o f a percent off o f the Johnson era price 
indices, and had also affected them in additional, largely undetectable, ways through 
their impact on the nation's inflationary outlook. Even these limited accomplishments, 
however, came only with an enormous expenditure of presidential energy; the 
traditional willingness to shirk the challenges of full employment made such a 
contribution almost an absolute requirement. That Johnson was willing to accept these 
challenges and press on with unparallelled vigor, boded well for the prosperity and 
stability o f the late 1960s. That his actions failed to convince institutional leaders and 
the public at large of the novel and quite real potential for economic stability at full 
employment, ensured, tragically, that future Presidents would have to make similar 
sacrifices and similar commitments. Unlike Johnson, few would prove equal to the task. 
"LBJ's energy," Otto Eckstein remarked, "was a sine qua non for the effectiveness of the 
guidepost policies, but was, perhaps an unreasonable expenditure....only a President 
Johnson could undertake it." '55
155 Quoted in Cochrane, "Moral Suasion," 293.
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Chapter 7.
Guns and Butter Revisited, or How I 
Stopped Worrying and Learned to Love Inflated Costs
There are many strategies for the achievement o f conservative— or reactionary 
ends. Those who drew Lyndon Johnson away from these preoccupations (federal aid to 
education, medical care for the aged, and civil rights reforms) into Vietnam and made 
that his fame were as skilled as any in all history.
- John Kenneth Galbraith
Because o f the influx o f U.S. supplies [into Vietnam], dockside waits are often 
quite lengthy...at one point late last year 120 craft were riding at anchor.
- Fortune magazine, March 1966
Were "guns and butter," the fabled agents of economic destruction, without impact, 
then, on inflation and the eventual economic decline of the 1970s? There is, quite 
simply, little to suggest that they did not play a significant role and that they had, on the 
contrary, profound implications for both the price inflation of the 1960s and the 
stagflation of the 1970s. Though the war in Vietnam, at its peak, comprised only 3% of 
the nation's GNP and never functioned as some critics had claimed—as a public 
employment program of last resort— it remained an irrefutable and significant factor in 
the economic turmoil of the age.1 Certainly less profound was the inflationary impact of 
the Great Society, but in evidence here, as well, were significant and lasting
1 Source o f  3% figure: Douglas B. Lee and John W. Dyckman, "Economic Impacts o f  the War: A 
Primer," American Institute o f  Planners Journal, September 1970, 298; and Walter W. Heller, "Getting 
Ready for Peace," Harper's, April 1968, 57.
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consequences. Neither the war nor the Great Society, however, produced much inflation 
or economic mischief based solely on their fiscal impact. Throughout the Johnson 
presidency, that was mostly negligible and benign.
In a layer-cake diagram, for example, depicting the components o f gross capacity 
product, expenditures for the war in Vietnam—as opposed to those for World War II 
and even the Korean War, appear as a hardly noticeable bump.2 Until 1968, despite the 
often unpredictable path they took, most outlays for Vietnam were actually offset by 
reductions in other areas of Defense spending and by new DoD efficiencies. Only in 
1968, when these offsets approached their political limits, did the marginal fiscal impact 
o f the war truly carry significant and noticeable weight. It was also precisely at this 
point that Johnson began to reconsider the whole war effort and sought to bring the 
CEA into the critical debates over future Vietnam policy, requesting input from CEA 
chair Arthur Okun in a March 1968 memo.3 "We began rooting for the doves," Okun 
recalled, "and hoping that the President was paying more attention to them than 
worrying about what Walt Rostow was telling him."4 1968 was also the year in which 
the fiscal impact of expenditures for Vietnam reached their peak (as reflected by 
additions to GNP).5 By 1969, a year in which the Johnson administration achieved a 
budget surplus, spending for Vietnam no longer impelled a greater than desired level of 
fiscal stimulus.
Despite its not insignificant proportions and its emasculation of preferred spending 
alternatives, the war in Vietnam sparked little concern, within the Johnson 
administration, over "runaway spending" and produced a fiscal policy that failed to 
measure up to only the high and unprecedented standards set by Johnson and his
2 Boulding, "Inflation as a Process in Human Learning," 17.
3 Okun, Oral History Interview, in Hargrove and Morley, eds., The President and the CEA , 279. Okun 
also noted here that this change led to Johnson's first rejection o f  a Vietnam spending proposal.
4 Okun, Oral History Interview, LBJ Library, March 29, 1969, Interview III, 6.
5 Citing a 1978 Wharton econometric study, Anthony S. Campagna points out that Vietnamese war 
additions to GNP went from $10 billion in 1966 to $25 billion in 1967 and 1968 to $3 billion in 1969. 
Campagna, The Economic Consequences o f  the Vietnam War (New York: Praeger, 1991), 45.
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Keynesian advisers. In October 1966, Gardner Ackley referred to the new financial 
demands o f the war as "an unexpected and unwelcome source o f further fiscal 
stimulus," but Walter Heller still warned of the potential for impending fiscal drag 
rather than excess demand. If defense spending were to level off at FY 1967 levels, 
Heller noted, a fiscal drag o f $12 billion would still develop by FY 1969, and o f $20 
billion by FY 1970.6 In a speech delivered the following year, in which he suggested the 
likely need for fiscal stimulus, Ackley would repeat this theme: "If the Vietnam war 
ended soon— by surprise— it should not set off a financial panic, and we could look 
forward to a tax cut, a reimposition o f suspended credits [investment tax credits for 
business] and easier monetary policy."7 And even by mid-1968, Heller continued to 
stress the compatibility o f the otherwise regrettable military outlays and necessary 
social spending. "War in Vietnam— or elsewhere— is not necessary to create jobs and to 
keep factories humming in America," Heller declared. "Nor is it such a drain on the 
economy that we have to give up our wars on poverty, slums, ignorance, and pollution 
here at home...wars do generate demand and thus enlarge total spending, income, jobs, 
profits, and production. But today we can do all these things in other ways and do them 
far better."8 Responding to critics who suggested that the war functioned as a chosen 
fiscal instrument, Johnson declared, in January 1966, that "production for Vietnam 
accounts for less than 1 Vi percent of our GNP....Our prosperity does not depend on our 
military effort."9 In October 1966, citing the declining level o f defense spending relative
6 Ackley, Notes o f  Vandeveer Memorial Lecture, Southern Illinois University, October 26, 1966, 
Robson-Ross Papers, Box 9, LBJ Library; Heller, N ew Dimensions, 106. "Fiscal drag" referred to the 
phenomenon by which growth produced added revenues which produced, ceteris paribus and at 
approximate budget balance, stagnating fiscal surpluses.
7 Ackley, Notes o f  speech, Luncheon o f  N1CB (National Industrial Conference Board), Waldorf-Astoria 
Hotel, "Business in 1967," Robson-Ross Papers, Box 9, LBJ Library. A ckley compared the "recent" $8  
billion increase in defense outlays to the $23.5 billion increase that occurred in a much smaller econom y  
from 1950-III to 1951-III.
8 Heller, "Getting Ready for Peace," 57.
9 Johnson, "Annual M essage to Congress: The Economic Report o f  the President," January 27, 1966, 
Public Papers, 1966: /, 97.
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to GNP since mid-1962, CEA member Arthur Okun even felt compelled to remind the 
American Ordnance Association o f this outlook. "Defense spending was clearly not the 
fuel propelling the economy toward full employment," Okun noted, but was instead "a 
lubricant that greased the wheels."10 By the end of the Johnson presidency, it remained 
an economic stimulus only by default and it was a lubricant for which the 
administration could find ample and much more suitable substitutes. "If we put our 
growing economic knowledge to work in sensible postwar planning," Walter Heller 
remarked in April 1968, "an end to the Vietnam War will be, not just a political and 
moral, but also an economic blessing."11
While the war in Vietnam had inflationary consequences that were not 
insignificant, it is therefore misleading to suggest— in light o f its relatively limited 
fiscal impact—that these stemmed solely or even largely from the fiscal stimulus that 
the war represented. Fiscal policy o f the era, affected greatly by the demands of the war 
in Vietnam, was never perfect. Rapid military appropriations in late 1965, for example, 
made fiscal planning and economic forecasting both difficult and unsettling through 
much of the following year. Likewise, the approximately $25 billion deficit in FY 1968 
was, despite wide-scale predictions for recession in 1967, clearly greater than Johnson 
or his economic advisers would have preferred. Yet, however daunting these problems 
may have been, neither revealed anything fundamentally wrong with the 
administration's economic strategy and neither lasted long enough to impair economic 
growth or stability. "Clearly, our economic policy in the first year of Vietnam," Walter 
Heller recalled in 1968, "was not all it might have been....But all told, the U.S. economy 
has rolled remarkably well with the punch of Vietnam, confounding both those critics 
who feared ruinous inflation in 1966 and those who foresaw a severe recession in
10 N otes o f  speech, Arthur Okun to the American Ordnance Association, Fort Lesley J. McNair, 
Washington D.C., October 12, 1966, Robson-Ross Papers, Box 19, LBJ Library.
11 Heller, "Getting Ready for Peace," 57.
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1967."12 Forecasting problems lasted only months and certainly proved to be o f little 
consequence by the end of 1966. Inflation in food and services, largely immune to fiscal 
and monetary policies, accounted for over half of the nation's inflation in 1966.13 Two 
tax bills in 1966, plus tightened credit, slowed inflation in 1967 without resort to 
disruptive mandatory controls. The nation's output of goods and services (just under a 
6% advance in 1966) easily kept pace with its rapidly expanding demand, including the 
added demand associated with the war in Vietnam. And by 1969, the previous year's 
fiscal deficit had been transformed into a fiscal surplus.
At the same time, the war effort may have well produced the kinds o f dislocations, 
common to most war-time economies, that often breed inflation and instability. Defense 
industries, after all, use proportionately fewer unskilled workers than the private sector 
and are less likely to hire from the ranks o f the unemployed. The shift of labor—skilled 
or unskilled— into war industries tends to raise the disposable income of shifted workers 
without producing additional production or consumer goods likely to be demanded by 
the wealthier labor force. The monopsonistic character of war contracts also tends to 
inhibit capital formation in the war industries themselves, particularly if  the end of the 
war is alleged to be near. The riskiness of dependence upon a single buyer, the all too 
customary predicament of many military contractors, truly can force those dependent 
industries to avoid expensive capital outlays or worker recruitment and training efforts 
and to utilize instead the more inflationary options of older machinery and overtime 
pay.14
Despite a swelling military budget in the 1965-1970 period, the war in Vietnam 
exhibited few of these tendencies to any remarkable extent. Many armaments 
manufacturers, for example, used Vietnam war contracts to subsidize capital expansion
12 Ibid., 58-59.
13 Ibid., 59.
14 Lee and Dyckman, "Economic Impacts o f  the War," 300-307.
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in their more consumer oriented divisions. Even the most aggressive military capitalists 
realized that while they could certainly fatten up on war contracts, they could not 
depend upon them indefinitely or with any confidence that they would not exhibit wide 
variation, even in the short run. McDonnell purchased Douglas Aircraft precisely for 
this reason, and United Aircraft and Raytheon also diversified their operations to avoid 
an overdependence upon war contracts. Others, such as General Motors, who produced 
cannon shells and supply trucks for the war effort, simply used profits from their 
military contracts to subsidize their already extensive non-military efforts.15 Companies 
that often fared less well, such as Lockheed and General Dynamics, simply refused to 
see that corporations could not function as grizzly bears, gorging themselves during one 
season and hibernating through another, particularly if  rational cost controls had been 
neglected when profits were expanding.16 The National Association o f Manufacturers 
even used this quite readily apparent tendency toward diversification to suggest that 
profits on war contracts were most often insufficient. Why else, they asked, would 
companies invest more in the production o f consumer or producer goods?17
What all this implied is quite simply the opposite o f the prevailing conventional 
wisdom, then and now. Guns and butter were not only possible, as President Johnson so 
often asserted, but were also, if  one had to have the guns in any substantial quantity, an 
economically advantageous combination. High consumer demand and expanding anti­
poverty programs, referred to by US News and World Report as "a lavish serving of
15 In 1969, General Motors received the tenth largest share o f  Defense dollar contracts, totaling $584.4  
million. Yet, from 1961-1967, a period in which their defense contracts compared favorably to the 1969 
totals, these contracts comprised only 2% o f  their total sales. Lockheed received the largest share o f  
Defense dollar contracts in 1969 (slightly over $2 billion worth) and proved to be most dependent on 
defense contracts in the 1961-1967 period among the top contractors (88% o f  total sales). Cited by 
Carroll W. Purcell, Jr., "Military-Industrial Complex," in Glenn Porter, ed., Encyclopedia o f  American  
Economic History: Studies o f  the Principal Movements and Ideas, Vol. HI (N ew  York: Charles Scribner's 
Sons, 1980), 932.
16 Ibid., 306.
17 "Comments o f  the NAM  on H.R. 14802 and Other Bills to Extend the Renegotiation Act o f  1951," 
submitted to House Ways and Means committee, February 28, 1968, NAM Papers, Series IV, Box 162, 
Hagley Library.
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butter," insured that defense industries would not curtail production for consumer 
markets as they tooled up for military production, but would expand such operations 
instead as a hedge against quieter, less profitable times.18 As a result o f these mostly 
rational business practices, as well as the unusually high proportion o f consumer goods 
(clothing, construction materials, foodstuffs) in Pentagon purchase orders for Vietnam, 
the war carried far less inflationary potential than most previous conflicts or high- 
technology defense spending in general.
What the war exposed, then, was not the economic myopia o f a paralyzed 
administration, the inherent weakness o f a full employment economy or the automatic 
tendency o f such an economy to breed inflation, but the very strength o f the New 
Economics and its Keynesian underpinnings. That it also magnified the perverse 
relationship between prosperity and corporate pricemaking tendencies, only insured that 
some inflation would result in spite o f  appropriate macroeconomic policy. Parkinson's 
Second Law, that expenditure rises to meet income, proved especially applicable to the 
corporate community (as opposed to the governmental milieu to which it was originally 
directed) during the war in Vietnam.19 Brought to the attention o f the federal 
government by the prosperity o f the Kennedy-Johnson years, which made them both 
potentially and actually more problematic, and Kennedy and Johnson's challenge to 
such behavior, which forced companies to confront their self-destructive tendencies, 
corporate spending practices had more to do with the inflation o f the era than either war 
finance or the fiscal and monetary policies o f the Johnson administration. At the same 
time, war finance and a full employment economic strategy only made these practices 
more difficult to contain or identify, and also made it easier for business leaders (and 
their political allies) to scapegoat government policy for problems of their own doing, a 
challenge readily acknowledged and accepted by President Johnson. "We know that
18 "Guns and Butter: Failure o f  a Policy," US News an d  W orld Report, February 12, 1968, 27.
19 See C. Northcote Parkinson, The Law an d the Profits (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1960).
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when most people have good jobs at good wages, we have problems with pricing," 
Johnson noted in September 1966.20 "They do give us problems," he declared three 
months later, when asked about new workers, full employment and inflation. "You have 
problems in whatever you do, whether you have unemployment or full employment. We 
like the problems we have now., .much more than we do those we would discuss if  we 
had a depression"21
Where the war functioned as a stimulus to inflation, and where the Johnson 
economic strategy fell short was at the level o f the firm, a level at which microeconomic 
price-setting phenomena prevailed. Aggregate demand and the fiscal and monetary 
policies o f the late 1960s, despite the jumbled forecasts in early 1966, the deficit in FY 
1968, and the omnipresent gap between policy choices and political reality, remained 
largely at a level compatible with relative price stability. Expenditures for Vietnam, in 
the absence o f preferred alternatives, clearly helped sustain the full employment or near­
full employment o f the latter Johnson years, and this environment also helped sustain 
the corporate behaviors that created much of the period's price inflation. But in most 
sectors and for most of the period in question (the Johnson presidential years) these 
expenditures and the federal budget in general did not cause price inflation nor was the 
inflationary response an automatic or otherwise unavoidable product o f this 
environment. Business managers, especially those directing companies with profitable 
war contracts, simply played a much larger role in the upward movement of prices than 
did the aggregate demand bolstered by the New Economics and the war effort. And 
while the connection between prosperity, advancing profits, and altered price-setting 
practices made the war effort a significant part o f the era's inflationary trend, other 
businesses, less directly affected by war contracts and war profits, exhibited the same
20 Johnson, Transcript o f  Press Conference, September 2 1 ,1 9 6 6 , The Johnson Presidential Press 
Conferences, Volume 2, 563.
21 Johnson, Transcript o f  Press Conference, December 2, 1966, Austin Texas, The Johnson Presidential 
Press Conferences, Volume 2, 681.
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tendency. The profitability of the age in general, not the war in Vietnam or the full 
employment policies that helped yield such high profitability, produced most o f the 
period's inflation. Through the mechanism of higher, and mostly discretionary, business 
costs, including the reputedly inescapable cost of unionized labor, businesses resorted to 
price inflation simply because they could, without suffering either an inordinant amount 
o f customer defection or public disapproval. Consistent demand and high profits insured 
that few businesses had to raise prices, but it also made it easier for many to do so.
Although their impact on aggregate demand was even less consequential, specific 
Great Society programs played a similar role in the national economy. Within Johnson's 
presidency, appropriations to programs such as Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC), the Job Corps, or the Food Stamps Program, despite popular images 
to the contrary, provided little stimulus to aggregate demand. Where Vietnam 
expenditures comprised approximately 3% of the nation's GNP, these programs 
combined for far less than 1 %.22 Outlays for those Great Society programs directed at 
the more prosperous middle classes, such as Medicare and aid to education, loomed 
somewhat larger but still carried too little macroeconomic weight to have any 
significant role in the emergence of a hypothetical excess demand situation. Absent this 
kind of impact, the microeconomic effects of the Great Society were still quite 
profound. Here, as it was with military contracts, corporate pricing policies were 
affected intimately; Medicaid and Medicare checks, grants for public housing and 
school construction, and various other products o f Great Society legislation, had 
significant impact, indeed, on the depth and duration of corporate profits, on the ability 
and willingness of corporations to alter their spending patterns, and on the subsequent 
pricing schemes affected directly by the newly ingrained spending habits.
22 See Johnson, "Annual Budget Message to Congress, Fiscal Year 1970," January 15, 1969, Public 
Papers, 1968-1969: II, 1273-1306.
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Regarding the Great Society and its macroeconomic impact, one caveat remains. 
The real issue, o f course, is whether or not direct spending on the poor, either in tandem 
with or separate from Vietnam expenditures, contributed to aggregate demand in such a 
way as to create an unavoidable, inflationary spiral, a contention which formed a part of 
what Robert Kuttner called "The Economic Illlusion."23 Those who have suggested that 
the Great Society functioned in this manner generally referred to it only as the "War on 
Poverty," for this enabled them to accentuate what they believed to be the real source of 
the ensuing inflationary crisis: spending on the poor, or the "lavish butter" added to an 
economy at or near full employment. Ironically, President Johnson believed his anti­
poverty effort to be even larger and more expensive than that suggested by the specific 
and clearly stunted anti-poverty programs. He simply did not consider the programs 
directed exclusively at the nation's poor, or the largely experimental programs o f the 
Office o f Economic Opportunity, to be the alpha and beta of the War on Poverty; other 
more general efforts were equally significant and the whole endeavor was most 
dependent upon a broad assault that included all economic policies. Joe Califano 
recalled that Johnson "was especially miffed that the press often judged his war on 
poverty by the size of the OEO [Office of Economic Opportunity] budget instead of the 
many more billions spent for health, education, housing, and cash benefits for the 
poor."24 Johnson himself often expressed the belief that few o f these investments made 
any sense unless coupled with the expanded opportunities inherent to a demand- 
oriented, full employment economy. "Because poverty itself is a complex problem 
composed of many interlocking facets," Johnson noted in his presidential memoirs, "our 
assault on it had to be an integrated attack launched on many fronts."25 Job training, for 
example, made little sense if the economy could not generate the jobs for which the
23 See Robert Kuttner, The Economic Illusion: False Choices Between Prosperity and Socia l Justice 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1984).
24 Califano, Triumph an d Tragedy, 168.
25 Johnson, Vantage Point, 81.
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disadvantaged were trained. "If combined with general economic policies to create job 
opportunities, and with equality o f job opportunity," CEA member Otto Eckstein 
remarked in 1965, summing up the administration approach, "the new investments in 
human resources should yield a handsome and satisfying return to society."26 Indeed, 
many overlooked the real gains made by the War on Poverty simply because they failed 
to recognize the critical role of Johnson's broader economic strategy. At the end of the 
Johnson presidency Business Week attempted to remind its readers o f this all too 
prevalent tendency:
Though the prosperity has been accompanied by a new sensitivity toward poverty 
and racial inequality, which sometimes made it seem as if  nothing was being done 
about those problems, the record is replete with evidence of progress. The number 
of Americans living below the poverty line declined by 18-million between 1961 
and 1968. And the unemployment rate for adult Negro males has declined from an 
appalling 11.4% in the winter o f 1961 to 3.9% in late 1968.27
Though these critical connections between economic strategy and anti-poverty efforts
were severed quickly and somewhat surreptitiously in the administration o f his
successor, Johnson contended that the Great Society, the War on Poverty, and the New
Economics advanced together or little at all.
In light o f Johnson's preferred approach, then, the War on Poverty had a more
substantial macroeconomic impact than its more conventional definition would imply.
But this was ultimately not what most critics referred to when they assailed Johnson's
"guns and butter" economic strategy, nor was it relevant to these "excess demand"
criticisms anyway, since the total o f all demand, including the War on Poverty (in either
manifestation), was not great enough to trigger very much of the period's price inflation.
Guns and  butter, in other words, were compatible with economic stability and full
employment, at least within the limits set for them by the Johnson administration.
26 N otes o f  Speech, Otto Eckstein, May 7, 1965, West Virginia University Conference on Poverty 
Amidst Affluence, Morgantown, WV, Robson-Ross Papers, Box 19, LBJ Library.
27 "New Economists Leave Their Last Testament," Business Week, January 18, 1969, 102-103.
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Johnson always hoped to break out o f the self-imposed limitations on social spending 
and lamented the conservative attacks on the minimal appropriations earmarked 
specifically for the War on Poverty. "Our work was just beginning," he once contended, 
"but there were those who felt that even this beginning was too much."28 But he always 
placed clear macroeconomic limits on both the Great Society and the war in Vietnam; 
large fiscal deficits were simply not perpetual or even routine components o f the 
Johnson political economy.29 The major problem with the FY 1968 budget, Budget 
Director Charles Schultze told Johnson in late 1966, was that "we are not able fund 
adequately the new Great Society programs."30 Appropriate fiscal policy and the level 
o f economic growth defined the parameters of Great Society spending, not the actual 
needs of even the most effective programs. While Johnson hoped to extend the Great 
Society partly through increased political leverage and expanding program popularity, 
he believed that only economic growth could truly insure its viability and long term 
success. "As long as the economy was growing rapidly..." Arthur Okun recalled, "he 
really did see an opportunity for shifting...the distribution o f public services toward the 
disadvantaged without having anybody feel it very much...it would be sharing the gains 
rather than asking for belt-tightening."31 Great Society outlays, in other words, were 
designed less to be the engine of the nation's prosperity than both a part and product o f a 
much broader assault on poverty, economic inequality, economic under-achievement, 
and racial discrimination.
Since the war had little intrinsic economic value to the Johnson administration, 
limited perhaps to its salutary effect upon the conservative reception of liberal domestic 
concerns, it is tempting to conclude that Johnson did not desire the war at all and that he
28 Johnson, Vantage Point, 82.
29 The budget deficits/surpluses for the Johnson years are, 1964:-$3.3 billion; 1965:+$0.5 billion; 1966: 
-$ 1 .8 billion; 1967:-$13.2 billion; 1968:-$6.0; 1969:+$8.4 billion. Sources: U.S. Department o f  
Commerce
30 Memo, Schultze to LBJ, November 7, 1966, White House Central Files, WE 9, Box 28, LBJ Library.
31 Okun, Oral History Interview, in Hargrove and Morley, eds., The President and the CEA , 275.
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only became trapped in it by forces beyond his control.32 At the very beginning o f his 
presidency, for example, the Kennedy assassination and Johnson's own desire to break 
the prevailing legislative logjam compelled him to accept, without much debate, the 
largely one-sided counsel of others. The February 1965 Pleiku tragedy happened to 
coincide with Soviet Premier Kosygin's visit to Hanoi, making it less possible, 
thereafter, to see the Vietnamese civil war in either a non-threatening or non-cold war 
perspective. Even George Ball, who counseled withdrawal in 1965, suggested the need 
for retaliation. "We are all in accord that action must be taken," Ball told Johnson after 
the attack.33 Likewise, South Vietnamese and U.S. military intelligence remained of 
poor quality throughout the war, further limiting policy options.34 Moving reluctantly at
32 Republican Senator Everett Dirksen, for example, often served as the key to Johnson's domestic 
legislative victories and was persuaded at least partly by Johnson's policy in Vietnam. Dirksen often went 
to bat for Johnson on domestic policy issues, and rebuffed those in his party who sought a more 
expanded military effort in Vietnam, but prohibited, as the price o f  his support, a more diligent peace 
effort as well. See N eil MacNeil, Dirksen: Portrait o f  a  Public Man (N ew  York: World Publishing Co., 
1970), 271-273. Johnson was also w ell aware o f  the potential divisions that this might cause in his own 
party. "I am probably more concerned over the corrosive effects politically o f  Vietnam than most," 
Charles Roche wrote to Johnson on June 10, 1966. "Both qualitatively and quantitatively, the 
Republicans have been less critical o f  Vietnam than elements within the Democratic party." Memo, 
Charles Roche to LBJ, June 10, 1966, LBJ Handwriting File, Box 11, LBJ Library. Just as the war made 
it easier for Johnson to sail a liberal domestic agenda past some conservatives, however, it also made that 
same agenda more vulnerable to the attacks o f  others. "Once the war began," Johnson told Doris Kearns, 
"then all those conservatives in Congress would use it as a weapon against the Great Society. You see, 
they never wanted to help the poor or the Negroes in the first place. But they were having a hard time 
figuring out how to make their opposition sound noble in a time o f  great prosperity." Quoted in Kearns, 
Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream, 252.
33 Quoted in Johnson, Vantage Point, 124. See also George W. Ball, The Past Has Another Pattern: 
M em oirs (N ew  York: W. W. Norton, 1982), 389-390. Ball suggested that he tried to block a retaliatory 
raid, and was accused o f  as much by Robert McNamara. He limited his protest, however, to the 
suggestion that retaliatory bombing be postponed until after Kosygin left Hanoi. Apparently, Kosygin 
and his advisers were prepared to meet the North Vietnamese request for greater assistance, but had also 
attempted to persuade them to consider a "compromise solution" to the war. Journalist Stanley Kamow  
reported that these discussions were "stormy" and that one Soviet participant described the North 
Vietnamese to him as a "bunch o f  stubborn bastards." See Stanley Kamow, Vietnam: A History (N ew  
York: Viking Press, 1983), 411. The Pleiku attack, begun at approximately 2 am at Camp Holloway 
where American advisers and Special Forces troops were stationed, concluded with eight dead 
Americans, more than one hundred wounded, and ten American aircraft destroyed. After the retaliatory 
raid, Johnson's public approval rating stood at 70%. See ibid., 411-414.
34 A point o f  which Johnson was clearly aware. "Can Westerners, deprived o f  accurate intelligence, 
successfully fight Asians in the jungles and rice paddies?" Johnson queried in July 1965. Quoted in Ball, 
Memoirs, 401.
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almost every stage, Johnson gave up drinking in January 1966 so he could better 
concentrate, and walked to the basement situation room at 4:30 or 5:00 every morning 
to keep abreast o f the smallest changes in the war and in the number o f U.S. 
casualties.35 "Given all the elements that had been unleashed," William Appleman 
Williams noted, "the wonder is that he went so slow....The point is that he did not 
honor, after the first attacks on American units, his own commitment to the existing 
system."36 Despite Johnson's caution and reluctance to accept uncorraborated advice, 
forbidden bombing targets were hit anyway, "friendly" villages were pacified four and 
five times over, body counts were adopted as the only conceivable scorecard in a  war of 
attrition, and a reporting system was adopted where soldiers were forced to give 
generals false reports—often for security reasons.37 The Tet offensive showed, First 
Lieutenant David Donovan remarked in his Vietnam memoirs, "that bullshit in the 
reporting system was to be measured in feet, not inches."38 It is also clear that for most 
o f the war, the press and the public in general remained belligerent toward Vietnamese 
communists and tended to loathe only the indecisiveness of a limited war in a complex
35 In January 1966 Johnson traded his Cutty Sark scotch for diet soft drinks (primarily Tab and Fresca). 
Cited in Valenti,/I Very Human President, 172.
36 William Appleman Williams, "Of Lyndon and JFK," 502. (reprinted from "Some Presidents: From 
Wilson to Nixon," in the N ew York Review, 1972, 83-107.)
37 Merle Miller suggests that Johnson was not unaware o f  the body count delusion and all that it entailed. 
Flying with the crew o f  the "Heckling Hare" (a B-26 bomber) in the Pacific theater during World War 11, 
Johnson (on an inspection tour) found him self on board when 8 Japanese zeroes attacked. In the course o f  
the flight, tail gunner Harry G. Baren told him, "All we ever knew about MacArthur were his fancy press 
pictures and his statements about the war....Well, if  we ever shot down as many planes as his 
headquarters used to say, we'd have wiped out the Jap Air Force in two months." Cited in Miller, Lyndon, 
97.
38 David Donovan, Once a  Warrior King: Memories o f  an Officer in Vietnam (N ew  York: Ballantine 
Books, 1985), 159. Donovan's memoirs provide a unique glimpse o f  the tragedy that was the war in 
Vietnam. As head o f  a Mobile Advisory Team (MAT) in an isolated Vietnamese village (Tram Chim, 
Dong Tien District, Kien Phong Province) about 100 miles from the nearest U.S. combat unit, Donovan 
proved to be the soldier envisioned by the most idealistic policymakers in Washington. He won the 
respect o f  the local citizens and he helped them fend o ff  disease, malnutrition, and Viet Cong terrorism 
(often directed against schools and markets). At the same time he makes it clear, in an almost 
unintentional fashion, why his situation was not often duplicated or repeated among the rest o f  the 
American forces in Vietnam. See pp. 216-217 for his surprising description o f  U.S. Special Forces' 
inefficacy.
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social and political milieu.39 Even intellectuals and academics that Johnson admired 
often counseled an aggressive posture vis-a-vis the North Vietnamese communists.40 
And, despite all these difficulties and diversions, some American intervention clearly 
provided what it had promised: enhanced village security and relief from an often
39 See Chester J. Pach, Jr., "And That's the Way it Was: The Vietnam War on the Nightly News," in 
Farber, ed., The Sixties: From M emory to History, 93-112. Though Johnson read several newspapers 
every morning, and had descriptions o f  evening network newscasts prepared for him by Peter Benchley  
and Robert Fleming— suggesting that he did not watch all the time— the famous three monitor console 
was often ablaze in the oval office; television news clearly informed his policy judgements in no small 
way. See also David Culbert, "Johnson and the Media," in Robert Divine, editor, Exploring the Johnson  
Years (Austin: University o f  Texas Press, 1981), 214-241, for an analysis o f  Johnson's perspective toward 
the television and print media and information on the Benchley-Fleming summaries (found on p. 223). 
Even the impact o f  critical reporting during and after the 1968 Tet offensive has been exaggerated— often 
quite handily. Accuracy in Media (AIM) produced a short film, narrated by Charleton Heston, which 
purported to show how error-prone reporting o f  the Tet offensive effectively turned public opinion 
against the war. In their haste to get the story as it quickly unfolded, reporters at the U.S. embassy in 
Saigon did make serious interpretive errors; reports on the attack at Khe Sanh U.S. air base were also far 
from being incisive. The real impact o f  the reporting here, however, did not come from any erroneous 
suggestions that Tet was a defeat for the Americans and their South Vietnamese allies— most news 
summaries in fact suggested that it was clearly not such a defeat— but from the realization that the war 
had become a quagmire instead where the enemy dictated the terms o f  battle in spite o f  hurrendous 
losses. And as Pach points out, the television reports on Tet were not that different from those o f  military 
officials. General Earle Wheeler called Tet "a very near thing," and noted that "the enemy has the w ill to 
continue." Walter Cronkite opened his February 14 ,1968  newscast by commenting, "First and simplest, 
the Vietcong suffered a military defeat." See Pach, "And That's the Way it Was," 110. See also Peter 
Braestrup, Big Story: H ow the American Press an d  Television R eported and  Interpreted the Crisis o f  Tet 
1968 in Vietnam and Washington, abridged edition, (N ew  Haven: Yale University Press, 1983); and 
David Broder, "Nixon Demands U.S. 'Tell Truth' About VC Strength," and Ward Just, "Romney Hits 
'False Optimism' on War," both in the Washington Post, February 6, 1968, A2, for the real origins o f  the 
"Tet as U.S. failure" analysis (conservatives and Republicans who hoped to skewer the Democratic party 
with it). "If what we have seen in the past week is a Viet Cong failure," Just quoted Romney, "then I hope 
they never have a victory."
40 Journalist Walter Lippmann, New  Deal "braintruster" A dolf Berle, novelist John Steinbeck, and 
historians Allan Nevins, Oscar Handlin, and T. Harry Williams were among those who supported the 
Johnson administration's struggle against Vietnamese communism. See Barry Riccio, W alter Lippmann— 
O dyssey o f  a  Liberal (N ew  Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1994), 154-156, 225; Jordan A. Schwarz, 
Liberal: A do lf A. Berle an d  the Vision o f  an American Era  (New York: Free Press, 1987), 354-376;
Elaine Steinbeck and Robert Wallsten, eds., Steinbeck: A Life in Letters (N ew  York: Viking Press, 1975), 
820; John Steinbeck to Jack Valenti, with cover from Valenti to LBJ, January 14, 1966, LBJ Handwriting 
File, Box 15, LBJ Library; and Goldman, The Tragedy o f  Lyndon Johnson, 433. The Steinbeck letter to 
Valenti is especially remarkable for its almost enthusiastic support o f  the war effort. In this letter, 
Steinbeck recommended the use o f  10 gauge shotguns ("if you are man enough"), napalm grenades, and 
irregular bombing patterns in the struggle against the Vietnamese communists. "But, oh boy," Steinbeck 
wrote, "let me tell you that out at Sag Harbor I have a ten gauge starting cannon....One day just to test it 1 
wadded in a handful o f  buck shot....At fifty yards it made a pattern that would bring down a squad."
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predatious communist insurgency.41 This had the effect of making complete and 
immediate withdrawal, perhaps Johnson's noblest option, a somewhat less palatable one.
If  Johnson was served by poor advice and limited options, he, nevertheless, brought 
much o f it upon himself. "He harangued, frightened, and overwhelmed most o f his 
Cabinet as well as his Staff," Leslie Gelb noted. "....If LBJ was a commanding figure as 
Senate Majority Leader, he was positively overpowering as President."42 But even more
41 Johnson's w illingness to countenance any kind o f  American presence in Vietnam centered on his 
concern for two groups o f  people: South Vietnamese non-communists (not necessarily anti-communists) 
who were subjected to communist terrorism; and American soldiers already in Vietnam fighting against 
these terrorist activities. Aware that this side o f  the war was perhaps the least important in the minds o f  
those who saw this only as a larger struggle within the Cold War paradigm, Johnson often became quite 
frustrated. "Viet Cong atrocities never get published," he often lamented. Quoted in Valenti, A Very 
Human President, 223. This concern over VC atrocities also dominated Johnson and Valenti's thinking 
when they endorsed John Wayne's request to make a Vietnam film. "My own judgement," Valenti 
remarked, "is that Wayne's politics are wrong....The principal defect o f  a documentary [however, as 
opposed to a fictional John Wayne film] is that w e have no film o f  the Viet Cong and no depiction o f  
their atrocities." M emo, Valenti to LBJ, January 6, 1966, LBJ Handwriting File, Box 11, LBJ Library.
See also James West Davidson and Mark Hamilton Lytle, "Where Trouble Comes," esp. 358-366, 
chapter in After the Fact: The Art o f  H istorical Detection, Vol. II (N ew  York: McGraw-Hill, 1992), 356- 
386, for a brief excerpt from Wayne's letter to LBJ and a critical review o f  the resulting motion picture: 
The Green Berets.
42 Leslie Gelb, "The Pentagon Papers and the Vantage Point," Foreign Policy, Spring 1972, 39. "The 
tentative answer I draw from the Pentagon Papers [to the question o f  Vietnam policy control]," Gelb 
asserted, "is that LBJ was more instrument than master prior to the summer o f  1965 and very much the 
domineering master o f  consensus thereafter." See ibid., 33. Yet, it is difficult to imagine, however 
imposing President Johnson was, persons like John Connally, Walt Rostow, or Dean Acheson being 
intimidated by him. When Johnson asked longtime political associate John Connally what he would do 
about the Vietnam dilemma, Connally replied that he would warn Hanoi to get out o f  South Vietnam, 
give them 72 hours, and then if  they did not respond, he would "destroy Hanoi." Johnson's only response, 
according to Connally, was, "Good God, I can't do that." Quoted in Connally with Herskowitz, In 
History's Shadow, 205. Rostow counseled a hard line in Vietnam even under the Kennedy administration. 
"It is som ehow wrong," Rostow wrote JFK, "to be developing these [military] capabilities but not 
applying them in a crucially active theater. In Knute Rockne's old phrase, we are not saving them for the 
Junior Prom." Quoted in George M. Kahin, Intervention: How Am erica Became Involved in Vietnam 
(N ew  York: Knopf, 1986), 131. And when Johnson convened one o f  his first Vietnam policy sessions 
with the foreign policy "wise men" in 1965, an unofficial group o f  advisers that included Truman's 
Secretary o f  State Dean Acheson, General Omar Bradley, and FDR's Assistant Secretary o f  War John 
M cCloy, he fully expected that most o f  the group would generally favor a firm policy. To his surprise, 
"the w ise men" were not just generally in favor o f  a firm policy against the Vietnamese communists; they 
saw no alternative to one. When Johnson expressed doubts about the potential U.S. role and complained 
about the political quandary he found him self in as a result o f  Vietnam, Acheson exploded and told him 
that "he had no choice except to press on," and the others followed by seconding Acheson's comments 
vigorously and without reservation. Appalled by this response, and certain that it shook President 
Johnson, George Ball reproached Acheson after the meeting had adjourned. "You goddamned old 
bastards," Ball retorted, [y]ou remind me o f  nothing so much as a bunch o f  buzzards sitting on a fence
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significant than Johnson's impact on his own advisers—which was arguably less 
profound than Gelb had suggested—was his genuine belief in the war effort. Though he 
told the press on December 27,1968 that a truce would "make us all happier than 
anything else," and that "it would be just paradise if  we could end that thing," he 
continued to believe that the majority of the South Vietnamese wanted and needed 
American military aid and that Americans ought to avoid what he termed a 
"dangerously short-sighted" isolationism.43 "You can sense how these people feel, they 
want the same things we do," Johnson remarked after a visit to a Vietnamese village in 
1961.44 "I believe that these [South] Vietnamese are trying to fight," he declared in July 
1965. "They're like Republicans who try to stay in power but don't stay there long."45 
And even after his presidency had come to an end, Johnson continued to press a similar 
theme. "Some are angry," he declared in 1971, "because what we have done for the 
world hasn't made other nations automatically do what we say. Some just don't like 
foreigners. Some think we should spend everything on ourselves instead o f trying to 
help avoid chaos elsewhere. Others just don't like spending money. Others just don't 
want to get involved."46 After the summer of 1965, Johnson clearly desired a limited 
war and was trapped only by the difficulty and complexity o f such an endeavor.47 
"Doubt and debate are enlarged," he noted in San Antonio on September 29, 1967,
and letting the young men die....W ould you have ever put up with this if  you had been Secretary o f  
State?" Quoted in VanDeMark, Into the Quagmire, 176.
43 Johnson, Transcript o f  Press Conference, December 27, 1968, The Johnson Presidential Press 
Conferences, Volume 2, 999,1000.
44 Quoted in Goldman, The Tragedy o f  Lyndon Johnson, 391.
45 Quoted in Valenti, A Very Human President, 335.
46 Johnson,"LBJ: Som e Warnings About Todays America," U.S. News and World Report, November 29, 
1971 ,92 .
47 In a secret cable sent to General Maxwell Taylor in December, 1964, Johnson stressed his aversion to 
a large scale war and bombing but his willingness to fight a small scale guerilla war. "Every time I get a 
military recommendation," Johnson wrote, "it seem s to me that it calls for large scale bombing. I have 
never felt that this war will be won from the air, and it seems to me that what is much more needed and 
would be more effective is a larger and stronger use o f  rangers and special forces and marines....I am 
ready to look with great favor on that kind o f  increased American effort, directed at guerrillas and aimed 
to stiffen the aggressiveness o f  Vietnamese military units up and down the line." Quoted in Berman, 
Planning a Tragedy, 34-35.
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"because the problems of Vietnam are quite complex. They are a mixture o f political 
turmoil—of poverty—of religious and factional strife—of ancient servitude and modern 
longing for freedom. Vietnam is all o f these things."48 This clearly seemed to be a 
President trying to move, rather than being moved by, political exigencies and public 
opinion.
Reflecting on the war and her husband's presidency, and implicitly suggesting that 
Lyndon Johnson remained well aware of the war's cost and unpopularity, Lady Bird 
Johnson acknowledged the public relations problem associated with a limited war. "The 
temperament o f our people," she noted in her diary in January 1967, "seems to be, 'You 
must get excited, get passionate, fight it, get it over with, or we must pull out.' It is 
unbearably hard to fight a limited war."49 A fragmentary doodle found on the President's 
desk on December 18, 1965 may have more accurately reflected his views than any 
memorandum or public address. Inscribed alone on the President's note to himself that 
day were the phrases, "Long bloody war" and "American people."50 George Ball had 
even provided Johnson, during the critical July 1965 strategy sessions, with a survey 
produced during the Korean conflict correlating negative public opinion with rising 
casualties.51 And Defense Secretary McNamara had expressed the view that our losses 
in Vietnam would be proportional to the number of our soldiers in the country.52 Clearly 
dissuaded from imagining that the war in Vietnam would be a popular endeavor, despite 
public opinion polls suggesting the opposite, Johnson pressed on anyway and became 
convinced that he should compel unanimity and perseverance when circumspection and
48 Johnson, "Address on Vietnam Before the National Legislative Conference, San Antonio, Texas," 
September 29, 1967, Public Papers, 1967: II, 876.
49 Lady Bird Johnson, January 5, 1967, A White House Diary, 469. This note was a response to a 
coversation between President Johnson and Budget Director Charles Schultze on limited war. "He and 
Lyndon were talking about the difficulty o f  doing that," Lady Bird noted. Ibid.
50 Note, December 18, 1965, LBJ Handwriting File, Box 11, LBJ Library.
51 Ball, Memoirs, 400.
52 Ibid. McNamara expressed this view also during the July 1965 strategy sessions. At the same time, 
however, General Maxwell Taylor suggested the opposite, that American casualties would decline as we 
poured greater numbers o f  troops into Vietnam.
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restraint may have been more appropriate.53 And in many ways, the tenacity o f 
Johnson's public declarations belied his own reluctance. Partly hemmed in by the 
belligerance o f the Joint Chiefs o f Staff and by the weight o f congressional and public 
opinion, as well as the actual events in Vietnam, Johnson strangely closed his eyes to 
genuine diplomatic possibilities. "I don't know what to do," Johnson told Douglas Cater 
early in 1965. "If I send in more men, there will be killin'; if  I take out men there will be 
killin'; anything I do there will be killin'."54 He told his press secretary, Bill Moyers, that 
he felt "like a hitchhiker caught in a hailstorm on a Texas highway. I can't run. I can't 
hide. And I can't make it stop."55 Walking the presidential beagles "him" and "her" a 
few months later, with members o f the press in tow, Johnson responded to the Vietnam 
question even more succinctly. "I don't know what the fuck to do about Vietnam. I wish 
someone would tell me what to do."56 Johnson's approach to the critical decisions o f 
July 1965, George Ball suggested, provided "some sense of the President's agonizing 
reluctance to go forward, his desire to explore every possible alternative, and, finally,
53 The many polls Johnson consulted regularly revealed a divided but still surprisingly hawkish 
American public. When he prepared for the critical "get in, or get out" meetings in July 1965, for 
example, a Harris poll showed that 47% o f  the public wanted to send in more troops, with 23% "not 
sure," 19% wanting to keep the present number, and only 11% wanting to take troops out. See memo, 
Hayes redmon to LBJ, June 17, 1965, White House Central Files, PR 16, Box 80, LBJ Library. Incoming 
mail elicited an even more confusing picture. See, for example, memo, Paul Popple to LBJ, January 20, 
1966, LBJ Handwriting File, Box 11, LBJ Library, which described the mail received for the w eek o f  
January 2 0 ,1 9 6 6 . More were against Johnson's policy than for it (755 to 369); more favored an increased 
peace effort than not (684 to 16); but more also favored an increased military effort than not (396 to 121). 
Even as late as October 1968 another Harris poll showed that only 13% o f  the American public favored a 
complete withdrawal. Cited in Stephen Ambrose, Nixon: The Triumph o f  a  Politician, 1962-1972  (New  
York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), 199. Robert Kennedy was stunned when he asked for a show o f  hands 
at a Catholic women's college in late 1967 and found that a majority favored more, not less bombing. 
Cited in Deborah Shapley, Promise and Power: The Life and Times o f  Robert S. McNamara (Boston: 
Little, Brown, 1993), 438. Although a strong anti-war consensus never materialized during Johnson's 
presidency, the prevailing sentiment remained "why can't we get it over with," rather than "why can't we 
withdraw." Cited in Gould, "Never a Deep Partisan," 30. TRB in the New  Republic issued a similar 
remark in 1966: "The country loathes the war, but also loathes the idea o f  not winning it." Quoted in 
Miller, Lyndon, 458.
54 Quoted by Douglas Cater in ibid., 41.
55 Quoted in Kamow, Vietnam , 396.
s(l Quoted in Rowen, Self-Inflicted Wounds, 4.
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his inability to reconcile his vaunted Texas 'can-do' spirit with the shocking reality that 
America had painted itself into a comer..."57
"When we were heading into the harsher days o f Vietnam," Ball recalled, "his 
constant advice was that we should 'hunker down like a jackass in a hailstorm."58 
Indeed, after the decision to step up the war effort, in July 1965, Johnson was only too 
ready to ignore dissent and to accuse critics of speaking out from cowardice, frustration, 
racism, or personal animosity.59 "There will be some Nervous Nellies and some who 
will become frustrated and bothered and break ranks under the strain," Johnson declared 
in a May 1966 address that both typified this response and prompted an indignant 
reaction from critics.60 Though much of Johnson's response to criticism was incisive and 
not completely without justification, it was also all together too indiscriminate and too 
strident and became, as a result, almost completely counterproductive. One o f Johnson's 
weaknesses, John Connally asserted, "was his desire to be loved by everyone. To this 
end, he often courted his enemies and abused his friends."61
Far less enigmatic than the causes o f and responsibility for the Vietnam tragedy 
was the economic policy that accounted for the demands of the war and the introduction 
o f the Great Society. Confident in his own knowledge and intuition, persistent in his 
pursuit o f sound advice and appropriate policy, Johnson managed to maintain a far­
sighted, flexible, and productive economic strategy even as the war in Vietnam created
57 Ball, Memoirs, 399.
58 Ibid., 319.
59 Johnson referred to Senator William Fulbright, for example, perhaps the most demonstrative opponent 
o f  the Vietnamese war in Congress, as "Senator Half-bright" because o f  Fulbright's racist view s and 
strident support o f  big business. Johnson believed that Fulbright turned against the war mostly because 
the Vietnamese people were not Caucasians, and therefore discounted much o f  his criticism. When 
Harrison Salisbury returned from his historic trip to Hanoi in December, 1966 and briefed Fulbright's 
senate committee he also noted Fulbright's personal animosity toward Johnson. "I thought it was very 
businesslike," Salisbury noted, "with the single exception o f  Fulbright him self. He kept asking me very 
sarcastic questions, in which he wanted to sort o f  share a sarcastic and sneering view o f  the present 
administration." Quoted in Miller, Lyndon , 473.
60 Johnson, "Vietnam and the 'Nervous Nellies," in Marvin E. Gettleman and David Mermelstein, eds., 
The G reat Society Reader: The Failure o f  American Liberalism  (New York: Random House, 1967),417.
61 Connally, with Herskowitz, In History's Shadow, 63.
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great political tension and the need for modest economic policy adjustments. "The true 
costs o f this conflict are death, pain, and grief; interrupted careers and separation from 
loved ones," Johnson declared early in 1966. "They are incalculable. But the economic 
cost o f Vietnam imposes no unbearable burden on our resources."62
Even the errors o f omission, most notably the failure to enact a timely tax surcharge 
in the face o f full employment and fiscal deficit in FY 1967, proved less costly than 
most imagined (including President Johnson) and only temporarily significant.63 
Congress clearly proved resistant to Johnson's call for added taxes and many began to 
speculate that Keynesian fiscal restraint was incapable of practical application.64 But the 
repercussions were slight and the political demands were uncommon. "It is not often," 
Walter Heller stressed in early 1968, "that Congress will have to be asked to raise taxes, 
because the federal tax take [at the current level o f GNP and continued full 
employment] automatically rises by about 9 billion dollars a year."65 Nor was there a 
significant problem with forecasting, as it has so often been claimed; Johnson did not 
cover up the costs o f the war to delay a tax increase and his advisers were unaware of 
actual costs only at the very beginning (late 1965) of the expanded war effort.66 "I 
would like to try very hard," Gardner Ackley noted when asked about Vietnam 
forecasting and Johnson's credibility, "to disillusion anybody who believes that. In the
62 Johnson, "Annual M essage to Congress: The Economic Report o f  the President," January 27, 1966, 
Public Papers, 1 9 6 6 :1, 97.
63 See chapter 8 for a more extensive examination o f  this point.
64 See James Buchanan and Richard E. Wagner, Dem ocracy in Deficit— The Political Legacy o f  Lord  
Keynes (N ew  York: Academic Press, 1977); and for a less pessimistic view , Samuel Brittan, "Can 
Democracy Manage an Economy?" in Robert Skidelsky, ed., The End o f  the Keynesian Era: Essays on 
the D isintegration o f  the Keynesian Political Economy (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1977), 41-49.
65 Quoted in "Where the N ew  Economics Went Wrong," US N ews an d  W orld Report, January 15, 1968, 
38.
66 See Schulman, Lyndon B. Johnson and American Liberalism, 101, for a recent example o f  this 
contention. "Johnson believed he could protect the Great Society," Schulman wrote, "only by 
downplaying the expense o f  his two-front war; he covered up the costs o f  the Asian struggle, economized  
on every domestic program, and delayed a tax increase as long as possible."
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first place we knew what numbers were being talked about....there was certainly no 
question about the absence o f sufficient information to reach a policy judgement."67
At the same time, Johnson was, indeed, less than candid with the American public. 
Arthur Okun recalled, for example, how he "tried to stay off the podium" in early 1966, 
so he "wouldn't have to tell lies."68 But Okun knew the actual spending levels and 
realized, as well, that these lies were designed not to sustain an otherwise impractical or 
unwise economic strategy but to restrain public opinion and to avoid the call for a 
greater war effort.69 "Everybody would start second-guessing the Budget Bureau's 
[defense] expenditure estimates," Okun recalled. "But then you'd get a week or so of 
this effort at the staff level which usually resulted in a single consensus reestimate after 
some negotiation."70 According to Defense Secretary McNamara, key economic 
advisers were not informed of Vietnam spending estimates in 1965. "I submitted my 
spending estimate and proposed tax increase [in late July 1965]," McNamara recalled, 
"in a highly classified draft memorandum known to only a handful of people. Not even 
the treasury secretary or the chairman of the Council o f Economic Advisers knew about
67 A ckley, Oral History Interview, in Hargrove and Morley, editors, The President and  the CEA, 247- 
248.
68 Okun, Oral History Interview, in ibid., 286.
69 "His great fear on Vietnam," daughter Lynda Bird noted o f  her father, "was not o f  the anti-war liberals 
but o f  the hawks on the right." Lynda Robb, quoted in Hardesty, ed. The Johnson Years, 165. This "fear" 
was confirmed by others, as well, including columnist Joseph Alsop, General William Westmoreland, 
and historian Kathleen Turner. It is interesting to note that while Alsop sympathized with Johnson on this 
point near the end o f  his administration, he was also among those chiding Johnson for an excessively  
cautious approach at the beginning. "Vietnam is what the second Cuban crisis was for John F. Kennedy," 
Alsop wrote on December 30, 1964. "...If Mr. Johnson ducks the challenge, w e shall learn by experience 
about what [it] would have been like if  Kennedy had ducked the challenge in October 1962." Quoted in 
VanDeMark, Into the Quagmire, 48. Westmoreland recalled that "both the President and the 
Congressional leaders were afraid o f  an open debate. They were unsure o f  thepolitical repercussions and 
more concerned about the 'hawks' than the 'doves' on the convenient theory that Red China might be 
provoked into the war." William C. Westmoreland, "Vietnam in Perspective," M ilitary Review, January 
1979, 37. Kathleen Turner maintained that Johnson attempted to restrain public opinion— partly by 
withholding information— to avoid a mounting war fever and a call for a greater war effort. Kathleen J. 
Turner, Lyndon Johnson's Dual War: Vietnam and the Press (Chicago: University o f  Chicago Press, 
1985). Johnson also believed that the "loss o f  China" had done more to create the McCarthy era than 
anything else; he did not want a command performance. 69
70 Okun, Oral History Interview, Interview I, 8, LBJ Library.
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it."71 While some forecasting difficulties remained, accurate spending estimates 
continued to elude Johnson's CEA and Treasury Secretary only for a very short period, 
and the economy behaved much as they predicted throughout Johnson's presidency. In 
1967, for example, perhaps the most difficult year to forecast in all o f Johnson's 
presidential term, a consensus o f the nation's professional economic forecasters 
predicted a year end GNP of $781 billion. The econometricians at the Wharton School 
followed with a prediction o f $785 billion, while Johnson's CEA predicted $787 billion. 
The only group to forecast a strong upsurge in the second half of the year, the CEA 
came closest to the actual $793 billion GNP figure registered at the end of 1967.72 All in 
all, the only forecast Johnson's Keynesian economists really missed was the forecast for 
late 1968 and early 1969, after the imposition o f the 10% tax surcharge.
Underestimating the level o f business investment that was encouraged by the low 
unemployment of the period—which they recognized and considered—but also by the 
profit-centered, supply side rhetoric of the President-elect—which they did not 
acknowledge as fully—Johnson's CEA predicted slower growth for that period than 
actually occurred. "I would still say," Arthur Okun recalled, "that the big error we made 
at that point was in assessing the underlying state o f private [investment] demand rather 
than in underestimating the stimulus that would be provided by monetary policy.
Capital spending didn't keep shooting up more than we expected because money was 
plentiful and interest rates had come down 50 basis points."73 As for the assessment of 
Nixon's political economics, though he had campaigned against both the wage-price 
guideposts and extension of the surcharge, Nixon was, after all, talked into extending 
the surcharge, even if it required much prodding and came only after his economic team
71 Robert S. McNamara, with Brian VanDeMark, In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons o f  Vietnam 
(N ew  York: Times Books, Random House, 1995), 205.
72 Forecasts in "Will Business Surge in the Fall?" Business Week, March 18, 1967, 136. Actual GNP 
figure from CEA, Annual Report o f  the Council o f  Economic Advisers, 1970 (Washington: U.S.G.P.O., 
1970).
73 Okun, Oral History Interview, in Hargrove and Morley, eds., The President and the CEA , 307.
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met with Johnson advisers during the transition period.74 In the belief that Nixon would 
ultimately have to continue much o f the Johnson economic policy, Arthur Okun 
declared, after the first few weeks o f the new administration, that the "country has much 
to be grateful for...Nixon feels absolutely no commitment to anything that he said 
during the campaign."75 Paul Samuelson even suggested that "President-elect Nixon is 
going to find himself doing pretty much what his two predecessors were doing. This is 
guaranteed by the closeness of the election if  by nothing else."76 But even in the short 
run, none o f Johnson's advisers really knew where Richard Nixon stood on economic 
policy. Their last economic forecasts missed the mark, therefore, not because they 
utilized bankrupt economic models or lacked sufficient and accurate economic data, but 
because they made excessively optimistic political forecasts.77 Ultimately, and with 
surprising alacrity, Nixon proved that he would not do what his predecessors had done. 
The nature o f inflation and economic growth, and the trajectory o f the nation's political 
economy, all changed drastically and somewhat surprisingly as a result.
Despite the fiscal flexibility o f the Johnson administration and the nation's 
economic capacity for both guns and butter, Defense spending in Vietnam remained a 
large economic problem and a source o f genuine inflationary trouble. Ironically, much
74 Nixon refused to let these advisers and oficials meet at first, fearful that he would be sold out on the 
surcharge (as he was). Ironically, Nixon later called upon LBJ to help pass a surcharge extension through 
Congress. Johnson responded by delivering the entire Texas House delegation minus one, even as the rest 
o f  the South voted against it.
75 Okun, Oral History Interview, Interview III, LBJ Library, 12.
76 Paul Samuelson, "The New  Economics," November 1968, selection in The Samuelson Sam pler (Glen 
Ridge, NJ: Thomas Horton and Co., 1973), 10.
77 Since the Fed was easing as the surcharge went into effect, a move that was endorsed by Johnson's 
CEA, many have cited it as the reason for the ineffectiveness o f  the surcharge. The enormous and still 
expanding corporate appetite for investment capital, however, fanned somewhat by various Nixon  
pledges on the war and the economy, had much more to do with the period's monetary expansion than 
any m oves made by the Fed's Open Market Committee. "I would still say," Arthur Okun noted, "that the 
big error w e made at that point was in assessing the underlying state o f  private [investment] demand 
rather than in underestimating the stimulus that would be provided by monetary policy. Capital spending 
didn't keep shooting up more than we expected because money was plentiful and interest rates had come 
down 50 basis points." Quoted in Hargrove and Morley, eds., The President and the CEA , 307. See also 
Okun, "Did the Tax Surcharge Really Work? Comment," American Economic Review 67, March 1977, 
166-169.
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of the economic difficulty inherent to the war effort came less from the magnitude of the 
conflict than from Johnson's struggle to limit it. That he did not hand the war over to the 
Joint Chiefs or General Westmoreland, technically kept war expenses to a minimum, 
helped insure the survival of the Great Society, and presumably helped prevent either a 
resurgent McCarthyism or a violent showdown with Communist China. The economic 
problem, however, lay more with the character o f these limited, but unusually drawn out 
expenditures and their impact on corporate profits and pricemaking decisions.
Before the late 1965-early 1966 escalation, McNamara and Johnson, together, had 
discovered a multitude o f new efficiencies in Defense procurement and they were 
actively seeking more. "You've done a good job protecting my two girls for years," 
Johnson told the Joint Chiefs early in his presidency, "but you're the biggest wasters and 
spenders in the country."78 To Henry Cabot Lodge, also early in his presidency, and 
before the escalation o f the war, he lamented that, "Generals know only two words— 
spend and bomb."79 Indeed, as Joseph Kraft noted in 1966, Johnson "was particularly 
adept at cutting the space and defense programs, because he had known them (and their 
weaknesses) from the beginning."80 When Johnson had chaired the Senate Military 
Preparedness subcommittee, for example, in the early 1950s, he had uncovered 
approximately $5 billion in waste and fraudulent spending alone, all on a subcommittee 
that cost the government $275,000.81 Unfortunately, as the war became a major part of 
total defense spending and continually frustrated the Johnson administration estimates 
for termination and withdrawal, many of these efficiencies became impractical. 
Emergency contract extensions or add-ons—made necessary by the prolonged war—
78 Quoted in Goldman, The Tragedy o f  Lyndon Johnson, 383.
79 Quoted in Larry Berman, Planning a Tragedy: The Americanization o f  the War in Vietnam (New  
York: Norton, 1983), 34.
80 Kraft, Profiles in Power, 13.
81 Cited in Sam Houston Johnson, M y Brother Lyndon, 82. Sam Johnson noted some o f  the abuses: 
supply sergeants issuing g o lf clubs; a Texan who had purchased $1.2 million in surplus airplane parts for 
$6.89 and then sold them back to the government for $63,000; and a $1.65 million Air force contract for 
white g loves (that was cancelled after LBJ reported it).
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coupled with the original desire for smaller military inventories (itself an efficiency 
minded change), led inevitably to a greater number o f hastily drawn, non-competitive, 
war contracts, all designed for a war effort nearing its culmination. But Vietnam resisted 
an easy climax, temporary contract provisions became semi-permanent fixtures in the 
corporate marketplace, costs followed skyrocketing profits, and cost-push inflation 
became a more prevalent and vexing problem.
As early as 1965, for example, with the first major increase in U.S. involvement 
just under way, Pentagon contracts soared to a $31 billion annual rate with many of the 
new obligations coming in the form of "letter contracts." Effected by emergency 
procurement, where work was begun on the basis of letters of intent rather than final 
signed contracts, these "letter contracts" remained an integral part of purchasing for 
Vietnam, even after the completion o f the first major buildup.82 The limited, ratchet-like 
fashion of the military escalation, combined with McNamara's policy o f "buying at the 
last moment" (to avoid the kind of excess stockpile the DoD had at the end of the 
Korean war), virtually put contracting for Vietnam on a permanent "emergency" 
footing. In fiscal years 1965,1966, and 1967, for example, original budget requests 
were exceeded by more than 100% in supplemental requests for funds.83 Offering 
critical insight into part o f what became President Johnson's "credibility gap," and an 
affirmation o f this emergency footing, William Bowen declared in Fortune magazine 
that "the [Vietnam war] budget is not misleading once its rather sophisticated 
underlying assumptions are understood."84 As a result, competitive bidding, ethical cost 
accounting, and reasonable profit margins—all McNamara priorities before the war—  
came to be partially sacrificed, or delayed, by the attempt to fight a limited, less costly 
war.
82 "Business Roundup," Forbes, February 1966, 38.
83 Tom Riddell, "The Vietnam War and Inflation Revisited," in Bernard J. Firestone and Robert C. Vogt, 
eds., Lyndon Baines Johnson and the Uses o f  Power, 228.
84 William Bowen, "The Vietnam War: A Cost Accounting," Fortune, April, 1966, 259.
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Even where competitive bidding initially prevailed, the contracting environment 
often served to confound the most carefully managed contract arrangements. When the 
Pentagon sought a Light Observation Helicopter for use in Vietnam in 1965, for 
example, Hughes Helicopter came in with a bid o f $19,860 per helicopter (minus 
avionics and engine). Since Hiller Aircraft bid $29,415 for the same craft, and since 
Hughes estimated its own cost at approximately $30,000 per helicopter, the Pentagon 
seemed to be getting a bargain basement price. McNamara's use o f the government's 
monopsonistic buying power, and corporate willingness to "buy in" to defense contracts 
at low levels combined to achieve this kind o f savings.85 When the Army suddenly 
decided to order 121 additional LOH helicopters in 1966, however, all on a rush basis, 
Hughes raised its unit price to $50,000 with obvious and far-reaching impact on the 
company's bottom line.86 In a rush, McNamara's oversight proved fruitless, if  not 
impossible; war profits ballooned as a result.
Emergency non-competitive bidding practices and unnegotiated contract extensions 
prevailed to an even greater extent where industries sold greater numbers o f less 
expensive items to the Pentagon. Indeed, while the war had great expansive effect on 
the motor vehicle and aircraft industries, its greatest impact came on the production of
85 Even where the potential for future higher priced contracts was low (evidently not the case with 
Hughes Helicopter), "buying in" still frequently paid substantial dividends. Defense contracting has 
typically provided the most generous cost accounting standards among all government agencies and 
departments. M oving and recruiting expenses, startup costs, and extravagant capital improvement costs 
have typically been viewed as standard costs in Defense contracts (where commercially oriented 
companies would figure them instead as long term, often non-recurring expenses). Even without 
extravagant profit margins, then, companies producing for the Pentagon stand a good chance o f  acquiring 
valuable assets much more cheaply and effortlessly than they could otherwise. In its defense in this 
particular case, for example, Hughes explained that it was able to bid so low, not because it was "buying 
in" but because it could charge $75,000 for the same helicopters in private markets; getting the military 
contract would clearly subsidize, then, their startup costs for civilian production. The development o f  the 
Boeing 707 out o f  the government financed program for mid-air refueling o f  B -52s is a good example o f  
this effect. On the issue o f  the DoD as monopsonist, even though it is modified by the search for 
technical perfection, the DoD can operate as a private monopsonist would, squeezing the sellers o f  the 
products and services that only it requires. See Ann Markusen, Peter Hall, Scott Campbell, and Sabina 
Deitrick, The Rise o f  the Gunbelt: The Military Remapping o f  Industrial America  (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1991), 34-35.
86 "Probing Pentagon's Buying Practices," Business Week, March 18, 1967, 121-122.
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ordnance, with communications equipment, clothing and foodstuffs not far behind. By 
January, 1966, for example, the Pentagon was using approximately $210 million worth 
of ammunition per month and by March o f the same year, the Defense Supply Agency 
was ordering $3 billion worth o f foodstuffs and consumer goods alone from well over 
5000 different manufacturers.87
One photograph, inserted in a March, 1966 Fortune story on procurement for 
Vietnam, also suggests that inflated contract prices may not have been the only road to 
excess profits for defense contractors, particularly when it came to the supply o f 
consumer goods and foodstuffs, where thousands of items were involved. The photo 
depicts a fatigued Vietnamese dockhand resting against a newly arrived palette full of 
American beer (Falstaff), shipped in to slake the thirst of American soldiers in Vietnam. 
Though it is a barely noticeable detail, the most interesting aspect o f the picture is that it 
reveals, through markings on the beer cartons, a shipment comprised o f beer m i l  
ounce cans (as opposed to the customary 12 ounce containers). While there is no way to 
tell if Falstaff sold the beer in question at its customary price for 12 ounce cans, had it 
done so, then the quantity change alone represented a 9% markup.88
However corporations managed to do it, emergency procurement, and "buying at 
the last moment" insured enormous profitability. In 1970, for example, the government's 
General Accounting Office examined 146 negotiated Defense contracts and found an 
average 56% profit on equity invested.89 As diluted as these profits became when mixed 
with the commercial operations of the same companies—where greater capital 
investment, expanded numbers of managerial employees, lucrative fringe benefits, and
87 Bowen, "The Vietnam War: A Cost Accounting," 121-123; "The Goods o f  War Pour Out," Fortune, 
March 1966, 115.
88 "The Goods o f  War Pour Out," 118.
89 Cited by Lee Metcalf, "The Vested Oracles: How Industry Regulates Government," in Charles Peters 
and John Rothchild, Inside the System  (New York: Praeger, 1973), 242. M etcalf also points out how the 
Defense Industry Advisory Group, comprised o f  23 corporate executives and one subcabinet DoD  
officer, rewrote the report showing a lower 21% profit margin, even though it was still released as a GAO 
report.
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often mourned but seldom opposed wage increases served to absorb much o f the extra 
cash flow—their impact on expected rates o f return was undeniable.90
When the Johnson administration pushed for the extension o f  the Renegotiation Act 
o f 1951, for example, legislation that would protect the government's ability to revise 
Defense contracts with excess profits, the National Association o f Manufacturers 
testified against it, and even suggested that Defense industry profits were perhaps a bit 
too low. Calling the profits o f military suppliers "inadequate" the NAM also suggested 
that the Renegotiation Act was harmful because o f its ability to produce "inequity in a 
competitive environment." Inadvertently tipping their hat in an attempt to bolster their 
argument, the NAM lobbyists noted how companies involved in the Defense business 
"have been experiencing a greater expansion o f their commercial operations than of 
their defense business." Since Defense profits were underwriting much of this expansion 
(see Hughes' rationale for their low-ball helicopter bid), that evidence should have come 
as no surprise. The threat here, concluded the NAM, "lies in the corruption o f the 
contracting process which substitutes the calculating machine o f the auditor for the 
judgement o f the trained military procurement officer."91 Though they were careful to 
avoid saying so directly, the NAM had essentially told the nation of corporate 
complicity in the emerging inflation. "Out with those calculators!" they seemed to be 
saying. "We'll tell you what our profits are. Trust us. And in the meantime, let us adjust 
our prices accordingly."
As the war stretched on with little or no end in sight, Pentagon demand became 
reliable enough to insure a steady flow of emergency war contracts. As a result, profit
90 In June, 1965 the Committee on the Economic Impact o f  Defense and Disarmament (established by 
President Johnson) reported that, as o f 1964, non-production workers in defense industries comprised 
43% o f  all workers, compared to 26% in all manufacturing. See O ffice Files o f  Horace Busby, Box 13, 
LBJ Library. This disparity, o f  course, stemmed from the growing trend toward military technology that 
was essentially handmade as much as it did from managerial featherbedding.
91 "Comments o f  the NAM  on H.R. 14802 and Other Bills to Extend the Renegotiation Act o f  1951," 
submitted to House Ways and Means committee, February 28, 1968, NAM  Papers, Series IV, Box 162, 
Hagley Library.
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margins expanded and remained at a high plateau long enough to elicit profound 
changes in the investment and wage-setting behavior o f literally thousands o f firms tied 
into the procurement of war materiel. The overall level o f demand and the full 
employment economy itself, still largely buoyed by non-Defense related purchasing 
power, were perhaps the most critical components o f the sustained investment demand; 
the relatively price inelastic margin of demand provided by the war in Vietnam, 
however, proved to be both an added incentive as well as one of the critical 
determinants o f changed price behavior. By serving to sustain the peak profit levels 
normally associated with youthful industries or the early stages of an economic 
advance, just as such an advance was coming to a head, the war in Vietnam transformed 
what were clearly temporary profit margins into standards for customary performance. 
Moreover, excess war profits were sustained long enough to undergo erosion, not at the 
hands o f market deterioration or rising competition, but, at the hands of greater capital 
outlays, expanded inventories, and a continued scramble for increasingly scarce skilled 
labor and investment funds. "Large amounts of cash," Business Week reported in 
March, 1967, "are being tied up in accumulating inventories and in a continued high 
level o f accounts receivable."92 Corporate net worth and profitability, in other words, 
were both advancing at remarkable rates, even as reported profits began to exhibit some 
deterioration. Wage costs were advancing rapidly too, but never enough to create a 
genuine profit squeeze; company investment decisions along with higher customary 
profits only made it seem that way.
Price inflation increased, then, not because of the era's high demand, but in spite of 
it. Although consistent demand and low unemployment truly encourage wage inflation 
through increased labor scarcity, this tends to occur only in businesses with high output 
and increasing profits, or in other words, in businesses where it can most readily be
92 "Dividends Feel the Pressure," Business Week, March 18, 1967, 59.
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absorbed. The greater substitution o f capital for labor, the broadening of overhead costs 
through increased capacity utilization, and the incentive to discourage greater 
competition—also common to high demand economies—should have, at the same time, 
allowed for stable or even lower prices in many industries.93 Indeed, since capacity 
utilization shrunk slowly but steadily from its first quarter 1966 peak o f 91%, the 
aggregate demand o f the following period was most likely below the level required for 
optimum economic efficiency.94 Though it may have been far too subtle in the 1967- 
1969 period to have any real impact, shrinking demand relative to supply— and the 
decreased capacity utilization accompanying it—was more likely to be a cause of price 
inflation than the still rising absolute level o f aggregate demand.
Vitiating or otherwise obscuring these phenomena, however, were the increasing 
level of public investment, on the federal, state, and local levels, and the war in 
Vietnam, the largest public project o f the decade. Corporations mostly raised prices in 
the late 1960s not because they had to but because they could, and because they were 
willing to overlook the ultimately self-defeating long term consequences o f such price 
decisions. Because Vietnam was America's longest war, it produced America's longest 
running experience with wartime excess profits, a phenomenon that had commonly 
prevailed before only for short periods and without extensive and lasting impact on 
corporate pricing decisions outside o f the market for war materiel. The war in Vietnam
93 Robert Eisner has created an economic model that illustrates this effect. In Eisner's model, high levels 
o f  unemployment do cut inflation, but low levels o f  unemployment do so even more effectively. The 
model suggests, Eisner maintained, "that we have no sound basis for deliberately raising unemployment. 
On the contrary, we ought to be trying to reduce it, not only by supply-side measures, but by ensuring 
that the economy is not starved for adequate demand or productivity-increasing public investment." See 
Robert Eisner, "OurNAIRU Limit: The Governing Myth o f  Economic Policy," The American Prospect, 
Spring 1995, 58-63. Quotation from ibid., 63. (NAIRU refers to the the "non-accelerating-inflation rate 
o f  unemployment") See also Sawyer, with Aaronovitch and Samson, Business Pricing an d  Inflation, for 
an earlier series o f  economic models which suggest a similar outcome, especially 42-90; and Eisner, The 
M isunderstood Economy: What Counts and How to Count It (Boston: Harvard Busines School Press, 
1994), 145-194, for a lengthier discussion o f  his approach to pricing theory.
94 Capacity utilization figures from Norton, The Employment Act and the Council o f  Economic Advisers, 
203.
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gave such a boost to corporate profit margins, for such an extended period o f time, that 
corporate managers often forgot just how extraordinary these profits were, and pricing 
decisions in general were affected quite profoundly. Any decline in profitability, due to 
either managerial investment, salary, or perquisite decisions, the levelling off o f defense 
purchases (which began to occur in 1968), the expanded government response to 
contracting abuse (which also began to emerge in 1968 with the CCPS), or to the 
pressure o f tightening labor markets (beginning largely in 1967), convinced these 
managers that customary, rather than extraordinary, profits were beginning to erode. 
Since labor costs were clearly rising in tandem with these changes, even if  they were 
mostly offset by rising productivity and capacity utilization, business managers had at 
their disposal, evidence o f that classic combination by which price rises had always 
been justified: increased costs and declining profitability. By obscuring the difference 
between the extraordinary profits associated with war contracts and the more customary 
profits associated with "business as usual," the war in Vietnam clearly helped sustain an 
inflationary environment. Indeed, Johnson's efforts to prevent the establishment o f a 
total war or a total war footing had much to do with the emergence o f this phenomenon. 
Making war contracts—and the extraordinary profits tied to them—more and more a 
part o f customary business expectations, the war ultimately made business managers 
more sensitive to profit erosion that should have been anticipated, less sensitive to their 
own cost-control problems, and more apt to respond with self-defeating and 
unnecessary price increases. Corporate costs were truly expanding, and they were doing 
so quite rapidly, but corporations were generally reveling in it, stopping to complain 
only long enough to blame higher prices on the higher wages that were clearly rising in 
tandem with the era's price inflation.
While Nixon's economists would chide the Keynesians in the departing Johnson 
administration for having produced a climate of "business uncertainty," the New 
Economics had actually produced the opposite; business confidence and economic
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certainty had seldom been higher. Never more certain o f sustained demand, and with 
Vietnam, lucrative government contracts, the business community responded partly by 
boldly declaring the need for higher prices. Ceteris paribus, price stability would have, 
indeed, implied diminished profitability. To assume that everything else had to remain 
the same, or should remain the same, however, was to ignore the only viable path to the 
price stability everyone had declared essential. Certainty and expanding profitability 
along with the lopsided market power o f many businesses and corporations, rather than 
uncertainty and diminished profitability, produced much of the era's troublesome 
inflation. Feigned corporate vulnerability, in the face o f the century's most propitious 
business climate, only obscured this critical phenomenon. "You know," Hewlett- 
Packard executive David Packard once admitted, "there are more companies that fail 
from indigestion than fail from starvation."95 Rising wages, then, even in the worst case 
scenario, were no direct or irresistible cause for general price rises. For the most part, 
they had risen only where high profits had encouraged their expansion.96 Although the 
war in Vietnam had significant impact on aggregate demand, particularly in an economy 
already on the verge of full employment, its impact on the nation's price indices was 
less an outgrowth of this demand than it was the result o f cost-push factors related to 
distinct managerial prerogatives.
The Great Society was plagued by a similar manifestation. While its 
macroeconomic impact was much smaller and largely inconsequential, it still generated 
and sustained enormous profit levels— like the war in Vietnam— for thousands o f the 
nation's businesses.97 As one historian noted, whatever Johnson did for the poor, he had
95 Quoted in Reston, Jr., The Lone Star, 401.
96 Alm ost all o f  the period's "excess" wage settlements came either in industries like construction where 
the profit margins were also abnormally large (and very dependent on city, state, and federal contracts), 
or in the service sector where productivity lagged and there was often a real need for relative wage 
adjustment.
97 As a percentage o f  GNP, federal non-defense spending actually decreased  from 1965 to 1969. Cited in 
Riddell, "Vietnam War and Inflation," 227.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
342
to do with the permission of the affluent, and the affluent often made him pay quite 
dearly.98
For all o f their accomplishments, and there were many, certain Great Society 
programs were captured by the affluent to such an extent that they became, in addition 
to everything else, conduits for federal dollars that funneled money to the already 
wealthy, generated tremendous profits for some individuals and many businesses, and 
wreaked havoc on the price stability of key industries in the process. The construction 
and health care industries, for example, were both impacted along these lines.
Great Society contracts in the construction industry, however, did little more than 
add a slightly larger stream of money to an industry already accustomed to price-fixing 
schemes and a heavy reliance on government outlays.99 It did so, then, with surprisingly 
little impact on the price structure of the industry's private markets. The nation's health 
care industry, on the other hand, easily became the most conspicuous example o f an 
enterprise that was transformed thoroughly, profit-wise and price-wise, by the Great 
Society. Indeed, when the cornerstones o f President Johnson's health care strategy— 
Medicare and Medicaid—became law in 1965, and were implemented the following 
summer, the health care industry underwent what was perhaps its most significant 
change ever.100 In the summer of 1966, health care improved, almost overnight, but the
98 Allen J. Matusow, cited in Jordan and Rostow, eds., The Great Society, 144. Matusow elaborates on 
this in The Unraveling o f  America, 226-232. In Unraveling, He explains health care inflation much as 1 
do here, except that he uses his analysis only to suggest that Medicare and Medicaid were a flop, citing 
largely irrelevant hospital admissions rate studies and highly speculative theories on the value o f  extra 
health care (authored by Victor R. Fuchs) as his primary evidence. He did not draw a connection, 
however, between the inflation he cited two chapters earlier, which he blamed on Keynes and the New  
Economics, and the inflation here, which he did not.
99 A perusal o f  the monthly Consumer Price Index reports for the late 1960s shows that most o f  the price 
inflation in the construction industry came as a result o f  increased borrowing expenses, rising local 
property tax rates, rising property insurance rates, or the inherent inflationary character o f  positional 
goods (choice real estate in an expanding economy). Public contracts continued to lead to bloated profits 
for many builders, but not to radical price changes in the private  construction market. Factored in over 
many decades, these profits had become, instead, a part o f  a relatively stable price structure.
100 Medicare, originally limited to a health assistance program for senior citizens (the general insurance 
option having been closed o ff  by American Medical Association lobbying), eventually came to be 
introduced and passed as a three-tier program. One part resembled previous legislative attempts (Aime
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industry itself also became an unparalleled inflationary dynamo. Outpacing the 
consumer price index every quarter from 1966 to the end of the Johnson presidency 
(and beyond); and representing the most significant components in the most significant 
sector (consumer services), with regard to general price inflation, the health care 
industry was directly responsible for much of the Johnson era inflation.101 Most CPI 
Detailed Reports, for the 1966-1968 period, for example, depict health care price rises 
as comprising between 33% and 66% of all service sector price rises, which, in 
themselves, were commonly responsible for 50% to 75% of the general inflation rate 
over this same period.102 Indeed, the disaggregated nature o f the economy and the
Forand Bill, 1958) that encompassed social security financed hospital insurance for the elderly; a second 
resembled the Kerr-Mills program enacted in September, 1960 (designed then as an alternative to and a 
way to avoid current proposals such as Forand's, passing the senate 91-2 with only Goldwater and 
Thurmond voting "no") that used government funds to subsidize private insurance covering physician's 
fees; and a third, known as Title 19 under the original bill and as Medicaid today, which provided federal 
grants to welfare recipients and the "medically indigent"(the blind, the disabled, the aged, or children in 
single parent fam ilies) in participating states. Allen J. Matusow maintains that the second and third parts 
were added "suddenly" and "casually," all at the behest o f  Wilbur Mills. See Matusow, U nraveling , 226- 
227. Wilbur Cohen, however, recalled how he sold President Kennedy on the idea o f  going for Kerr- 
M ills an d  Medicare, and Secretary o f  Commerce John Connor recalled how Title 19 came into being as a 
way to soften AM A opposition. According to Connor, the AMA came to the White House and 
complained about "socialized medicine," but then admitted that the poor needed a government program 
to pay for their health care. "Would you support legislation like that? Would the John Birchers?" Johnson 
asked. When they answered yes, Johnson pronounced it a "wonderful idea" and said that he would try to 
get legislation. "Does that mean," the AM A delegates asked, "that you will no longer support Medicare?"
"Hell no. I'll support that too," Johnson replied. "We need them both." Quoted by John Connor in 
Hardesty, ed., The Johnson Years, 134. Cohen's recollection from Wilbur J. Cohen, Oral History 
Interview, interviewed by David McComb, December 8, 1968, Tape 1, 35, LBJ Library. Many 
Republicans and physicians were also criticizing the original Medicare bill for not doing enough, sensing 
incorrectly that their bluff would not be called by President Johnson. "We have agreed to give a banquet, 
or a barbecue, for 100,000 people," remarked Dr. Edward Henderson o f  the AMA, "and we've provided 
food for only 1000. That's bad planning." Quoted in memo, Cohen to Cater, Papers o f  LBJ, White House 
Central Files, IS -1, Box 1, LBJ Library. The three-tiered bill, then, was not adopted "casually" at all, but 
came instead as a result o f  careful and necessary political calculation.
101 And indirectly responsible for even more. See, for example, memo, A ckley to LBJ, January 28, 1967 
"Weekly Price Report," Robson-Ross Papers, Box 13, LBJ Library, where Ackley informed Johnson that 
"Dupont raised the price o f  X-ray film 7%." Many price increases for equipment and supplies used 
heavily, but not exclusively, by the health care industry followed the implementation o f  Medicare. It 
should be noted that the Dupont X-ray film increase prompted CEA letters to Kodak and General Aniline 
(other major suppliers). When Kodak agreed, on February 6, not to follow the increase, Dupont rescinded 
its m ove (on February 17).
102 Meant to be estimates with a significant margin for error, these figures do suggest, however, that up 
to 50% o f  the nation's inflation rate could be accounted for by health care inflation during this period. See 
introductory comments, The Consumer Price Index: U.S. City A verage and Selected  Areas (Washington:
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preponderance o f movements in relative, as opposed to general, prices suggest that 
inflation was not the macroeconomic problem it was often purported to be; analyses of 
industry specific price rises generally remain outside the scope o f  most conventional 
analyses of inflation—to the detriment o f an even modest comprehension o f the overall 
phenomenon. Johnson's adherence to the wage-price guideposts, despite their alleged 
arbitrariness and imprecision, and his efforts to rein in health care inflation, stand as 
testimony to his awareness o f this reality and problem. Aware that one firm's price 
change may eventually become another's cost change, and that ideomorphic price 
changes may well become part o f a general inflationary trend, the Johnson 
administration considered health care inflation a special case that happened to be 
contributing greatly to a far more general problem.
The inflationary character o f the industry was, o f course, never completely a 
product of the Great Society. Like the construction industry, health care was somewhat 
predisposed toward unwarranted costs and excess profits even before President Johnson 
took office. Most company health and welfare plans, for example, won through union 
struggles in the 1940s and 1950s, were by 1955, administered almost exclusively by 
employers through private insurance company intermediaries.103 Overcharges, and 
related welfare fraud became commonplace, largely because employers were dispensing 
health care dollars to providers from funds that were essentially a substitute for wages, 
and through insurance companies that were exempt from most antitrust laws.104
U.S. Dept, o f  Labor, various months, 1966-1968). See also memo, Robert Ball, Commissioner, Social 
Security Administration to Califano, May 21, 1966, Papers o f  LBJ, White House Central Files, IS -1, Box 
1, LBJ Library, for data on professional medical and hospital services price rise during the months 
leading up to medicare implementation. Ball notes that, as o f  the April 1966 CPI, all medical care was 
assigned a weight o f  5.80% in the consumer price index.
103 1 94 8 was a watershed year in this development when the National Labor Relations Board ruled that 
health benefits were subject to collective bargaining.
104 If the intermediary was a Blue Cross/Blue Shield company, established in California in 1932, it was 
also exempt from most insurance com pany regulation and was considered a non-profit charity and 
therefore exempt from federal taxes as well (thanks to heavy lobbying by the American Hospital 
Association and the American Medical Association). Only the AFL-CIO, and not the NAM , U.S.
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Combined with what John Steele Gordon once termed "the Dog Food effect," where the 
recipient of a good or service does not pay for it directly, these factors produced a health 
care industry that came to be dominated by cost-plus billing and little consumer or 
governmental oversight.105
Before Medicare, the health care industry had also established strict guidelines for 
medical school admission, school certification, and entry into the profession (or local 
professional society) that served to limit numbers and protect high fees as much as it 
sought to protect health care consumers from medical malpractice. Johnson's father Sam 
had fought against the Texas Medical Association on behalf o f optometrists previously 
denied the right to practice.106 Black physicians had been excluded from all Southern 
state medical societies and limited in their practices as a result. Local medical societies 
also barred physicians who attempted to establish new, less expensive forms of health 
care financing. One Oklahoma physician, for example, who organized a prepaid medical 
co-op among local farmers in the 1930s found himself removed from the local medical 
society when they disbanded and reformed without him.107 The Washington D.C. based 
Group Health Association—a federal employee Health Maintenance Organization, also 
formed in the 1930s— found the AMA expelling member doctors and denying them 
hospital privileges.108 Dr. Caldwell Esselstyn's Rip Van Winkle clinic in Hudson, New 
York, with 60 salaried M.D.s and a prepayment plan that was the model o f efficiency, 
was eventually hectored out o f business by the AMA when they convinced the clinic's
Chamber o f  Commerce, or the AMA, supported the 1959 Welfare and Pension Funds Disclosure bill 
which was designed to combat some o f  this fraud. See Hutchinson, The Imperfect Union, 151, 303, 359.
105 John Steele Gordon, "How America's Health Care Fell 111," American H eritage, May/June, 1992, 49- 
65. And even before the advent o f  Medicare, federal, state, and local governments were spending 
approximately $7 billion o f  the $35.4 billion spent on all health care. Cited in Theodore Marmor, The 
Politics o f  M edicare (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1970), 2.
106 Caro, Path to Power, 81.
107 James A. Morone, The Dem ocratic Wish: Popular Participation an d  the Limits o f  American  
Government (N ew  York: Basic Books, 1990), 255.
108 Howard W olinsky and Tom Brune, The Serpent and the Staff: The Unhealthy Politics o f  the 
American M edical Association  (New York: Jeremy P. Tarcher, G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1994), 21.
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wealthier clients to join them in their struggle against "socialized" medicine."109 When 
the Borden Milk company, through its Milbank Fund, advocated compulsory health 
insurance in the 1930s, the AMA led a successful boycott against the company. 
Afterward, Milbank fired its director and muted its advocacy.110
Alternative health care not provided by the profession, such as pre-natal and post­
natal care in the early part o f the century, was also disparaged and marginalized by the 
profession's local and state societies. When it was left to the government to sponsor—as 
it was with maternity care, through the 1921 Sheppard-Towner Act and the largely 
female staffed Children's Bureau—it was first derided as "socialized medicine" and a 
bureaucratic nightmare, but then coopted by the medical societies themselves when they 
saw that people actually valued the service being rendered.111 When the Journal o f  the 
American Medical Association endorsed the use o f Physician Assistants in 1961, to help 
combat physician shortages, the Association itself quickly repudiated the article and 
worked to insure that payments to PAs from Blue Cross-Blue Shield plans (and 
Medicare once it passed) would be well near impossible.112
The advent o f Medicare, however, transformed this tendency into a full-blown 
preoccupation, and provided, along with other Great Society programs for medical
109 Nelson Cruikshank, Oral History Interview, Interview 5, interviewed by Peter Coming, September 
23, 1966, Columbia University Oral History Program, Social Security Administration Project, Part III, 
N o. 151, 255. Dr. Esselstyn was a former all-American halfback at Yale (B.A., 1925) and President o f  
the Group Health Association o f  America, who also listed Lou Gehrig and Eleanor Roosevelt among his 
former patients.
110 W olinsky and Brune, The Serpent and  the Staff, 21.
111 Theda Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins o f  Social Policy in the United 
States (Cambridge: Belknap Press, Harvard University Press, 1992), 10, 512-521. Having no alternative 
to offer to the Children's Bureau care, when the care itself soon came to be regarded as valuable, 
physicians undertook an education/public relations campaign to make it their business to assume these 
duties. As Skocpol points out, most o f  the doctors who trained themselves for this task, did so at the 
government sponsored Sheppard-Towner clinics they had always derided.
112 James Workman, "Health Care for Less," Utne Reader, January/February, 1993, 81. The 
Congressional O ffice o f  Technology Assessment found that physician assistants were fully qualified to 
perform up to 80% o f  the procedures commmonly done by physicians, and a RAND corporation study 
found that physician assistants and nurse practitioners "provided more medical attention, monitored drugs 
more closely, and signed medical orders more promtly" than physicians or registered nurses.
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education, research and infrastructure, a massive infusion of cash that swelled profit 
margins and the prices o f medical services.113 Hospital room rates, already climbing at a 
6% annual rate from 1960 to 1965, shot up 16.5% in 1966, with an 11.5% increase 
coming between the implementation o f Medicare on July 1 and the end of the calendar 
year. After rising approximately 3% per year for the 1960 to 1965 period, doctor's fees 
also witnessed a marked increase in 1966, rising 7.8% for the year—the biggest annual 
rise since 1927.114 Similar rises occurred every year thereafter (slightly smaller in 1967 
and 1968; slightly larger in 1969 and 1970), and the income of medical professionals 
increased at an even faster rate than their fee schedules, roughly doubling from the 
beginning of the decade to the end.115 And there was marked evidence that physician 
and hospital exploitation o f the new Medicare/Medicaid program lay behind much of 
the industry's inflaiton. A 1968 Senate Finance Committee study revealed, for example, 
that in Illinois the most a Blue Shield plan would pay for cataract surgery was $165 
while Medicare paid $444. The same study revealed that while Blue Shield paid $117 
for a hernia operation in Florida, and $95 for a gall bladder operation in Texas,
Medicare paid an average of $255 and $303 respectively.116 On top of the abnormally 
high fees, the Finance Committee study also cited overvisiting, gang-visiting, and 
superfluous lab testing as prevalent problems in the fledgling Medicare program.
113 By 1968 the Johnson administration was spending $3 billion annually for the construction o f  new  
laboratories, hospitals, and health clinics; $2.5 billion for military health care; $700 million for the 
prevention o f  diseases; $160 million for the Partnership for Health (to create health planning agencies); 
$50 million for the Heart Disease, Cancer, and Stroke Program, and was providing approximately 75% o f  
all funds for biomedical research, all programs funded outside o f  the Medicare program. See Johnson, 
"Special Message to Congress: 'Health in America,'"March 4, 1968, Public Papers, 1968: /, 322-332.
114 Though Johnson signed the Medicare bill on July 30, 1965 in Independence, Missouri (in the 
presence o f  Harry Truman), the program was not implemented until July 1, 1966. According to Wilbur 
Cohen, this was done to allow ample time for planning and to avoid opening the program close to the 
winter flu season. See Cohen, Oral History Interview, Tape 2, December 8, 1968,12. Inflation statistics 
from Consumer Price Index, January, 1967, and "A Bad Case o f  Inflation," Business Week, March 4, 
1967,35.
113 Marmor, The Politics o f  M edicare, 123; Gordon, "How America's Health Care Fell III," 60.
116 Wolinsky and Brune, The Serpent and the S ta ff  49-50.
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Increased demand for medical services, rising wage rates for medical assistants and 
custodial staff, and increased equipment prices were all cited by physicians, hospital 
administrators, and business publications as reasons for the sudden price changes; to 
some extent, these were, indeed, all contributing factors. The most significant factor of 
all by far, however, was the peculiar economic character o f the health care industry 
itself. Operating exclusively on a historically established cost-plus basis, and suffering 
no economic consequences for inefficiency as a result, hospitals and physicians found it 
easy to use Medicare and Medicaid as a springboard to higher costs, higher fees, and in 
the case of physicians, substantially higher personal income. Among the non-profit 
institutions that received or administered Medicare funds—primarily hospitals and the 
Blue Cross-Blue Shield "charities"—higher costs translated into higher salaries, 
valuable company perquisites, and technically advanced equipment. The Blue Cross- 
Blue Shield companies in particular, which served as intermediaries in 32 o f the first 48 
Medicare plans, were fast becoming commercial operations with an increasing number 
o f for-profit spinoff companies, even though they were classified as tax exempt 
charities. Worse yet, many off these spinoff companies were in high risk fields; if they 
hit paydirt, the Blue Cross-Blue Shield executives/investors profited mightily, if they 
went bust, losses were charged to policyholders.117 Unlike most companies in other 
sectors of the economy, there was simply no downside to the phenomenon o f higher 
operating expenses.
Profitmaking institutions, of course, such as approximately 85% of the nation's 
nursing homes, and all o f the private insurance companies that served as financial 
intermediaries for the Medicare program, did have some incentive to control costs. As it
117 The other 16 intermediaries were comprised o f  15 insurance companies and 1 independent insurer. 
See Jane Fritsch, "Empire Says Data on Insurance Loss Were Erroneous," N ew  York Times, June 17, A l,  
B5; and Fritsch, "Blue Cross Gave False Report to '92 Legislature," New York Times, June 18, 1993, A l,  
B4, for a brief study o f  Empire (New York state) Blue Cross-Blue Shield operations and these type o f  
practices.
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was with most o f the nation's physicians, however, guaranteed government payments 
with few or no strings attached made higher fees irresistible, even if costs were 
relatively stable. Much like businesses in other sectors of the economy, that rode a 
perceived  wage-based profit squeeze to higher prices, these physicians and institutions 
also utilized the general perception o f an industry-wide cost explosion (along with some 
real cost increases) to achieve higher prices and higher real income. Most o f the 
elements Arthur Okun found among oligopolistic companies in the general economy, 
however, that had always contributed to a general price stickiness, were simply not 
prevalent in the health care industry. This explains, in part, why the AMA fought so 
hard to win Congressional limits on the number o f paying customers new Community 
Health Centers (sponsored by the Great Society's Community Action program) could 
accomodate.118 A shopper's mentality was the last thing the AMA wanted to introduce 
to the profession's provider-client relationship. Even if they were perceived as a 
favorable development within the industry, and were largely unassumed by physicians 
and for-profit institutions, rapidly increased costs became a prevalent part o f the health 
care industry at large after the implementation of Medicare.119 This made price rises, for 
the health care providers, anyway, relatively painless and almost inevitable.
I f  the source o f this inflationary momentum, however, was to be found within the 
open-ended fee structure o f the Medicare program, was the inflation, then, not the fault 
o f the Johnson administration? Medicare was, after all, a Johnson priority. It was also 
made very clear to President Johnson, at the time of passage, that Medicare would serve 
to propel health care prices skyward. As it was with Community Action and other Great
118 Morone, The Dem ocratic Wish, 265.
119 Costs also varied widely within the industry, a symptom o f  substantial inefficiency. Johnson's Health 
Manpower Commission, for example, reported in 1967 that costs among som e o f  the nation's best 
hospitals varied by as much as 100%, "without significant differences in quality or scope o f  services." 
Cited by Johnson in "Special M essage to Congress: 'Health in America,'" 329,
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Society programs, Johnson knew, in advance, what kind o f trouble to expect.120 On 
April 25, 1966, for example, some two months before Medicare implementation, HEW's 
John Douglas wrote to Joe Califano:
The present likelihood that the medical profession will use the advent o f Medicare 
on July 1 as a springboard for raising fees and charges to a level substantially 
higher than at present. If nothing is done, there is every indication that costs will 
continue to rise and at a faster  rate (emphasis in original). The medical profession 
will probably blame this on Medicare and the administration's policy with respect 
to it.121
On June 29 HEW Undersecretary Wilbur Cohen wrote to Douglas Cater, Johnson's 
liaison with HEW, reminding him o f "the President's concern that physicians may 
increase their fees over the next few months." Further reminding Cater of insurance 
company responsibility for "fee reasonableness" in the Medicare system, Cohen urged 
him to go forth with plans to issue a statement from the administration to these carriers 
and to stress the applicability o f Title 18, section 1842(b) o f the Medicare law which 
decreed that Medicare charges must conform to "prevailing local charges," and that they 
"cannot exceed fees for comparable service to the carriers' own subscribers."122 Twenty 
days later, Cater received another memo from Cohen, informing him that the American 
Medical Association would like to meet with the President, and that they also requested 
that the "fee reasonableness" statement not be issued. "The Secretary (Anthony 
Celebrezze, Cohen's superior at HEW) does not believe," Cohen added, "that the AMA 
behaved very well at [their convention] the week before Medicare went into
120 On Community Action, for example, Johnson knew that "maximum feasible participation o f  the 
poor" would spark clashes with established political machines, many o f  them Democratic. In this case he 
welcom ed the problem. When West Virginia's Robert Byrd called to complain about "blacks getting 
involved" in local politics, Johnson remarked (privately to Joe Califano), "Its about time som e o f  these 
politicians heard from the poor in their communities." See Califano, Triumph and Tragedy , 78.
121 Memo, Douglas to Califano (approved by Douglas, Dr. Stewart, and Jim Deusenberry), April 25, 
1966, Robson-Ross Papers, Box 13, LBJ Library.
122 Memo, Cohen to Cater, June 29, 1966, Papers o f  LBJ, White House Central Files, IS-I, Box 1, LBJ 
Library.
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operation....If the physicians raise fees, as seems likely, the President should not appear 
to be agreeing to AMA policies."123
On one hand, however, the political source o f the problem was truly irrelevant; only 
its economic character mattered. The crucial point was, and still is, that much o f the 
period's price inflation came not from excess demand or from the alleged weaknesses of 
Keynesian macroeconomic precepts, but, in this case, from the economic weaknesses of 
America's health care delivery system, weaknesses that would have generated 
significant price inflation even in a low-demand environment (as they did within a 
number of recessions in the 1970s and 1980s). On the other hand, Johnson's culpability, 
here, would also support, somewhat, the claims of his detractors who suggested that the 
emerging inflation of the period was o f little concern to him.
All in all, however, Johnson had few, if any, alternatives when it came to health 
care reform; Medicare was launched at a time when he and the CEA were still 
concerned with fiscal drag rather than a tax surcharge; and, while it was considerably 
unwieldy, Johnson actively sought and always believed in the potential for, a solution to 
the health care inflation problem. His commissioning of the June 1967 National 
Conference on Medical Costs and his special message to Congress on March 4,1968, 
entitled "Health in America" suggests that he did not shrug off this sobering 
predicament. "It is appropriate," Johnson noted in the 1968 address, "that the 
Government— which pays more than 20% of the National medical bill—take the lead in 
stemming soaring medical care costs."124
Utterly unwilling, from the start, to settle for no change at all in the way health was 
provided, President Johnson was hemmed in by the intransigence of conservative 
Congressmen and industry lobbyists, and the magnitude of the health care problem. "I'm 
going to make Harry Truman's dream come true," he remarked. "Old folks are not going
123 Memo, Cohen to Cater, July 19, 1966, ibid.
124 Johnson, "Special M essage to Congress: 'Health in America,'" 329.
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to be barred from a doctor's office or a hospital because they don't have any money for 
medical attention. They are never again going to have to be sick and hurt and cry alone. 
Its a goddamned crime..."125 Indeed, before Medicare, four out o f five persons over 65 
had a disability or chronic disease, and one half had no health insurance.126 "I'm one of 
the few...old enough to remember the good old days," remarked Republican John 
Gardner, Johnson's one-time HEW Secretary. "So was Lyndon Johnson. In that time, 
old age and poverty were firmly linked, and a good many folks went 'over the hill to the 
poorhouse'....A great many others were mendicants in their own families. Don't talk to 
me about the good old days."127 As late as 1968 Johnson remained convinced that much 
health care reform was still required. "Goddamn it Larry," Johnson remarked to White 
House counsel Larry Temple in late 1968, "there are a lot o f old people in this country 
who aren't getting the proper care. They keep telling me that everybody is doing as good 
a job as they can. It's a goddamn lie. They're not. Everybody's not doing it, and those 
that are doing it are doing it because they can make money out o f it."128
The pressing health care crisis among the nation's poor also helped frame Johnson's 
outlook on reform. In his 1968 Special Message to Congress, he recalled part o f the 
problem: "This great, wealthy, resourceful Nation—which should lead the world in 
saving its young— instead ranked 15th in infant mortality in 1965."129 The pressure
125 Cited by Jack Valenti in Hardesty, ed., The Johnson Years, 20. AFL-CIO lobbyist Nelson Cruikshank 
recalled that Truman became the first President willing to clash with the AMA out o f  his experience as a 
county judge with doctors who refused to take care o f  their poor clients. See Cruikshank, Oral History 
Interview, Interview I, November 18, 1965, Columbia University Oral History Program, 6.
126 Tom Wicker, in Hardesty, ed., The Johnson Years, 4.
127 Cited in ibid., 24. See also Papers o f  LBJ, White House Central Files, IS-1, Box 1, LBJ Library, for 
letters, some critical, most laudatory, written to Johnson from private citizens after the implementation o f  
Medicare. Many tell a similar story, thanking the President for the Medicare bill, and noting that because 
o f  the Medicare funds, nursing homes were actually getting nurses for the first time, dining areas with 
tables, and other such "luxuries." Virtually all o f  the critical letters are fron physicians railing about 
socialized medicine and what they imagined as the end o f  the free enterprise system.
128 Quoted in Miller, Lyndon. 547.
129 Johnson, "Special Message to Congress: 'Health in America,'" 323. A 32% decline in infant mortality 
rates, from 1965 to 1974, was one o f  the most notable accomplishments o f  the Medicare/Medicaid 
program. See Karen Davis and Cathy Schoen, Health and the War on Poverty: A Ten Year A ppraisal 
(Washington: Brookings Institution, 1978).
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from medical industry lobbyists to do nothing, however, was every bit as great as the 
nation's compelling need for change. "In health," Joe Califano recalled, "our quest to 
provide access for the elderly and the poor led us to accede to the demands o f hospitals 
and doctors for open-ended cost-plus and fee for service payments."130
Lobbyists for the health care industry were simply too well equipped, and too 
influential, to be ignored. By 1965, the AMA had 23 full-time lobbyists on their payroll 
at a total o f $5000 per day.131 With 159,000 dues paying members, the association spent 
approximately $830,000, in 1965 alone, for TV, radio, and newspaper ads critical o f the 
Johnson Medicare proposals.132 In 1962 and 1963, the American Medical Political 
Action Committee, in conjunction with the Conference o f State Manufacturers and the 
National Association o f Manufacturers, produced a get-out-the-vote film entitled "The 
Velvet Curtain"— a thinly disguised attempt to warn citizens o f big government in 
general and socialized medicine in particular. Though it was labeled "bipartisan" and 
deemed impartial, qualifying it for a tax deduction, it did little but connect upper middle 
class voter apathy to the otherwise unwarranted success o f liberal Democratic schemes 
for big government. "Don't forget the Kennedy-Nixon election!" it warned soberly.133 
The AMA also produced a sound recording, after President Kennedy endorsed 
Medicare, that was widely distributed among the spouses o f member physicians. 
Beginning in 1962, they heard the following admonition:
Write those letters now; call your friends and tell them to write them. If  you don't, 
this program, I promise you, will pass just as surely as the sun will come up 
tomorrow. And behind it will come other federal programs that will invade every 
area o f freedom as we have known it in this country, until one day...we will awake 
to find that we have socialism. And if  you don't do this, and I don't do it, one of
130 Quoted in Hardesty, ed., The Johnson Years, 50.
131 Goldman, The Tragedy o f  Lyndon Johnson, 291.
132 Marmor, The Politics o f  M edicare, 27; W olinsky and Brune, The Serpent and the Staff, 26.
133 Script summary and background notes, NAM  film presentation, "The V elvet Curtain," Papers o f  the 
NAM , Series I, Box 69, Hagley Library. The $49,000 project was financed with $25,000 from AMPAC, 
$ 16,000 from COSMA, $2000 from the NAM , and the remaining $6000 from a variety o f  individual 
contributions.
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these days you and I are going to spend our sunset years telling our children what it
was like in America when men were free.134
Physicians groups, including the AMA, also endorsed any legislation, or 
amendments to legislation, that might have upset the Johnson strategy for Medicare 
passage, however illogical their position might have seemed. When Senator Russell 
Long introduced Medicare amendments, for example, that would remove all coverage 
restrictions on the length o f hospital visits and outpatient treatment, dramatically 
increasing the potential cost o f the program, the AMA supported the Long amendments 
wholeheartedly with the tacit understanding that they would cripple the legislation.
Only through the energetic efforts o f senators Paul Douglas and Clinton Anderson, with 
the latter of the two being coached extensively by President Johnson, were the costly, 
and potentially lethal, Long amendments defeated.135 And though the AMA seldom 
found themselves supporting legislation for higher taxes, they did just that when they 
supported Republican John Byrnes' attempt to raise Social Security taxes to 10% (from 
the existing 7.25%) in the hope that any further increase, needed to accomodate the 
Medicare program, would be precluded. This change was also narrowly averted, 
collapsing only when doctrinaire Texas Republican Bruce Alger (alumnus of the 1960 
Adolphus Hotel incident) decided that he could not support the move in good 
conscience.136
Before the 1964 elections made passage of a Medicare bill almost inevitable, the 
AMA had applied pressure to the U.S. Congress in other ways. In 1963, key House 
Ways and Means member John Watts of Kentucky, for example, was prevailed upon not
134 Quoted in Morone, The Dem ocratic Wish, 262. V oice on recording: Ronald Reagan.
135 Goldman, The Tragedy o f  Lyndon Johnson, 291-293; memo, Clinton Anderson to LBJ, July 1, 1965, 
Papers o f  LBJ, White House Central Files, IS -1, Box 1, LBJ Library; and Clinton Presba Anderson, Oral 
History Interview, interviwed by Thomas H. Baker, May 20, 1969, LBJ Library, 15-16. Anderson, a 
major sponsor o f  the Medicare legislation, was an N YA  director in New  M exico when Johnson served in 
the same capacity in Texas. See the Goldman pages for a probing, yet nicely balanced analysis o f  Russell 
Long's motivation here.
136 Marmor, The Politics o f  M edicare , 44. The rate was raised to 8.4% in 1966 to insure that Medicare 
was on a sound actuarial footing.
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to vote for a Medicare bill in exchange for an AMA pledge not to endorse the Surgeon 
General's report on cigarette smoking.137 When Republican congressman Walter 
Moeller said at the same time that he was not sure about Medicare, but that he would 
not come out against it, physicians in his Ohio congressional district vowed not to treat 
patients if  they voted for him, and spread the word that he was a socialist.138
Personal attacks were often part of the anti-Medicare effort as well. Because 
Johnson's Secretary o f Commerce, John Connor, was also a Merck CEO, many 
physicians, in 1964 and 1965, conducted a boycott against Merck products as a way of 
punishing Connor for his support of President Johnson.139 United Mine Workers and 
AFL-CIO consultant I.S. Falk and HEW Undersecretary Wilbur Cohen, both Jewish and 
key figures in the struggle for Medicare, became the frequent target of vicious anti- 
Semitic attacks leveled by a number of physician's groups. The anti-Semitic attacks on 
Cohen and Falk were reminiscent of the AMA's first foray into a separate political 
fund—the National Physician's Committee for Medical Service, formed in 1939—a 
venture that was allowed to expire in 1948 after it produced an "embarassing" series of 
anti-Semitic letters and a contest for editorial cartoonists seeking to ridicule national 
health insurance proposals.140 The AFL-CIO even had to suspend a Women's Auxiliary 
letter writing campaign when the letters, many of which were sent to personal 
physicians, drew unusually vitriolic and wholly frightening responses. "You communist 
bitch, don't show up in my office again," was one o f the more loathsome, but not 
infrequently scrawled replies.141
137 Cruikshank, Oral History Interview, Interview 2, February 16, 1966, Columbia University Oral 
History Program, 97. Watts' vote also influenced Ways and Means chairman Mills' stand, for Watts 
would have been the 13th vote (out o f  25).
138 Goldman, The Tragedy o f  Lyndon Johnson, 286.
139 Connor, Oral History Interview, 28-29.
140 W olinsky and Brune, The Serpent and the Staff, 70.
141 Cruikshank, Oral History Interview, Interview 4, August 16, 1966, Columbia University Oral History 
Program, 196, 197.
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When the National Council o f Churches endorsed Johnson's Medicare proposals, 
the AMA even attempted to cover the religious front. Launching a campaign to 
repudiate the National Council o f Churches' stand, the AMA encouraged doctors to 
flood the Presbyterian national convention, and after procuring a list o f all delegates, 
had a strongly worded letter awaiting each one in their hotel rooms.142 Though they 
overplayed their hand here, and on numerous other occasions as well, physician's groups 
were clearly able to affect the tone o f the administration's Medicare proposals.143 
Without at least a modicum of physician support, Medicare might still pass, but it would 
never be implemented successfully or without great, socially debilitating, political 
rancor.
While Johnson and many of his supporters in the Medicare fight continued to plan for 
fee schedules and strict cost controls within the Medicare program, right up to the end, a 
threatened physician boycott effectively dashed these aspirations at the very 
beginning.144 Knowing that they would have a difficult enough time trying to force
142 Ibid., 246, 252.
143 The AM A even found themselves overplaying their hand with President Eisenhower, who ran against 
"socialized medicine" in 1952. When Ike created the HEW and named right-wing Democrat Oveta Culp 
Hobby to the Secretary's post the AMA wanted one o f  theirs to sit at her right hand. When she rejected 
the first AM A candidates as political hacks, the Association leaders paid a visit to the White House and 
presented Ike with a detailed, slickly produced notebook that described how they had elected him almost 
singlehandedly. Ike threw a fit and said he never wanted to see an AMA delegation again. See 
Cruikshank, Oral History Interview, Interview 6, August 29, 1967, Columbia University Oral History 
Program, 428-429,
144 The Harris County (Houston,TX area) Medical Association's response was typical o f  many. The 
Medical society newsletter read, in part: "The program is designated 'The Individual Responsibility 
Program.' Its sole purpose is to prevent governmental efforts to establish fee schedules which certainly in 
the future could equate medical care with non-professional services. This would result in overutilization 
and poorer quality medical care, and by oath and ethics w e cannot in good conscience allow this 
sequence o f  events to occur." This statement was followed by a list o f  "basic elements" which included: 
"The physician should refuse payments from any insurance company or governmental agency," and "All 
physicians should voluntarily refuse to fill out or sign any governmental or other insurance forms." See 
memo, Michael DeBakey to Douglass Cater, March 1, 1966, Papers o f  LBJ, White House Central Files, 
IS-1, Box 1, LBJ Library (DeBakey was a prominent physician who supported the Johnson Medicare 
proposals). See also memo John Gardner to LBJ, December 14, 1965, ibid., where Gardner apprised 
Johnson o f  a boycott planned by the Association o f  American Physicians and Surgeons (though at that 
date, Gardner was chiefly telling Johnson not to worry, for the AAPS was only 15,000 strong and was not 
likely to be joined by the AMA).
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Southern hospitals to take black Medicare patients, Johnson and his advisers had little 
choice but to take the boycott threat seriously, compromising cost controls in the 
process.145 "Reasonable costs" replaced fee schedules, financial intermediaries chosen 
by the physicians themselves became responsible for these "controls," and the rout was 
on.146
When Lyndon Johnson stepped down from the presidency in January 1969, health 
care price inflation had clearly garnered the attention o f the Cabinet Committee on Price 
Stability, just then coming into its own. Just as it was with the war in Vietnam and its 
resulting price dislocations, however, genuine solutions were obscured by, or even 
sacrificed to, a changing political climate, and much was left undone. As Anthony 
Campagna noted in his study o f the war in Vietnam and its impact on the U.S. economy, 
"the greater tragedy, however, may not be in what was left undone, but in the belief that 
we had done all that we could do and failed."147 While it had begun to emerge slowly 
and without certain dominion, perhaps as early as 1964 when Johnson signed the 
landmark Civil Rights Act, this greater tragedy came to draw much of its plausibility
145 In the critical first w eeks o f  Medicare implementation, the top three administrators at HEW spent 
more time dealing with discrimination problems in Southern hospitals than anything else, including the 
obvious pricing problems. Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and South Carolina were the states with the 
most non-compliant hospitals. Alabama governor Wallace, in fact, was urging hospitals to refuse black 
Medicare patients. See Marmor, The Politics o f  M edicare, 88; memo, Farris Bryant, Director, O ffice o f  
Emergency Planning, to LBJ, May 23. 1966, Papers o f  LBJ, White House Central Files, IS -1, Box 1, LBJ 
Library; and memo, James McCrory, HEW Director o f  Public Information, to Douglass Cater, July 15, 
1966, ibid.
146 Largely at the behest o f  Russell Long in the Senate Finance Committee, depreciation costs (at 
replacement value) were included in the definition o f  "reasonable cost," even though much o f  the 
depreciable capital was financed with government grants. (To Long's credit, he informed Social Security 
commissioner Robert Ball that he opposed the payment o f  depreciation on assets created with public 
funds; he was largely concerned with for-profit institutions such as nursing homes. See memo, Ball to 
Califano, May 21 ,1966, Papers o f  LBJ, White House Central Files, IS-1, Box 1, LBJ Library). The 1946 
Hill-Burton Act, technically a massive government "intrusion" into the nation's health care system, 
provided construction funds for approximately 35% o f  the nation's hospitals in the 1946-1974 period.
This kind o f  intrusion, with almost no strings attached, was a smash hit with conservative physicians who 
opposed socialized medicine. In its first two years o f  operation under Hill-Burton, the Public Health 
service funded 347 projects in 42 states. See Morone, The Dem ocratic Wish, 259-261. Austin, Texas built 
four hospitals with Hill-Burton funds. Cited in Sam Houston Johnson, M y Brother Lyndon, 61.
147 Campagna, The Economic Consequences o f  the Vietnam War, 143.
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from the administration o f Lyndon Johnson's successor. In his history of American 
populism, Michael Kazin noted:
But liberalism did not topple from the weight of its own failures. Beginning in the 
late 1960s, conservative activists and politicians— most o f whom were 
Republicans—re-created themselves as the authentic representatives o f average 
white Americans. They learned to harness the same mass resentments (against 
federal power, left-wing movements, the counterculture, and the black poor) for 
which George Wallace had spoken [in the 1968 presidential campaign] but was 
unable to ride to victory....Without abandoning their core beliefs, activists and 
politicians on the Right became skilled at courting white Democrats, both North 
and South, with praise of their labor, their families, their ethnic identities, their 
moral beliefs.148
Woven together by the shared assumption that liberal economics had failed and that 
liberal politics promised worsening social conditions, this disparate offensive remained 
intact only as this assumption remained alive. Never embracing or understanding either 
the economic concerns o f the working class, whose resentment he tapped so freely, or 
the tenets of the New Economics he was so anxious to leave behind, Richard Nixon 
would have more to say about the fate of the New Economics than either John Kennedy 
or Lyndon Johnson. Both the clarity and efficacy of the nation's political economy 
would suffer as a result. Before Nixon could launch his counter-offensive, however, 
Johnson would find himself defending the New Economics with a page from an old 
economics text. Though macroeconomic features o f the Johnson era political economy 
had less to do with inflation than many other factors—health care reform included— 
they were not insignificant and, more importantly, had to be controlled to prove their 
very limited relationship to the period's emerging inflation. Thus began, largely in 1967, 
the Johnson administration's battle for an income tax surcharge, a battle widely 
misapprehended by both the American public and professional historians.
,48Michael Kazin, The Populist Persuasion: An American History (N ew  York: Basic Books, 1995), 246- 
248.
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Chapter 8.
New Economics and Old Medicine:
The Tax Surcharge Debate
If  it should turn out that additional insurance is needed, then I am convinced that 
we should levy higher taxes rather than accept inflation—which is the most unjust and 
capricious form o f taxation.
- Lyndon Johnson, 1966 Economic Report of the President
This is not a problem for the next six months or two years but for the decade. The 
end o f the war won't solve it. A tax increase won't solve it (though it could help). It will 
have to be approached head on. Sometime, somewhere, we will have to find a way to 
convince the unions they cannot continually push wage costs up, and to convince 
businesses that profit margins cannot continually rise.
- CEA Chairman Gardner Ackley to President Johnson, July 27, 1966
That guns and butter and everything else in the Johnson budget caused some 
demand-pull inflation in the 1966-1969 period is undeniable. Near-full employment 
had been attained and fiscal policy remained stimulative through 1968. Other things 
being equal, such a combination could not help but produce inflation in some industries 
and some sectors. Only if genuine market forces were ignored or otherwise evaded, 
could the prices o f some goods and services remain flat. But was this sufficient cause 
to effect an abrupt change in the nation's fiscal policy and to do what many of 
Johnson's Keynesian advisers recommended in the winter o f 1965-66: ask for a small 
tax increase? And did the absence of such fiscal restraint guarantee not just some
359
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inflation in some sectors but a veritable landslide o f price increases instead? "There is 
one major economic question of the day," Paul Samuelson wrote in 1966. "In the board 
rooms of Wall Street, the common rooms o f Cambridge, and the offices o f 
Washington, we are all asking ourselves: should President Johnson recommend an 
increase in personal and corporate-income tax rates in January [1967]?...All the 
industrialists I know are against a tax rise. Most o f my banker acquaintances are for 
it."1 From the vantage point of the post-Keynesian era, the answers to these questions 
seem obvious and simple: the failure to enact a tax rise in 1966 or 1967, "let the genie 
out o f the bottle" and triggered a widespread inflation that would ultimately 
compromise the Keynesian revolution and darken the nation's economic prospects for 
nearly a decade and a half.2 Although none of Johnson's Keynesian advisers ever 
suggested that this failure caused that much harm, many believed, in retrospect, that it 
had, at the same time, been a mistake. "Lyndon Johnson's fateful error," James Tobin 
wrote in 1987, "was to ignore this advice [for a tax increase]."3
But the answers are not so simple, and it was not that clear in 1966 when the 
debate commenced and the options began to be measured. "Like Oscar Wilde, who 
spent the morning putting in a comma and the afternoon taking it out," Paul Samuelson 
noted in 1966, "I find myself oscillating."4 Indeed, few argued that a tax increase 
would not help dampen both the genuine demand-pull inflation that had begun to 
emerge and the inflationary psychology that had risen up with inflation in general, no 
matter what the origin. Gardner Ackley's memo to Johnson after the airline mechanics 
settlement in 1966 suggested as much. There was little consensus, however, on the 
more significant and somewhat less manageable questions regarding side-effects, 
absolute necessity, or political possibility, and Johnson and his economic advisers were
1 Paul Samuelson, The Samuelson Sampler, 29.
2 Matusow, The Unraveling o f  America, 159.
3 Tobin, "Keynesian Economics and Its Renaissance," 106.
4 Samuelson, The Samuelson Sampler, 29.
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never convinced that excess demand alone caused very much o f the period's inflation. 
Forty percent o f New York business economists predicted recession for 1967; if their 
forecasts were reasonably accurate, a tax increase would certainly be unwise (this was 
Samuelson's conclusion).5 Many in Congress, such as Senator William Proxmire, 
expressed the same concern and drew the same conclusion. Johnson and his economic 
advisers knew that some fiscal restraint was desirable, but they also knew that much o f 
the country's inflation originated not with excess demand but with the price-making 
customs and prerogatives o f the nation's business community. Target return on 
investment, a dearth o f genuinely competitive markets, and corporate awareness o f an 
increasingly inelastic demand curve (that accompanied the nation's growing 
prosperity), combined to generate much of the inflation that had begun to trouble 
policymakers and citizens alike.6 Much as it would provide a helping hand, Johnson 
and his advisers concluded, a tax increase would not then be as effective an inflation- 
fighting tool as either reinvigorated guideposts or government contracting reforms, and 
it also possessed a greater number o f potentially harmful side-effects, particularly since 
it would have to emerge from an increasingly conservative Congress. Simultaneous 
attempts to strengthen the guideposts and to use the federal government's tremendous 
buying power, in the fight against inflation, truly made the tax increase question 
somewhat less pressing and significant. Moreover, for every administration adviser 
who remained somewhat skeptical about the suitability of a tax increase, there were 
thirty politicians who opposed it outright—mostly on ideological grounds— and twice
5 Ibid., 30.
6 See Demetrios S. Giannaros and Bharat R. Kolluri, "Deficit Spending, Money, and Inflation: Some 
International Empirical Evidence," Journal o f  Macroeconomics, Summer 1985, 401-417, in which it is 
suggested that a government's budget deficit is not an indirect or direct determinant o f  m oney supply 
growth or inflation in most countries. Giannaros and Kolluri found that the U.S. was the primary 
exception to the rule, for there was some statistical evidence o f  both direct and indirect inflationary 
effects emanating from budget deficits. "In general," they conclude, "differences observed between the 
U.S. and the rest o f  the industrial countries on the propositions tested may be a reflection o f  the different 
institutional structures and the different policy priorities o f  these countries." Ibid., 415.
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that number of professional economists who opposed it because o f the war in Vietnam. 
As Paul Samuelson reminded President Johnson, in a March 1967 open letter, there 
was also "no real agreement" among those economists who urged the passage o f a tax 
increase.
Dr. Galbraith thinks it the necessary price for maintenance o f public expenditure 
in the public sector and pushing forward with the new programs of the Great 
Society. Dr. Roosa [former Undersecretary o f the Treasury for Monetary Affairs] 
thinks higher taxes are needed to keep us from going down the road to inflation. 
Dr. Heller does not think 1967 will be a year of demand-pull inflation: he wants a 
change in policy mix without contraction—higher taxes only in order to have 
easier interest rates.7
Unequivocal and preponderant support for a tax increase simply did not exist in
1966 or 1967, even among professional economists. Some endorsements were also
grounded on a rationale that appeared at least somewhat suspicious or disingenuous to
President Johnson. "I am afraid that the reason so many businessmen and bankers are
supporting you on the surtax," Harry McPherson wrote to Johnson in late 1967, "is so
that they will feel free to increase prices and interest rates after you lose the surtax fight
(having fought the good fight with LBJ)."8 There was little testimony or economic
evidence compelling Johnson to push for a tax increase in 1966 or early 1967. When
economic data and CEA forecasts provided a clearer impetus, Johnson acted decisively
and used his January 10, 1967 State of the Union Message to call for a 6% income tax
surcharge.9 That it took eighteen months to obtain passage of the surcharge, by then a
10% rather than a 6% "tax on a tax," suggests that Johnson shirked his fiscal
responsibilities, and that he was ineffective as an economic policy maker. Since the
Revenue and Expenditure Control Act (the 10% tax surcharge) was not signed into law
until June 28, 1968, the long interval between proposal and passage also gave credence
7 Samuelson, The Samuelson Sampler, 33.
8 Quoted in McQuaid, Big Business and Presidential Power, 251.
9Public Papers, Lyndon Johnson, 1967: 1, 8. The 6% surcharge eventually came to be (in 1968) a 10% 
surcharge.
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to the charges that Johnson deceived or failed to listen to his economic advisers. 
Several o f these economists, after all, including CEA chairman Gardner Ackley, had 
recommended a tax surcharge (initially 6%) as early as December 1965.10 Did Johnson 
truly ignore this advice, resolving its implications only with "a combination o f wish 
projection and deceit?"11 Or did the decision for or against a tax surcharge and the 
passage o f the legislation itself remain both a difficult and uncertain task throughout 
the period o f debate?
"If the budget is $115 billion," wrote Gardner Ackley in a memo to President 
Johnson on December 17,1965, "there is little question in my mind that a significant 
tax increase will be needed."12 Johnson noted that Budget Director Charles Schultze 
also warned him at the same time of rising Vietnam expenditures and inflation. "In 
practical terms," Schultze told Johnson, "this means tax increases" eventually. Johnson
10 See Robert Collins, "Growth Liberalism in the Sixties," in David Farber, ed. The Sixties: From 
M emory to History (Chapel Hill: University o f  North Carolina Press, 1994), 30-34, where he notes that 
LBJ "refused to push for a major tax hike in 1966, despite pressure from his economists and other 
advisers;" that "Johnson's long inaction on the tax front allowed the inflationary spiral to take hold;" that 
Johnson had "stretched the economy close to the breaking point;"and that "The delay [on the tax bill] 
had been an integral part o f  Johnson's guns and butter policy." See also Stephen Skowronek, The 
Politics Presidents Make: Leadership from  John Adams to G eorge Bush (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 
Harvard University Press, 1993), 353, where he maintains that "by December 1965 his [LBJ's] 
economic advisers were already urging a tax increase....Johnson overruled them....Manipulating 
econom ic reports to have things break his way, Johnson let the whole bundle o f  commitments run on 
automatic pilot." Also Bruce J. Schulman, Lyndon B. Johnson and American Liberalism, M l,  in which 
he noted that Johnson decided, fatefully, that he could protect the Great Society only by downplaying 
the costs o f  his two-front war and by delaying a tax increase as long as possible;" Donald K. Pickens, 
"LBJ, the Council o f  Economic Advisers, and the Burden o f  New  Deal Liberalism," in Bernard J. 
Firestone and Robert Vogt, eds., Lyndon Baines Johnson and the Uses o f  Power, 197, in which he 
suggested that Johnson ignored the CEA's advice because he thought the war would end in late 1967; 
Allen J. Matusow, The Unraveling o f  America, 160-161 in which he claimed that Johnson refused the 
advice o f  his economic advisers; that this advice came without qualifications and was essentially 
unanimous; that Johnson and his CEA did not predict the economic slowdown in late 1966 and early 
1967; that a "temporary reinstatement o f  some excise taxes" was the only fiscal adjustment being made; 
and that Johnson did not want to "wrap him self in the flag" to get the tax surcharge because he feared 
that this would "enforce austerity on his Great Society programs." These view s represent practically the 
only perspective o f  this situation in the Johnson historical literature. O f these contentions, only the latter 
one made by Matusow has much validity (desire to avoid a bigger war also  a factor in that decision).
11 See Matusow, The Unraveling o f  America, 160, for the "wish projection and deceit" charge; and 
Johnson, Public Papers, 1968-1969: 1, 754-755, for Johnson's comments after the signing o f  the 10% 
tax surcharge.
12 Memo, A ckley to LBJ, December 17, 1965, LBJ Handwriting File, Box 11, LBJ Library.
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also noted, however, that Schultze "did not think it wise to propose a general tax 
increase at that time. Neither did Treasury Secretary Fowler."13 Ackley's memo was 
also less conclusive than it has often been made out to be. Attached to the memo was a 
cover letter from Joe Califano suggesting the need to be "discreet" about any tax 
changes. Johnson's handwritten response to the memo and Califano's attachment 
suggest, however, that Johnson had no personal opposition to a tax increase and that he 
would not have wanted to ignore sage economic advice. Indeed, internal debate over 
the tax increase proposal would follow closely, rather than veer away from, the policy 
prescriptions and economic forecasts o f Johnson's economic advisers. "Caution them 
[the CEA] not to go into detail with staff and keep away from all reporters," was 
Johnson's only response.14 All in all, this infamous memo—along with Califano's 
attachment and Johnson's handwritten response—revealed little more than Ackley's 
reasoned economic assessment—subject to other unspoken qualifications and 
considerations—and an additional, economically sound, reason for understating 
expenditures in Vietnam. "Government statements can't do much to prevent 
inflationary psychology, but they can easily fan it," Ackley noted at the end of the 
memo. "We have to give great deal o f thought to how we play whatever we do— on the 
budget, in Vietnam, etc."15
Inflationary psychology was, indeed, one of the Johnson administration's 
preeminent concerns over the course of the tax increase debate. Ackley, Califano, and 
Johnson were all aware of how a general inflationary mindset could be triggered and 
encouraged by the news of larger than expected government outlays. As such, 
aggregate demand and fiscal stimulus became a larger concern than they may have 
otherwise been. Rooted less in the level of aggregate demand than in the
13 Johnson, The Vantage Point, 325.
14 Memo, Ackley to LBJ, December 17, 1965, LBJ Handwriting File, Box 11, LBJ Library.
15 Ibid.
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microeconomic parameters of corporate pricing strategy— under which companies 
hoped to secure the unusually high profits o f an economic upswing and a war-time 
economy—inflationary psychology still responded greatly to positive changes in 
consumer, investment, and government demand. They also knew that this response was 
all the more likely and far more unsettling if  these new outlays came suddenly and with 
great urgency, for competitive bidding and close government supervision (fast 
becoming the trend under McNamara and Johnson) would once again become the 
exception rather than the rule and companies would tend to become even less 
responsive price-wise to an increasingly inelastic demand curve. This approach, rather 
than a concerted attempt to evade unwanted, but sound, economic advice, characterized 
Johnson's behavior in the early stages o f the the tax surcharge debate. Once passed, 
despite its exemptions for the poorest Americans, the surcharge would indeed cool off 
the prevailing inflationary psychology mostly at the expense, however, o f consumer 
demand that in itself warranted little cooling off. Ackley's initial decision to ask for a 
surcharge, after all, was triggered not by any forecasts for consumer demand but by a 
surprisingly optimistic government survey of business investment plans, issued in early 
December 1965.16 The administration's campaign for a surcharge, begun in early 1967 
when Johnson became convinced of its desirability, also implied that Johnson and his 
economic advisers judged the threat of inflationary psychology to be greater and far 
less reversible than an otherwise economically questionable brake on consumer 
demand. Intuitively, Johnson felt foolish asking for a tax increase after having so 
recently touted the success o f the 1964 tax cut (and having called for and received 
excise tax cuts in 1965), but he clearly separated the two issues in his mind: the tax cut 
was less about psychology than pure economics; the tax surcharge was just the 
opposite. Johnson, like Keynes, did not want to look upon full employment and
16 Okun, The Political Economy o f  Prosperity  (New York: W. W. Norton, 1970), 66-68.
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exuberant consumer demand as Dante had regarded Beatrice—worshipped and 
idealized from afar but the source of little more than alienation and distress at close 
range. To Johnson (and to Keynes), a full employment economy did not imply the end 
o f a struggle but the beginning of one, and the abandonment o f even higher 
employment goals was never really considered. He did regard the beginnings o f a 
potentially resistant inflationary psychology, however, as a serious development; so too 
were the signs of a business community increasingly isolated from all but the most 
profound changes in the nation's demand curve. Though consumer demand was not 
insignificant, economic psychology and business pricing strategies were the principal 
targets o f the tax surcharge proposal and Johnson's overall wage-price strategy.
Even when the surcharge proposal became the object of serious consideration, and 
ultimately a well publicized goal of the administration, it met with great resistance 
from many quarters. In 1966 and early 1967 Johnson found that it either lacked the 
force o f unanimous consent among official and unofficial advisers, or that it 
represented a policy change that was simply a political impossibility. "For God's sake, 
get agreement!" Johnson told Joe Califano in June 1967.17 The surcharge proposal, and 
the inflation it was designed to counteract, were never taken lightly in the Johnson 
White House. Nor was there much evidence of substantive fiscal trickery, designed to 
forestall a needed tax increase. Some budget gimmicks were utilized, to be sure, such 
as the reliance on participation certificate sales and the use of inconvertible soft 
currencies for overseas government transactions, but these were neither large nor 
unprecedented.18 Moreover, supplemental appropriations for Vietnam were broadcast 
openly, if only in general terms. Only the fear of inflamed public opinion, that would
17 Cited in Kettl, "The Economic Education o f  Lyndon Johnson," 67. The lack o f  agreement referred to 
here was by that time (June, 1967) centered on the amount and the coverage o f  the surcharge rather than 
its applicability.
18 See Harvey C. Mansfield, Sr., Illustrations o f  Presidential Management, 25-26, for more detail on 
these techniques.
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call for a larger war effort along with the passage o f a "war tax," and not the the 
reluctance to face economic "facts," stood in the way of an earlier, more vigorous 
campaign for a surcharge. In his July 28, 1965 televised news conference Johnson 
noted:
Secretary McNamara, in addition, will ask the Senate Appropriations Committee 
to add a limited amount to present legislation to help meet part of this new cost 
until a supplemental measure is ready and hearings can be held when the Congress 
assembles in January. In the meantime, we will use the authority contained in the 
present Defense appropriation bill under consideration to transfer funds in addition 
to the additional money that we will ask [for].19
Many other impediments to the tax surcharge proposal began surfacing quickly. 
Congressional tax writing committees opposed the tax surcharge vehemently, 
especially the House Ways and Means committee with its prideful and economically 
shrewd chairman Wilbur Mills, the committee in which all tax bills would have to 
originate. Congress was losing confidence in "Heller economics," warned Republican 
senator John Byrnes, reflecting the Republican party artfulness which warned of 
economic problems largely in the hope that dire forecasts would become self-fulfilling 
prophesies.20 Business leaders either opposed it, or in the case o f the Business Council 
members who were quite close to the administration, proved very reluctant to endorse 
it.21 The National Association o f Manufacturers even stood opposed to the excise tax
19 Johnson, "The President's N ew s Conference o f  July 28, 1965," Public Papers, 1965: II, 796. This 
conference came immediately after Johnson's deliberations with military advisers, key members o f  
Congress, and the Joint Chiefs o f  Staff referred to by Jack Valenti as the "get in, or get out" meetings.
20 Quoted by the Washington Post, April 21, 1967, in Personal Organization Papers, Walter Heller, Box 
1, LBJ Library.
21 Johnson cited a Business Council meeting/dinner at the White House on March 30, 1966 where he 
asked for a show o f  hands, for or against the tax surcharge, and recalled how "not a single hand went 
up" in favor o f  the surcharge proposal. See Johnson, TheVantage Point, 444. Otto Eckstein, retired fron 
the Johnson CEA on February 1, 1966, wrote to Johnson afterward, however, and explained how he had 
spoken to a number o f  these business leaders and some had suggested that they were in favor o f  the 
surcharge, if  tentatively so, but were caught "flat-footed with their tongues tied" by the March 30 
request for a show o f  hands. Quoted in Cochrane, "Moral Suasion," 264. When the Business Council 
staged their annual retreat at Hot Springs, Virginia, Ralph Lazarus, the chairman o f  the BC domestic 
econom y committee reported that "the surtax was given reluctant support. Cuts in federal spending were 
regarded as more desirable, but an unlikely alternative. Generally, enactment was regarded as inevitable, 
but few  felt that the final version would be 10% across the board. The consensus was 6-8% on
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
368
increases Johnson had guided through Congress in early 1966 as a partial substitute for 
a surcharge. The NAM observed that "a new excise tax might be appropriate in a 
period like the Korean War, when there was a very substantial buildup in military 
spending, but not if  the purpose o f a tax increase was to dampen inflationary trends."22 
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce also made it clear that they would prefer spending 
cuts instead, with only half o f their members expressing a willingness to back a tax 
increase, and then only if it was coupled with spending cuts. Only 4% o f the surveyed 
U.S. Chamber members said they favored a tax increase without any qualifications.23 
None of Johnson's advisers wanted the increase if it had to be paired with large 
spending cuts. "In scientific economics," Paul Samuelson noted despairingly, 
"expenditure cuts and tax rises are substitutes to fight inflation. Not so in 
politics....This is upside-down economics with a vengeance."24 In his November 1967 
Newsweek column, Samuelson explicitly characterized his own position and implicitly 
echoed the feelings of most administration advisers:
I believe it would be tragic if the new campaigns we have been waging against 
poverty and inequality—both at home and abroad—were to be abandoned or 
even curtailed because o f the myth of economic necessity.
Newsweek readers know that I favor a tax increase.* Let me make clear that I 
do not favor it at any price. If its costs were a legislative deal to cripple important
consumers, and 10% on corporations— both effective January 1, 1968." Notes o f  Report in Papers o f  
Henry Fowler, Box 231, LBJ Library.
22 National Association o f  Manufacturers, Government Finance Meeting, July 2 6 ,1 9 6 6 , NAM Papers, 
Series I, Box 97, Hagley Library. This kind o f  response reminded Walter Heller o f  the time he testified 
before Congress in 1950 for a Korean War tax increase. "We won't vote a dollar more in taxes to stop 
inflation," R.L. 'Muley' Doughton cried out, waving a finger in the economist's face, "but we'll vote for 
higher taxes to send planes and guns to Korea." Cited by Harold Chucker in the M inneapolis S tar, 
Monday, May 13, 1968, in Personal Organization Papers, Walter Heller, Box 1, LBJ Library. Johnson 
was all too aware o f  this sentiment, surprisingly on the rise again in the progressive 1960s.
23 Washington Post account o f  U.S. Chamber survey, November 26, 1967, in Papers o f  Henry Fowler, 
Box 231, LBJ Library. Survey results: 78% favored spending cuts; 54% were willing to back tax 
surcharge with cuts; 41% opposed tax increases under any circumstances; and only 4% favored a tax 
increase without any qualifications.
24 Samuelson, The Samuelson Sampler, Ah. Emphasis in original.
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welfare programs, I would ahve to point out that a degree o f open inflation is not 
the greatest evil.25
Economic signals during the early stages of the debate were also somewhat 
inconclusive. Until the third quarter of 1967 they were mixed at best, with many o f the 
short term indicators pointing downward in 1966 and early 1967. Twenty-three o f the 
thirty leading indicators used by the Commerce department to forecast economic trends 
were, in fact, pointing downward.26 Though circumstances would quickly change, in 
late 1965 and early 1966, actual defense spending was also lagging behind contracted 
obligations, repeating the spending pattern associated with the Korean War.27 As the 
key to congressional approval o f any tax bill, Wilbur Mills made ample use o f the 
uncertain economic forecasts, even though his primary rationale lay elsewhere. "We've 
got fiscal troubles and we've got balance of payment troubles," Mills noted dryly, "but 
I don't see the answer in the tax bill."28 Mills contended that much of the inflation was 
cost-push, that there was no indication of excess demand, and that the surcharge, 
therefore, would have little impact on inflation. While these assertions were generally 
correct, his main objection to the surcharge, however, was based on the view that 
additional taxes would sanction additional social spending, and his version of the cost- 
push explanation was little more than a rehash of the oversimplified union 
monopoly/wage-price spiral theory popularized by the National Association of 
Manufacturers and the U.S. Chamber o f Commerce.29 Mills was also prejudiced by his
25 Ibid., 41. *SamueIson had only recently (m id-1967) swung over in support o f  the tax surcharge 
proposal.
26 Arguing against the tax surcharge in his testimony before the Joint Economic Committee, on 
February 20, 1967, Walter Reuther o f  the UAW pointed out that these Commerce department indicators 
were currently pointing downward. See Reuther, Policies and Priorities fo r  Progress, 46. The CEA had 
reached a consensus by this point predicting correctly that an upturn would begin in the third quarter o f
1967, convincing Johnson to ask for a delayed surcharge (ask for it now, implement it only in the year's 
second half.) See Johnson, "Annual Message to the Congress on the State o f  the Union," Public Papers, 
1967: /, 8.
27 F ederal Reserve Bulletin 54, September, 1968, 709.
28 "Mills Bars Surtax; Backs Travel Curbs," The Washington Post, February 7, 1968, A 1 .
29 Many other congressmen, including Senator William Proxmire, opposed the surcharge on the same 
grounds, and, like Mills, also called for budget cuts. When Gardner Ackley debated Proxmire in early
1968, and pointed out the contradiction in his call for budget cuts while claiming that the econom y was
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well known desire not to report a bill out o f committee unless it was assured o f 
passage. Urging Mills to support a surcharge in November 1967, Paul Samuelson 
reminded him of the need for courageous leadership that seemed to contradict both 
conventional wisdom and popular opinion. "Since there is no popular ground swell 
from the people for higher taxes," Samuelson noted, "what is needed is responsible 
leadership. By you. May I quote Disraeli? 'A leader who never loses a legislative battle 
is like a miser who never spends his money.'"30 When his opposition proved to be the 
death o f  the surcharge proposal, throughout late 1967 and early 1968, Johnson used 
one occasion to remind Mills' congressional colleagues of the chairman's fundamental 
position. "That's the risk Wilbur Mills is taking with our country," Johnson noted, 
"because his momma doesn't like the welfare program."31
Many others noted the changed economic climate as well. "The wisdom of the 
administration's proposed 6% surcharge...now seems highly questionable," the editors 
o f Business Week noted in March 1967. "Under the circumstances, any decision on the 
tax increase should be postponed until there is new evidence o f the kind of demand-
"too weak" for the tax increase, Proxmire responded only by saying that his statement would have been 
clearer i f  there had been "more emphasis on timing"(?). See Hobart Rowen, "All Seem Agreed on War 
Tax Need," The Washington Post, February 6, 1968, D6.
30 Samuelson, The Samuelson Sampler, 39. Emphasis in original.
31 Quoted in Califano, Triumph an d  Tragedy, 286. Gardner Ackley noted that Mills had an economist, 
Norman Ture, who was "violently opposed" to a tax increase throughout this period. M ills h im self had a 
reputation for never reporting a bill out o f  his committee unless he was already assured o f  passage 
(house members deferred to Mills to avoid interest group pressure and because o f  the complexity o f  
most tax bills, allowing him to report out bills with closed rules. As a tradeoff, they expected him not to 
report bills that were controversial or that lacked overwhelming support). He opposed the tax surcharge, 
however, primarily because o f  his belief that the current inflation was cost -push and not demand-pull 
(which he blamed almost exclusively on unreasonable worker's demands), and because he did not want 
to sanction increased social spending. This came at a time when AFDC payments averaged only 
$8/month in Mississippi, approximately 2 to 8% o f  the total Mills was known to drop in a Washington 
D.C. strip joint in one evening. The Washington Post reported that he once spent $1700 cheering on the 
area's most reknowned ecdysiasts, all in one evening. See Walter Shapiro, "Wilbur Mills: The Ways and 
Means o f  Conning the Press," Washington Monthly, December, 1974,4-13. Eventually, after reneging 
on one agreement to report the surcharge bill if  Johnson agreed to $4 billion in budget cuts, Mills 
reported the bill after the President agreed to $6 billion in cuts (most o f  which, ironically, Congress 
found them selves unable to enact).
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pull inflation that a tax increase would be effective in halting."32 Though Ackley,
Okun, and others pleaded with them on an almost daily basis, the editorial staffs o f the 
New York Times and the Washington Post also opposed the tax increase throughout the 
1966-1968 period. In a survey o f the nation's economic forecasters taken in early 1967, 
fully 95% expressed the opinion that it would be a mistake to impose the surtax at mid­
year.33
While Walter Heller was busy rounding up the support o f economists across the 
nation, eventually convincing 260 of them to sign an endorsement of the tax surcharge, 
several prominent members of the profession also publicized their opposition. Leon 
Keyserling, former chairman o f the CEA under Truman, suggested that the economy 
was simply too weak for the surcharge. "The forecast o f the Council o f Economic 
Advisers for a sharp upturn in the second half of the year," Keyserling remarked in 
March 1967, "does not seem to me to be justified at this stage."34 Paul Samuelson 
rescinded his support for the tax surcharge early in 1967, though Gardner Ackley 
suggested that this was a decision he soon came to regret. That same year, in 
November, Robert Lekachman also registered opposition, noting that factory 
utilization rates were down 6% from the previous year (85 % versus 91 %), suggesting, 
as well, that administered prices were responsible for much of the current inflation. On 
January 4, 1968, 320 economists went on record opposing the tax surcharge, 
announcing their positions in a prominent New York Times article. Kenneth Boulding, 
president-elect o f the American Economic Association and one o f the 320, lamented 
that October, that the "administration is trying to create an impression that the 
economics profession is united behind the proposed tax increase." His own view, 
supporting Peter Collier and David Horowitz' theory that "every thought and
32 "Policy fora Period o f  Uneasiness," Business Week, March 4, 1967, 190.
33 "Will Business Surge in the Fall?" Business Week, March 18, 1967, 137.
34 Quoted in ibid.
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perception in those days was filtered through the dark and distorting glass o f the 
Vietnam War," was that a tax increase would be the final abdication o f power to an 
executive "drunk with power, and incapable of wisdom."35 Indeed, opposition to 
Johnson's Vietnam policy was the most often cited rationale among the 320 economists 
who opposed the tax surcharge. "Here we are possibly sacrificing some very real 
values, those o f an articulated well understood full employment policy for symbolic 
and I am afraid meaningless protest," remarked economist Kenneth Arrow 
prophetically, in a letter to Robert Eisner on October 17, 1967.36
The push for a tax surcharge was also partly foiled by a preemptive interest rate 
hike effected by the Federal Reserve in late 1965 (while Johnson was in Texas 
recuperating from emergency gall bladder surgery). On December 3 o f that year, by a 
narrow 4-3 margin, the Federal Reserve Board voted to raise the discount rate from 4% 
to 4.5%.37 Fed Chairman William McChesney Martin acted partly on the basis o f his 
belief that he had access to current and forthcoming Department o f Defense budget 
information that administration economists lacked.38 Credit market conditions and
35 Samuelson cited by Gardner Ackley, Oral History Interview, in Hargrove and Morley, eds., The 
President and the CEA, 255; Lekachman, Boulding, and New York Times article cited in Personal 
Organizational Papers, Walter Heller, Box 1, LBJ Library; Collier and Horowitz citation from Peter 
Collier and David Horowitz, Deconstructing the Left: From Vietnam to the Persian  Gi/(f(Lanham, MD: 
Second Thoughts Books, 1991), 27. While Collier and Horowitz ignore the real revolution o f  the 1960s 
(the slowly emerging economic revolution that they mistake for the "normal workings o f  the system"), 
as did they and most o f  their cohorts in the 1960s, their perception o f  their own shortcomings during 
that period (they are writing as former 1960s radicals who have seen the light and joined the Reagan 
revolution), are as insightful as they are illuminating.
36 Arrow to Eisner, October 17, 1967, Personal Organizational Papers o f  Walter Heller, Box 1, LBJ 
Library.
37 Discount rate = the rate at which the Federal Reserve loans money to member banks; not to be 
confused with the prime rate, which is the rate at which private banks will loan money to its low risk 
customers. LBJ's two appointees to the Federal Reserve Board, J.L. Robertson (1964), and Sherman 
Maisel (1965), were 2 o f  the 3 voting against the rate change. Not long after the 1965 run-in with 
Martin, in February 1966, Johnson would appoint a third Fed member, Andrew Brimmer o f  Louisiana, 
then a distinguished sub-cabinet level officer in the Department o f  Commerce.
38 There are a number o f  widely differing accounts as to how Martin was informed o f  accurate Defense 
spending numbers. Dewey Daane, Fed Board o f  Governors member, cited Martin's "pipeline" to David 
Packard, then serving in the DoD; others cited similar "pipelines" to Senator Dick Russell o f  the Senate 
Armed Forces committee, Senator John Stennis o f  the same, and chairman Wilbur Mills o f  House Ways 
and Means. It seems likely that Martin used all o f  these contacts and more.
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Vietnam expenditures were such, Martin reasoned, that tighter monetary policy was 
warranted. Since Treasury financing was about to go forward, he concluded, he simply 
had to act when he did.
This became the source o f a sizable controversy, for Martin was scheduled to meet 
President Johnson, CEA Chairman Ackley, Treasury Secretary Fowler, and Budget 
Director Schultze, three days later at the LBJ ranch for substantive discussions on the 
nation's fiscal and monetary policy. While Ackley and Califano had warned Johnson of 
imminent Fed tightening, and had correctly forecast a 4-3 decision when it came to the 
raising o f the discount rate, Johnson expected no move until after the December 6 
meeting at the ranch. After meeting with Arthur Okun o f the CEA, Charles Zwick of 
the Budget office, and Paul Volcker from Treasury in November, and reporting that 
there would be a "possible" need for restraint in 1966, Federal Reserve staff member 
Dan Brill exclaimed, "I'll bet we've made monetary policy for the rest of the year."39
Apprised o f this report, Johnson was dumbfounded then, when the Fed took action 
on December 3. He was not in fundamental disagreement with the change, but he did 
have a desire for closer coordination between the Fed and his administration.40 As
39 Quoted in Anderson and Hazleton, M anaging Macroeconomic Policy, 128. Okun, Zwick, Volcker, 
and Brill made up what was known as the Quadriad research group. After meeting in November and 
issuing their report on November 6, Ackley told Johnson, "Bill Martin is apparently ready to buy the 
report." See ibid.
40 Though Gardner Ackley suggested that Johnson "didn't like and really trust Bill Martin," and called 
Martin "absolutely zero as an economist" himself, and though Martin felt that Johnson also knew 
precious little about economics, all evidence suggests that the Federal Reserve system and the White 
House never were, and never have been, as close as they were during the Johnson administration. See 
William McChesney Martin, Oral History Interview, interviewed by Michael Gillette, May 8, 1987, LBJ 
Library, 17-18.; and Ackley, Oral History Interview, in Hargrove and Morley, eds., The President an d  
the CEA, 236. In a fascinating study o f  pressures on American monetary policy, and in one section, 
administration "signalling" to the Federal Reserve Board, Thomas Havrilesky points out how relations 
between Martin, the Fed, and the Johnson administration were virtually devoid o f  significant stresses 
after the publicized 1965 "shootout," yet were also characterized by "a new precedent in Federal 
Reserve/executive branch interactions." See Thomas Havrilesky, The Pressures on American M onetary 
P olicy  (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993), 59-60. See also Havrilesky's charts on pages 76- 
80, where he graphically analyzes the extent and character o f  executive branch "signalling" to the Fed 
(from 1952-1991, based on articles in the Wall Street Journal which mentioned the views o f  
administration officials). These figures will help explode the myth that Johnson, Heller, Ackley, and 
Okun overlooked "the significance o f  money," for Johnson era signalling is characterized by mild,
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Undersecretary o f the Treasury Frederick Deming put it, "I don't think anybody was 
really arguing substantively that you shouldn't have restraint; the real question was 
what the mixture [between fiscal and monetary policy] should be."41 In his presidential 
memoirs, Johnson tried to clarify his opposition to Fed chairman Martin's abrupt policy 
change. "My argument with Martin," President Johnson noted, "was not over the rate 
increase but over its timing and the failure to coordinate the action with key fiscal 
policy decisions just ahead."42
It is clear that Fed chairman Martin had access to fairly accurate projections of 
federal defense spending, in spite of administration attempts to soften his position with 
low-ball (privately shared) estimates o f their own; what is not quite so clear is whether 
or not the discount rate change impaired the chances for passage o f the tax surcharge. 
Martin was known to have a good rapport with Wilbur Mills; Ackley suggested that he 
may have understood, then, well in advance, Mills' steadfast opposition to a tax 
increase and acted accordingly.43 In a 1969 inteiview, however, Arthur Okun 
contended that it would have been easier to get a tax increase in the January 1966 
budget had the Fed not tightened in December.44 Only a few years later, focusing 
largely on Mills' intransigence, Okun came to appraise the situation somewhat 
differently:
unusually varied signals (9 shifts from tightening to easing signals or vice versa). Nixon era signalling, 
by contrast, exhibits only one shift up to October 1972, and 3 more from that point to the end o f  Nixon's 
presidential term (9 straight tightening signals at beginning, and 21 straight easing signals, thereafter).
41 Frederick L. Deming, Oral History Interview, Interview I, interviewed by David G. McComb,
January 7, 1969, LBJ Library, 29.
42 Johnson, Vantage Point, 445.
43 Martin's "off the record" speech at the New York State Banker's Meeting, on December 4, 1967 at the 
Madison Hotel casts som e doubt on this assertion. He told the bankers in attendance that he was "miffed 
because he ran a looser than warranted monetary policy in anticipation o f  the new tax surcharge bill that 
never came. Since Mills was the primary impediment to the surcharge then, just as he was in early 1966, 
Martin's disappointment here is difficult to understand if  he truly had close ties to Mills. See memo, 
Marvin Watson to LBJ, December 6, 1967, LBJ Handwriting File, Box 22, LBJ Library, for a report o f  
the Martin speech.
44 Okun, Oral History Interview, Interview I, LBJ Library, 25.
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In December 1965, the President knew it was going to happen....We knew damned 
well that the economy needed restraint at that point. Our view was that our best 
chance o f trying to sell a tax bill was if we could go to the President saying the 
Fed hasn't tightened but would have to tighten unless he went for a tax bill, and 
that he should tell Congress that they had sixty days to show their conviction 
before the Fed tightened. Well, we were kidding ourselves.45
Okun's predecessor as chairman of the CEA, Gardner Ackley, displayed a similar
reversal o f opinion when he reflected on the situation:
You know, at the time, I thought that his political judgement was wrong. I thought 
that reason would succeed if we were allowed to present the case. But when he 
recommended it in January 1967 and didn't get it until July 1968, and this under 
circumstances in which the evidence as to what was happening was obvious to 
everyone, convinces me that his political judgement was absolutely right: he 
couldn't have gotten a tax increase [in 1966] 46
It was highly unlikely, indeed, that a surcharge proposal would have passed 
through congress in 1966, even without the Fed-induced monetary restraint. The 
discount rate change, however, in conjunction with a restraining open market policy, 
instituted two months later in February, 1966, did produce a credit crunch in the 
nation's housing industry, and it did compel many businesses to adjust inventories 
downward as the competition for available funds intensified.47 Though the CEA kept 
telling everyone that this was only a temporary slowdown, as it turned out to be, it 
made it virtually impossible to even begin pressuring Mills and his congressional
45 Okun, Oral History Interview, in Hargrove and Morley, eds., The President and the CEA , 295.
46 Quoted in ibid., 254-255.
47 Insurance companies and savings and loans were clearly hit the hardest in the 1966 credit crunch; 
S&Ls could not meet the competition for funds since their moneys were essentially locked away into 
low rate long term loans for housing. Insurance companies saw their cash positions become strained as 
they became subject to increased demand for policy loans. The business sector o f  the econom y felt the 
crunch least o f  all as bankers strained to find every loanable dollar (selling municipal securities, for 
example), and the businesses themselves increasingly relied upon commercial paper, widening accounts 
receivable balances, and the burgeoning Eurodollar market. See Administrative History o f  the Federal 
Reserve System, Vol. 1, Box 1, LBJ Library, 32-40. Anthony Campagna highlighted two other 
significant consequences o f  Martin's actions in 1965 and early 1966: the contraction in money supply 
shocked many people out o f  their expectations for reasonable price stabilty; and the credit crunch 
spawned by the contraction also served as a destabilizing force since it forced alterations in financial 
markets and the monetary system that made it harder for the Fed to control M2 or M3 (formation o f  one 
bank holding companies that could issue commercial paper above Regulation Q limits, for example). 
See Campagna, Economic Consequences o f  the Vietnam War, 54, 68.
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colleagues until the credit crunch wound down in early 1967. While it had little 
bearing, in other words, on the 1966 effort to pass a tax surcharge, the December 1965 
Federal Reserve bank tightening clearly forced the postponement o f critical lobbying 
efforts, and therefore set back the eventual date of passage.48 To convince Mills, as 
well as the American people in general, that a small tax increase was a good thing, 
intensive lobbying was an absolute prerequisite. Despite the significance o f the 1968 
gold crisis and the pivotal role o f Wilbur Mills, administration lobbying efforts 
ultimately proved to be decisive in the eventual passage of the tax surcharge. 
Undersecretary of the Treasury Frederick Deming cited the American Banking 
Conference in Puerto Rico, in May 1968, as a good example of this influence. Treasury 
Secretary Fowler attended the conference, set up meetings with the participating 
bankers, region by region, urged them to support the tax surcharge proposal, and 
encouraged them to put pressure on their representatives in Congress. Almost all o f the 
bankers in attendance complied, with great impact on the congressional outlook and 
Mills' reluctance to report a bill. Unfortunately, when it was finally reported out o f 
Mills' committee and signed into law in the Spring and Summer o f 1968, Johnson had 
already made his stunning withdrawal from the 1968 presidential campaign, and 
Richard Nixon was well on his way to the White House. Though Nixon would win by 
only a small margin, a Republican landslide seemed imminent until the last few weeks 
of the campaign. As a result, Nixon's supply side rhetoric and obvious tilt toward the 
business community signalled a change, likely to take place, that served to offset much
48 See Deming, Oral History Interview, Interview III, February 17, 1969, LBJ Library, 12. The Fed 
tightening also led to a protracted "cat and mouse" game between the Johnson administration and the 
House Ways and Means committee over the tax surcharge. This produced an on again, o ff  again 
operation, that created dissonnant interest rate movements (and parallel stock market movements as 
well) that forced later (1967-1968) Federal reserve policy to be too easy, for too long. Its impact, then, 
on the level o f  investment demand in the 1967-1968 period was critical. See Deming, Oral History 
Interview, Interview III, LBJ Library, 16-17, and memo, Joseph Barr to LBJ, "Bond market 
deterioration as a result o f  Tax Bill Uncertainty," May 21, 1968, Papers o f  Ernest Goldstein, Box 9, LBJ 
Library.
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of the favorable psychological impact o f the tax surcharge bill. As Johnson's 
economists predicted, consumer demand was reduced by the tax surcharge; affected 
principally by the changing of the guard and the reemergence of a supply side 
presidency, investment demand was not.49
From the standpoint of the Johnson administration, concern for the tax surcharge 
had mounted in tandem with the interminable conditions in Vietnam. "Slowly but 
surely," Johnson recalled, "more people began to recognize the necessity for an 
increase in taxes as it became apparent that the war in Vietnam would continue for 
some time."50 While the surcharge was clearly designed to thwart an inflationary 
spiral—much to the chagrin of conservative congressmen who kept urging Johnson to 
call it a war tax— it was never designed to be the solution to the inflation problem.51
Johnson did not, however, rely exclusively upon the surcharge, for he knew it to 
be a vastly unpopular proposal that stood little chance of passing Congress, and that it 
remained less critical to price stability than the guideposts or other microeconomic 
policies in general.52 As a result, other more palatable options were utilized in its place, 
even as he continued to push for the surcharge through all o f 1967 and much of 1968. 
He continued to hold tight reins on the federal budget, for example, reducing the 
overall number o f federal employees in non-Defense categories, and he personally
49 In his presidential memoirs, Johnson blamed him self partly for the tardiness o f  the surcharge 
legislation. "For one thing," he noted, "I failed to explain clearly enough that the surcharge was not a 10 
percent increase in the income tax rate but rather a tax on a tax, or ten extra cents on every dollar o f  
taxes." See Johnson, Vantage Point, 450. Clearly Johnson's refusal to "wrap him self in the flag" on 
behalf o f  the surcharge also made it tough for conservatives in Congress to swallow. Walter Heller, 
among others, expressed his satisfaction that Johnson refused to do this. He and the President, Heller 
noted, felt that Americans were mature enough by that time to understand the basic need. See Walter 
Heller, "President Johnson and the Economy," in James McGregor Bums, ed., To Heat and to Build:
The Program s o f  Lyndon Johnson  ( New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), 160.
50 Johnson, Vantage Point, 445.
51 "Why don't you call a spade a spade, and tell us we need a tax for the war," Republican senator 
Charles Percy complained. "The inflation argument hasn't motivated Congress, and hasn't motivated the 
nation." Cited by Rowen, "All Seem Agreed on War Tax Need," D6.
52 As Johnson saw it in 1967 and 1968, the surcharge proposal was unpopular with the American people 
in general, but, more significantly, was also unpopular with key members o f  Congress and most 
business leaders.
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approved every issuance of government paper from September1966 to the middle o f 
1968.53 He also sought to limit the number and magnitude o f pay raises for Federal 
employees, and generally attained government employee wage contracts at or under the 
guidepost target figures. Only Defense and Aerospace foiled his efforts there. Arthur 
Okun recalled the rationale o f Johnson's efforts to restrain federal pay:
In the sixties, Johnson was in the business o f asking for price and wage restraints 
from business and labor; this was an important element in his willingness to 
accept some restraints for the Federal government, whether it was on federal pay 
or even on proposals to raise price floors in agriculture. You could say, 'Look,
Mr. President, that's creating inflation, and you're asking all these guys to hold 
down in order to stop inflation.' You couldn't say, 'This is going to make the 
difference between a 3 percent and a 5 percent inflation rate,' but basically, 'How 
credible are you in asking for restraint by the private decisionmakers if  you don't 
show some kind of restraint in the decisions you  make, even if they're relatively 
small decisions?'54
When he pushed hard for minor fiscal adjustments in early 1966, Congress 
responded quickly with the Tax Adjustment Act, restoring previously cut excise taxes 
and speeding up the collection o f corporate and Social Security taxes. Social Security 
taxes were also increased by approximately $6 billion at the same time. "Just as tax 
reduction was a vital stimulus to an under-employed economy in 1964 and early 1965," 
Gardner Ackley noted, "tax increases have been called for to restrain an overly buoyant 
economy this year. The President's program is drawing $10 billion out o f private 
hands..."55
53 Many o f  Johnson's political opponents in the Republican party claimed the opposite on the issue o f  
federal employment. Senator John Williams o f  Delaware, claimed in m id-1967 that 108,910 new federal 
government employees had been added since September, 1966, attributing them all to Great Society  
expansion. Budget director Charles Schultze noted in a May 8, 1967 memo to President Johnson: "We 
have been over these figures with Senator Williams a number o f  times, when w e were before the Senate 
Finance Committee on various matters. He refuses to listen." Schultze then attached the actual 
employment Figures to his memo: Defense employment up to 1,940,000 from 1,823,000 (+117,000); all 
other down to 931,000 from 943,000. Schultze to LBJ, May 8, 1967, LBJ Handwriting File, Box 22,
LBJ Library.
54 Okun, Oral History Interview, in Hargrove and Morley, eds., The President and the CEA , 300. 
Emphasis in original.
55 CEA Report, "The Record o f  Johnson Policies to Combat Inflation," April, 1966, Robson-Ross 
Papers, Box 5, LBJ Library.
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Johnson also ordered the Securities and Exchange Commision, late in 1966, to 
slow down the approval o f new stock issues, and signed a bill in November suspending 
the Investment Tax Credit and the accelerated depreciation allowance, measures 
designed to cool off the one part o f overall demand (capital investment) that was 
putting real market pressure on price levels in several business sectors.56 In a similar 
vein, the Federal Power Commission, the Departments o f Transportation, Housing and 
Urban Development, Agriculture, and Health, Education and Welfare, along with the 
Army Corps o f Engineers, were all ordered to slow permits and actual spending on 
construction projects. "Call in the hundred biggest spenders in government," Johnson 
commanded Joe Califano in March, "and ask them to hold up on their plans a little bit, 
and call in the top lending people to ask them to temporize a little on approving loans." 
A few days later he repeated the same order to Califano, but with a different accent. 
"There are thirty key people in the entire goddamn government—just thirty key people. 
Spend an hour with each of them. Ask them 'what are you doing [that you can stop] to 
heap gasoline on the fire?'"57
As a companion measure, the Federal Reserve also instructed its member banks in 
September 1966 to "make adjustments more through restraint on business lending and
56 This type o f  demand obviously creates a greater supply  o f  goods and services as w ell (thereby 
offsetting much o f  its potential inflationary impact). The speed with which it advances, then, is in many 
ways more significant than its absolute level. On the suspensions o f  the investment tax credit and 
accelerated depreciation, Commerce department economist Harlow Osborne noted, "It is the incentive to 
investment, not the cash flow o f  funds to invest, that has to be the target o f  the proposed suspension." 
Essentially what Osborne was saying, anticipating problems that really appeared early in the Nixon 
administration, was that government attempts to utilize monetary policy alone would ultimately 
backfire, reducing corporate cash flow, but not the overall level o f  investment or the availability o f  
credit. The credit would only be more expensive, imparting small inflationary rather than deflationary 
effects on the economy. Indeed, in 1966, the most rapidly advancing component o f  overall price 
inflation was the interest expense on loans. In May, 1966, for example, while the cosumer price index 
rose by a low 0.1 %, mortgage servicing costs rose by 0.6% (annual rates o f  1.2% and 7.2%  
respectively). See Memo, Harlow Osborne to William H. Shaw, Assistant Secretary o f  Commerce for 
Economic Affairs, September 22, 1966, Robson-Ross Papers, Box 5; and for May, 1966 inflation 
statistics see Memo, Ackley to LBJ, June 17, 1966, LBJ Handwriting File, Box 11, LBJ Library.
57 Quoted in Califano, Triumph and Tragedy, 140-141.
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less through sales of securities."58 This was a clear sign that business profits and cash 
flow were leading the economy into inflationary territory—not a too rapidly expanding 
federal deficit or money supply. To help effect this change, Johnson called Texas 
Congressman Wright Patman, telling him to put pressure on Treasury Secretary Henry 
Fowler. Suspecting that Fowler was unwilling to pressure the nation's bankers as he 
wanted him to, Johnson hoped to energize Patman, longtime foe o f Wall Street and the 
nation's banking establishment, to get Fowler moving. When Patman wrote Fowler the 
next day, Fowler took the bait, called Califano and Johnson immediately, and 
wondered aloud what to do about the veteran Texas Congressman. Put pressure on the 
banks, Johnson told him, "or else he'll [Patman] turn your hearing into a Texas 
barbeque."59 As Johnson suspected, Fowler had taken the bait perfectly, and with his 
own personal plea—delivered to 200 business executives at an April 1966, White 
House dinner—Johnson's pressure on Secretary Fowler (through Wright Patman) did 
help curtail business lending somewhat in late 1966 and early 1967. "The long uptrend 
in bank loans to business has been stopped, at least for the time being," said the 
Commerce department's senior economist on September 22, 1966.60 Just as it was with 
his microeconomic wage-price policy, when Johnson found himself unable to use his 
primary policy weapons (the guideposts for wage-price policy and the tax surcharge for 
fiscal policy), he quickly seized suitable, less politically abrasive, substitutes. "The 
fiscal and monetary measures we carried out in 1966 had some effect," Johnson 
recalled in his presidential memoirs. "As a result of our actions, the [inflation] rate fell
58 Report, CEA to OECD, "U.S. Economic Situation and Outlook in Mid-1966," Robson-Ross Papers, 
Box 5, LBJ Library.
59 Quoted in Califano, Triumph and Tragedy, 142. Johnson always displayed a visceral distaste for high 
interest rates. "It made him ill to think about those bankers collecting 12% interest [in 1966]," Gardner 
A ckley recalled. "He had clearly a very populist attitude toward this," Arthur Okun added. Okun, Oral 
History Interview, in Hargrove and Morley, editors, The President and the CEA, 233, 274.
60 Memo, Harlow Osborne to William H. Shaw, Assistant Secretary o f  Commerce for Economic 
Affairs, September 22, 1966, Robson-Ross Papers, Box 5, LBJ Library.
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back to 2.3% between September, 1966 and June,1967."61 In need of some adjustment 
afterward, macroeconomic policy in the first half of 1966 wound up being, as Walter 
Heller noted, "just what the doctor would be inclined to order."62 The national income 
account federal budget—embracing Social Security and other trust funds—actually 
wound up with a $3 billion surplus in the first half o f 1966.63
On two counts then, most historians have misrepresented Lyndon Johnson's stance 
toward the tax surcharge in particular and toward inflation in general. First o f all, 
contrary to the now standard interpretation, he did pursue the surcharge as vigorously 
as any of his economic advisers and did not spurn their critical advice or turn away 
from a fight against inflation only to pursue an unworkable economic strategy based on 
little more than fiscal stimulus. If anything, like Ackley and Okun, Johnson was 
dismayed by the self-defeating position held by many fellow liberals, who believed 
that political attacks on social programs would disappear or diminish in significance if 
the tax bill failed. "I am also struck by the illusion of some liberals," Okun declared, 
"that downward pressure on Federal programs will disappear if the tax bill fails. On the 
contrary, in that event, the atmosphere of financial emergency at home and abroad 
would give conservatives the upper hand in choking high priority programs."64 Johnson 
and his advisers knew, contrary to much of the conventional liberal wisdom, that 
failure o f the tax bill would give conservatives the upper hand as these opponents o f 
the New Economics played up the themes o f fiscal irresponsibility and runaway 
inflation. Unlike Paul Samuelson who noted that he could not remember a single 
instance in which war had been halted by the refusal to raise taxes, Johnson was less
61 Johnson, TheVantage Point, 445. From June 1965 to September 1966 the inflation rate was 3.4%.
62 Walter W. Heller, "A Dash o f  Bitters— But No Recession N ow In Sight, Life, September 9, 1966, 30.
63 Cited in ibid.
64 See memo, Okun to LBJ, April 27, 1968, Administrative History o f  the Council o f  Economic 
Advisers, Volume II, Box 1, Document Supplement. See also Joseph Kraft, "Republicans Seek to Blame 
Democrats for Any Inflation," Washington Post, October 5, 1967, A 25, for an analysis o f  Republican 
attempts to thwart the tax surcharge so that they could pin the rising inflationary psychology on Johnson 
and the Democratic party.
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astonished by the numerous economists who voiced opposition to the tax surcharge as 
a symbol of anti-war protest.65 Much of Johnson's initial reluctance to press for the tax 
rise in 1965 and 1966, after all, came from his reluctance to widen the war any more 
than he already had. People would pay a war tax, he was convinced, only if  they 
received in return a wider, more decisive, war effort. Despite these misgivings the tax 
surcharge and the struggle for price stability remained atop Johnson's list o f priorities 
throughout his last two years in office. John Connally even went so far as to suggest 
that the economy and the fight for the surcharge, rather than the Vietnam stalemate, 
was the primary reason Johnson chose not to seek reelection in 1968.66
Secondly, Johnson and his advisers judged the surcharge to be less significant than 
their own rhetoric or subsequent historiography would imply, for it was desirable 
largely for its potential impact upon inflationary expectations; its other effects were of 
secondary importance and only partly useful. Its impact upon aggregate (mostly 
consumer) demand, for example, was not completely in the interest o f prosperity or 
economic balance. To the extent that it dampened investment, rather than consumer 
demand, it might prove helpful. So too would it serve the public interest if it exhibited 
a noticeable impact upon inflationary expectations and the business perception of 
demand curve elasticity. If businesses could be made to believe that their profits would 
not be protected at all costs and that demand for their products could, and would 
respond with increasing alacrity to frequent price changes, there was hope for relative 
price stability amid near-full employment and a small part for the tax surcharge to play. 
There was, accordingly, great hope among Johnson economic advisers that a tax 
surcharge could be crafted that would focus most of its impact on investment demand 
and business expectations. Visiting Washington in June 1967, to stump for the
65 See Samuelson, The Samuelson Sampler, 42, for his comments on opposition to the tax surcharge as a 
form o f  anti-war protest. "This is at best a sym bol o f  protest," Samuelson remarked. Emphasis in 
original.
66 Connally with Herskowitz, In History's Shadow , 212.
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surcharge proposal, Walter Heller told Joe Califano that some consideration should be 
given to a two-tiered surcharge with a higher corporate than individual rate. Heller's 
analysis, with which Califano and Johnson both concurred, implied that the surcharge 
was much more than a means to a balanced budget and softened aggregate demand. 
Indeed, Johnson and his economic advisers saw the value of the surcharge more in its 
potential to slow the rise o f investment demand and an ever more troublesome 
inflationary psychology than anything else. Amid great opposition and mixed economic 
signals, this approach made it that much easier for Johnson to trade the surcharge, in 
1966, for the more modest Tax Adjustment Act instituted in March of that year. With 
roughly half the fiscal impact, the Tax Adjustment Act was deemed sufficient, 
nevertheless, for a period o f diminishing rather than increasing inflationary 
expectations.67 When inflationary signs became more prevalent, however— for Johnson 
and the CEA in early 1967 and for the public at large in late 1967— Heller's suggestion 
for a two-tiered surcharge proved to be as insightful as it was politically impossible. 
Just as conservative politicians and a lingering supply side mentality doomed key parts 
o f the 1964 tax cut, forced Johnson to shelve tax reform until the very end of his term, 
and compelled him to reinstate the suspended Investment Tax Credit with great haste 
in March 1966, so was Johnson limited to a somewhat regressive, 10% across the 
board, surcharge proposal in 1967 and 1968. Minority leader Gerald Ford wanted 
spending cuts without any tax increase at all; a tax increase borne principally by 
corporations and the wealthy stood almost no chance at all. "No tax without reduction," 
Johnson scrawled on a note to himself in April 1968.68 Despite its soundness, Heller's 
two-tiered surcharge never made it to first base.69
67 Ackley's estimate o f  negative fiscal impact o f  the Tax Adjustment Act o f  1966 (from "Annual Budget 
Message to Congress, Fiscal Year 1967," Public Papers, 1966: /, 49): $1.2 billion in FY 1966 and $4.8  
billion in FY 1967.
68 "Doodle," Lyndon Johnson, April 3, 1968, Johnson Handwriting File, Box 29, LBJ Library.
69 The reinstatement o f  the l.T.C. was a particularly troublesome development; it was needed to 
maintain the support o f  conservatives and business leaders, but it also aggravated what became one o f
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The surcharge was passed too late, o f course, to exert the kind of influence for 
which it was designed. But this was not the fault of the Johnson administration, nor 
was it proof o f the inherent inapplicability o f the Keynesian system. In his presidential 
memoirs, Johnson did blame himself partly for the tardiness o f the tax surcharge 
legislation, citing his somewhat less than lucid explanation of the tax itself. "For one 
thing," Johnson recalled, "I failed to explain clearly enough that the surcharge was not 
a 10 percent increase in the income tax rate but rather a tax on a tax, or ten extra cents 
on every dollar o f taxes."70 There is little to suggest, however, that the public would 
have made a critical difference in the debate had they properly understood the 
magnitude of the proposal. No increase o f any size could have been expected to garner 
substantial grass roots support. Indeed, although a President must be an outspoken and 
influential educator if  he believes in policies that attract little interest or command little 
popularity, some proposals, like the 1968 tax surcharge, require equal measures of 
luck, crisis psychology, and transparent political power. Convinced by many of his 
advisers, both economic and legislative, that he should not try to implement a tax rise 
until late 1967, Johnson used every means at his disposal to obtain a tax surcharge bill 
once his advisers handed down a clear recommendation. Those who blame the 
Keynesian system, rather than President Johnson, have suggested that the economics of 
public choice theory indicates that Keynesian countercyclical medicine is simply not 
very likely to be applied evenly. In the real world, these critics have noted, politicians
the real sources o f  inflationary trouble (investment demand). See "A Boost for Business," Business 
Week, March 18, 1967, for a glimpse at the politics o f  the 7% Investment Tax Credit reinstatement. "If 
anything," Business Week noted, "Congress was more enthusiastic than the White House about the 
project." (recall Gardner Ackley's NICB Waldorf-Astoria speech where he spoke o f  reinstatement only 
after the end o f  the war) Enthusiastic may have been an understatement, for the bill was a direct 
reponse to a Commerce Dept./SEC survey issued only days before that predicted a slight contraction in 
capital outlays for the first half o f  1967. Mills' Ways and Means committee even approved a bill more 
liberal than the one Johnson eventually signed (the final bill made the credit retroactive, to the 
suspension date o f  October 10, 1966, for machinery and equipment purchases, though not real 
property).
70 Johnson, Vantage Point, 450.
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are more than willing to heed advice that they tax less or spend more in order to close a 
demand gap. They are far less willing, however, to tax more or spend less in order to 
close an inflationary gap. "There is accumulating evidence," James Buchanan and 
Richard Wagner asserted in 1977, "that an economy subject to attempted Keynesian 
management will be unstable, and that such management will itself produce 
unpredictable changes in unemployment."71 Although the tax surcharge struggle seems 
to support this assertion, and experience in the 1980s demonstrated that the tendency 
toward deficit spending and tax cutting can become quite profound and quite 
destabilizing, anti-Keynesians have too readily assumed that a Keynesian approach 
suggests little need for fiscal responsibility or institutional change, a nearly blind focus 
on insufficient demand, and an equally blind faith in the uniform effects o f deficit 
spending, regardless of the nation's spending targets. As Abba Lerner and others have 
exhibited, saving propensities, spending habits, responsivity to changing prices, and 
multiplier rates all vary with income.72 The effects of deficit spending often depend as 
much on the target o f the spending, then, than its absolute level. Ignoring these factors, 
the perverse Keynesianism that followed Johnson's presidency has demonstrated, 
indeed, that it can attain the destructive outcomes predicted by the anti-Keynesians and 
the public choice theorists. Genuine Keynesianism, such as that practiced and sought 
by the Johnson administration, tried, with a fair measure of success, to avoid the very 
assumptions that lead to an imbalanced fiscal policy, increased inflationary bias, and 
zero-sum paralysis. Johnson's last budget alone, $3.1 billion in surplus, stands as 
formidable testimony to that proposition. To fault the Keynesian system, then, for the 
tardiness and ineffectiveness of the tax surcharge is to overlook the very political 
roadblocks and economic customs that the Keynesian system was trying to vanquish. "I
71 James M. Buchanan and Richard E. Wagner, D emocracy in Deficit— The Political Legacy o f  Lord  
Keynes (New York: Academic Press, 1977), 183.
72 See E. Ray Canterbery, "Inflation, Necessities, and Distributive Efficiency," in Gapinski and 
Rockwood, eds., Essays in Post Keynesian Inflation, 79-102, for a brief exposition o f  these views.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
386
see no reason for exalting the unconscious failure of other revolutions," Walter 
Lippmann declared in 1913, "into deliberate models for the next one."73 Unconscious 
or not, the failure of the 1968 tax surcharge, was more apparent than real, and, as 
Anderson and Hazleton pointed out, Johnson's "delay in seeking a general tax increase 
was a matter o f calculation and timing rather than uncertainty and hesitation."74 
Embracing the perverse Keynesianism that his predecessors had rejected, muddling 
through on wage-price policy, and resurrecting the ghost o f the pre-Keynesian fiscal 
orthodoxy, the incoming Republican President simply made all this exceedingly 
difficult to discern.
73 Walter Lippmann, "LaMonte, Walling, and Pragmatism," New Review  /, November 1913, 907.
74 Anderson and Hazleton, Managing Macroeconomic Policy , 237.
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Chapter 9
Hugging the (Phillips) Curve: Nixon at the Wheel
Boys, I may not know much, but I know the difference between chicken shit and 
chicken salad.
- LBJ, when asked why, as majority leader, he had not 
responded to a speech by Vice-President Richard Nixon
The mind of this country, taught to aim at low objects, eats upon itself.
- Ralph Waldo Emerson, 1837
On November 5, 1968 the United States took a firm step away from the New 
Economics. On that day, Richard Nixon was elected President— though by the 
narrowest of margins—and the Republican party was swept back into the White House 
after an eight year hiatus. As stark as the political differences were between the new and 
old administrations, the sea change in the management o f the nation's economy, implied 
by this presidential transition, went virtually unnoticed. Many still see 1980, for 
example, rather than 1968, as the political and economic watershed of the era, and that 
point at which the nation turned away from the so-called Keynesian revolution. But 
1968 represented a much more profound if  relatively unrecognized turning point; 
whatever remained of the New Economics and the Keynesian revolution, from that 
point on, stood as a pale shadow of its previous form. Worse, this new form represented 
a political economy reconstituted more for politics than economics, thus insuring that it 
would be harder to recognize, that it would fail of internal contradictions, and that it
387
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would subvert the foregoing political economy it pretended to embrace. Posing as a 
guardian of the Great Society, at least throughout his first term, Richard Nixon praised 
it, showered it with federal funds, and milked it for thousands o f votes. But he also 
ignored its administrative difficulties and responsibilities, and divorced it from the 
macroeconomic policies that truly made it both effective and venerable. Separating the 
Great Society from the New Economics, Nixon destroyed both. Pretending that the two 
had always remained distinct, and that they had only unraveled as they ignored or 
evaded the verities of the old "trickle-down" approach, Nixon discredited both. Events 
in 1980, tumultuous as they were, simply confirmed a much earlier, though somewhat 
unsubstantiated, economic counter-revolution. The demise o f the New Economics came 
with the election o f  Richard Nixon in 1968 and was as sudden as it was surreptitious. 
That many presumed it to have survived—even flourished—throughout the 1970s is 
testimony to both the political craftiness and economic ambivalence of the Nixon 
presidency.
Much of this happened as it did, partly by design and partly by accident, because 
the figurehead of the counter-revolution—Richard Nixon— held views on the economy 
that were simply too difficult to pin down, even for one of his chief economic advisers. 
"Probably the key words to describe these views," Nixon adviser Herbert Stein wrote, 
"are 'mixed' and 'ambivalent.'"1 Nixon referred disparagingly to the conservative 
economics o f old, for example, as the economics of "three yards and a cloud of dust."2 
He valued high employment, even if he saw it more in terms of the ballot-box than the 
pocketbook, and he clearly appreciated the sophistication of modem economics, even if 
he had no real desire to plumb its depths.3 Chief o f Staff H.R. Haldeman's diary entry
1 Stein, Presidential Economics, 135. Stein was a member o f  Nixon's Council o f  Economic Advisers, 
throughout both terms, and its chairman from 1972-1974.
2 Ibid. Always wanting to be "one o f  the boys," Nixon loved sports metaphors, especially those from the 
world o f  football (Operations Linebacker I and II, for example).
3 Nixon's narrow defeat in the 1960 presidential election, haunted him for years. He was convinced that 
he lost primarily because Eisenhower had placed a higher priority on price stability than employment,
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for February 15,1970 revealed at least part of this outlook: "Long chat on way home 
[from Key Biscayne] about recession-minded cabinet members, like those o f DDE's in 
'57 and '58. P more inclined to follow Shultz as the only really knowledgeable 
economist."4 At the same time, however, Nixon was also beholden to a new class of 
"sunbelt millionaires" who attached great significance to their own accomplishments, 
and he was clearly cynical about government interventions in the economy.5 His 
family's struggle to keep their garage and grocery store afloat, his brother Donald's 
failed venture in the restaurant business, and his own failure as a frozen orange juice 
entrepreneur during the Great Depression also colored his thinking on the economy.6 
Businesses, as Nixon tended to see it, were fragile undertakings deserving of a relatively 
free hand and direct assistance. As Michael Kazin noted, while Johnson had a difficult 
time comprehending the affluence o f young adults in the 1960s, and the effect this 
affluence would have on their political priorities, Nixon had "an equally difficult time 
understanding the affluence and overriding power o f corporations in the same 
generation."7 His new appointees to the Council of Economic Advisers were also very 
much taken by Milton Friedman's natural rate o f  unemployment theory, certainly in 
itself a harbinger o f a less activist political economy (as well as an invitation to a
creating a recession just in time for the stretch run o f  the 1960 campaign. As Eisenhower's Vice- 
President, Nixon was more easily identified, then, with the recession (Ike's third).
4 H. R. Haldeman, The Haldeman Diaries: Inside the Nixon White House (N ew  York: G.P. Putnam's 
Sons, 1994), 127. William Satire pointed out, however, how Nixon had a difficult time remembering 
Shultz' first name (or the spelling o f  his surname). See Safire, Before the Fall (Garden City,NY: 
Doubleday, 1975), 108.
5 The appraisal o f  Nixon's most prominent supporters comes from Joseph Heller. See Heller, "Playboy 
Interview," interviewed by Sam Merrill, June 1975, in Adam Sorkin, editor, Conversations with Joseph  
H eller (Jackson: University Press o f  Mississippi, 1993), 155.
6 Roger Morris, Richard Milhous Nixon: The Rise o f  an American Politician  (New York: Henry Holt and 
Co., 1990), 194-197; Gore Vidal, U nited States: Essays, 1952-1992 (N ew  York: Random House, 1993), 
898; Michael Kazin, The Populist Persuasion: An American History (N ew  York: Basic Books, 1995), 
249. Donald Nixon's Whittier, California restaurant went bankrupt despite a $200,000 "loan" from 
Howard Hughes and an epicurean menu that featured "Nixonburgers." See Vidal, U nited States, 898.
7 Kazin, The Populist Persuasion , 249.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
390
politically advantageous but economically perilous deception).8 In many ways, Nixon 
reflected the emerging character o f the American voter, of which he was clearly an 
eager student—more concerned with economics than ever before, yet less and less able 
to grasp its basic tenets, or to visualize its critical relationship to government policies.9 
Gallup polls showed clearly that the economy had become a much more significant 
issue in the late 1960s and early 1970s; 10% of the respondents chose it as the "most 
important problem facing the country today" in 1964 while 82% did so a decade later.10 
Yet, at the same time, sophisticated mathematical models and heightened political 
polarization had rendered the public increasingly oblivious to the basic principles by 
which the economy functioned. Commenting on one aspect of this misapprehension in 
September 1971, Nixon Treasury Secretary John Connally noted: "We sometimes kid 
ourselves, that it is a free enterprise system, but it is not all that free. Much o f it lives 
under regulation. Much o f it lives under subsidy."11 Few in the Nixon administration, 
including the President himself, were ever able to admit as much.
8 Since Friedman's theory suggested that government intervention to boost demand and overall economic 
output cou ld  succeed  in the short run, if  only by counting on eventually corrected misperceptions, 
adherence to the theory could also result in a pseudo-activist approach designed to bring only positive 
short-term  results (presidential election years?).
9 Herbert Stein suggested for example, that Nixon's "free-market" prejudices came not from a study o f  
the "elaborate model by which free markets were shown to maximize efficiency," but from an isolated 
experience as a low-level (P-3) employee o f  the OPA (O ffice o f  Price Administration) during World War 
II (He served as an OPA lawyer in the tire rationing division, quitting before gasoline rationing came into 
effect, and resented the experience primarily because he thought him self underpaid and underranked). 
Stein, Presidential Economics, 136. See Morris, Richard Milhous Nixon, 235-244; and Jonathon Aitken, 
Nixon: A Life (Washington: Regnery Press, 1993), 95-96 for a more detailed analysis o f  Nixon's short­
lived OPA career. It should be noted, however, that the legislation creating the OPA also prohibited 
persons from holding policymaking decisions without prior experience in business or industry. The OPA, 
in other words, was, in part, another example o f  how a government apparatus was hobbled not by any 
inherent weakness but by the intrusion o f  private interests that often did not want the agency to succeed. 
See Cochrane, "Moral Suasion," 289. Stein also makes the mistake, here, o f  assuming that all Keynesians 
liked m andatory wage and price controls. See my later comments on the Nixon era controls in this 
chapter.
10 Cited in Kim Ezra Schienbaum and Ervin Scheinbaum, "Public Perceptions o f  Economic Performance: 
From Johnson to Carter," Presidential Studies Quarterly, Summer 1982,421.
11 Quoted in James Reston, Jr., The Lone Star: The Life o f  John Connally (N ew  York: Harper and Row, 
1989), 400. Connally made this statement as he defended the proposed government bailout o f  the 
Lockheed Corporation in September 1971, a company he knew to be failing because o f  poor 
management.
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An additional reason that November 1968 saw no one printing an obituary, let 
alone a proper eulogy, for the New Economics, was because o f its association with the 
Great Society and the War on Poverty. As long as something remained o f these two 
programs, even in name only, the public continued to assume that Johnson's economic 
strategy had prevailed as well. Interested in capturing the political center, and in having 
a convenient scapegoat always close at hand, Richard Nixon did little to dissuade this 
line o f thinking, and, in fact, often did a masterful job, himself, professing the 
endurance o f the New Economics.12
When Nixon took the oath o f office on January 20, 1969, unemployment stood at 
3.3%, the current budget (FY 1969, ending June 30) was in surplus, as was the nation's 
international balance o f payments (for the first time since the 1950s), and the most 
recent inflation figures (for December 1968, the last full month o f the Johnson 
presidency) revealed a dampened 2.4% annual rate.13 The policies that had produced 
such results and that had launched a continuous economic expansion that was then into 
its 95th month— most of them integral parts o f the New Economics—were, nonetheless, 
quickly discarded by the new President.14 While he waited until the 1972 electoral 
victory before he instructed domestic policy adviser John Ehrlichman to "flush the
12 The most conspicuous example o f  this is, o f  course, his famous "I am now a Keynesian" 
pronouncement, spoken at the unveiling o f  his deficit-laden 1971 budget (TV interview with Howard K. 
Smith). Startled, Smith told Nixon that was "a little like a Christian crusader saying 'all things considered, 
I think Mohammed was right."’ Fearing that this kind o f  rhetoric, hollow or not, would drive the old 
guard out o f  the GOP, Nixon speech writer Pat Buchanan fired o ff  a seven-page, single-spaced, 
complaint-filled memo to Nixon. "Ehrlichman's shop," Buchanan lamented, "is a small group o f  
pragmatic technicians who can teach it either way." See Ambrose, Nixon: The Triumph o f  a  Politician , 
404-405. See additional comments on Nixon's budgetary politics later in this chapter.
13 See the Consumer Price Index, December, 1968, and January, 1967.
14 Though I maintain that Johnson's economic policies can be credited for much o f  this, it is clearly not 
the case with the international balance o f  payments. While he and his advisers were responsible for much 
o f  the improvement in that category, the late 1968 and early 1969 successes were made possible largely 
by the August 20-21, 1968 Soviet invasion o f  Czechoslovakia. Following the invasion a great deal o f  
money fled Europe for U.S. banks, contributing greatly to the balance o f  payments surplus.
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Great Society," Nixon spumed the principles that made the Great Society possible—the 
principles of the New Economics—immediately and without any hesitation.15
To be sure, Lyndon Johnson did not bequeath Richard Nixon an ideal economic 
situation. Hampered by the war in Vietnam, climate-influenced fluctuations in food 
prices, and the imposition o f major health care reform, the economy was, indeed, beset 
with a number o f considerable problems. Pockets o f high unemployment, a rising 
inflationary psychology, an over-valued dollar, and rising foreign competition were 
among the more significant examples. In his final speech to the Business Council, 
Johnson highlighted inflation, emphasizing that he "would be less than candid to gloss 
over it."16 Even as they left office, however, Johnson and his economic advisers were 
pursuing these very problems, and were beginning to see some positive results— 
without diverging from their basic economic strategy. Arthur Okun was calling for, and 
working on, a reinvigoration of the wage-price guideposts; tax reform had finally 
become a political possibility (since it no longer stood in the way of other more 
significant fiscal changes) and was being pursued with much vigor in the executive and 
legislative branches; the fee schedules and efficiencies excised from the original 
Medicare legislation were being readied for restoration; and the Department of Justice 
was dusting off the antitrust statutes and preparing to become a more integral part of the 
administration's overall economic strategy. "We were still fooling around with ideas on 
the morning o f January twentieth," remarked outgoing HEW Secretary Wilbur Cohen.17 
Borrowing Winston Churchill's famous anecdote repeatedly, President Johnson 
suggested in his last public addresses that there was indeed, much left to do.18
15 Only days after the 1972 election Nixon told Ehrlichman, "Flush model cities and the Great Society.
It's failed. Do it, don't say it." Cited in N icholas Lemann, "The Unfinished War, Part Two" Atlantic 
M onthly, January 1989, 68.
16 Johnson, "Remarks to Members o f  the Business Council," Public Papers, 1968: II, December 4, 1968, 
1168.
17 Quoted in Miller, Lyndon, 529.
18 Johnson usually repeated the story with which Churchill framed the anecdote. When Churchill was 
accosted by a member o f  one his nation's temperance groups, and chastised for having drunk enough
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When President Nixon asserted, then, at his first press conference, that he would 
engage in "some fine-tuning" o f the economy, many predicted changes that were subtle 
rather than large, and to some extent a continuation of the New Economics.19 The 
closeness o f the 1968 election and the heightened concern for unemployment (on the 
part o f both President-elect Nixon and the American public) also seemed to guarantee 
that Nixon would be unable to stray very far at all from the economics o f the Kennedy- 
Johnson administrations. "Were the old Nixon to whisper to the New Nixon," Paul 
Samuelson noted in his Newsweek column, 'Keep that budget in balance,' he would be 
sent packing as an impractical extremist....I am not an economic determinist. But I can 
predict with confidence that Richard Nixon will be using the New Economics if  only for 
the reason that new times make it inescapable."20 Incoming CEA chairman Paul 
McCracken had also invited the Johnson CEA staff to stay on, encouraging this kind of 
prognostication even further. Johnson's outgoing CEA chairman, Arthur Okun, though 
quick to point out his distaste for the monetarist economics McCracken seemed to 
admire, even speculated that there would be a bigger difference between McCracken 
and the other new CEA members [Herbert Stein and Hendrik Houthakker] than between 
McCracken and himself.21
On economic policy, however, subtle change was not to be; what the country 
received instead— in spite o f Nixon's occasional and genuine streaks of pragmatism— 
was counter-revolution. Subtlety, it seems, was reserved for the domain o f rhetoric and 
public relations (or presidential offensive, as Nixon termed it) alone, and was not much 
of a concern when it came to actual economic policy.22 Though he was soon reckoned a
liquor to fill half the room in which they stood, he looked at the wall, and then the ceiling, and sighed: 
"so little have I done, so much I have yet to do."
19 Lester Sobel, ed., Inflation and the Nixon Administration, Volume I: 1969-1971 (N ew  York: Facts on 
File, 1974), 10.
20 Samuelson, The Samuelson Sampler, 11.
21 Okun, Oral History Interview, Interview III, LBJ Library, 7-8.
22 "Presidential Offensive" label cited in Haldeman, The Haldeman Diaries, 82.
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latter day Disraeli—a conservative unafraid of liberal ideas—and though McCracken 
termed the administration's economic approach "gradualism," Nixon's management of 
the economy suggests an outlook not so liberal and not so gradual in character.23
The pace of change stemmed, in many ways, from basic differences in personality 
and philosophy between Johnson and Nixon. In terms of their approach and general 
philosophy, it would be difficult to find two prominent politicians with more divergent 
views on the American economy, despite their common affinity for "hardball" politics. 
For Nixon, inflation represented, as always, a convenient way to impugn or discredit 
liberal Democratic economic policies, but it also moved him little, inspiring no great 
fear or trepidation. "We'll take inflation, if necessary, but we can't take unemployment," 
Nixon remarked early in his presidency.24 Inflation was, perhaps, in his way of looking 
at the economy, only a problem with a simple solution; an issue fraught with symbolism 
but little economic import. "Inflation is not percentage points, it's the price of bacon," 
read one memo circulated among the Nixon campaign staff.25 The approach was simple: 
make people feel inflation by associating it with products rather than dry economic 
statistics; pin it on the opposition party and their harried interventionism; and solve it 
with a steady dose of macroeconomic (mostly monetary) contraction. Though 
McCracken subscribed to Friedman's criticism of the Phillips Curve trade-off between 
employment and inflation, the early Nixon anti-inflation strategy reflected little more 
than the simple belief that the nation could indeed ride the Phillips Curve downward to 
price stability.
23 The identification with Disraeli was in part a reflection o f  Nixon's actual concern for the middle class 
and the working poor. Much o f  it, however, was simply a cultivated or contrived image suggested to 
Nixon by his Democratic adviser (Asst, to the President for Urban Affairs) Daniel Patrick Moynihan.
24 Quoted in John Ehrlichman, Witness to Power: The Nixon Years (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1982), 254.
25 Harry Treleaven, "Notes re Nixon for President Advertising in the Primary Campaigns," November 21, 
1967, in Joe McGinniss, The Selling o f  the President 1968 (New York: Pocket Books, Simon and 
Schuster, 1969), 189.
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Johnson, on the other hand, had judged inflation a far less simple and a far more 
significant problem. While this was partly a result o f his experience as a liberal 
Democrat, where inflation had always served as a boon for the conservative politicians 
and the conservative policies that he opposed, it also stemmed from his appreciation of 
inflation as an insidious and unwieldy affliction, not easily comprehended, nor easily 
solved. Sensing that it had both microeconomic and psychological origins— in addition 
to the more customarily implicated macroeconomic sources— Johnson, ironically, 
approached inflation more seriously than did most of the conservative opposition who 
accused him of indifference. To think that one could choose between employment and 
inflation, Johnson realized, would be to ignore both the political and psychological 
reality o f price behavior in a mixed economy.
When it came to fiscal policy, there were also marked differences between the two 
Presidents. For his part, Nixon did not share the traditional Republican aversion to 
taxes. Possessing an instinctive supply-side outlook on investment, employment, and 
the business cycle, he believed taxes to be onerous only when they weighed too heavily 
upon corporate cash flow. With a fine appreciation o f corporate attorneys and 
accountants (being one o f the former himself, and hiring one o f the latter, Maurice 
Stans, to be his fundraiser and Secretary o f Commerce), Nixon saw little need to worry 
about corporate cash flow, even when tax rates were raised. Loopholes and accounting 
gimmicks were simply too readily available, and too difficult to erase.26 Never 
insignificant, tax policy was to Nixon, however, like inflation— more of a symbolic than 
a serious economic gesture, and within reasonable margins, never much o f a threat to 
the economic fortunes of the corporations he believed to be the economic lifeline of the 
country.
26 Johnson's last Secretary o f  the Treasury, Joseph Barr, had prepared the first tax expenditure budget 
(exemptions, credits, deductions, etc.) and found that the total was equal to 25% o f the entire FY 1968 
budget. Cited by Ronald King, Money, Time, an d  Politics, 329.
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While Johnson did not hold a much more sanguine view of corporate lawyers or 
accountants, he had become convinced that the smallest, seemingly inconsequential 
numbers still held great economic significance, poring over every line o f the 1964 
budget, for example, and exercising great concern, even over a 1 cent rise in the price of 
gasoline. To him, small, marginal effects were important, and tax policies were 
weighted with great significance, in spite of the need for loophole-closing and a more 
truthful brand of corporate accounting. As a result, he always approached proposals for 
tax increases soberly and with great apprehension. When Medicare wended its way 
through Congress in 1965, Johnson and his economists instituted a broadening of the 
Social Security tax base to allow reduced Social Security tax rates, even though 
Medicare implied greater Social Security outlays.27 When the tax surcharge passed in 
June 1968, Johnson held no signing ceremony though he fought for the legislation 
gamely. "I never got a pen for that one," recalled Arthur Okun.28 And when presidential 
candidate George McGovern visited the LB J ranch in the middle of his 1972 
campaign—after calling for a tax increase to finance many of his campaign proposals— 
Johnson lashed out: "In all my years I never heard of anybody elected to office on a 
platform of raising taxes."29 Near the end of the campaign Johnson gave McGovern 
additional advice on how to defeat Nixon: "I would go after him on the Big Rich. The 
Republicans always sell you out to Wall Street and this is the worst bunch o f all."30
On the expenditure side o f the government's ledger, Johnson and Nixon also 
differed widely. On social spending in general, for example, and Johnson's Great 
Society in particular, Nixon focused far less on the costs o f specific programs than he
27 See Berkowitz, Mr. Social Security, 232-233, 235.
28 Okun, Oral History Interview, in Hargrove and Morley,eds., The President and the CEA, 276. Okun 
called the tax surcharge the only bill he knew o f  that Johnson supported but did not want to sign publicly.
29 Cited in Valenti, A Very Human President, 386. See also McGovern's letter to LBJ, written as a 
follow-up to his visit, where he notes that he "came to a new appreciation o f  both the remarkable force o f  
your personality and your grasp o f  what is enduring in American life." Ibid., 387-388.
30 Quoted in Miller, Lyndon, 551.
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did on their effectiveness or political popularity. Striking the "welfare dependency" 
theme throughout the 1968 campaign, but desiring a "leftward balance" once he became 
President, he approached social policies somewhat schizophrenically.31 Costs, however, 
were almost never an important issue, and in fact, Nixon seemed genuinely perplexed 
by Johnson's preoccupation with cost controls. Speaking to Chief o f Staff H.R. 
Haldeman after a visit with the former President, Nixon termed this preoccupation 
"peculiar" and speculated that perhaps he [LBJ] was "hypersensitive because o f all he's 
taken down to Texas plus all the criticism about how much money he's made while 
President."32 Moynihan ridiculed Johnson's attempt to reduce the White House light bill, 
referring to it as "undignified" and reflective o f a "low estimate of the intelligence and 
taste o f the American people," and Nixon responded approvingly and caustically. "Turn 
on all lights!" he wrote in return.33 Never one to underestimate the American people, 
Nixon promptly decided that he needed a Southern (Key Biscayne,FL) and a Western 
(San Clemente,CA) White House. $17 million worth of government financed 
improvements later he had them both.34 The very first bill Nixon signed, appropriating 
extra funds for ex-federal employees on February 8, 1969, was, perhaps, an indication 
o f this relative indifference toward budget limitations. "There was no fiscal 
responsibility in the Nixon years," lamented former Secretary of Commerce and Merck 
CEO, John Connor.35
31 See Haldeman, The Haldeman Diaries, 69, for note on "leftward balance." On July 7, 1969 Haldeman 
noted, "P thinking o f  moving on Family Security Plan [work for welfare program]....Now feels w e need 
the domestic momentum and leftward balance before he leaves for Asian trip."
32 Quoted in Haldeman, The Haldeman Diaries, 83. LBJ and Nixon had met on the occasion o f  the 
former's birthday, on August 27, 1969.
33 Memo, Moynihan to Nixon, January 23, 1969, Special Files, President's O ffice Files, President's 
Handwriting, Box 1, Nixon Presidential Materials, National Archives.
34 As an IRS investigation later proved, a portion o f  this figure went for improvements to Nixon's private 
homes that had nothing to do with enhanced security, helicopter landing facilities, etc. Even if  one 
assumes that the two auxiliary White Houses were necessary, Nixon should have been responsible for 
these expenses ($701,000 for San Clemente home; $575,000 for his Key Biscayne dwelling).
35 Connor, Oral History Interview, 48. While this remark should not be taken at face value since Connor 
was a Johnson administration cabinet member, he was also a fiscally conservative Republican CEO who 
clearly disagreed with many o f  Johnson's policies as well.
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When bad economic reports reached his desk, however, as was the case in late 
1969, Nixon could also revert to the old style conservatism that he normally tried to 
resist. "He realized [the] economic outlook [was] still bad," noted Haldeman on 
December 15, "so [he] told Mayo [Budget Director Robert] to cut all budgets 25%."36 
While he often committed key economic statistics to memory, particularly if they told a 
compelling story that reinforced a favored political approach, actual statistics and 
numbers meant little to President Nixon in the long run. CEA Chairman McCracken's 
presentations, filled as they were with statistics, truly bored President Nixon.37 The 
demand for 25% budget cuts, for example, was indeed a spurious one, not meant to be 
taken seriously; Nixon knew not, however, what kind of a realistic figure to suggest. 
"We often had to straighten out Nixon's statistics," speechwriter William Safire 
recalled.38
The specifics o f Defense spending also remained less important to Nixon than did 
an anticipated Vietnam war dividend. The 1968 Republican party platform, from which 
Nixon showed no sign of departing, even suggested that advanced military research and 
development "have been inhibited and stagnated by inexpert, cost-oriented 
administrators."39 Johnson and McNamara had concerned themselves with the cost of
36 Haldeman, The Haldeman Diaries, 115. Emphasis added. Haldeman added the following, in 
parentheses, after the note on Nixon's budget request: "He's been saying this for weeks and not really 
meaning it, but now he feels he's really got to push the cuts as far as possible."
37 Norton, The Employment Act and  the Council o f  Economic Advisers, 229.
38 Cited in "Nixon: Hillary Strikes Out on Baseball," USA Today, May 13, 1994, 2C. Safire was the 
Nixon speechwriter responsible for most o f  his economic addresses. Not very adept at econom ics, Safire 
was chosen largely for his ability to reduce economic language to a more "people-type" language. See 
Haldeman, The Haldeman Diaries, 101, where Haldeman notes how Safire "got the inflation speech 
down to a 'high prices' speech." The USA Today remark came in response to a story about Nixon 
ridiculing Hillary Clinton for not remembering baseball hall o f  famer and Arkansas native Joseph Floyd 
"Arky" Vaughn. Nixon cited Vaughn's .367 lifetime batting average to reinforce the profundity o f  
Hillary's ignorance, when, in fact, Vaughn's career average was .318. (Safire failed to point out, in 
addition, that Vaughn retired to California in 1948 when Ms. Clinton was just over a year old, and died 
four years later, in Eagleville, CA, several months before her 5th birthday.)
39 Cited in I.F. Stone, "On National Defense, Space, and Foreign Policy, the New  GOP Platform Reads 
As if  Written by General Dynamics for a New Arms Race," Polem ics and  Prophecies, 1967-1970  
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), 160. Emphasis added.
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the nation's defense, and while they had also glossed over the military-industrial 
complex to a great extent, for both political and military reasons, they had done so 
mostly out o f confidence in their own abilities to resist it or tame it. Nixon simply 
pretended that it did not exist. When Daniel Patrick Moynihan wrote to Nixon early in 
1969, for example, suggesting a statement on the subject, Arthur Burns, John 
Ehrlichman, and President Nixon all rejected the idea. "Having spoken to Ike frequently 
about his address (farewell address where he warned o f the military-industrial complex), 
noted Arthur Burns, "he felt it had been 'widely misinterpreted and misused.'"40 From 
that point on, economic efficiency at the Pentagon was dropped as a topic for serious 
consideration.
While it also became clear, in early 1969, that Nixon would recuse himself from 
most domestic policy formulation, even asking Ehrlichman to take over for weeks at a 
time, he encouraged and seconded rapid economic policy changes in general. Attacks on 
Johnson's economic policy, made during the 1968 campaign, almost made it impossible 
for him to do otherwise, even though a flurry o f discussions between his and Johnson's 
economic advisers, for example, had forced him to support, rather than terminate, the 
10% tax surcharge. Nixon had been particularly aggressive on the issue o f  inflation, 
calling the 1960s an era o f "false prosperity, founded on a timeless device of 
deception— inflation." He also suggested that workers were falling behind, that 
"presidential pay raises" [of 3.2%] would erode their real income, and that it was all 
created by out o f control non-defense expenditures. Repeating fabrications often enough 
and long enough to make them credible, Nixon, and the Republican party in general, 
worked the inflation issue as hard as any other. "Inflation was evident...as early as the 
fall of 1963," read one campaign press release. "Non-defense spending has risen more 
than defense spending, and constitutes a larger proportion o f the whole," read another.
40 Memo, Bums to Nixon, April 18, 1969, Special Files, President's O ffice Files, President's 
Handwriting, Box 1, Nixon Presidential Materials, National Archives.
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Running mate Spiro Agnew joined the fray as well, targeting Democratic economic 
policies almost as often as hippie radicalism. "Agnew Says Inflation Is So Bad Savings 
Bonds Are a Poor Deal," read one New York Times headline in September 1968. And in 
August 1968, the London Times summed up the campaign: "Inflation has been a stick of 
priceless value with which to beat the Johnson-Humphrey administration, and Nixon 
has missed no chance of banging away."41
The first, and perhaps most significant, economic policy change made by the Nixon 
administration was the categorical rejection o f the wage-price guideposts. Six days into 
his administration, at his first press conference, Nixon announced that there would be no 
guideposts and no incomes policy.42 Though Johnson advisers had labored here as well 
to exert the same influence on the Nixon economic policy team as they had with the 
surcharge extension, these pleas fell upon deaf ears. In this case McCracken and the 
CEA remained solidly behind the President, helping him to resist the overtures o f the 
economic ambassadors from the Johnson administration. Reflecting on the complete
41Press release o f  N ixon campaign, July 6, 1968; Press release o f  Republican Coordinating Committee, 
July 24, 1967; N ew York Times, September 24, 1968; London Times, August 9, 1968; in Robson-Ross 
Papers, Box 24, LBJ Library. The Republican party, in 1966 and 1968, and Nixon, in 1968, were 
exploiting white backlash to the civil rights movement as well, but this remained a largely covert 
operation, at least until 1972, or perhaps even 1980 (when Ronald Reagan started concocting his welfare 
queen stories). When Kevin Phillips suggested this kind o f  exploitation in The Emerging Republican  
M ajority (New Rochelle: Arlington House, 1969), suggesting that the key to political success was 
"knowing who hates who," Harry Dent wrote to Nixon on October 13, 1968 and recommended such a 
plan (go more conservative to take the South, and go after swing states o f  California, Ohio, Illinois, 
Pennsylvania, and New  Jersey with moderate conservative policy), but also recommended that it be 
disavowed publicly. "We should disavow Phillips' book as party policy and assert that we are growing in 
strength nationally because the public is increasingly conscious o f  the soundness o f  our philosophy." 
Memo, Dent to Nixon, October 13, 1968, Special Files, President's Office Files, President's Handwriting, 
Box 3, Nixon Presidential Materials, National Archives. See Garry Wills, Nixon Agonistes: The Crisis o f  
the Self-M ade Man (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1969), 265, for an analysis o f  the "who hates who" 
strategy. Almost by default, then, inflation became the focal point o f  Republican attacks in the 1966-1970 
period, a change directed by RNC chairman Ray Bliss o f  Ohio after Johnson's landslide win in 1964. See 
also Gould, "Never a Deep Partisan," 38, for a brief description o f  Larry O'Brien's White P aper, a report 
prepared for the Democratic party in 1968 that anticipated much o f  what Phillips would say, and take 
credit for discovering, in The Emerging Republican Majority.
42 Cited in Sobel, ed., Inflation and the Nixon Administration, 10.
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and immediate abandonment of the guideposts six weeks later in March, McCracken 
noted: "The administration has properly decided not to follow that course."43
Unfortunately, many of the nation's less public-minded corporations were also 
eager for this kind of a change. Immediately after the January press conference, Pierre 
Rinfret, New York business consultant and former Nixon adviser, wired his clients and 
told them to raise their prices, for there would now be no interference.44 Noting both 
Nixon's actions and Rinfret's dispatches, John Kenneth Galbraith suggested that it was 
entirely possible "that in these first weeks the Administration did more to promote 
inflation than it accomplished in the next year and a half in controlling it."45 1968 fourth 
quarter profit figures were coming in at the same time, and the top 500 corporations 
showed results that were 7.3% above those for the fourth quarter of 1967. Clearly there 
was little or no marketplace basis for price rises, but they began to mount just the same. 
With inflation climbing at an even faster pace than it had in 1968, Nixon still ignored 
the price setting capabilities of the nation's corporations, and counted on the Invisible 
Hand instead. "Anybody who bets on continuing inflation," he remarked, "will lose that 
bet....Labor that asks for exhorbitant wage increases, management that raises prices too 
high— will be pricing themselves out of the market."46
If market forces were to play much of a role, however, someone would have to 
inform the nation's business managers, for their pricing strategies were becoming more, 
rather than less, inflationary, and they were borrowing more than ever, increasingly
43 Memo, McCracken for Cabinet Committee on Economic Policy, March 5, 1969, "A Truly Private 
Voluntary Approach to Price Stability," Special Files, President's Office Files, President's Handwriting, 
Box 1, Nixon Presidential Materials, National Archives.
44 Rowen, Self-Inflicted Wounds, 45.
45 Galbraith, Economics Peace and  Laughter, 90.
46 Quoted in Sobel, ed., Inflation and the Nixon Administration, 22-23. While its true that some 
industries, such as the steel and automobile industries, were fast moving in the direction o f  price-led 
market deterioration, it was coming at the hands o f  foreign, not domestic competition, and it was coming 
so slow ly that it could (and would) preclude any decisive action for several years. Even the most 
idealistic (or deluded) free market theorist would not have recommended inaction for nearly a decade as 
the nation waited for competition to affect price rises.
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aware o f the dividends created for the debtor by accelerating inflation (and the 
willingness of the new President to add new streams of lucrative supply-side goodies). 
At mid-year, Arthur Okun pleaded with the Nixon administration to readopt the 
guidepost apparatus. "I don't think," Okun remarked after being rebuffed, "you would 
have gotten the oil price increase and as many of the non-ferrous metal price increases, 
if not for a feeling that the White House is never going to raise its voice against such 
business decisions."47 On oil prices in particular, Haldeman reported that Nixon was 
"trying to figure out a way to duck the whole thing and shift it [the blame] to 
Congress."48 Though he argued for a more conservative approach, and had helped 
clients exploit the situation, Rinfret still lamented the administration's indifference 
toward inflation. "Never have so many lied to so few so successfully," he remarked in 
December 1969.49
At the end of the year, with no apparent change in administration policy, Okun 
continued to press Nixon and his economic advisers. Industries that had responded to 
guidepost pressure in 1968, he pointed out, had raised prices that year by approximately 
1%. In 1969, without the guideposts (and with dwindling, rather than increasing, 
consumer demand), those same industries had raised their prices instead by an average 
of 6%.50 Saul Nelson, who had authored the initial "Weekly Price Reports" for President 
Johnson in 1966, sent a six-page summary o f "important guidepost actions" to Paul 
McCracken in August, hoping to convince him that universal coverage was not 
necessary, but that action in key industries often had a significant and positive spillover
47 Okun, Oral History Interview, Interview III, 9.
48 Haldeman, The Haldeman D iaries, 116. Haldeman noted that in this case Nixon was concerned about 
the fate o f  GOP congressmen in Texas, particularly George Bush. Johnson, if you will recall, had this 
same concern. Since oil prices were at already artificially high levels, however, Johnson assumed that 
price stability  was enough to offer the Texas oilmen who donated to his campaigns. Here, Nixon was 
pushing for price increases instead.
49 Quoted in Sobel, ed., Inflation and the Nixon Administration , 30.
50 Cited in ibid., 61-62.
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effect.51 Nelson simply tried to convince the new CEA chairman that some action was 
clearly preferable to none. McCracken and Nixon remained unm oved, however, with 
the former suggesting only that the administration consider encouraging a private effort 
to adopt "education and moral suasion." Even this, however, the economic equivalent o f 
Ronald Reagan's "Just Say No" anti-drug initiative, proved too unwieldy and messy for 
a President who took three days to get his new Irish setter to take a dog biscuit. Nor did 
McCracken push too hard, suggesting that "the argument against stimulating a private 
effort o f this kind, is that it may look like a retreat from the pure free-market philosophy 
implicit in the rejection o f the guideposts....The ideal development would be the 
spontaneous emergence o f a private voluntary effort."52 No one in the administration, 
however, seemed ready to offer an explanation as to how such a spontaneous effort 
could possibly be triggered. As Galbraith noted, "always the stability would come 
approximately two quarters in the future."53 And these promises for stability seemed to 
embody the entire anti-inflation policy o f  the Nixon administration. "Not since Herbert 
Hoover predicted the turning of the immortal corner," Galbraith added, "was prediction 
therapy so remorselessly pursued as in the first eighteen months of the new 
administration."54
As unemployment continued to move higher in 1969, reaching 4% in September, 
and inflation showed no signs o f responding to the market forces that Nixon and 
McCracken had depended upon, some members o f the administration began to grouse 
about for change. Arthur Burns, Counsellor to the President (and chairman o f the 
Federal Reserve Board after William McChesney Martin's retirement in January 1970), 
recommended an incomes policy like the Kennedy-Johnson guideposts. HUD Secretary
51 N elson to McCracken, August 6, 1969, White House Central Files, CEA Staff Subject Files, Box 15, 
N ixon Presidential Materials, National Archives.
52 M emo, McCracken for Cabinet Committee on Economic Policy, March 5, 1969, Special Files, 
President's Office Files, President's Handwriting, Box 1, N ixon Presidential Materials, National Archives.
53 Galbraith, Economics Peace an d  Laughter, 90.
54 Ibid., 91.
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George Romney and Interior Secretary Wally Hickel also gave Bums some support on 
the matter, but it was all to no avail. Nixon ignored Burns and spoke o f removing both 
Romney and Hickel.55 When Romney continued to pursue the matter, and spoke out at a 
cabinet meeting in February 1970, McCracken and George Shultz (then Sec. o f Labor) 
brushed him off, and Nixon lashed out. "P finally really whapped him," Haldeman 
reported, "by saying wage-price-policy had never worked. Romney said it had in 
England; P laid him low saying, 'Don't talk to me about England..."56
Paul Samuelson, Gardner Ackley, Thomas Watson of IBM, former Eisenhower 
CEA member Henry Wallich, retired Fed chairman William McChesney Martin, and 
Assistant Treasury Secretary Murray Weidenbaum added their voices to those 
clamoring for at least a partial return to the Kennedy-Johnson guideposts. Even the 
Committee for Economic Development (CED), a moderate conservative band of 
business leaders and economists with which CEA member Herbert Stein was formerly 
associated, spoke out in favor of a return to a guidepost approach. "Inflation is too 
serious a problem," the CED declared in 1970, "to permit us the luxury o f ignoring 
potential weapons for curbing it that are at our disposal."57 Nixon did not budge,
55 The Bums-Nixon relationship got o ff  to a rocky start at the beginning o f  the Nixon presidency and 
never really improved despite Nixon's obvious respect for Burns's work in the Eisenhower 
administration. Bums had "an avuncular style that drove Nixon bats," remarked Wyatt C. Wells in his 
recent biography o f  Bums. According to Wells, Nixon soon came to dread meetings with Bums, who was 
likely to lecture the President on a number o f  topics, and even encouraged Haldeman and Ehrlichman's 
sarcastic impressions o f  Bums and their limiting o f Bum's access to the oval office. Bum s him self made 
this limiting o f  access much more feasible by passing up a west w ing White House office for a more 
spacious office in the Executive Office Building. See Wyatt C. Wells, Economist in an Uncertain World: 
Arthur F. Burns and the Federal Reserve, 1970-1978  (N ew  York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 29- 
30. See also footnote # 145, this chapter.
56 Haldeman, Haldeman Diaries, 128. It is odd that Romney cited the English example and not an 
example from the U.S. auto industry. While he left the presidency o f  American Motors Co. in 1962, just 
as the guideposts were being deployed, he then became Governor o f  Michigan and was undoubtedly 
aware o f  Johnson's negotiations with Frederic Donner, James Roche, and other automobile executives. 
Perhaps he thought Nixon could have been persuaded more readily with an example from a foreign 
country.
57 Research and Policy Committee o f  the Committee for Economic Development, Further Weapons 
Against Inflation: Measures to Supplement Genera! F iscal and M onetary Policies (N ew  York:
Committee for Economic Development, 1970), 14. There were others who also joined the chorus calling 
for something resembling the Wage-Price guideposts. Donald McNaughton o f  Prudential Insurance Co.;
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however, acceding only to "CEA Inflation Alerts" in August and December 1970— 
missives that criticized price actions in several industries (auto, oil, railroads, and 
construction) but that implied no government action or penalties.58 "The economic 
system imposes its own sanctions on costs that are clearly out o f line with general 
trends," read part of the second Inflation Alert.59 Only in 1971, after two years in office, 
did Nixon make his first real attempt at using the presidency to influence corporate price 
decisions. When Bethlehem Steel announced a 12.5% increase on its construction 
industry steel products in January, Nixon responded by threatening a change in the 
nation's steel import regulations. With the help of a smaller (6.8%) US Steel increase, 
this was enough to compel a Bethlehem price rollback. Minimal presidential persuasion 
had convinced Bethlehem that they could go no higher than the 6.8% price rise 
announced by US Steel. This set no precedent, however, for two weeks later in the 
Economic Report o f  the President, Nixon asserted that "free prices and wages are the 
heart o f our economic system," and he urged McCracken to consider their stand on the 
guideposts unchanged. Industries such as steel and oil were special cases, Nixon 
maintained, since both were partly regulated by the government.60 In truth, the 
Bethlehem increase had precipitated an uncharacteristically strong Nixon response 
primarily because it happened to coincide with his tentative efforts to suspend the 
Davis-Bacon Act (requiring union scale wages on government construction contracts), 
and came on the very day he announced liberalized depreciation allowances for 
business. Allowing an immense steel price increase at the same time would have been a
Fortune magazine; Wilfred Lewis, Jr. o f  the National Planning Association; Gaylord A. Freeman, Jr. o f  
the First National Bank o f  Chicago; the Lionel D. Edie Co.; Senator Jacob Javits (R-NY); and 
Congressman Henry Reuss (D-W I) were but a few o f  these.
58 Sobel, ed., Inflation and the Nixon Administration, 123.
59 Cited by Crauford D. Goodwin, "A Report o f  the Conference," in Goodwin, ed., Exhortations and  
Controls, 323.
60 Ibid., 132, 167. Report issued February I, 1971. One wonders, here, whether Nixon really meant this 
and simply did not know the true extent to which the government regulated, subsidized, underwrote, or 
otherwise contributed to most businesses in the nation, or whether he utilized this qualification only as a 
convenient, but obviously hollow, excuse.
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disastrous political move and would have too readily exposed Nixon's tilt toward the 
business community. Though he had previously objected to the guideposts on the 
grounds that selective enforcement would penalize patriotic corporations (who willingly 
submitted to the logic o f the guideposts), he was now willing to be more selective than 
ever before.
Nixon's imposition o f a 90-day wage-price freeze, then, on August 15,1971, 
followed by two separate periods of selective controls and a second freeze, shocked 
many observers and suggested a revolutionary change in his approach to inflation. 
Introduced along with a termination o f the American pledge to exchange gold for 
dollars (at $35 per ounce.), a 10 percent import surcharge, and an assortment of mostly 
supply side tax incentives— known collectively as Nixon's New Economic Policy— it 
suggested a change that presumably brought him full circle, closer to the anti-inflation 
policy o f the previous administration.61 Much has been made, for example, of the 
support lent to the original 90 day price freeze by prominent Democrats in Congress and 
economists such as Walter Heller, Arthur Okun, and John Kenneth Galbraith. Nixon 
was presumably giving them exactly what they wanted. When the controls ended, 
then—officially in April 1974, but unofficially on January 11, 1973—suggesting little 
in the way of real accomplishment, their failure was judged to be invariably the failure 
o f wage-price policy in general, and an apparent blemish on the New Economics.62 At a
61 Out o f  these changes, the closing o f  the "gold window"— as it was known— and the 90 day freeze were 
clearly the most surprising. The import surcharge was dropped within a few months (used primarily to 
force revaluation o f  other currencies) at the December 16-18 Smithsonian meeting o f  the G-10 finance 
ministers, and the tax proposals were modified somewhat by Congress (making them less regressive). See 
Rowen, Self-Inflicted Wounds, 69-72; and Paul Volcker and Toyoo Gyohten, Changing Fortunes: The 
World's Money and  the Threat to American Leadership (N ew  York: Random House, Times Books,
1992), 88-90.
62 On January 11, 1973, just as he was telling Ehrlichman to flush the Great Society, Nixon scrapped the 
Phase II price controls. Until the second freeze was imposed in June 1973, triggering George Shultz' 
resignation, controls were voluntary and remained in effect only for food, health care, and the 
construction industry.
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Boston University conference on wage-price policy in November 1974, Herbert Stein 
noted:
We were racing across the snow in a horse-drawn sled pursued by wolves who 
occasionally gained on us and when they got close enough to us, we threw out a 
baby to divert them from the pursuit for a while...and so we threw out the inflation 
alerts...and then we threw out the construction business [subject o f March 1971 
executive order erecting an industry controlled wage stabilization system], and 
finally we had no more babies to throw out, so we threw out the mother-in-law on 
August 15, 1971.63
The 90-day freeze and the controls that followed it, however, differed greatly from 
the Johnson era incomes policy. As Neil De Marchi noted in his study of Nixon's wage- 
price policy prior to the freeze, "the organization devised to administer the controls was 
the very antithesis of what is implied by jawboning and moral suasion."64 Phases II, III, 
and IV of the Nixon controls, for example, relied upon fmes($5000 per violation), 
injunctions, and criminal penalties. Big businesses and labor unions also had to obtain 
prior approval for all wage and price increases.65 Unlike the Johnson guideposts, there 
was no element o f voluntarism or acceptance o f the government's significance in normal 
pricing decisions, nor was their a recognition o f changes in relative, as opposed to 
general, prices; prices and wages were simply imposed by government fiat, almost 
invariably without discerning any of the underlying economic factors. And the price 
controllers were like reluctant disciplinarians who envisioned their role as both 
contrived and unlikely to effect long term behavioral changes. Worse yet, most o f the 
Nixon price controllers operated on the peculiar assumption that wages, rather than 
prices, were the most appropriate target of the controls. When asked about future
63 Quoted in Goodwin, "A Report o f  the Conference," 388.
64 N eil De Marchi, "The First Nixon Administration: Prelude to Controls," in Goodwin, ed., Exhortations 
and Controls, 344.
65 Intermediate size firms and their non-union employees were subject to periodic reporting requirements 
instead o f  prior approval statutes, while smaller firms and non-profit organizations and their employees 
were largely left to their own devices and audited only by the IRS. See C. Jackson Grayson, with Louis 
Neeb, Confessions o f  a  Price Controller (Homewood,IL: Dow Jones-Irwin, 1974), for details on the 
various phases, freezes, and administrative rules o f  the Nixon wage-price controls.
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controls, and the prices and "fantastic profits" o f the pharmaceutical industry, for 
example, Nixon replied that he had no desire to "penalize" any sector o f the economy 
"for being successful."66 The primary point o f the Johnson guideposts, on the other 
hand, was to influence wage and price decisions in a way that would enable workers and 
managers to better conform to, and better hear signals associated with, a theoretical free 
market, showing them tangible long term benefits in the process.
Nor were the Nixon controls like the Johnson era policy in another respect— 
Nixon's price fighters devoted precious little energy to the study of pricing behaviors in 
specific industries, or to the preparation of the controls in general. Called to Washington 
from his post at Southern Methodist University in Dallas to chair the Phase II Price 
Commission, C. Jackson Grayson, Jr. met with Herbert Stein on October 23, 1971. "Not 
much in classical economics seems to be working," Stein remarked, "why don't you 
come up with something on your own rather than be prejudiced by our views." Finding 
no staff, no background papers, and no office space when he arrived, Grayson was 
startled. "It seemed incredible—and frightening—that so little had been done in 
advance," he recalled later.67
When the Phase II system was up and running, company officials and labor leaders 
simply applied to the Nixon administration for price and wage changes. The 
administration assumed a posture, then, that was largely defensive and reactive, unlike 
the Johnson administration before them. Phase II controls, for example, operated largely 
under the influence o f the tripartite Pay Board and Price Commission, with business, 
labor, and consumer interests represented in each. Nixon had agreed in advance that the 
Cost o f Living Council— comprised of administration members with general oversight 
responsibilities— could not veto Pay Board or Price Commission decisions. If labor and
66 Speech to Economic Club o f  Detroit, September 23, 1971, quoted in Sobel, ed., Inflation and the 
Nixon Administration, 265.
67 Grayson, with Neeb, Confessions o f  a  Price Controller, 7.
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industry members approved wage or price increases above target figures (5.5% for 
wages, for example), as they often did (outvoting consumer delegates 2 to l), that was 
the end o f it, no matter how much this resembled the very behavior targeted as collusive 
and counterproductive by the Johnson CEA. While John Connally often added an 
element o f persuasion to the process, bringing it closer to the guidepost philosophy in a 
superficial way, his was less "moral suasion" than brute force, with little or no accent on 
critical long term economic goals. Charles Colson sent Connally a memo in February 
1972, for example, urging him to "browbeat" the heads o f the ten largest supermarkets. 
"Knowing how you are in handling people," Colson noted, "I suspect they would 
happily swallow a nickel a pound on hamburger to avoid incurring your wrath."68 Gone 
were the genuine economic levers or the educational efforts common to the Kennedy- 
Johnson guideposts; physical compulsion remained in its stead. "Connally has the ball," 
Haldeman noted in January 1972, "he doesn't consult, he operates."69
Furthermore, those identified with the Johnson administration and the New 
Economics who applauded the freeze, did so largely out o f their inclination to take the 
new President at face value, for he had recommended the freeze as a temporary 
arrangement and only as a bridge to a new policy. Galbraith, Heller, Arthur Okun, and 
many others simply held out the hope that the subsequent policy would indeed bring the 
Nixon administration around to something more closely approximating the wage-price 
guideposts. On NBC's Meet the Press in October 1971, for example (at roughly the 
midpoint of the first 90 day freeze), Heller warned that the "natural reaction of Mr. 
Nixon...in anger and frustration might be to clamp on direct controls. I would urge him 
to hold his fire."70 Asked how he would have the Cost o f Living Council operate, Heller 
continued:
68 Quoted in Reston, Jr., The Lone Star, 435.
69 Quoted in Haldeman, The Haldeman Diaries, 399.
70 Transcript, NBC's M eet the Press, October 17, 1971, LBJ Post-Presidential File, Economy-National, 
Inflation, Box 13, LBJ Library, 4.
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I think that the President had better be ready....It does worry me that I see some 
conflicts still going on within the administration, with the Herbert Steins and 
George Shultzes saying, 'Let's do it by case law' and with the John Connally's and 
Arthur Bums saying, 'No, indeed, we need a firm hand and a firm guide, and 
guideline, or yardstick. Judging by John Connally's performance to date, I am 
laying my bets on him.71
Unfortunately, for Heller (and for the economy), the freeze did not give way to a 
genuine guidepost approach, primarily because Nixon never sought one. Nor did it 
operate under firm guidelines, for Stein's case law approach eventually prevailed.72 It 
had been concocted, after all, not to tame inflationary momentum, but to convince 
international bankers that our closing of the gold window and dollar devaluation was 
not a signal for greater inflation; to help recession bound businesses quash increasing 
wage demands; and to hold back inflation while monetary ease and fiscal expansion 
paved the way for the 1972 reelection campaign.73 Paul Volcker, then Undersecretary of 
the Treasury, went streaking off to Europe to assure its central bankers that we still 
meant business on the inflation front in spite of the August 15 announcement; business 
leaders and Wall Street applauded the freeze, ushering in a record day for the Dow 
Jones averages on August 16 (DJIA up 32.9); and Nixon leveled his sights on the 
Federal Reserve and a series of regressive tax benefits for coiporate America.74 Controls
71 Ibid., 6.
72 This was partly due to Connally's desire to remove him self from the day-to-day operations o f  the 
system, it also resulted, however, partly from Stein's elevation to CEA chairman, replacing McCracken in 
January 1972.
73 The Construction Users' Anti-Inflation Roundtable, for example, called openly for controls throughout 
1971 as did many Business Council members such as J. Irwin Miller o f  the Cummins Engine corporation. 
See De Marchi, "Prelude to Controls," 339-340.
74 The question o f  the Nixon-Fed chairman Burns relationship in 1971 and 1972 is a critical one, 
however, it is also one characterized by an intensity o f  debate that belies its significance. The customary 
assumption has Nixon ordering Bums to crank up the nation's money supply so as to engineer rapid 
growth and a spurt in employment (while controls kept inflation in check) in time for the stretch run o f  
the 1972 reelection campaign. Nixon did attempt to coerce Burns, even unleashing Charles Colson and 
his bag o f  "dirty tricks." Colson leaked a false rumor that Burns, the inflation fighter, was seeking a 
$20,000 pay raise when in actuality he had proposed a 10% paycut for all administration em ployees only 
to have it rejected by Nixon. See Tom Wicker, One o f  Us: R ichard Nixon an d the American Dream, 563- 
564; and Stephen Ambrose, Nixon: The Triumph o f  a  Politician, 455-456. In the end, however, Burns 
simply engineered a monetary policy that he deemed appropriate with 6% unemployment, providing the
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also appealed to Nixon because they would presumably help him deprive critics o f a 
particularly useful issue. The congressional passage o f legislation granting presidential 
price control powers, in 1970, was mostly a bluff intended to embarass Nixon for 
negligence on the wage-price front. Full-blown mandatory controls, Nixon reasoned, 
would, at the very least, help him silence these critics as well as a public that generally 
disapproved of his economic policy.75 As John Connally advised, "if the legislature 
wants to give you a new power—you take it. Put it in the comer like an old shotgun."76
Ultimately the mandatory controls proved to be a failure and little more than a 
stopgap measure. Some wage rate increases were slowed considerably while most were 
not, but almost all prices continued to rise quickly. While the price rise target for the 
controls period was 2.5%, from mid 1971 to mid 1974, prices rose at a 6.6% annual rate 
instead.77 Consumer prices even rose at a 2.4% annual rate during the first full month of 
the 90 day freeze. Worse, after the cessation of controls in January and February 1973 
(before the second freeze in June of that year), prices rose at an even more rapid pace 
(8.8%) giving lie to the claim that the controls had stemmed inflationary momentum. 
Food prices in particular witnessed spectacular rises (28% annual rate) in the early post- 
Controls period.78
economy with "a good set o f  wheels." The growth and rise in employment in 1971 and 1972 came more 
from an increase in the income tax personal exemption and a 20% increase in Social Security benefits.
75 An August 9 Harris poll gave Nixon a 73% negative rating on economic policy, a rating he was also 
anxious to change. Cited in Sobel, ed., Inflation and the Nixon Administration, 208.
76 Cited in Reston, The Lone Star, 396.
77 An example o f  some o f  the various exemptions that led to this kind o f  price inflation: 7% to 
Bethlehem and National Steel on their tinplate products (suggesting that it would not set a precedent); 
7.7% increase for US Steel's tin mill, sheet, and strip products (because US Steel couched it in terms o f  a 
smaller 3.6% aggregate  price increase); an American Motors Co. increase (during the 1971 freeze  period- 
-because they made certain optional equipment standard); and a 22% rate increase to Blue Cross-Blue 
Shield for their coverage o f  federal workers. Cited in Sobel, ed., Inflation and  the Nixon Administration, 
268, 292, 295, 299.
78 While rising food prices stemmed more from worldwide agricultural problems, particularly in 1972 
(Russian wheat crop failure, Argentinian and Australian drought, decline in the world fish harvest, and an 
inadequate monsoon season in India), the Nixon administration had ample evidence o f  Asian famine, low  
Soviet output, and the decreased fish harvest well in advance o f  the crises. To his credit, George Shultz, 
recommended putting more land into production, but was overruled by Nixon and Secretary o f  
Agriculture Earl Butz who "didn't want to be known as a cheap food man in an election year." 62 million
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While the Johnson administration understood the inherent weakness o f mandatory 
controls, and even resisted discussing them as an viable option (for fear o f preemptive 
price rises), the Nixon era controls had transformed what was an ineffective policy 
option— loaded with a plethora o f potential economic distortions— into a virulent and 
insidious economic force.79 Nixon and his economic advisers simply had a difficult time 
escaping their own economic prejudices; their simplistic view of the profit squeeze and 
rising wages compelled them to treat symptoms of the inflation rather than its most 
basic causes. Accordingly, they targeted, almost exclusively, rising wages. "We've come 
to three conclusions" Nixon told Haldeman in November 1971, "we can't make peace 
with labor unions...the Pay Board must be tough and not back down to them, and...if 11 
be very hard to make the Hoffa move right now, under these circumstances."80 On the
acres were withheld from production as a result and payments to farmers (not to grow crops) doubled to 
approximately $4 billion (most o f  which went to large conglomerates with agricultural interests— and 
$164,048 to conservative Mississippi democrat James Eastland). See Roger Morris and Hal Sheets, "Why 
Leave it to Earl?" Washington Monthly, November 1974, 12-19; and Sobel, ed., Inflation and the Nixon 
Administration, 192. Treasury Secretary John Connally also helped Nixon rationalize high food prices, 
setting him up for the ensuing crisis. "Just remember," Connally lectured Nixon, "when you talk about 
food prices, and you bleed for the consumer— food prices in the United States are cheaper than they've 
ever been in the history o f  this nation." Nixon simply cooed in response: "He's my favorite secretary." 
Quoted in Ambrose, Nixon, 435; and Reston, Jr., The Lone Star, 491. By contrast, when Johnson 
Secretary o f  Agriculture Orville Freeman proposed raising the support price o f  soybeans, LBJ called  
Freeman to protest, quashing the proposal. "Orville," Johnson remarked, "Joe Barr [Undersecretary o f  the 
Treasury] is over here and he tells me you're farting under the bedsheets." Quoted in Connally with 
Herskowitz, In History's Shadow, 199. By late 1971, fa llin g  farm prices, due to surpluses, were 
considered a problem for the Nixon administration. See "A Com Crop So Big It's a Real Headache," U. S. 
News and  W orld Report, November 29, 1971, 42.
79 "Nobody wants controls," remarked Joe Califano in late 1965. See "Governing by Guideline," Time, 
Novem ber 26, 1965, 89. See also Kermit Gordon's memo on "why economists...tend to flinch when 
mandatory price control is mentioned," in Cochrane, "Moral Suasion," 269-270; Arthur Okun's 
"screaming memo" warning Johnson and Califano not to even imply that they were thinking o f  
mandatory controls, in Okun, Oral History Interview, Interview III, LBJ Library, 16; Gardner Ackley on 
the damage caused by mandatory controls in Rowen, "All Seem Agreed on War Tax Need," Washington 
Post, February 6, 1968, D6; and President Johnson's "Annual Message to Congress: The Economic 
Report o f  the President," January 16, 1969, Public Papers, 196 8 -1969: 11, 1316 where he refers to 
mandatory controls as "a dead-end for econom ic freedom and progress."
80 Quoted in Haldeman, The Haldeman D iaries, 377. The "Hoffa move" was to offer the supply side 
labor leader an early exit from prison via executive clemency. Nixon commuted Hoffa's sentence on 
December 23, 1971, but was convinced by Charles Colson and Teamster president (installed July 1971) 
Frank Fitzsimmons to bar him from union activity, and keep him under surveillance. Hoffa had indicated 
that he would challenge the current Teamsters leadership when released and would work to sever the 
Teamsters-organized crime connection; Colson, Fitzsimmons, and Nixon hoped to prevent this.
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other hand, huddling with Safire just a few weeks earlier in preparation for his Phase II 
speech, Nixon termed the handling o f profits a "ticklish" situation.81 Reassuring as it 
was misleading, their view was simple: most wage increases were bad for the economy; 
almost all increases in profit were good. Accompanied by a growing assortment of 
supply side "inducements" the Nixon controls did little more than encourage the 
sanctification o f administered profits, worsening inflation and rigidifying inflationary 
expectations.
The second critical economic policy change executed by the Nixon administration 
was a rapid shift to a tight monetary policy. Fully aware that Fed chairman Martin 
shared many of their economic prejudices, and was therefore amenable to a regimen of 
tight money, the Nixon administration effected this change every bit as abruptly as the 
shift away from the Kennedy-Johnson guideposts. Arguing naively and incorrectly that 
they were the first administration to concern themselves with monetary and fiscal policy 
in tandem, and that the previous administration had mistaken high interest rates for tight 
money, the Nixon administration essentially placed the entire anti-inflation struggle into 
the hands o f the man Nixon blamed for his defeat in the 1960 presidential election: Fed 
chairman William McChesney Martin.82
Convinced that they were the heirs to a classic demand-pull inflation, and that the 
nation's money supply had created the excess demand predicament (and the eventual 
return to a higher natural rate o f unemployment), Nixon and his economic advisers were 
also convinced that contraction of the nation's money supply (Ml then, M2 later in the 
decade) was, alone, a sufficient response to the inflation problem.83 This enabled them,
81 Quoted in ibid., 362. Many products (fertilizer, copper, steel, etc.) could also, and did, seek foreign 
markets during the controls period; Labor could not do so as readily, skewing the impact o f  the controls 
even further.
82 See William Greider, Secrets o f  the Temple, 329, for an account o f  Nixon's call on Fed chairman 
Martin after the 1960 election.
83 Keynes pointed out that the obverse o f  Friedman's natural rate o f  unemployment theory was more 
pertinent and valid. Friedman argued that money-induced wage increases would eventually be matched 
by money-induced price increases, leading to a natural unemployment sticking point at a higher rate o f
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of course, to forsake the guideposts as they presumed to ride the Phillips Curve to lower 
inflation, but it also forced, in combination with their basic conservative outlook, an 
approach to monetary policy that even confounded their hopes for lower money supply. 
If  money mattered, as it most assuredly did, then greater, rather than less, government 
intervention was required. Money supply had soared in the late 1960s not because the 
monetary authorities willed it singlehandedly to a certain plateau, but largely because 
much of it was needed to accomodate growth, and because financial markets, 
responding to high consumer demand, had created it largely o f their own devices. It had, 
indeed, become a significant part of the late 1960s inflation problem, but it was a 
critical factor primarily in the business investment sector, where the Federal Reserve 
had the least amount of control. While the Johnson administration had acknowledged 
this, and had been moving toward logical changes in the Federal Reserve system,
Nixon, McCracken, Stein, and most of the other Nixon advisers remained wedded to a 
simple, but misleading and dangerous rule: Fed control o f monetary aggregates was the 
only required tool.84
inflation. Keynes pointed out, however, how unemployment induced wage decline— thought by orthodox 
economists to trigger hiring o f  the unemployed— tended to come only in industries that were also forced 
to drop prices, thereby producing a situation o f  constant real wages, no added incentive to hire, and a 
stagnant economy. Those who updated Keynes' work in the last half o f  the twentieth century also pointed 
out how increases in the money supply could rise with demand (as a precursor to increased investment 
and production) just as easily as it could affect increases in demand, and could occur, therefore, with 
relatively stable rather than rising prices.
84 See Papers o f  LBJ, Special Files, Task Force Reports, 1968 Interagency Task Force on Reorganizing 
the Federal Reserve System, Box 29; and Johnson, "Annual Message to Congress: The Economic Report 
o f  the President," Public Papers, 1968: II, 1316-1318; for an outline o f  the proposed monetary policy 
changes (many o f  which, such as the recommendation io shin open market operations to the Federal 
Reserve Board from the district banks, implied an extension o f  government control). Though McCracken 
told the press that he was "Friedmanesque, if  not a Friedmanite" on the issue o f  monetary policy 
(suggesting a moderate form o f  monetary contraction), this tempered the overall change only a little. 
"Gradual" tightening was ordered over an extreme form (as Friedman him self would have it), but the Fed 
still responded perversely when they had little short-run affect on monies loaned to businesses, and 
gradual tightening soon gave way to a harsher variety. The cues from the administration to target money 
supply irrespective o f  interest rates, created a credit crunch for the average citizen, and higher borrowing 
costs for businesses and the government, whether they wanted that or not. Overall money supply was the 
least affected by this change. "Friedmanesque, if  not a Friedmanite" comment cited in Rowen, Self- 
Inflicted Wounds, 45.
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Greater government intervention in the nation's credit markets was the logical 
prescription for a monetary problem that was still—when it came to inflation—more of 
an added influence than a direct cause. Conservative prejudices among the Nixon 
economic advisers that precluded this kind of intervention, however, made this 
approach, and the small contribution to price stability that it implied, virtually 
imponderable. Raising reserve requirements and withdrawing additional money through 
its open market operations, the Fed moved quickly to tighten the nation's money supply. 
M l advanced at a 3.8% annual pace from January through May 1969, but M2 actually 
fell by 0.3% over the same period.85 Credit was, indeed, becoming a much scarcer 
commodity for many o f the nation's small businesses and consumers, who drew down 
their time deposits, but it remained much less of a problem for bigger businesses who 
closed the credit gap by tapping the Eurodollar, domestically based foreign bank, and 
commercial paper markets. Sales o f corporate securities rose by 22% in 1969, and when 
Nixon relaxed the Kennedy-Johnson controls on foreign investment and lending on 
April 4, 1969, the number of Eurodollar loans accelerated at an even sharper pace, 
driving interest rates on three month (Eurodollar) loans as high as 13%.86 Only the cost 
o f credit, rather than its supply, changed for most of the nation's largest corporations, 
giving them an added incentive to raise prices even more than they already had.
When M l slowed to a 1.5% annual increase in 1969 in the May to September 
period, and M2 fell even more precipitously, by a -3.1% annual rate, George Shultz 
warned Nixon in October of a too restrictive monetary policy. Passing Shultz' memo 
and Ehrlichman's cover letter to Arthur Burns, soon to be named Fed chairman, Nixon
85 Figures drawn from memo, George Shultz to Nixon, October 7, 1969, Special Files, President's Office 
Files, President's Handwriting, Box 3, Nixon Presidential Materials, National Archives.
86 Cited in Sobel, ed., Inflation and the Nixon Administration, 4 1,42, 47, 58. The interest equalization tax 
(designed to prevent excessive capital outflows to Europe) was lowered from 1.25% to 0.75%, and the 
minimum amount subject to regulation was raised from $200,000 to $1,000,000.
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wrote: "Arthur—I agree—will it be too late when you take over?"87 Misreading the 
evidence all together, however, Nixon assumed that a reversal o f Fed policy was 
perhaps all that the economy needed, and at any rate, was not yet prepared to alter his 
administration's course. When Ehrlichman provided a cover letter to a McCracken 
memo, several weeks later on November 26, noting how the CEA chairman had also 
come out for monetary ease, Nixon wrote in response: "Don't let the unemployment 
figures stop action."88 Even Bums disagreed with the assumption that a monetary shift 
would solve all the problems, sardonically dismissing McCracken's gradualism in his 
first press conference (as Fed chairman), openly calling for a return to the guideposts, 
and suggesting in no uncertain terms that money was, indeed, not all that mattered. Near 
the end o f  his first year as Fed chairman, amidst even greater presidential clamor for 
monetary expansion, Bums reminded Nixon that "the banks are full and looking for 
customers."89 Rising unemployment, created by sudden policy shifts that increased 
inflation and lessened buying power at the same time that it shook down consumers, 
small businesses, and government agencies for greater borrowing expenses, only 
compelled Nixon and his advisers to ignore inflation even more completely than before.
87 Memo, Shultz to N ixon, October 7, 1969, Special Files, President's Office Files, President's 
Handwriting, Box 3, N ixon Presidential Materials, National Archives. When Bums did take over as Fed 
chairman in February 1970 Nixon responded to the applause at his swearing in by saying, "there's a 
strong vote for lower interest rates." Resenting any implication that he could be influenced, Bum s was, 
according to Hobart Rowen who spoke to him a few days later, "deeply offended that Nixon had been 
that careless." See Rowen, Self-Inflicted Wounds, 49-50.
88 Memo, John D. Ehrlichman to Nixon, November 26, 1969, Special Files, President's O ffice Files, 
President's Handwriting, Box 3, Nixon Presidential Materials, National Archives.
89 Quoted in Sobel, ed., Inflation and  the Nixon Administration, 172. The banks would remain full for 
some time. Federal Reserve Board member Andrew Brimmer, who was an LBJ appointee but who also 
voted to tighten considerably in 1969 (unlike Johnson's other two appointees— Maisel and Mitchell), 
noted in March 1971 that "the sharp decline in interest rates and the generally increased availability o f  
credit certainly do suggest that the economy is not suffering from a shortage o f  money." Cited in ibid., 
178. A s Bums also noted, M2 had risen at an annual rate o f  12% in December 1970 and January 1971, 
largely as a result o f  Fed attempts at bolstering liquidity. M l, however, reflecting the obverse o f  the 
situation that had prevailed one year earlier, had only advanced at a meager 1.1% annual clip. Judging 
from these figures, the Fed truly seemed to be "pushing on a string." See later comments by Walter Heller 
on Nixon tax policy for an explanation o f  the subtle economic improvement that did occur in 1972.
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"I'll tell you one thing," Lyndon Johnson remarked in early 1971, "this country can't 
survive long half slave, half free, and with 14% interest."90
Rising to 4.3% by the end of the first quarter 1970, and to 5.8% by the end o f that 
year, unemployment, rather than inflation, suddenly became the economic problem for 
the Nixon administration. From this point on, the government's struggle against 
inflation languished in an ideological and administrative funk. Not until the shocking 
imposition o f mandatory wage-price controls in August 1971, spurred largely by the 
approaching reelection campaign, would Nixon seek a new approach to the inflation 
problem. Summing up the Nixon economic policy for the Women's National 
Democratic Club in September 1970, Arthur Okun remarked: "They've had seven 
interceptions, are forty points behind, its the fourth quarter, and they're sticking to the 
same game plan."91
Rising inflation, however, could still combine with other economic problems to 
worsen the employment picture. Nixon imagined a scenario, however, where inflation 
could be ignored or pinned on the opposition, and where employment could be 
stimulated by expansive monetary policy combined with a series of supply-side 
spending and tax relief provisions. At one point in early 1971, Nixon even relied upon 
an econometric model, supplied by Shultz assistant Art Laffer, that asserted 
instantaneous GNP effects from money supply changes, as well as an embarassingly 
high prediction for a 9% advance in GNP.92 As both unemployment and inflation
90 Quoted in Hugh Sidey, "Down Home with LBJ,” Life, May 21, 19 7 1 ,48. In 1969 alone, short-term 
interest rates on business loans rose from 6.68% to 8.21%. See Nixon, "Annual Message to Congress: 
The Economic Report o f  the President," January 27, 1972, Public Papers, 1972: /, 112.
91 Quoted in Rowen, Self-Inflicted Wounds, 56.
92 Cited in Sobel, ed., Inflation an d  the Nixon Administration , 172. The actual change in real GNP that 
year (1971) was +3.4%. Source: Campbell R. McConnell, Economics: Principles, Problems, and  
Policies, 9th edition (N ew  York: McGraw-Hill, 1984), back cover. Laffer taught economics at the 
University o f  Chicago with George Shultz, though he possessed an MBA rather than an econom ics PhD, 
and joined Shultz when the latter moved from the Dept, o f  Labor to the newly established O ffice o f  
Management and Budget (OM B) in 1970. Laffer was also responsible for the infamous Laffer Curve, 
sketched on a cocktail napkin at the Two Continents restaurant in 1974, that became the illogical 
philosophical underpinning for Ronald Reagan's tax policies in the early 1980s.
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(stagflation) proved resistant to, and even worsened by, Nixon's economic strategy, he 
responded with a public relations blitz, rather than with a fundamental reordering of his 
economic priorities.
To achieve public relations success in the face o f a deteriorating economy, Nixon 
clearly relied, more and more, upon perceived foreign policy breakthroughs and—in the 
domestic arena—outright denial.93 William Safire began cranking out a series of 
speeches designed to aid this cause, blaming increased joblessness on everything from 
returning Vietnam veterans to a longer duration o f unemployment for the nation's 
jobless individuals (as opposed to greater numbers o f unemployed).94 As early as June 
1969, Safire had encouraged Nixon to concoct an "identifiable" economic philosophy 
that focused on "climate creation" instead of a thankless struggle against inflation. On 
June 19, urging an abandonment of the inflation fight, Safire wrote:
We can keep on insisting that we inherited this mess...but in the public mind it is 
our inflation now....The beauty of inflation as a political charge is this: if  you stop it 
cold and cause a downturn, you lose; if you let it run on for fear of harming the 
employment, you lose; and if you skillfully cool it from 6% to 3%—who cares? You 
are still vulnerable to charges of dramatic price rises.95
Nixon's handwritten response to this memo suggests that it was an instant hit with the
new President. "Excellent idea (one of the best I've seen in administration. We need
93 See Haldeman, The Haldeman Diaries, 168, for a candid appraisal by Nixon o f  his own political 
fortunes. Noting on May 21, 1970 that the President's ratings were up, Haldeman wrote, "[The President 
is] Really pleased by our poll and says its remarkable with the economy the way it is." With 
Vietnam ization proceeding apace, Nixon's handling o f  the American econom y was almost irrelevant to 
the average voter. His overall ratings climbed in 1970, even while his negative rating on economic policy 
remained consistently in the 70-75% range.
94 See Nixon's March 21, 1970 press conference in particular. Cited in Sobel, ed., Inflation and the Nixon 
Administration , 75-76. As it is with most recessions, there was some truth to this statement, for the 
frequency and duration o f  unemployment often exhibit changes equal to or greater than additions to the 
actual ranks o f  the unemployed. It should still not be construed as a positive sign, particularly since 
empirical evidence suggests that the poor are disproportionately affected by these changes when they 
occur.
95 Memo, William Safire to Nixon, June 19, 1969, Special Files, President's Office Files, President's 
Flandwriting, Box 2, Nixon Presidential Materials, National Archives.
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more like this.) I believe we should follow through, don't let it get submerged in 
'study.'"96
Several months later, however, "climate creation" meant little more than higher 
inflation, higher unemployment, a more charitable reliance upon supply side incentives, 
and a continued effort to blame all problems on the political opposition. "At the present 
time," remarked Jeb Stuart Magruder, on January 7,1970, "all efforts are being made 
for administration speakers to place the blame for inflation on the Congress and the 
Senate."97 When John Brown wrote to President Nixon on January 12,1970, regarding 
"Presidential Action Requests Not Yet Completed," out of the twenty-six items, there 
was one that suggested maintaining "the offensive on the crime and inflation issues, 
placing the blame on Congress;" another urging a plan to "better recognize auto racing 
as a sport," but absolutely nothing related to an actual initiative against inflation.98 That 
same day, after a long meeting with Haldeman and Ehrlichman, Nixon concluded that 
"we really can't stop inflation this year...so you just make the best of it. In this case form 
is more important than substance."99
When it became clear that 1970 was a recession year, with real GNP declining for 
the first time in nearly a decade, Nixon took "climate creation" a step further, directing 
the Labor Department to suspend its twenty year tradition of holding press conferences 
to report monthly CPI and unemployment figures.100 Unemployment was still lower,
96 Ibid.
97 Memo, Magruder to John R. Brown III, January 7, 1970, Special Files, President's Office Files, 
President's Handwriting, Box 4, Nixon Presidential Materials, National Archives. Magruder was an aide 
to H.R. Haldeman, Deputy Director o f  White House Communications, and eventual Deputy Campaign 
Director, Committee to Reelect the President (1972 campaign).
98 Memo, John R. Brown III to N ixon, ibid.
99 Quoted in Haldeman, The Haldeman Diaries, 120. Haldeman also recalled how on December 31, 
1969, only days before this statement was made, Nixon pronounced "building a mythology" as the 
primary goal for the upcoming year. Ibid., 116.
100 Cited in Sobel, ed., Inflation and the Nixon Administration , 179. This policy change was effected in 
March 1971.
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Nixon hastened to point out, "than any peacetime year in the 1960s."101 When 
joblessness figures showed some improvement in 1972, mostly because o f  Democratic 
tax changes implemented by the 92nd Congress, Nixon had Press Secretary Ron Ziegler 
pose with an unemployment chart devised to make a small drop (from 5.9 to 5.7%) look 
like an enormous decline. "It's a dishonest chart, and I won't do it," remarked George 
Shultz when Ziegler asked him to pose with the chart.102 Termed "benign neglect" by 
administration supporters and sympathetic historians, Nixon's approach to inflation and 
unemployment were truly neglectful, but almost certainly less and less benign.103
If Nixon's unwinding o f the Johnson wage-price and monetary policies were 
responsible for the worsening economy and the emergence of stagflation, then the 
deescalation o f the war in Vietnam may very well have been the only clear Nixon 
contribution to price stability and economic balance. Troop withdrawals, after all, 
became a reality only under the Nixon administration, and defense expenditures, clearly 
a part o f the 1960s inflation, did exhibit a small decline beginning in 1970. Even here, 
however, especially in the context o f overall defense spending, Nixon's policies made 
prosperity and price stability more elusive than ever.
101 Quoted in ibid., 126. Assuming that "peacetime" implied a year in which U.S. ground troops were not 
actively engaged in battle, then Nixon was referring to the 1960-1963 period two years o f  which (1960  
and 1961) comprised part o f  the last Eisenhower recession. The other two (1962 and 1963) saw  
unemployment rates lower than the first two but stuck at the 5.5 or 5.6 level for most quarters. Though 
held up somewhat by conservative resistance in the business community and in Congress, these rates 
were still in decline at that point. The unemployment rate, however, was increasing  in December 1970 
when N ixon made this comparison. It was also 5.8%, for November 1970, and would register 6.0% when 
the December figures were tallied in January 1970. (Maybe he was referring only to 1960 and 1961?)
102 Quoted in Rowen, Self-Inflicted Wounds, 382n. See also additional comments in this chapter on these 
tax and other fiscal policy changes.
103 Daniel Patrick Moynihan was largely responsible for this characterization, for he first urged it upon 
the Nixon administration in its efforts to cool heated race relations. It soon came to characterize much o f  
Nixon's domestic policy in general. While Nixon liked it, Moynihan came to regret its political 
implications (his memo suggesting it was leaked to the N ew York Times and published on March 1,
1970). Moynihan saw Haldeman on March 31 about the leak problem and noted that he w as "ruined in 
Democratic party because o f  the 'benign neglect' memo." See Haldeman, The Haldeman D iaries, 133, 
144. See also Robert Collins, "Growth Liberalism in the Sixties," 36. "At home," Collins noted, "Nixon 
proposed some notable initiatives, such as the Family Assistance Plan, continued many o f  the Great 
Society programs underway, and brought to domestic poiicy a note of'benign neglect' that contrasted 
sharply with the passionate, chaotic, activism o f  his predecessor."
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While the emerging plans were kept from most citizens at the time, American 
military disengagement from Vietnam clearly began in the latter stages o f the Johnson 
administration. If the Tet Offensive o f 1968 did nothing else, it led President Johnson to 
reassess the U.S. role in Vietnam, particularly after General Westmoreland, through 
General Wheeler at the JCS, requested an additional 206,000 troops on February 28. By 
late March 1968 Johnson had concluded that he must withdraw from the 1968 
presidential race and that the American military must withdraw from Vietnam. "Can no 
longer do the job we set out to do," Johnson wrote as he listened to his advisers' 
recommendations. "Adjust our course...move to disengage."104
When Richard Nixon entered the White House in 1969, then, he clearly inherited a 
policy o f disengagement from the war in Vietnam. Responding to public opinion that 
was growing less and less tolerant of the protracted war effort, Nixon embraced the 
rhetoric o f withdrawal, as well as a commitment to remove increasing numbers o f 
American troops. Chief o f Staff Haldeman even recalled how Nixon hoped to initiate 
troop withdrawals quickly and without hesitation so that he could beat (LBJ Secretary 
of Defense) Clark Clifford's timetable (all out by the end of 1970).105 Though U.S. troop
104 Quoted in Schulman, Lyndon B. Johnson an d American Liberalism, 149. Abe Fortas, W.W. Rostow, 
and General Earle Wheeler wanted to stay the course; almost all o f  the other key advisers suggested  
deescalation and withdrawal including Dean Acheson, Clark Clifford, McGeorge Bundy, Henry Cabot 
Lodge, George Ball, Douglas Dillon, and Matthew Ridgway. "With all due respect, Mr. President," Dean 
Acheson told Johnson on the day Wheeler submitted the troop request, "the Joint Chiefs o f  Staff don't 
know what they're talking about." Out o f  these, only Dillon and Lodge had not expressed the same views 
to Johnson earlier that month in a variety o f  meetings, and only Ridgway counseled a slow (2 year), 
rather than a fairly rapid, withdrawal. Acheson cited in David M. Barrett, Uncertain Warriors: Lyndon 
Johnson an d  His Vietnam Advisers (Lawrence: University Press o f  Kansas, 1993), 129. See also N eil 
Sheehan, A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and  America in Vietnam (New York: Random House, 
1988), 720-722; David DiLeo, George Ball, Vietnam, an d  the Rethinking o f  Containment (Chapel Hill: 
University o f  North Carolina Press, 1991), 118-119; Stanley Kamow, Vietnam: A H istory (N ew  York: 
Viking Press, 1983), 545-566; and especially Barrett, Uncertain Warriors, 111-157 on Johnson's 
thoughts regarding deescalation and on the depth and variety o f  advice he was seeking and receiving. 
Johnson was clearly against the Westmoreland request for 206,000 additional troops, and was most likely 
convinced that further escalation would not work well before his March 26 meeting with the W ise Men 
and his March 31 address to the nation.
105 Haldeman, The Haldeman Diaries, 65. Haldeman also noted how this came as something o f  a 
surprise to Nixon's Vietnam advisers, especially Henry Kissinger. "All this shook K pretty badly....I feel 
that he just wanted to hit back at Clifford and overplayed his hand," Haldeman wrote.
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strength in Vietnam reached its peak in April 1969, three months after Nixon's 
inauguration, by December 31,1969 there were approximately 51,000 less troops in 
Vietnam than there were when Johnson left office on January 20 (536,100 to 
475,200).106 As it turned out, however, Nixon's "Vietnamization" was less of an attempt 
to turn the entire war effort over to the South Vietnamese, than it was an effort to buy 
time for a new American strategy. Unlike Johnson, Nixon continued to believe that an 
American victory was possible, and did not change this outlook, according to Chief of 
Staff Haldeman, until May 1,1972.107 Troop withdrawals clearly increased the 
Vietnamese responsibility for ground combat, but they also kept the doves at bay back 
home; made casual, poorly managed domestic initiatives less o f a political consequence; 
and helped buy time for a renewed war effort based more heavily upon bombing, 
interdiction o f supplies, and "secret" negotiations. "Kept doves at bay this long," 
Haldeman noted in October 1969, "now have to take them on....Problem is that this does 
make it his war."108
More importantly, with respect to the U.S. economy, Nixon's changes in Vietnam 
and at the Pentagon also implied a military strategy and budget that would be more, 
rather than less, inflationary. In 1969, for example, a year that should have witnessed 
the first appearance of a "peace dividend" and a small decline in the inflation triggered 
by war contracts and excess profits, actual spending on the war in Vietnam registered a 
slight increase. While appropriations were down for the year, Treasury cash disbursals 
were up. Vietnam expenditures for the first seven months o f FY1970 (July 1, 1969 to
106 Cited in Herbert Y. Schandler, Lyndon Johnson and Vietnam: The Unmaking o f  a  President 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), 352. Source: U.S. Department o f  Defense, OASD  
(Comptroller), Directorate for Information Operations, March 19, 1974.
107 Haldeman, The Haldeman Diaries, 450. On this day, Henry Kissinger read General Abrams report 
from Vietnam that suggested that the South Vietnamese were about to fold. Strangely enough, one o f  
Nixon's first responses to the report was to laugh.
108 Ibid., 96.
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January 30,1970), based on these disbursals, were actually $800 million higher than 
they were for the same period in FY1969.109
When spending for the war in Vietnam actually registered its first real declines, in 
1970, savings were substantially offset by other non-Vietnam defense spending 
increases, and were, therefore, reduced to levels that were almost negligible. In the 
budget for FY 1971, for example, Vietnam spending had decreased by approximately 
$13 billion. The same budget, however, also included $5.3 billion in added non- 
Vietnam defense expenditures, $1.5 billion of which was targeted for preliminary work 
on an anti-ballistic missile system (ABM) that was never even fully approved, and that 
Johnson and McNamara had fought against.110 Since the cuts turned out to be smaller 
than estimated— based partly on the belief that the war would end that year—and the 
new defense spending, conversely, turned out to be somewhat larger than anticipated, 
even the projected $7.7 billion savings proved to be illusory. $8.5 billion worth of 
military spending was not even reflected in the FY 1971 military budget, for veterans' 
benefits were shifted to the social spending column for the first time. While Johnson 
and his economic advisers had anticipated a "peace dividend," had predicted the need 
for further tax cuts as the dividend became available, and had isolated inflationary 
tendencies within Vietnam war contracts, Nixon and his advisers considered the peace 
dividend "a rather oddball concept" and insisted that neither Vietnam, nor the Pentagon
109 Cited by I.F. Stone, "Nixon, Inflation, and the War," in Polem ics and Prophecies, 390.
110 Ibid., 397. The ABM was a system designed to offer a defensive shield against incoming nuclear 
warheads. Ronald Reagan’s "Star Wars" Strategic Defense Initiative was little more than a revival o f  the 
earlier ABM program initiated under Nixon. Johnson hoped to stem strong Congressional support for 
ABM, by launching arms control talks with the Soviets. Genuine progress was made here until the 
Czechoslovakian invasion forced a tragic retrenchment. Nixon campaign assistants, Harry Treleaven and 
Frank Shakespeare were responded ecstatically to the Czech invasion and unraveling o f  arms control 
talks, "makes it kind o f hard to be a dove," Treleaven noted, smiling. "What a break!" Shakespeare 
exclaimed moments later. "This Czech thing is just perfect. It puts the soft-liners in a hell o f  a box!" 
Quoted in McGinniss, The Selling o f  the President, 44-45. See also Tom Wicker, One o f  Us, 447-460, for 
a detailed overview o f  the Johnson-Nixon transition on arms control and the deployment o f  strategic 
weapons.
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in general, had anything at all to do with rising inflation.111 Never a priority, then, for 
the new administration, real defense spending cuts were not about to materialize by 
accident.
Since the inflationary impact o f the war came more from the character o f the war's 
military contracts than from their total dollar value, these figures were, to some extent 
anyway, irrelevent. What was relevant—even critical— in the struggle against price 
inflation, was the presence o f emergency contracts, cost-plus arrangements, and non­
competitive bidding practices. Troublesome and ineradicable as these were during the 
Johnson administration, the Johnson administration had made a strenuous effort to 
minimize them. But they flourished during the Nixon administration, precisely when 
they should have become even less prevalent. As the deployment o f troops tapered off, 
so should have emergency appropriations. Escalating troop deployments were, after all, 
the primary source of these arrangements during the 1960s. Under Nixon, however, 
cost-plus, non-competitive contracts even came to be something of an economic 
priority.
While Nixon's recessionary policies did more to squeeze profits than anything else, 
he remained wedded to the belief that excess wages and rising prices were the culprit— 
dominating, rather than dominated by, corporate managers. Never having recognized the 
negative impact that his own policies were having on corporate profitability, then, or 
that corporate managers themselves were responsible for many o f the inflationary forces 
now coming back to haunt them, Nixon saw additional cost-plus contracts as a
111 Nixon Budget Director Robert Mayo quoted in Stone, "Nixon, Inflation, and the War," 396. 
Surprisingly enough, Nixon seems to have shared LBJ's disdain for the military mind. On January 17,
1972, for example, Nixon dusted o ff  an H.G. Wells' book and showed Kissinger a quote, nodding in 
approval, about the mediocrity o f  the military mind. "Of course," Nixon remarked, "Wells has the feeling 
that the solution to all problems is education for everyone, and that's a terrible idea, especially for 
women." Quoted in Haldeman, The Haldeman D iaries, 397. What he did not share with Johnson, 
however, was an equally abiding disdain for military spending practices or their effect on contractor 
profits (and American price stability).
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legitimate way to shore up sagging profit margins.112 A calculated transition from a 
military budget dominated by expenditures for personnel and related costs (food, 
clothing, ammo), to one geared increasingly toward the production o f strategic weapons, 
made this search for increased profitability that much easier. Returning largely to the 
Massive Retaliation strategy of his Vice-Presidential years, with its accent on strategic 
weapons and covert action, Nixon saddled the economy with a new breed of expensive, 
virtually handmade, weapons, a rapidly advancing "Black Budget" (for covert action) 
that would grow to an estimated $15 to 20 billion by 1972, and an ever widening array 
o f cost-plus contracts tied to the new weaponry and to the covert action programs.113 
While Nixon took the oath o f office in 1968 promising symbolically to beat swords into 
plowshares (the inaugural Bible was opened to Isaiah 2:4), he wound up beating swords 
into strategic hardware instead. The conversion of Polaris and Minuteman missiles into 
Multiple Independently Targeted Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs), a $2.6 billion 
modernization of the naval fleet, the ABM, and the development of the SAGE and 
AWACS anti-bomber systems all helped soak up the peace dividend during the first two 
years o f the Nixon administration and provided defense industries with a more than 
suitable substitute for the cannon shell and army boot contracts that were beginning to 
taper off.
While the cost of the new strategic weapons were almost always inflated and 
wholly unmanaged, and represented, therefore, an unnecessary drain on the public 
treasury, their inflationary impact came almost exclusively from the rich stream of 
profits they guaranteed. When company profits soared, so did their wages, salaries, and
1,2 Recall that much o f  this profit squeeze came as a result o f  accounting gimmicks and vast increases in 
corporate assets, not poor performance alone. In the third quarter o f  1970, for example, Bethlehem Steel 
reported profits o f  33 cents per share, yet they still paid their customary 45 cents per share dividend. See 
Sobel, editor, Inflation and the Nixon Administration , 114. While Nixon's Commerce Dept, reported a 
rise in all corporate profits for that same quarter, the Walt Street Journal had reported a small decline.
113 See Annette E. Meyer, The Evolution o f  United States Budgeting: Changing Fiscal and Financial 
Concepts (N ew  York: Greenwood Press, 1989), 84, for an estimate o f  covert funds and the Black Budget.
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executive perquisites, almost always more than they would have otherwise. Even if they 
conducted almost all o f their business with the Pentagon, then, as was the case with no 
small number o f defense contractors, many of the affected corporations could still 
impart great pressure on the general price level through their less direct impact on 
general trends in the area o f executive salaries, wages, and company perquisites. As 
defense dollars flowed increasingly away from contracts for consumer goods and 
toward small-batch, custom made strategic weapons, they also generated far fewer 
economies o f scale and far less spin-off potential, making price stabilizing productivity 
advances far less likely. As one analyst put it, "when companies become wedded to the 
Pentagon [through classified strategic weapons], industrial efficiency and competitive 
economic strategies are sacrificed in the name of one over-arching goal—technological 
superiority over the Soviet Union."114
Nixon's encouragement of these contracting arrangements also never remained 
limited to the Pentagon alone; Pentagon style contracting with non-competitive, cost- 
plus arrangements soon prevailed in many other government departments. In 1972, for 
example, Marriot Corporation's Frederic Malek was appointed head of Nixon's 
"responsiveness program," designed to deliver non-competitive, cost-plus contracts for 
political support and campaign contributions. Litton Corporation's Roy Ash was named 
as the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in 1973, and instructed 
to lead a contracting-out revolution that also relied heavily upon non-competitive, cost- 
plus contracts.115 Pentagon contracts remained the most profitable, by far, but others 
were reaching similar proportions. While Johnson had availed himself of similar 
arrangements with Brown and Root, a construction firm with labor intensive operations, 
never— before Nixon— had it been done in such a widespread or systematic fashion. All 
liberal or Keynesian pretensions aside, Nixon was, perhaps almost by default, a believer
114 Jay Stowsky, "Competing With the Pentagon," World Policy Journal, Fall 1986, 717.
115 John Hanrahan, Government By Contract (New York: Norton, 1983), 263, 89-90.
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in the "old-time religion" who quite simply reasoned that these supply side 
arrangements were good for the American economy.
President Nixon was so thoroughly convinced that increased profits led 
automatically to a healthier economy, that he tended, even more perversely, to gauge 
economic health by trends in the stock market. His concern for employment and price 
stability, though certainly never completely lacking, paled next to his concern for rising 
stock market indices. By late 1971 he had even convinced himself that unemployment 
and inflation statistics were false, skewed by a "Jewish cabal" at the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics who wanted to make his administration look bad. White House aide Frederic 
Malek was dispatched to the Department o f Labor and asked to root them out.116
While Johnson and his economic advisers had struggled to convince the nation that 
profitability would ensue when full employment provided steady demand for risk-taking 
investors, Nixon was turning this principle—basic to the New Economics—on its head. 
Poverty must go on, he seemed to be saying instead, so that profit can thrive.117 With far 
fewer guarantees on the supply side o f the economy, however, profits themselves never 
could insure full employment, or even reasonable economic stability, a principle that 
President Nixon clearly failed to appreciate. When the Dow Jones Industrial Average 
fell 21 points on May 25, 1970 Nixon was alarmed. "Called all shook up about stock 
market drop," Haldeman noted in his diary. "Problem is, no one shows any sign of 
undue concern except him."118 Rushing to steady the stock market, Nixon arranged a 
stag dinner with business executives for the 27th, where he assured them of his concern 
for their dwindling profit margins. "Guess it worked before it even happened,"
Haldeman noted, "because market gained 31 points....Really neurotic."119
116 Ambrose, Nixon, 457; Walter Isaacson, Kissinger: A Biography (N ew  York: Simon and Schuster, 
1992), 561.
117 See I.F. Stone, "The Rebirth o f  Freedom—or Fascism?" December 29, 1969, Polem ics and  
Prophecies, 461, for the original rendering o f  this appraisal.
118 Haldeman, The Haldeman D iaries, 169.
119 Ibid.
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Though real growth would remain negative for the duration o f the year, and though 
unemployment would continue to rise every quarter until 1972, the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average continued on a steady incline until early 1973. When the recession 
persisted, and talk o f it filled newspaper columns across the country, Nixon responded 
as if  the Dow Jones Index was all that mattered and as if  reporters actually liked the 
recession. "Unfortunately for them," Nixon told Haldeman in July, referring to the 
journalists who were then criticizing his economic policies, "the market went up a big 
chunk today."120 In an attempt to convince the public that the ongoing recession was 
just not what it seemed to be, White House communications director Herbert Klein even 
broadcast, with much fanfare, a list of ten stocks up sharply for the year. "This 
inexcusable flackery had no precedent," remarked Washington Post economics writer 
Hobart Rowen.121
Nixon's wage-price, monetary, and defense procurement policies had devastating 
effects on the nation's price stability and overall prosperity, especially for those at the 
bottom who had made their first tentative gains under the Kennedy and Johnson 
administrations. While the overall unemployment rate, for example, had risen from 
3.3% to approximately 6% over Nixon's first two years in office, unemployment among 
blacks had risen from 6.4% to nearly 10% over the same period, and among black teens 
the increase was even more profound, increasing from 25% to 35%. Even when 
joblessness showed its first real decline under the Nixon administration, in late 1971, 
black unemployment continued to rise. While overall unemployment fell from 6% to
120 Ibid., 184. For all o f  his concern, Nixon was the only U.S. President since the Great Depression to 
suffer more than one stock market decline— represented by the DJIA— in excess o f  35%. From Dec. 3, 
1968 to May 26, 1970 the DJIA fell 35.9% and from January 11, 1973 to December 6, 1974 it fell 45.1%. 
In the 20th century there have been 9 DJIA bear markets o f  this magnitude, all but 3 coming before or 
during the Great Depression.
121 Rowen, Self-Inflicted Wounds, 61. For comments such as this, Rowen was labeled by CEA member 
Herbert Stein as an "implacable and unscrupulous enemy o f  the administration." Charles Colson, in a 
memo to Frederic Malek suggested that the "Army take over the Washington Post [and] have Hobart 
Rowen beheaded." Cited in ibid., 78-79.
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5.8% in October 1971, black unemployment rose to 10.7%.122 While much of this 
stemmed from these critical policy changes—changes that helped joblessness and 
inflation rise in tandem— other, somewhat less noticeable, Nixon policies also had a 
similar impact.
In the area o f health care inflation for example, Nixon ignored the issue of cost 
containment all together, one o f the chief priorities o f the departing administration. 
Egged on by his own political instincts and by Moynihan's encouragement o f policies 
that would defuse left-wing opposition, Nixon focused, instead, on enlarging benefits 
and socializing the cost o f even the most questionable or least cost-effective procedures. 
HEW Secretary Robert Finch often had to function, for example, as a brake on the 
President's plans to expand Medicare coverage. When Nixon requested that chiropractic 
fees be covered by Medicare in June 1969, Finch reminded him o f the cost factor. 
"Everybody who wants a rubdown will be sending us a bill," he remarked. Unmoved, 
Nixon wrote in response: "No. If a state approves chiropractors— the Federal 
government will follow that rule."123 At the behest o f Louisiana congressman F. Edward 
Hebert, Nixon even pushed for the establishment o f a military medical school to which 
the Pentagon had objected.124 Though most of his coverage proposals eventually 
collapsed from liberal Democratic opposition (who generally pushed for national health
122 Source: U.S. Department o f  Labor, Employment and Training Report o f  the President, 1982, and 
Sobel, ed., Inflation an d the Nixon Administration, 9 0 ,9 6 , 11 2 ,1 8 0 ,2 7 9 . Inflation often displayed 
similar variation. Johnson's CEA found, for example, that much o f  the food price inflation in the 1965- 
1968 period came from ghetto merchants gouging their local customers.
123 Memo, Stephen Bull to N ixon, June 12, 1969, Special Files, President's Office Files, President's 
Handwriting, Box 2, Nixon Presidential Materials, National Archives. When Finch hoped to nominate 
liberal Boston physician, John H. Knowles, to the Assistant Secretary post, John Tower, Everett Dirksen, 
and the AMA convinced Nixon to pull the plug on the Knowles nomination sent to him in June 1969. 
"There’s no reason to alienate a large group o f  contributors," Tower advised Nixon. Cited in Wolinsky 
and Brune, The Serpent and the Staff, 73-74. Quotation in ibid., 74.
124 Daniel Rapaport, "F. Edward Hebert— A Credit to His Race," Washington Monthly, June 1974, 25- 
30. Hebert was interested in the project, in part, because he hoped to appoint a physician friend to the 
school's Board o f  Regents— Dr. Ashton Thomas o f  New Orleans. "Can he read and write?" Nixon asked 
Hebert. "I don't know," replied Hebert, "he went to Whittier." In defense o f  N ixon, here, Hebert, as 
chairman o f  the House Armed Services Committee, threatened to withhold the annual military 
appropriations bill if  the school was not given approval.
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insurance schemes instead) and diversions such as the creation o f "the plumbers" unit 
and the ensuing dirty tricks campaign, cost containment was abandoned completely and 
never retrieved.
Railing against socialized medicine at the same time that he proposed to socialize 
more of the industry's costs, and counting on free market mechanisms to control 
industry prices when none really existed, Nixon allowed health care costs to continue 
rising unimpeded. Blind to the already extensive socialization of the industry's costs, 
much of which predated Medicare (Hill-Burton hospital construction funding, 
Medicare/Medicaid depreciation allowances, and investment tax credits, for example), 
Nixon pressed the "socialized medicine" theme persistently. "When I go to a hospital, or 
when I call a doctor, I want that doctor to be working for the patient, and not for the 
federal government, and that is what this is all about." When a Miami reporter inquired 
about Nixon's personal physician, his publicists had to admit, sheepishly, however, that 
the President's doctor was Walter Tkach, a major general in the Air Force who worked 
at Bethesda Naval Medical Center.125 Though many economists predicted a slowly 
diminishing rate of increase for health care costs as Nixon took office, including many 
of those who disagreed with Nixon's basic economic strategy, the gap between health 
care inflation and the consumer price index remained steady throughout the Nixon 
presidency, even widening somewhat in 1969.126
Moreover, while Medicare administrative costs had actually decreased from FY 
1967 to FY 1968, from $223 million to $221 million, these same expenses balooned to
125 Quoted in "Tidbits and Outrages," Washington Monthly, May 1974, 53. This is the same physician 
w ho, in 1969, once recommended to Nixon that sleep was not a real necessity. See Haldeman, The 
Haldeman D iaries, 28. See also ibid., 164, where Haldeman notes how Ehrlichman told Nixon "he was 
tired and not very effective. This made him mad, and it came up several times later in the day. Real 
trouble is, he's just toally pooped....Rogers called me very concerned about P....Feels we've got to keep 
him on a short leash until he gets rested up." Also ibid., 166, where Haldeman reports that Nixon was 
"driving him self too hard on unnecessary things and because o f  this is not getting enough sleep."
126 Doctors fees were advancing about one and a half times as fast as the general price index; hospital 
charges were rising about twice as fast. See Consumer Price Index, D etailed Reports, various monthly 
issues, 1969-1974.
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$299 million in FY 1969, with much of the increase coming in the first few months of 
the Nixon administration. Over the next two fiscal years these costs would rise even 
further, to $369 million in FY 1970 and $397 million in FY 1971.127 Nixon continued to 
rely upon the discipline o f the marketplace, however, even as these costs and health care 
prices in general continued to mount. In 1973 he introduced a program that promoted 
Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs), touting them as mechanisms by which 
competition would soon prevail in the nation's health care delivery system. The National 
Health Planning and Resources Act, signed by Nixon in 1974, also proposed to bring 
about marketplace efficiencies. HMOs, unfortunately, never caught on until they were 
transformed into little more than traditional insurance plans, and the Health Systems 
Agencies created by the 1974 legislation did little more than create competition for 
federal funds, rather than competition among health care providers.128 Responsible for 
"scientific planning" and the issuance of certificates o f need (for new hospitals or 
nursing homes), these HSAs were soon besieged by lawsuits over agency boundary 
lines and the issuance o f certificates, were dominated by health care providers, and 
reduced the governing power of physicians only at the expense of insurance executives 
and Blue Cross officials. Like the NRA of the New Deal era, this system actually 
proposed to reduce, rather than increase, marketplace competition, in the name of 
cooperative planning that included consumers. Also like the NRA, however, it only 
succeeded in bringing providers into closer, increasingly collusive arrangements with 
one another (and with the insurance industry and Blue Cross intermediaries as well) 
without demonstrably increasing the voice or power of the industry's consumers.129
127 See table in Marmor, The Politics o f  M edicare, 91.
128 Having expired in 1974 (first passed in 1946) the Hill-Burton Act, providing federal grants for 
hospital construction, merged with the National Health Planning and Resources Development Act.
129 See Morone, The Democratic Wish, 270-289, for the original version o f  this analysis. The NRA/HSA  
comparison is Morone's as well.
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The rise in Medicare administrative expenses under the Nixon administration 
presaged similar increases in almost all Great Society programs. On the average, these 
costs went from approximately 7% of all costs under the Johnson administration to 
approximately 22% under the Nixon administration. It is easily forgotten that programs 
like the Office of Economic Opportunity began under Johnson with thousands o f unpaid 
volunteers and makeshift office arrangements, and developed into overstaffed, over­
regulated bureaucratic nightmares (that, fortunately, still managed to provide some 
badly needed services) only under Nixon in the 1970s. President Nixon also introduced 
"reforms" that further lessened the efficiency of these so-called "poverty programs." A 
school voucher system was proposed and studied by the Nixon OEO as was the 
integration of commercial electronic teaching aids into public schools. The Community 
Development Block Grant Program paved access roads to country clubs and constructed 
tennis courts in affluent neighborhoods.130 The programs seemed inherently bad and 
horribly inefficient for they were truly directing less and less o f their efforts toward the 
poverty stricken citizens they were designed to help. This inefficiency and poor 
performance, however, had less to do with the actual programs than it did the priorities 
o f the new administration. Programs were extended and funded to defuse the Left or to 
outdo specific politicians, not to accomplish their stated goals. Those that were 
effective, anyway, were, ironically, the subject of incessant behind-the-scenes attacks. 
Nixon dismissed support for the Peace Corps, Head Start, Legal Aid, and VISTA for 
this very reason.131
Even as Nixon assailed the Great Society for its "bureaucratic welfare dependency," 
stigmatized its mission as one designed exclusively for blacks (though 66% served by 
AFDC and the OEO were white), and ignored virtually all administrative shortcomings,
130 Fred M. Hechinger, "Education," Collier's 1971 Yearbook, 219; Donald Kettl, Government By Proxy: 
(M is?)M anaging Federal Program s (Washington: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1988), 49.
131 See Haldeman, The Haldeman Diaries, 114-115, 181.
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he allowed their costs to balloon.132 It was simply too easy to blame all the cost 
overruns or inefficiencies on the programs themselves—or the Democratic opposition 
that supported them—and to receive political credit just by extending a vague 
pronouncement o f support and an open sack of federal revenue. When someone 
suggested that he rename the Office of Economic Opportunity early in his 
administration, Nixon begged off, heeding the advice of Arthur Burns. "It is not clear to 
me that it is desirable to change the name of OEO," Burns wrote. "With its present 
name, the Democrats will at least share the blame. With a new name, your 
administration will be charged with the full responsibility..."133 Few suggestions 
convinced Nixon as readily.
When the House passed Nixon's plan for welfare reform in April 1970, the famous 
Family Assistance Plan (FAP) devised largely by Daniel Patrick Moynihan, the 
President moved to insure that this symbolic effort not pass through the Senate. In June 
he suggested moving Moynihan to the UN (a post eventually given to George Bush after 
his defeat in November's congressional election) to "keep him out of HEW" and to keep 
the Family Assistance Plan from becoming too popular.134 In July, Nixon went even 
further telling his assistants to make sure "its killed by Democrats and that we make [a] 
big play for it, but don't let it pass, [we] can't afford it."135 While Nixon believed that it
132 On April 28, 1969 Haldeman recorded Nixon's discussion o f  welfare: "P emphasized that you have to 
face the fact that the whole problem is really the blacks. The key is to devise a systemthat recognizes this 
while not appearing to....Pointed out that there has never in history been an adequate black nation, and 
they are the only race o f  which this is true." See Haldeman, The Haldeman D iaries , 53.
133 Memo, Burns to N ixon, March 21, 1969, Special Files, President's O ffice Files, President's 
Handwriting, Box 1, Nixon Presidential Materials, National Archives.
134 Quoted in Haldeman, The Haldeman D iaries, 173. There is some question as to whether or not 
Moynihan, himself, might have been a willing participant in the Nixon charade. N o one doubted for a 
minute that the FAP would add significantly to the budget, with most estimates falling around $4.5 
billion for its first full year o f  operation. Yet Moynihan had advised Nixon on several occasions that he 
"can't have a domestic policy" for lack o f  sufficient funds. See ibid., 39. The FAP called for a direct cash 
payment to poor fam ilies in lieu o f  some federally provided services. As proposed, the minimum  
payment for a family o f  four, subject to additional state contributions, was $1600, rising to $2000 by 
1973 and $2400 by 1975. Out o f  his opposition to Moynihan's FAP, Arthur Burns began referring to 
Moynihan pejoratively as "the spender." Cited in Wells, Economist in an Uncertain W orld , 31.
135 Quoted in Haldeman, The Haldeman D iaries, 181.
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would never pass through Russell Long's Senate Finance Committee unscathed, he 
refused to take any chances.136 Passing environmental legislation with relatively few 
teeth, supporting school desegregation without funds for implementation, and voicing 
support for integrated housing and anti-discrimination statutes without adequate 
enforcement were other significant parts of a domestic policy designed primarily for 
political, rather than social, consumption. When HUD Secretary George Romney 
moved a little too aggressively on the open housing front (and urged an incomes policy 
a little too stridently), Nixon even exploited his own administration's intentionally weak 
efforts to relieve Secretary Romney of his duties. "George won't leave quickly," 
Haldeman noted, "will have to be fired. So we have to set him up on the integrated 
housing issue and fire him on that basis to be sure we get the credit."137 This was an 
administration, after all, that could actually countenance the idea o f leaving riot-torn 
areas in shambles— "for shock effect."138
By late 1970, however, Nixon tired of playing the game. "P has changed his mind," 
Haldeman noted on August 9; [has] reached a new conclusion. Is convinced policy of 
sucking after Left won't work, not only can't win them, can't even defuse them."139 
Complaints from conservatives—that Nixon referred to as that "constant right wing 
bitching"—had taken their toll, but most of all the president himself was chagrined and 
confused by the abject failure of policies he genuinely believed in.140 He confided in
136 It was killed in the Finance Committee after Long added a one year residency requirement and a 
"man in the house" provision (to deny benefits to families with an able-bodied male head-of-househo!d). 
Long called the defeat one o f  his "proudest moments." Quoted in Mann, Legacy to Power, 299,300. 
Compare to Johnson administration efforts to avoid this kind o f  a program. See memo, Okun to LBJ, July 
22, 1968, Papers o f  LBJ, White House Central Files, LA 8, Box 33, LBJ Library, where Okun sought a 
remedy to the problem whereby there is an incentive for men to leave their families so the children can 
qualify for welfare.
137 Haldeman, The Haldeman D iaries, 210-211.
138 Notes, authors unidentified, Urban Affairs Council Meeting, April 7, 1969, Special Files, President's 
O ffice Files, President's Handwriting, Box 1, Nixon Presidential Materials, National Archives.
139 Haldeman, The Haldeman D iaries, 187.
140 See ibid., 348-349 for example o f  the "constant right-wing bitching" and how it annoyed Nixon (very 
much the way criticism from the left annoyed LBJ). "Mitchell reported on his dinner with the Reagans, at 
which there was a great deal o f  carping about a lot o f  trivia, mainly from Nancy Reagan....P got upset
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McCracken's gradualism, for example, and trusted that it would slow inflation and keep 
unemployment below 5%. It did neither, however, scrambling Nixon's vision o f his own 
administration. "Told E [John Ehrlichman] he was seriously considering complete 
change in advisers," Haldeman reported, "since they failed in the one prime objective he 
set, to keep unemployment under 5% in October."141 Ultimately, howevei, Nixon's 
economic advisers remained and were even bolstered somewhat by the recruitment of 
John Connally as David Kennedy's replacement at Treasury and by a ringing 
endorsement from Milton Friedman. Connally possessed only a superficial knowledge 
of economics, but admired the conservative instincts o f Nixon and his economic 
advisers. "I should have spent more time with that boy," lamented Lyndon Johnson 
when he learned of Connally's new assignment. "His problem is he likes those oak- 
paneled rooms too much."142 Friedman visited the White House in November 1970 and 
urged the President to stay the course. "Says we're in good shape if we stay with it," 
Haldeman noted.143
Assured that his economic plans were on target, Nixon was left to reason that his 
phony liberalism had compromised his efforts; he would now be more willing to attack. 
Convinced that the New Economics was something akin to the social spending he 
embarked upon so recklessly, or the deficits he created almost by accident, Nixon 
anchored the policies o f his predecessor to his own inept governance (as did the 
American people). While the inflationary effect of these inefficiencies was small, they 
helped breed a growing and wholly unnecessary distrust o f government intervention in
about that, said the conservatives are aiming at the wrong target, they should be hitting the Congess, not 
the P..."
141 Ibid., 211.
142 Quoted in James Reston, Jr, The Lone Star, 434. Nixon economic adviser Peter Peterson described the 
Nixon-Connally relationship as symbiotic neuroses defined by the axiom "the rocks in my head fit the 
holes in yours." Connally, aware o f  his own lack o f  knowledge, did enroll in a brief, informal tutorial 
with William McChesney Martin before taking over at the Treasury Department. See footnote # 39, 
Chapter 8, for Gardner Ackley's appraisal o f  Martin's economics knowledge.
143 Quoted in Haldeman, The Haldeman Diaries, 212. Nixon's response to Friedman's visit was to say 
that "it was nice to have someone say we're doing things right."
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the economy. This would clearly undermine the effectiveness o f future wage-price 
interventions, for these worked best when adopted voluntarily. It would also 
shortchange those at the bottom of the economy whose lack of skills, and unfettered 
access to both training and critical business networks, hampered productivity and labor 
mobility at the same time that it produced greater income inequalities that lent 
themselves to price inflation in the various markets for positional goods.
Tax policy changes lent further momentum to both the inflationary and 
recessionary trends o f the first Nixon administration. While Nixon adopted the 10% 
surcharge with some reluctance, he also showed little compulsion to stick with it very 
long (halving it in April, 1969), and he created numerous exemptions precisely where 
the tax was needed most— for corporate income. When former Nixon adviser Pierre 
Rinfret suggested a ban on consumer credit cards, a 15% tax surcharge (with implied 
business exemptions), and a renewed investment tax credit, as a way to dampen 
inflation, Arthur Bums fired off a memo attesting to the wrongheadedness o f Rinfret's 
proposal and to the investment demand problem in general. "I cannot support the 
suggestion of the President’s friend,” Bums wrote. "In the first place, it is not the 
consumer who is adding heavily to aggregate monetary demand at the present time. 
Heavy pressure is coming from business spending and government spending."144 
Haldeman's diary entries for 1969, however, suggest that Burns had been shunted 
aside.145 Whatever the reason, Nixon did not heed Bum's advice, and by 1971, with the 
1970 recession made official, he moved increasingly toward supply side tax incentives.
On January 11, 1971 Nixon unveiled liberalized depreciation allowances similar to 
the kind adopted by President Kennedy in 1962. Retroactive to January 1, 1970 they
144 M emo, Bums to Staff Secretary, December 19, 1969, Special Files, President's Office Files, 
President's Handwriting, Box 4, Nixon Presidential Materials, National Archives.
145 See Haldeman, The Haldeman Diaries, 41, 54, for example. On March 17, 1969 Haldeman noted 
"Poor E has to untangle all this and Arthur Bums is now driving him nuts, as he did me (and still does)." 
And on May 7, 1969: "Huge Bums flap because he didn't get in to see P about two sentences in hunger 
message....Feels if  he can't get in when he wants to he'll have to quit. N o more need for him."
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represented, like the Kennedy administration changes, a substantial (approximately $2.6 
billion) tax reduction for business. Unlike the Kennedy depreciation allowances, 
however, they came at the end o f a seven year investment boom, and at a time when 
factory utilization rates were exceptionally low (73%). The chances were simply much 
greater in 1971, as opposed to 1962, that the liberalized depreciation allowance would 
amount to little more than a giveaway with almost no impact on job creation. With one 
fourth o f the nation's industrial capacity laying idle, and with the federal government 
picking up a larger portion o f any potential investment outlay, the chances were great, 
indeed, that any new investment would serve primarily to replace members of the 
workforce, workers made relatively more expensive by the accelerated depreciation.
When Nixon closed the gold window and introduced mandatory wage-price 
controls on August 15, 1971, few noticed that significant tax changes were proposed 
then as well. At the Camp David meetings two days prior to Nixon's shocking 
announcements (Friday the Thirteenth), Treasury Secretary John Connally explained the 
logic behind the new round of supply-side tax incentives. "If we close the gold 
window," Connally said, "we'll need an import tax o f 10-15%. This will keep foreign 
products out and be inflationary [as would the closing of the gold window], so we'll 
need a further stimulant: we will reinstate the investment tax credit at something greater 
than 7% [the rate o f the last ITC removed in early 1969]."146 Echoing the perverse logic 
o f the National Association o f Manufacturers and the Allied Products Institute, who saw 
this "stimulant" (the ITC) as an anti-inflationary device designed to spur efficient 
production, Connally laid bare much o f the rationale for his predecessor's hasty 
departure in late 1970. After all, David Kennedy, replaced by Connally in December,
146 Quoted in ibid., 341. See 341-344 for Haldeman's record o f  the critical August 13, 1971 meetings at 
Camp David. Johnson and several Democratic congressman had pushed for a repeal o f  the ITC in 1968. 
It was largely held up, however, by Senate Finance Committee chairman Russell Long's concurrent 
struggle for check-off box financing o f  presidential campaigns. Mike Mansfield criticized Long 
vociferously for this unnecessary roadblock. See Mann, Legacy to Power, 251.
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had gone on record against the reimposition o f the ITC. In testimony before the House 
Ways and Means Committee in 1969, Kennedy sounded much like Heller, Ackley, or 
Okun: "I would have been reluctant to recommend the removal o f any measure that 
assists in keeping U.S. business competitive. But it now appears that the consumer 
demand to be generated by our economy in the foreseeable future will provide sufficient 
impetus for industrial modernization without the investment tax credit."147
Along with the new investment tax credit— on the books at 10%— came 
approximately $9 billion in additional income tax reductions weighted heavily in favor 
o f corporations, the removal of the existing 7% excise tax on automobiles, and an 
increase in the level o f the personal income tax exemption. Weighted slightly less 
favorably toward corporations than Nixon and Connally had originally planned, due to 
the handiwork o f congressional Democrats, these moves still constituted a significant 
step away from the New Economics and toward the "trickle-down" economics o f old.148 
Moreover, the increased personal exemption and the slightly lowered personal income 
tax rates, favorable as they were at the time, eventually failed to offset the imposition of 
higher payroll (Social Security) taxes, particularly after January 1973, when rates had to 
be adjusted to pay for the 20% increase in benefits introduced the previous October.149 
Corporations would pay much less under the new plan; most consumers at the bottom of
147 Quoted in King, Money, Time, an d  Politics, 332. "P...wants to wait until after elections [1970] and 
clean out Cabinet, especially Hickel, Romney, and Kennedy." Quoted in Haldeman, The Haldeman  
D iaries, 168.
148 Interviewed on NBC's M eet the Press, on October 17, 1971, Walter Heller referred to the President's 
August 15 proposals as "raw meat for business and a soup bone for consumers," but also noted that "the 
interesting thing is that a democratic Congress may save him from him self by putting more thrust into 
that tax program and more balance between business and consumers. It would be an irony if the success 
o f  his fiscal program attributable to a Democratic congress would put him back in office." Transcript, 
NBC's M eet the Press, October 17, 1971, LBJ Post-Presidential File, Economy-National, Inflation, Box 
13, LBJ Library, 9.
149 As it was with many o f  Nixon's economic decisions, particularly those with obvious short term 
effects, the Social Security benefits-to-taxes ratio was manipulated carefully to provide a fiscal boost 
before the 1972 election and to effect an inevitable fiscal drag (to remain on a sound actuarial footing) 
only after the November 1972 votes had been counted. The benefits increase, implemented in October 
1972, accounted for much o f  the year's 3.3% rise in real disposable income, one o f  the clearest measures 
o f  voters' economic confidence and well-being. Cited in Wicker, One o f  Us, 562.
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the economy would, by 1973, actually pay more.150 Aggregate demand and the 
economy in general would suffer as a result.
Where Johnson had tried to show American businesses how fortunate they were, 
and how they prospered most when they acted on behalf o f those who worked for them 
and purchased their products, Nixon encouraged the less savory side o f the business 
personality, teaching them to scapegoat an ever-changing variety of hobgoblins, from 
"monopolistic" labor unions, and "outrageously expensive" social programs to the 
"distortions" o f the war in Vietnam. Ironically, the more Nixon and corporate America 
indulged in this behavior, the more they came to believe in profits that were less and 
less a function of corporate market performance, and the more they altered— for the 
worse— the fundamental nature of their customary scapegoats. As they came to depend 
more and more upon supply side favors and less and less upon viable markets, 
corporations tended to encourage both "business unionism"—which simplified 
corporate management as it inflated wage packages—and winner-take-all contests with 
the rest o f the labor force, making it more difficult to remember the welfare of the 
nation's consumers and more necessary for these workers and consumers to act solely in 
their own interest. If government contracts were an accepted part of the supply side 
repertoire, as they most certainly were under Nixon, then military spending in general, 
even after Vietnam, became even more of a distortion. And if businesses had to prosper
150 Though it is often asserted that Social Security increases are unavoidable because o f  their actuarial 
basis, a phenomenon Nixon never understood anyway, this ignores the vast potential for controlling the 
costs (such as Medicare) that impel the actuarial revisions. See Wilbur Cohen, Oral History Interview, 
Interview II, 7-8, where he discusses Wilbur Mills understanding o f  the actuarial basis o f  the Social 
Security system, and Nixon's ignorance o f  the same. Nixon, for example, pushed for the removal o f  the 
retirement test— a critical part o f  the system's financial soundness, a move thwarted, for the most part, by 
Wilbur Mills. Mills did adopt uncharacteristically harmful benefits increases during his 1972 run for the 
presidency, changes that were largely triggered by his descent into alcoholism, one o f  the most out-of­
control presidential campaigns ever, and his Emil Jannings-like affair with Washington D.C. stripper 
Fanne Foxe. Unfortunately, Nixon encouraged the change, thankful that the first checks under the new 
benefits schedule found their way to voters' mailboxes in early October, approximately one month prior 
to the 1972 election. He even went so far as to enclose a letter with the checks explaining how the 
increase had come from a bill "signed by President Richard Nixon."
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first, before consumers and workers could benefit, social programs would only become 
more necessary and more isolated from the general economy, becoming, as a result, 
much more expensive and ineffective than they should have been. Taught to settle for 
"crumbs from the groaning board," along with diminished opportunities in the general 
economy, America's underclass could not help but seek bigger and bigger crumbs, and 
the nixon administration found itself fulfilling another one of its more prominent self- 
fulfilling prophecies.151
Disguised only weakly by the rubric attached to the whole package (the New 
Economic Policy) but greatly by the shock of the accompanying international monetary 
changes and wage-price freeze, Nixon's economic counter-revolution proceeded 
haltingly, at times even without affirmation from its creator and sponsor, but with great 
destructive force. His policies were an economic watershed, almost invisible at the time, 
that augmented inflationary tendencies once cornered by the previous administration; 
that made it increasingly difficult for corporations to hear what the market said to them, 
and that returned the nation to a zero-sum political economy where "sharing the gains" 
quickly became a quaint notion destined for oblivion. Moreover, as one commentator 
recently suggested, Nixon's mistakes were gifts that kept on giving.152 His sudden 
abandonment of the Bretton Woods international monetary system on August 15, 1971, 
for example, led partly to the 1973 and 1978 oil crises that made the Nixon inflation— 
and the Nixon economy (with 9% unemployment by 1975)—that much more 
ineradicable.
Indeed, oil price increases o f approximately 400% in October and December 1973, 
that sent the price o f oil from $3.01 per barrel to $11.65 per barrel, came largely because
151 This phenomenon also made it easier for conservatives to win economic policy debates, albeit for the 
wrong reason. Many social welfare programs have become costly (though not nearly as expensive as 
most people imagine them to be) and convenient targets for economic conservatives. This has transpired, 
however, largely because conservative, rather than liberal, ideology— since the Nixon administration—  
has reasserted its dominance.
152 Jonathan Rauch, "What Nixon Wrought," The New Republic, May 16, 1994, 31.
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Nixon chose deflation of the dollar as an easy way out o f  the gold crisis looming before 
him.153 Moreover, the key player in the OPEC price rise—the Shah of Iran—had also 
embarked upon a spending spree for American military hardware largely at the behest o f 
President Nixon, who received, for his part, a seemingly powerful cold war proxy and 
an additional source o f profit for American corporations.154 Unfortunately, this made the 
value o f Iranian oil dollars that much more significant. Since all oil sales in the non­
communist world were denominated in U.S. dollars, the Shah found himself pinched by 
staggering arms purchases on one hand and by a cheaper dollar on the other—both 
direct results o f Nixon administration policy changes. Having already rejected a barter 
proposition in 1969, where the Shah proposed to fill the U.S. Strategic Reserve (at the 
rate o f $1 per barrel) in exchange for an equivalent supply o f arms, Nixon continued to 
ignore the obvious financial implications of his August 15 decision.155 By June 1973, 
the U.S. dollar had undergone three successive devaluations, beginning with the
153 Nixon had ample warning that this might be the case, for the Shah o f  Iran had complained as early as 
the Caracas OPEC (Organization o f  Petroleum Exporting Countries) meeting in December 1970 that 
dollar devaluation was making his oil less valuable. After the August 15, 1971 announcement he spoke 
up again, requesting an adjustment in taxes paid to OPEC nations (by oil companies) based on monetary 
changes (dollar devaluation).
154 From 1972-1977, Iran, under the Shah's leadership, would spend approximately $16 billion for 
American military hardware, an outlay that would increase the Iranian military budget by 700%. Cited in 
Walter Isaacson, Kissinger, 564. Compare to the Kennedy-Johnson relationship to the Shah, where in 
May, 1961 the Kennedy administration compelled the Shah to name reform-minded econom ist A li Amini 
to the prime ministerial post, and where in August, 1962 Vice-President Johnson returned from Teheran 
after convincing the Shah to emphasize socioeconom ic spending over military spending. See Amin 
Saikal, The Rise and Fall o f  the Shah (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), 76-77.
155 In Nixon's defense this proposal was clearly a tough call in 1969. The Johnson administration had 
studied the feasibility o f  underground storage after the 1967 Arab embargo and pronounced it impractical 
for the follow ing reasons: 1) Have to use expensive pumping equipment; 2) Unfavorable econ om ics-  
using $2/barrel for Mideast oil and a figure o f  l$/barrel storage cost, then the storage o f  500 million  
barrels represents a $1.5 billion investment. For comparison, the oil industry in 1965 spent in the U.S. 
$675 million to obtain 583 million barrels o f  new reserves plus 6.5 trillion cubic feet o f  natural gas; 3) 
The productive capacity o f  U.S. wells which was roughly equal to our total consumption and slightly 
greater than our refinery capacity; 4) During 1967 crisis, production increased 8% within a month, and 
approximately 12% after two. See letter, Cordell Moore, Assistant Secretary o f  the Interior, to Senator 
Fred Harris, July 20, 1967, Papers o f  J. Cordell Moore, Box 4, LBJ Library. N ixon, o f  course, had
$1/barrel oil to work with, making the proposition somewhat more attractive. To effect the same arms 
sales profits, however, under the barter plan, he would have had to expand the U.S. military budget 
precisely when everyone was clamoring for a Vietnam peace dividend.
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Smithsonian agreement in December 1971. U.S exports soared initially, in predictable 
fashion, but Nixon continued, blindly, to count on the eventual strengthening of the 
American dollar. "Poor old Nixon was not a deep thinker in these matters," Paul 
Volcker recalled. "He had no intellectual conviction about floating [currency rates]."156
To make matters worse, Nixon also failed to respond to the brewing oil crisis with 
the great number o f tools and weapons he had at his disposal. He ignored the 
implications o f the Alaska pipeline, for example, and the estimated 1.5 million barrels 
o f oil it would carry each day, even though U.S. demand was now outpacing the 
discovery o f new domestic reserves for the first time ever (beginning in 1968). 
Originally scheduled for completion in 1972, the pipeline alone would have given the 
U.S enough leverage to circumvent the 1973 oil price rise. Choosing benign neglect, 
however, Nixon did nothing to expedite the pipeline project, but threw a variety of 
obstacles in its path instead.157 "The United States is not in the oil business," declared 
Nixon's Undersecretary o f State John Irwin in 1971, "and does not intend to become 
involved in the details o f the producing companies negotiations with the oil
156 Quoted in Wicker, One o f  Us, 555. Herbert Stein noted that business leaders "did much to convince 
the conventional conservatives [and Nixon] o f  the virtue o f  free exchange rates." (These business leaders 
were clearly constrained— as they should have been— by the Kennedy-Johnson system o f  international 
econom ic controls, such as the Interest Equalization Tax, and they desired som e short term compensation 
for their trouble.) Quoted in ibid., 547. These controls were part o f  a much more rational approach to a 
two-part problem— a balance o f  payments deficit, and a separate gold crisis— both o f  which had been 
exacerbated by a huge flow o f  dollars to foreign countries (especially European nations). While the 
unilateral devaluation, set in motion by the August 15, 1971 decisions, was purported to be a response to 
both problems, it was in actuality only a response to the gold crisis, a crisis that was as much a 
psychological problem as it was a real economic dilemma.
157 These range from the careless framing o f  litigious environmental legislation designed less to protect 
the environment than to appease environmentalists; the hiring and firing o f  an Interior Secretary (Wally 
Hickel o f  Alaska) who was at first too combative— announcing immediately that he would disregard 
Johnson Secretary Udall's pledge concerning Native land claims, and then too much o f  an irritant to 
N ixon— helping to keep Nixon aloof from the whole pipeline embroglio; an apathetic approach to the 
Native Land Claims issue— allowing the Alaskan business community and Bar Association to lambaste 
Arthur Goldberg's efforts at resolution (the Bar Association was peeved because Goldberg offered his 
services free o f  charge); and an effort to cut in the Teamsters, who promptly built a useless road throught 
the arctic tundra that did little more than raise the ire o f  environmental groups, dragging out construction 
negotiations even further. See Jack Anderson, with James Boyd, Fiasco (N ew  York: Times Books,
1983), 59-78, 113-159.
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companies."158 The same could have been said about the details of domestic oil 
production. While the U.S. was in the oil business, as they were in many others, Nixon 
saw things only from the supply side; to him the enormous subsidies, price supports, tax 
breaks, and tax incentives that the industry thrived upon were somehow analagous to the 
free market. Intervention on the supply side, as Nixon sized things up, no matter how 
extensive, never really counted. In that light, Nixon saw no cause for alarm in the early 
1970s for he was largely indifferent to the demand side, where the real trouble lay. 
OPEC had clearly effected substantial price rises, even before October 1973, and oil 
companies had begun to notice a decline in their share of foreign oil revenues. The 
companies had, nonetheless, also witnessed a substantial rise in their profit margins.159 
This was incontrovertible good news to Nixon, for he was sold on the idea that these 
kind o f profits made the American economy rattle and hum. Even as late as 1972, then, 
he was still "relaxing and enjoying the inevitable," as he put it, and brushing concerns 
over pipeline construction and domestic oil supply under the rug. On March 27,1972 
Haldeman noted:
He [Nixon] had a meeting with [Secretary o f the Interior] Morton today about the 
Alaska pipeline and was concerned that the idea of running it through Canada was 
not good because we're losing jobs in Alaska, and even though Alaska's 
unimportant, its going to sound bad here. The thing of it being good internationally 
is useless to us and the environmental pluses are questionable at the least. Jobs are 
more important than either one of those. So the question is whether its worth 
breaking it off in Alaska now or should we just screw around with it until after the 
election.160
Nixon also missed the opportunity to reform the infamous Oil Depletion 
Allowance, and therefore the opportunity to increase domestic exploration, by refusing 
to budge on his 1968 campaign promise to stand by the legendary handout. As much as 
he wanted to jump on the tax reform bandwagon, largely to avoid being run over by it,
158 Quoted in ibid., 266.
159 While their share o f  the profit split had gone from 80% to 60% from 1970 to mid 1973, company 
profits had risen from 30 cents per barrel to 90 cents per barrel. Ibid., 287.
160 Haldeman, The Haldeman D iaries, 432.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
4 4 4
and as much as he prided himself on successfully gauging public opinion, Nixon failed 
to heed signs, here, that revealed even the industry's willingness to compromise on the 
Depletion Allowance. A so-called "plowback" provision, that would have required 
investing tax reduction money into new exploration, was the chief reform proposal. The 
primary defect o f the Depletion Alowance, its detractors claimed, was that it coexisted 
with a industry controlled regulatory system that sought to dampen supply (to keep 
prices high) while the whole rationale for the subsidy in the first place was to offer an 
incentive to discover or develop new gas and oil deposits. A plowback provision, or 
something akin to one, was even acceptable to oil state legislators such as Hale Boggs 
and Russell Long of Louisiana who proposed shifting the benefits of the Depletion 
Allowance to the exploration minded independents and away from the big oil 
companies.161 In the end, however, Nixon showed nothing but apprehension one way or 
the other, and the Oil Depletion Allowance emerged at 22% instead of 27.5%, but with 
no real incentive for exploration. Since lower production had always implied higher 
profits for the oil industry, and higher profits remained Nixon's primary economic goal, 
he saw no reason to change what had always been a phony rationale into a genuine goal. 
Reversing the trend of the Johnson years, domestic exploration and production declined 
throughout Nixon's first term in the White House (12% over the first three years), just as 
he wanted it.
Even after oil prices rose to $11.65 per barrel in December 1973, Nixon and his 
economic advisers still saw little need for concern. What they saw instead were oil 
companies flush with cash, presumably ready to play their part in spurring the U.S. 
economy to a higher plateau.162 When Energy Czar William Simon recommended 
rolling back prices with domestic control changes, CEA chairman Herbert Stein, 
reflecting Nixon's laissez-faire orientation, warned that doing so would only increase the
161 Anderson with Boyd, Fiasco, 92.
162 Exxon's 1973 profits were 59% higher than their 1972 profits. Cited in Daniel Yergin, The Prize, 658.
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length o f the now customary gas lines. Cut the demand instead, Stein suggested, by 
letting gasoline prices go up another 10 cents.163 Likewise, when James Akins at the 
State Department released a study in early 1974 suggesting conservation, increased 
domestic production, and the importation of oil from "secure" foreign sources (already 
up from 2.2 million barrels per day in 1968 to 4 million barrels per day in 1973), chief 
domestic policy adviser John Ehrlichman brushed him aside, informing Akins that 
"conservation is not the Republican ethic."164 Saudi Arabian representatives even urged 
Nixon to exploit OPEC's dependency upon American technical advice, transportation, 
and distribution networks—all to no avail.165 An economic cataclysm in almost every 
way except for its impact on short term oil company profits, the 1973 oil crisis was as 
much a product o f the New Economic Policy and the Nixon approach to political 
economics as it was an OPEC invention. The U.S. and much of the developing world, 
would pay dearly for this monumental policy blunder.166
Richard Nixon, H.R. Haldeman noted in early 1969, "was most anxious to avoid 
any appearance o f being like LBJ."167 On fiscal, monetary, and wage-price policy alike, 
it seems that he should not have had much of a struggle, for he was clearly not Lyndon 
Johnson. Stark economic policy differences, however, had become blurred, precisely
163 Cited in Rowen, Self-Inflicted Wounds, 91.
164 Quoted in Yergin, The P rize , 591. Import statistics (regarding Latin America, Canada, Asia, and 
Oceania) from Anderson with Boyd, Fiasco, 86-87.
165 There were five similar crises with the Shah o f  Iran during the Johnson administration. In all five 
cases Johnson applied economic leverage mindful o f  the obvious OPEC dependency upon the American 
oil companies and their technological and marketing assets.
166 One o f  the least obvious results o f  the embargo and the higher oil prices w as its impact on 
indebtedness in the developing world. Petrodollars went from U.S. banks to developing countries so they 
were able to make payments on their more expensive oil imports. Indebtedness rose with oil prices, 
austerity programs were introduced in the debtor nations, those nations' demand for imports other than oil 
(often American products) declined, and an important source o f  American export trade remained bottled 
up or in decline. As Robert Kuttner has pointed out, this also led the Nixon administration to urge Latin 
America to produce more agricultural products, with which to service its growing mountain o f  debt, 
driving down commodity prices by the end o f  the decade to the point where the illegal drug trade became 
a much more profitable alternative. See Robert Kuttner, The End o f  Laissez-Faire: N ational Purpose and  
the G lobal Economy After the C o ld  War (N ew  York: Knopf, 1991), 248.
167 Haldeman, The Haldeman D iaries, 26. In this particular case Haldeman referred to LBJ's poll- 
watching tendencies; the appraisal still commends itself to a more general application.
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because Nixon wanted it that way. Had he clarified the sharp break in outlook and 
policy that actually occurred, all problems would have been identified with his own 
administration, a risk he was utterly unwilling to take. "He had done a magnificent job 
on the politics o f his problems," suggested Stephen Ambrose.168 Indeed, economic 
problems of his own making were somehow charged to others; Lyndon Johnson, 
Democrats in Congress, and Keynesian economists were all implicated for the 
shortcomings o f gradualism, monetarism, and blind faith in a profit-centered economy. 
Economic adviser Herbert Stein maintained, however, that "Mr. Nixon did not come 
into office to make a conservative revolution in economic policy."169 This is true 
enough, for there was no conservative revolution to make in the first place. The New 
Economics was revolutionary; the New Economic Policy was not. Change was the 
hallmark of the Nixon economic strategy, but it was change marked by a return to an 
older, still widely cherished way of explaining the economic world, an outlook that 
Nixon's predecessor had hoped to consign to oblivion. Nixon truly was "one of us," as 
Tom Wicker has suggested. His strengths and shortcomings were often vivid reminders 
o f the nation's most common, and sometimes compelling attributes.170 Tragically, in the 
political economy, this implied little more than a steadfast unwillingness to see things as 
they were, the restoration o f a creed devoted to profit, and an outlook where poverty 
stemmed more from the pathology o f the poor than from limited opportunity. Though 
all bets were off at the beginning, the Nixon administration ultimately chose Herbert 
Spencer and Adam Smith over John Maynard Keynes, consigned the nation once again 
to a "stop-go" adhocracy, and buried the promise and challenge of the New Economics 
beneath the rubble of heightened partisanship, zero-sum politics, and stagflationary
168 Ambrose, Nixon, 662.
169 Stein, Presidential Economics, 206.
170 Wicker, One o f  Us, 687.
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economics. A political and economic course had been set on a divisive and disabling 
trajectory. The Keynesian revolution remained the revolution that never was.
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Chapter 10 
You Say You Want a Revolution:
LBJ and the Economy Reconsidered
You say you want a revolution—well you know, we all want to change the 
world....You say you got a real solution—well you know, we'd all love to see the plan.
- John Lennon/Paul McCartney, 1969
The slogan o f the yippies is: 'Rise up and abandon the creeping meatball!' The 
straight press thought that the 'creeping meatball' meant Lyndon Baines Johnson and 
that we wanted to throw him out o f office. We just laughed because we love LBJ. LBJ 
was our leader, founder, guru. Where would we be without LBJ?
- Jerry Rubin, 1970
History will never tell us what a Johnson presidency would have meant in the 1969- 
1973 period. It does make it apparent, however, that Nixon's management o f the 
economy differed fundamentally from that of his immediate predecessor. Reviving old, 
not yet interred, stereotypes and myths about the economy—partly to win political 
favor, and partly because he believed in them—Nixon brought about changes in the 
nation's political economy that were as immediate as they were profound. He recklessly 
and without hesitation abandoned the Johnson anti-inflation policy, built around the 
wage-price guideposts and increasingly balanced fiscal and monetary policies. He 
unleashed inflationary forces that he chose not to contain and was eventually compelled 
to introduce mandatory price and wage controls that exacerbated both inflation and
448
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economic inequality just as they removed the political possibility for a more limited, 
equitable, and effective type of intervention.1 He reintroduced and extended a series o f 
supply side tax benefits, subsidies, and preferred contractual arrangements, convincing 
gullible citizens—and himself—that these were not a drain on the public treasury, a way 
to dilute already marginal market forces, or a serious misallocation of resources in an 
economy with shrinking capacity utilization and increasingly unstable consumer 
demand. Unlike his predecessor, he chose not to see supply side measures as tools of 
limited usefulness but tended to view them collectively as an economic panacea. All 
together, Nixon restored to American politics not so much laissez-faire economics— 
which never existed in the first place—but the politics o f scarcity and a zero-sum 
economic strategy.2 Gains for one group now often meant, once again, losses for 
another, and economic strategy mirrored and intensified the zero-sum phenomenon of 
inflation itself, a process by which producers, debtors, and small groups o f favored 
workers benefitted at the expense of everyone else. As a consequence, inflationary 
tendencies became more rather than less embedded in conventional economic practices 
o f the private sector.
Requiring more growth to reproduce employment and GNP effects comparable to 
that o f the Johnson political economy, Nixon's supply side approach also placed the
1 According to Robert E. Smith, senior staff member o f  Johnson's Cabinet Committee on Price Stability, 
had Hubert Humphrey been elected in 1968, it is likely that plans to reinvigorate the guideposts and to 
establish "industry desks" in approximately fifteen o f  the most inflation prone industries would have been 
implemented (modeled partly after the seminars with business leaders in chemicals, machinery 
manufacturers, and household appliance manufacturers held by Stanford Ross in August 1967). See 
Cochrane, "Moral Suasion," 238n, 275. When a number o f  Jimmy Carter's economic advisers suggested 
the readoption o f  the Kennedy-Johnson wage-price guideposts, for example, neither President Carter nor 
organized labor was very keen on the idea. George Meany o f  the AFL-CIO (who had walked o ff  o f  
Nixon's Pay Board in 1972) ridiculed the notion o f  a return to wage-price jawboning as "wishboning." 
Though Charles Schultze, Johnson Budget Director, was Carter's CEA Chairman, he was not part o f  
Carter's inner circle; throughout the 1970s and 1980s the power and significance o f  the CEA diminished 
significantly. See Burton I. Kaufman, The Presidency o f  James Earl Carter, Jr. (Lawrence: University 
Press o f  Kansas, 1993), 7 1 ,8 0 .
2 See Lester C. Thurow, The Zero-Sum Society  (New York; Basic Books, 1980), for a more extensive 
examination o f  the zero-sum idea. Thurow, an M.l.T. economist, served briefly on the Johnson CEA staff 
in 1965-1966 as a manpower specialist.
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nation more squarely on a collision course with both foreign competition and 
environmental limitations. Inflated costs that were painless, even profitable, to many 
corporations, and production levels less and less tied to marketplace demand insured 
that this would be the case. Anxious to be environmentally active, to head off Edmund 
Muskie's candidacy in 1972 and to placate a burgeoning environmentalist movement, 
Nixon soon realized, however, that his economic policies were incompatible with 
environmental limitations, and that something had to give. "We have gone overboard on 
the environment," Nixon complained to John Ehrlichman in 1971, "and are going to 
reap the whirlwind for our excesses—get me a plan for cooling off the excesses."3
The return to a supply side approach and greater income inequality, ushered in by 
the Nixon administration, meant greater environmental degradation even as it implied 
slower growth and higher unemployment.4 Although Johnson and his economic advisers 
had demonstrated the economic value o f stable markets, Nixon revived the debate, 
thought by many to have been settled in the 1960s, over how one could best insure this 
stability. Under Johnson, and for the first time in U.S. history, Keynesian
3 Quoted in John Morton Blum, Years o f  D iscord, 402.
4 The Savings and Loan crisis o f  the 1980s and 1990s may best sym bolize this tendency. The outgrowth 
o f  a supply side approach to banking success, this crisis created a vast supply o f  unusable real estate 
(representing unnecessary environmental degradation) just as it soaked up vast sums o f  the taxpayers' 
m oney. It also speaks for the real economic benefit o f  regulation since the savings and loan crisis—as a 
product o f  deregulation—will probably wind up costing the taxpayers approximately four times as much 
as a ll regulations cost all businesses ($300 billion to $76 billion). See Murray L. Weidenbaum, The Costs 
o f  Government Regulation o f  Business (Washington, U.S.G.P.O., 1978); Weidenbaum, The Future o f  
Governm ent Regulation  (N ew  York: Abacom, 1979); and Schwarz, America's Hidden Success, 98-107  
for an appraisal o f  the costs o f  regulation circa 1976-1980, just before the savings and loan crisis began 
to take shape. Weidenbaum's work was used to justify deregulation; Schwarz showed how Weidenbaum  
contradicted his own research in assessing the total cost o f  all regulation (Weidenbaum based his final 
figure o f  $100 billion on a 20 to 1 multiplier that reflected the ratio o f  administrative costs to overall 
costs; Schwarz revealed how Weidenbaum's own research showed this multiplier to vary from one 
regulatory area to another). Even when the crisis was acknowledged, its supply side roots were still 
overlooked. Consequently, supply side inefficiencies, largely responsible for the problem, were also 
evident during the cleanup. As Jonathan Silvers noted, "private sector efficiencies were imposed on what 
had been conceived as an orthodox [public] bureacracy. Redecorated offices, bonus pay and other 
amenities led to a $50 million restructuring at the RTC [Resolution Trust Corporation]—defended on the 
grounds that the RTC had 'more assets than Citibank.'" See Jonathan Silvers, "Motivated Seller: The 
Great S&L Giveaway," The N ew Republic, January 25, 1993, 12.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
451
macroeconomic and microeconomic tools achieved it by helping to adjust demand to 
supply and by teaching producers to follow and to buttress demand once it reached 
satisfactory levels. Under Nixon, in a return to the more traditional approach, large 
corporations were once again encouraged to serve as the primary safeguard against 
market instability, largely by adjusting supply to demand when the latter exhibited 
weakening tendencies. Since Nixon's supply side approach also implied a willingness to 
rescue producers from their own forecasting or production errors—with subsidies, tax 
breaks, tariffs, etc.— supply and demand often had to reach levels of extreme imbalance 
before producers made the necessary downward adjustments. What this implied was an 
economic strategy, therefore, where supply—and environmental degradation— 
consistently outpaced the levels required for full employment and prosperity under the 
alternative Keynesian approach, sacrificing some employment and prosperity at the 
same time. Moreover, this was the case even if one assumed a stable level o f successful 
business ventures. Beset by adjustments that achieved market stability only in the most 
halting and uneven fashion, and characterized by diminished marketplace clarity, the 
return to supply side economics also led, ironically, to an increase in the number of 
small business failures— failures that represented, in at least some respects, exploitation 
o f the environment without which the nation would have been no less prosperous.5
Though the New Economics, itself, seemed to place an untoward amount of 
emphasis on growth, suggesting a casual ignorance of environmental limitations, it was, 
paradoxically, an economic strategy better suited to these limitations.6 With full
5 See Ann Mari May, "Economic Myth and Economic Reality," 656-657, for statistics on percentage 
change in small business failures in the Eisenhower through Reagan presidencies. When Reagan 
unleashed a full blown version o f  the supply side strategy reintroduced by Nixon, small business failures 
showed their first percentage increase since 1955. This was the natural outgrowth o f  a system which 
heaped some special favors upon all businesses and many upon a select few, and which also encouraged 
the irrelevance o f  demand— the very lifeblood o f  most small business ventures. Delayed by the lag time 
associated with the disparate accretion o f  supply side favors and the accompanying diminution o f  
marketplace clarity, the business failure bubble did take nearly a decade to burst.
6 See Robert Collins, "Growth Liberalism in the Sixties," 19-28, for a recent analysis o f  Johnson's 
economic strategy and its relationship to environmental limitations. Collins asserted, incorrectly, that
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employment and steady demand, supply would not outpace demand as readily and 
rising economic equality would better enable the nation to adjust its economic appetite, 
for it would not then entail as much of a sacrifice in terms of jobs and subsistence on the 
part o f the most often penalized underclass. Still convinced, early in the Nixon 
administration, that economic equality was on the rise and that the new President could 
go only so far in destroying the prosperity generated by his administration, Johnson 
recommended just such an adjustment, implying as well that the wealthiest Americans 
could easily afford to trim their sails. "We're the wealthiest nation in the world," he 
remarked, "we need to appeal to everyone to restrain their appetite. We're greedy but not 
short on the wherewithal to meet our problems."7 Just as it was with inflation, however, 
the reversion to a more conservative economics warranted greater sacrifices— in terms 
of employment and overall prosperity—just to insure a constant level o f amelioration.
supply side measures were Johnson and Heller's primary means to growth and that they operated "freed 
for the moment from the discipline o f  stringency." He did attest to the complexity o f  Johnson's growth 
liberalism, however, by citing Johnson's concern for the environment as well as his desire to transcend 
growth with an emphasis on quality. He also noted how Johnson signed into law over three hundred 
conservation and beautification measures entailing outlays o f  over $12 billion. Collins ultimately 
ignored, however, the extent to which the New  Economics was a step in this direction (perhaps because 
he considered it a supply side variation and not the demand side revolution that it was) and also 
suggested that sincere as Johnson was about "quality," he really did not know how to achieve it.
7 Quoted in "The Time Machine," American H eritage, February 1990, 42. Statistical evidence suggests 
that the Johnson years exhibited the most equitable distribution o f  wealth in the post World War II 
period. In terms o f  the percentage o f  income garnered by each group, the top quintile reached its lowest 
point then (35.5%), while the second lowest quintile also reached its peak during the Johnson years 
(12.2% ). The lowest quintile reached its peak during the Nixon administration (5.5%), reflecting both the 
residual effects o f  the Great Society and the N ew  Economics as well as the beginnings o f  N ixonom ics 
when the second and third lowest quintiles were taxed more (Social Security increases) and offered less 
in the way o f  employment (recessionary macroeconomic policy) partly to keep the lowest quintile afloat. 
Source: Statistical A bstracts o f  the United Stales (Washington: U.S.G.P.O., various years). See also 
Morgan Reynolds and Eugene Smolensky, Public Expenditures, Taxes, and the D istribution o f  Income, 
1950, 1961, 1970 (N ew  York: Academic Press, 1977) for an examination o f  changes in income 
inequality using Gini coefficients (which measures how far a Lorenz curve o f  income distribution varies 
from a diagonal representing a line o f  equal distribution). Reynolds and Smolensky suggested that after 
taxes and government transfers—assuming the usual tax breaks for the wealthy and the "leaky bucket" 
appraisal o f  aid to the poor—income inequality lessened somewhat in the 1960-1970 period (represented 
by lower Gini coefficients). What was striking, but also suggestive o f  the ability o f  corporate America to 
withstand both marketplace (tightening labor markets) and government (tax and wage-price policy) 
forces, were the increased  Gini coefficients over the same period when Reynolds and Smolensky 
considered income before taxes and government transfers.
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This would make an appeal for restraint, critical and necessary as it was, much less 
attractive or even sensible.8
Left-wing opponents of the Johnson administration also played a significant role in 
this transformation by helping to undermine the political economy best able to 
withstand the onslaught originating with their more powerful conservative counterparts. 
"Leaders of the New Left demanding 'Power to the People'," Richard Nathan noted, 
"flailed away at national bureaucracies in the same way that conservative governors 
Wallace of Alabama and Ronald Reagan of California won applause by criticising 
governmental 'paternalism."9 Partly out of their opposition to Johnsonian liberalism, the 
counterculture o f the 1960s unwittingly surrendered economic strategy to economic 
conservatives, and subordinated their vision o f environmental limitation to a greater, 
and much more conservative, consumer culture that was only seemingly more 
democratic; a culture that drew much o f its appeal from rising inequality and which also 
encouraged rootlessness ("new and improved!") and cynicism ("buyer beware!") even as
8 Liberals who claimed to be economic conservatives but social liberals often ended up, because o f  this 
phenomenon, sacrificing the feasibility o f  the few liberal policies (like environmental protection) they 
clung to. For a closer look at Johnson's outlook on environmental issues see Johnson, "Remarks at the 
University o f  Michigan," May 22, 1964 (The Great Society speech), Public Papers, 1963-1964 :1, 704- 
706; Johnson, "Remarks to the Delegates to the White House Conference on Natural Beauty," Public 
Papers, 1965: I, 576-580; Johnson, Vantage Point, 336-340; Lewis L. Gould, Lady B ird Johnson and the 
Environment (Lawrence: University Press o f  Kansas, 1988); Elizabeth Brenner Drew, "Lady Bird's 
Beauty Bill," Atlantic Monthly, December 1965, 68-72; and Califano, Triumph and Tragedy, 81-85 (on 
Highway Beautification). It should also be noted that Walter Heller, Johnson's CEA chairman until late 
1964 and informal adviser thereafter, was a friend and admirer o f  E.F. Schumacher, author o f  Sm all is 
Beautiful: Economics as i f  People Mattered, and champion o f  the idea that natural resources are capita l 
rather than income items and that modem economics should take full account o f  that. Nicholas Lemann 
suggested that Johnson rejected Heller's vision here presumably because he "was uncomfortable with 
abstract concepts," and because he liked bigness. Lemann also suggested that Heller and Kermit Gordon 
went to the LBJ ranch during the Christmas holidays in 1963 to "talk LBJ into Community Action" and 
smallness (at least with respect to the War on Poverty's assistance programs). Johnson expanded 
Community Action, however, not because he liked bigness or thought it to be an abstract notion, but 
because it would not survive politically otherwise, and he invited Heller and Gordon to the ranch and 
urged them to be creative; the two economists did not have to talk Johnson into it. "Give me the ideas," 
Johnson often said. "I can handle the politics." Johnson, quoted by John Gardner in Hardesty, ed., The 
Johnson Years, 60. See Lemann, "The Unfinished War," Atlantic Monthly, December 1988, 45-48.
9 Richard P. Nathan, The P lot That Failed: Nixon and the Administrative Presidency (New York: John 
W iley and Sons, 1975), 15.
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it blamed these very problems on the amorphous counterculture it had so successfully 
exploited.10
Nixon also committed the nation, by limiting the War on Poverty to 
microeconomic, politically charged, assistance programs, to the strange belief that 
economic problems could somehow be solved in isolation from the broader economy. 
As a result, the poor, whose numbers began rising at the end of the Nixon 
administration, were not deemed the products of a poorly managed economy but were 
increasingly thought to be either victims o f a welfare state that encouraged their worst 
behaviors, or wards o f the state who were simply offered assistance too meager to 
produce satisfactory results. Few noticed Nixon's quiet separation of economic strategy 
from the War on Poverty, largely because most assumed, incorrectly, that the War on 
Poverty had been designed and implemented that way. Nor were many even aware o f a 
fundamental change in economic strategy, for Nixon originally professed a desire to 
continue the War on Poverty, even as he launched a supply side insurgency that 
effectively insisted upon the survival, and gradual enlargement, o f poverty so that profit 
could thrive. Neither the culture o f poverty thesis, then, nor the welfare rights 
movement, both o f which emerged in the late 1960s, focused on the emerging and very 
real predicament for most o f the nation's poor: shrinking economic opportunity and an 
increasingly limited connection to the conservative strategies by which the general 
economy was beginning to be managed. Completely lost in the shuffle were the 
vicissitudes and advantages of a demand-oriented mixed economy, identified now not as
10 I concur largely with Lawrence Grossberg who argued in We G otta Get Out o f  this Place: Popular 
Conservatism  an d  Postm odern Culture (New York: Routledge, 1992), that the new anti-ideological and 
apolitical America has been consciously produced by the "new conservatism" working to sever 
connections between popular culture and politics and to construct a "mood politics" based on passion and 
commitment rather than facts, ideology, or institutions. Observing the first Earth Day (May 1, 1970) I.F. 
Stone called it a "gigantic snow job," and noted that "just as the Caesars used bread and circuses so ours 
were at last learning to use rock-and-roll, idealism, and non-inflammatory social issues to turn the youth 
o ff  from more urgent concerns which might really threaten the power structure." See Stone, "How Earth 
Day Was Polluted," May 4, 1970, in Polem ics and Prophecies, 237.
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it truly was under Lyndon Johnson and the New Economics but erroneously with a 
system o f forced redistribution focused exclusively toward the poor. Though many of 
the prejudices and stereotypes that enabled this awkward transformation clearly 
preceded the presidency o f Richard Nixon, and therefore had little to do with the 
nation's 37th President, it was Nixon who exploited them to the point o f insuring their 
predominance and increasing hold cn the American electorate.
Last of all, because this transformation came largely without apprehension, it also 
undermined the growing credibility o f economics in general and, out of the resulting 
confusion and frustration, unleashed a renewed racism—though of a much less overt 
and much more carefully coded variety than previous incarnations. In 1969 economists 
seemed to be the envy of social scientists everywhere; the New Economics had 
presumably ended the business cycle and the first Nobel Prize in economics had been 
awarded.11 Two decades later, however, with the economy still suffering from the 
contortions and deceptions of the Nixon era, pundits began to suggest that Presidents 
could do very little at all to change important economic trends. The expectation that the 
President can manage the economy, argued Charles R. Morris in 1993, "is punishingly 
at variance with anything any President can credibly deliver."12 The incoherence o f the 
U.S. economy, however, that lent itself to this kind of an appraisal, stemmed more from 
confusion in the political economy than it did from its own unpredictability or 
unwieldiness. Obscured, due largely to the machinations and deceptions o f the Nixon 
administration, was the salience o f the Keynesian revolution—a movement that 
stressed, almost above all else, the unreliability and unpredictability (as well as the
11 The 1969 Nobel Prize in Economics went to the Norwegian economist Ragnar Frisch and the Dutch 
econom ist Jan Tinbergen for their work in econometrics and their use o f  mathematical models to analyze 
econom ic data. Their work seemed to indicate the potential for even greater management o f  the 
traditional business cycle. Kennedy and Johnson economic adviser Paul Samuelson won the second 
N obel Prize in Economics, awarded in 1970.
12 Charles R. Morris, "It's (Not) the Economy Stupid," Atlantic Monthly, July 1993, 49-62. Morris 
concluded his analysis by suggesting that the "background noise" is so great in any economy that all one 
can do to encourage prosperity is to restore confidence and integrity.
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preeminent value) o f an economy based on a free market. Nixon was enamored of 
modern economics and urged his advisers to use it both in their public relations and 
their policymaking efforts. Convincing the nation that he was a Keynesian, however, as 
he destroyed the very fiber of the nascent Keynesian revolution, and a politician with 
liberal pretensions, as he undermined Johnsonian liberalism, Nixon taught the nation to 
discount the prescriptions of most liberal economists, then still in the vanguard o f their 
profession.13 With the silent majority and the suburb as its penultimate symbols, a 
revived racism emerged on the heels o f this economic confusion and the new zero-sum 
political economy such disorientation had partly engendered. What was very active but 
diminishing in significance in the mid-1960s, became much more significant by the end 
of the decade. What originated as filter through which specific Great Society programs 
were misperceived, came to be a much more blinding obstruction that provoked a 
misunderstanding o f the whole economy.14 Helping to transform security into a function 
of selfishness and architectural isolation, rather than community prosperity, the rising
13 Outside o f  his interview with Howard K. Smith, when he announced him self as a Keynesian, Nixon's 
embrace o f  the Keynesian label was perhaps most apparent when he borrowed the N ew  Economics 
principle o f  the "balanced budget at full employment," not because he believed it to be a valid principle, 
but because it was a convenient excuse for greater deficit spending and because it helped him align his 
ill-fated policies with the ideology and strategy o f  his Democratic predecessors. Nixon adopted this 
principle in an April 1970 speech: "At times the economic situation calls for...a budget deficit. There is 
one basic guideline which w e should never violate....Expenditures should never be allowed to outrun the 
revenues that the tax system would produce at reasonably full employment." Quoted in John Morton 
Blum, Years o f  D iscord, 404.
14 See Jill Quadagno, The Color o f  Welfare: H ow Racism Undermined the War on P overty  (N ew  York: 
Oxford University Press, 1994), for a cogent analysis o f  how racism has limited public anti-poverty 
programs and convinced many that these programs are much larger and more debilitating than they really 
are. See also Zarefsky, President Johnson's War on Poverty , 89-91, for an analysis o f  Johnson's attempt 
to broaden the definition o f  the War on Poverty and the ensuing consequences o f  that effort. Zarefsky 
noted that the War on Poverty, despite Johnson's attempts to broaden the definition, had become 
"identified in the public mind with a component even sm aller than the Office o f  Economic Opportunity 
[to which Johnson thought the public had limited it]: local community action." Emphasis in original. 
Though Zarefsky confused presidential rhetoric impelled by anxious and often angry constituents 
(Johnson's attempts to highlight only initiatives through which federal funds were spent directly on poor 
relief) with the real War on Poverty (which included the administration's fiscal, monetary, and wage- 
price policies as well), he did uncover the almost absurd dimensions o f  the misguided public response. If 
anything, the definition o f  the War on Poverty that encompassed fiscal, monetary, and wage-price 
policies makes Zarefsky's thesis all the more profound.
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enmity between the races also made it that much easier for Nixon and his successors to 
loose the economy from its fragile demand-based moorings without drawing significant 
recognition or protest.15 Suggesting, like many politicians after him, that the poor 
(blacks) were victimized and shortchanged by those who sought to help them, only 
made the new racism as palatable as it was disingenuous. This also paved the way for a 
defeatist and paternalistic approach that helped create, for example, an affirmative 
action policy characterized by quotas, set-asides, and dual standards, couched in an 
economic system where one gained only at the expense of another. Where Johnson had 
encouraged an economic strategy that produced a scarcity o f skilled labor, Nixon 
encouraged one that produced a scarcity of good jobs. Where Johnson had encouraged 
an effort to find qualified minorities for both public and private employment—where 
there was real demand, Nixon wanted nothing so messy or incontrovertible and sought 
rigid targets instead. With them, he simply had the best o f both worlds (in his own 
mind, anyway), for he could take credit for civil rights "progress" just as he helped 
discredit affirmative action or "welfare" in general, creating, as Jonathon Rauch put it, 
veritable "factories of resentment" that would clearly target his Democratic opponents.16
If the Nixon administration truly derailed the New Economics, and with it the 
American economy, how did the United States travel from one system which created 
prosperity to another which made it increasingly more elusive? Was Nixon unwise 
enough and cunning enough to do this by himself? Did Americans simply fail to notice 
domestic policy in an era of foreign policy turbulence? Like Johnson, Nixon was only 
responsible for part of any major policy change; Congress, the private sector, and the 
public at large all impinged upon the potential for a restructured economic strategy. Nor 
did most Americans exhibit a predilection for overlooking domestic policy. The 1970s,
15 For a brilliant evocation o f  this dystopic and desperate approach to security see Mike Davis, City o f  
Quartz: Exca\>ating the Future in Los Angeles (London: Verso, New  Left Books, 1990), especially 223- 
263.
16 Jonathan Rauch, "What Nixon Wrought," 30.
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rather than the 1960s, were, after all, the decade in which government regulatory 
activity and bureaucracy truly mushroomed. It is unlikely that waning interest could 
have combined in any way with such frenetic legislative activity and bureaucratic 
change. Nixon was able to create a fundamental change in the nation's political 
economy, instead, because the war in Vietnam, combined with the enigmatic personality 
o f Lyndon Johnson, had created a considerable political vacuum, and because the profit- 
centered supply side paradigm remained compelling to most Americans even as 
Kennedy and Johnson suggested its obsolescence. Even "Operation Breadbasket," for 
example, a program designed by the clearly liberal-minded Southern Christian 
Leadership Conference, did more to help black entrepreneurs than it did to help the 
unemployed, even though it was designed to help the latter most o f all.17
A beneficent economic strategy was discarded largely because most Americans 
came to identify it as something it was not, and because a substantial political vacuum 
had made such a misrepresentation possible. Left-wing radicals believed that 
Johnsonian liberalism sought "growth at all costs," and saw it, therefore, as an approach 
that made the Cold War (and Vietnam) little more than an extension o f a flawed 
domestic policy. Johnson's fellow liberals often sympathized with the radical-Left 
appraisal, but also had a difficult time distinguishing, and therefore defending, 
Johnsonian liberalism and the New Economics from the corporate liberalism against 
which it so often struggled. To many o f them, Johnson was little more than a corporate 
liberal firmly ensconced in the big government, New Deal tradition, and Keynes was 
simply an advocate o f the fiscalism that made such a political enterprise possible. Less 
surprisingly, conservatives also lent little support to the New Economics, despite their 
tentative support of some of its key initiatives. In so far as their conservatism stemmed 
from an allegiance to the American business community, however, those on the right
17 See James MacGregor Bums and Stewart Bums, A People's Charter (N ew  York: Knopf, 1991), 329.
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were often in a position to see somewhat less darkly and to defend the prosperity o f the 
Kennedy-Johnson political economy. The New Economics had, after all, coincided with 
a period of unparallelled business profitability. Notwithstanding Johnson's efforts at 
bipartisanship and consensus, it was, nevertheless, still too easy to regard the success of 
an ostensibly Democratic strategy as a threat to the political fortunes o f the party to 
which many in the business community still belonged. For his part, Johnson truly failed 
to appreciate— in the wake of his unprecedented drive for consensus—the extreme 
partisanship o f the Republican party and its members' resistance to a genuine 
consensus.18 Likewise, it was also too easy to spark the fear that business profitability 
remained threatened by, rather than dependent upon, Johnsonian liberalism and steady 
consumer demand. Most conservatives were, instead, anxious to credit technological 
change and managerial ingenuity for the rising prosperity and rising profits o f the 1960s 
and to blame excess demand for the era's most intractable economic problems. As most 
o f Johnson's Keynesian advisers would attest, technology and corporate ingenuity were 
not, after all, insignificant factors. Nor were they, however, suitable substitutes for 
steady demand; standing alone they would clearly begin to diminish in both power and 
prevalence. Say's law, it seems, was alive and well, despite the successes o f the 
Keynesian revolution and the efforts of these same advisers to qualify their appreciation 
o f both technology and managerial expertise.19
The incremental pattern of Johnson's political strategy, dictated as much by 
economic as it was political considerations, also made a successful conservative assault
18 See Lewis Gould, "Never a Deep Partisan," 23, for an extended appraisal o f  this problem.
19 Attributed to the French businessman and economist, Jean Baptiste Say (1767-1832), Say's law 
suggested that supply created its own demand. The overturning o f  Say's law was one the primary 
objectives undertaken by Keynes in The General Theory. See James Tobins' comments in Tobin, 
"Keynesian Economics and its Renaissance," 106, for an example o f  this kind o f  "qualified" 
endorsement. "Fiscal and monetary management o f  aggregate demand," Tobin declared, "imoprtant and 
essential as they are in the advanced democratic capitalist countries, w ill not bring Bangladesh or 
Tanzania out o f  poverty. They will not even speed up significantly the growth o f  productivity in the 
advanced economies themselves." Tobin added, however, that the "long run growth o f  potential output" 
would clearly be hampered by high rates o f  unemployment and excess capacity.
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all the more likely. When the public asked what was working and what was failing, it 
was still too easy for conservative pundits to provide deceptively simple and thoroughly 
misleading responses. Consequently, many Americans had great difficulty identifying a 
clean break between the old and new policies. Orthodoxy received acclaim that was 
largely unwarranted and the New Economics became identified with principles and 
practices that it had tended to scom. Conservative criticism of a particular variety, 
originating in the 1930s with the New Deal, had in fact spawned the mistaken belief that 
there had been no break at all—that the Keynesian demand model, characterized by 
deficit spending, had prevailed all along and had remained intact through the 1970s. 
Nothing could be more misleading or false, but it became, nevertheless, the most 
commonly accepted appraisal. Yet, this trap could hardly be avoided. The New 
Economics had set out, after all, not to force a sudden redistribution o f the nation's 
income, but to alter, in a much more subtle and incremental fashion, the way the 
country's businesses, workers, and consumers listened to and reacted to the 
marketplace—acknowledging at the same time that the government had a significant 
role in the sharpening of both marketplace clarity and consistency.
If  Johnson failed in any large way here, it was because he was weak in 
understanding, as journalist William S. White described it, "that many others are not as 
perceptive as he is....persisting in the assumption that sensible men will understand his 
purposes without being told, just as he would, in fact, understand theirs."20 Education, 
by the President and his economic advisers, was, indeed, an inescapable part o f the New 
Economics and its requirement for subtle, incremental change. Although Johnson 
proved successful at persuading business leaders and conservative opponents to try the 
New Economics, he often felt less of a need to explain exactly what it meant. "When I 
do something, I figure I am dealing with grown-up people," Johnson once said.21
20 White, The Professional, 65.
21 Quoted in White, The Professional, 69.
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Indeed, Johnson was dealing with grown-up people, and his relationship with many 
business leaders and conservative politicians, those he most fervently hoped to sway, 
remained strong even as his popularity plummeted. Many members of the business 
community were also coming to understand the soundness o f the Johnson anti-inflation 
program and were, as a result, beginning to endorse its difficult logic. The origins o f the 
inflation, in fact, made the struggle for price stability and the crusade to win business 
support inseparable. There remained a political vacuum, however, for much of the 
American public and many small business owners were as yet unconvinced by the 
obvious success o f the New Economics, and the war in Vietnam added a dimension of 
loathing and visceral hatred that isolated Johnson from his otherwise natural 
constituency. Johnson's successor was also a politician whose party stood poised to pick 
up the pieces o f a shattered consensus. Fellow liberals, who should have been among 
the staunchest supporters o f the New Economics, had become bitter opponents instead, 
equating Johnson with Vietnam and domestic with foreign policy. That Richard Nixon 
would exploit this division, to the detriment of the nation's economy, should have come 
as no surprise. Ultimately, like Jacksonian Democrats who voted for the Tariff of 
Abominations in 1828 so their leader could then run against it, Nixon chose to ignore 
inflation and to encourage anti-war protest even as he remonstrated against high prices 
and draft-dodging beatniks (or sent Spiro Agnew and Pat Buchanan out after them). "He 
is one o f the ablest, shrewdest, most disingenuous and slipperiest politicians ever to 
show up on the American scene," John Birch Society founder Robert Welch once said 
o f Nixon. "I think Nixon could become a very patriotic anti-communist," he added, "if 
we could create circumstances in which it would be smart politics to be one."22 
President Kennedy was even more succinct. To him, Nixon was simply "a filthy, lying 
son-of-a-bitch, and a very dangerous man."23
22 Quoted in Donald Janson and Bernard Eismann, The Far Right (N ew  York: McGraw-Hill, 1963), 37.
23 Quoted in Reeves, A Question o f  Character, 190.
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As shrewd and disingenuous as Nixon was, however, it was the scorn and 
incomprehension of liberals and the New Left that really swallowed Johnson and the 
New Economics. As Michael Riccards put it, "the liberals never understood or cared to 
appreciate the extent to which the poverty program especially, and the Great Society in 
general were dependent on Lyndon Johnson."24 Johnson was the glue that held the 
1960s liberal coalition together, but few ever realized just what comprised this coalition, 
let alone that it was fragile enough to require such a leader. Crucial to the success o f the 
conservative counterrevolution in the 1970s and 1980s, John Schwarz noted, was that it 
"evolved at a time when there existed few other ideas, a virtual vacuum of thought, with 
liberal views in almost complete disarray." As Schwarz saw it, liberals "could neither 
explain nor provide a solution to the problem of stagflation," forcing Americans to 
search for a new direction and to consider any plan "other than the policies and the 
programs that had dominated the past."25 Christopher Lasch was even more emphatic. 
"Liberalism," Lasch noted, "the political theory o f the ascendent bourgeoisie, long ago 
lost the capacity to explain events in the world of the welfare state and the multinational 
corporation; nothing has taken its place. Politically bankrupt, liberalism is intellectually 
bankrupt as well."26
The disarray and political bankruptcy described by Schwarz and Lasch were real 
enough; New Left historians and liberal Democrats alike adopted new gurus, from 
Milton Friedman to Friedrich von Hayek, who told them that active management of the 
economy was destined to backfire and disappoint. Lost was a clear appraisal o f the New 
Economics and the ability to distinguish Johnsonian liberalism from either its historical 
forerunners or its vulgarized successors. Even Lasch's critique, observant and insightful
24 Michael Riccards, "Failure o f  Nerve: How the Liberals Killed Liberalism," in Firestone and Vogt, eds., 
Lyndon Baines Johnson and  the Uses o f  Power, 83-85.
25 Schwarz, America's Hidden Success, 122.
26 Christopher Lasch, The Culture o f  Narcissism: American Life in an Age o f  Diminishing Expectations 
(N ew  York: W.W. Norton, 1979), 18.
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as it was in regard to liberalism in the 1970s, missed the essence o f Lyndon Johnson and 
the New Economics. Lasch termed corporate bureaucracies "the real centers o f power in 
our contemporary society," and suggested that "Naderite and cooperative movements" 
had begun to lead us away from "consumerism and the thrall of corporate political 
power," but there was no recognition that Johnsonian liberalism was indeed a challenge 
to these very "centers o f power." In a work that purported to deconstruct the failings of 
Johnsonian liberalism, Lyndon Johnson is mentioned only once.27
Although Schwarz provided a compelling defense of an activist approach to 
economic management, he too reflected a casual acceptance of the anti-Keynesian 
economic framework and a relative blindness to the challenge of the New Economics.
To Schwarz, the "crowded generation," and government's unwillingness to acknowledge 
it, rather than a fundamental shift in economic priorities, lay at the root o f the post- 
Johnson economic breakdown. The War on Poverty, Schwarz suggested, was a success; 
its relative abandonment a critical mistake. But to Schwarz, government assistance 
programs comprised virtually the whole o f this noble effort; there was, as he saw it, no 
New Economics to which one could attribute the economic success o f the 1960s. 
Overlooked is the aggregate character of the post-war baby boom: while it swelled the 
size o f the potential workforce in the 1960s and 1970s and served as a potential 
economic obstacle of no small significance, it also helped create jobs just as it 
demanded their creation.28 Largely ignoring the evolution o f the New Economics—
27 Ibid., 116-117 ,21 , 377. While Lasch focused much attention on the weakness and bankruptcy o f  
liberal economics, and suggests that this determined much o f  the culture he finds wanting, he simply 
assumed, unlike his approach to other somewhat subordinate inquiries, that his primary contention was 
valid. Nowhere in the entire work did he offer an explicit example o f  1960s liberal econom ics at work. 
Mentioned only on page 119, Johnson was cited here only as an illustration o f  som eone scorned by the 
country's preoccupation with image over reality. He was not even the primary subject o f  this one 
selection.
28 Schwarz, America's Hidden Success, 124-144. On the Kennedy-Johnson acknowledgement o f  
population boom, see Kennedy's speech to a Tampa, Florida steelworkers' local a few days before his 
death. "We have to move tremendously fast," Kennedy noted, reminiscent o f  Lewis Carroll's Red Queen, 
"just to stand still." Cited in Rowen, The Free Enterprisers, 271.
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where job creation came just ahead of market-oriented redistribution—as well as the 
tight labor markets that prevailed at the end o f the Johnson presidency, Schwarz 
overlooked both the general efficiency of the New Economics and the extent to which it 
had begun to make the War on Poverty both a fiscal possibility and a manageable 
crusade. Providing millions o f jobs for the non-poor (and thousands for the poor) and 
the kind of growth that made new income transfers a possibility, the New Economics 
had, indeed, helped tighten labor markets to the point where redistribution of wealth 
was not only a more distinct possibility but also a step in the direction of economic 
efficiency.
Fundamental to the liberal inability to understand the New Economics was the 
complex political personality o f Lyndon Johnson. An enigma throughout his career, 
Johnson was simply not an easy politician to figure out, even if his political personality 
stemmed in large measure from his overwhelmingly simple and unvarnished approach 
to political communication. "You study different pictures o f Lyndon Johnson," John 
Connally recalled. "You try to put them together. It is like trying to lift an untied bale of 
hay."29 Johnson Press Secretary George Reedy recalled how Johnson perplexed even his 
closest associates. "He was a son of a bitch," Reedy noted, "but he was a colossal son of 
a bitch."30 Most liberals, and almost all of those who described themselves as the New 
Left, though, believed only the first part of Reedy's characterization. To many of them 
Johnson was coarse and profane and largely one-dimensional. He whooped for tourists 
in the Taj Mahal, chauffered journalists at the LBJ ranch at speeds approaching 100 
m.p.h., slowing only to refill his Cutty and soda or to seize a piglet for an admiring 
journalist. When he won the 1964 presidential election a small Texas town gave him its 
used fire truck; he took it for a drive, clanging the bell and driving like he was rushing 
to the scene o f a great conflagration. He showed the world his surgical scar after a 1965
29 Connally, with Herskowitz, In History's Shadow, 63.
30 George Reedy, Lyndon Johnson: A Memoir, (New York: Andrews and McMeel, 1982), 158.
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gall bladder operation—a gesture caricatured brilliantly by David Levine in the New 
York Review o f  Books (redrawing the scar to resemble a map of Vietnam). He swam 
naked in the White House pool, and conducted business from the White House 
bathroom—often exaggerating his openness to normal biological functions or nudity to 
shock those he deemed too pretentious.31 He reprimanded associates often without 
regard for curious and somewhat unfamiliar onlookers and he would often eat off o f his 
friends' plates. His speech was filled with country rhythms and country similes, and he 
cursed with the ease o f a man accustomed to a free-flowing barnyard vocabulary. 
Getting your "pecker cut off," for example, was Johnson's way of describing a 
resounding political defeat.32 "Mr. President, You're Fun," read one Time magazine 
caption in April 1964. "Let him get a whiff of a spring-fresh Texas range dotted with 
cattle and Angora goats," remarked the Time writer, "and he comes on like a cross 
between a teen-age Grand Prix driver and a back-to-nature Thoreau in cowboy boots."33
As Bill Moyers once noted, however, "Lyndon Johnson was also a man of 
extraordinarily high intelligence. His ponderous physical presence and his country style 
diverted attention from other qualities that were crucial to his effectiveness and the 
capacity for swift and sure judgement."34 Few who worked closely with Johnson left 
unimpressed by the force of his active intellect. "After years of meeting first-rate minds 
in and out of universities," Princeton historian Eric Goldman added, "I am sure I have
31 Joe Phipps, a Johnson assistant during the 1948 senatorial campaign, recalled how Johnson would  
dictate memos to his female secretaries as he emerged naked from a shower and how he would often dart 
back into the bathroom in the middle o f  a conversation and continue with business as usual, bathroom 
door ajar. "I was still not hardened to his openness with normal biological functions," Phipps noted, "he 
didn't bother to close the door." See Phipps, Summer Stock, 192.
32 When Richard Goodwin failed to influence negotiations over the Highway Beautification bill as LBJ 
had hoped and expected, Johnson told the White House staff (including Goodwin) that "...the ugliest 
sound 1 heard this week, was the swish, swish, swish when Pat NcNamara [Chairman o f  the Senate Public 
Works Committee] cut o ff  Goodwin's pecker." Quoted in Califano, Triumph and Tragedy, 83.
33 "The Presidency: 'Mr. President, You're Fun'" Time, April 10, 1964 ,22a-23a. The caption title came 
from a remark attributed to Hearst reporter Marianne Means, a passenger in Johnson's Continental as the 
President "zigzagged around dung mounds and clusters o f  white-faced cattle."
34 Quoted in Hardesty, ed., The Johnson Years, 26.
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never met a more intelligent person than Lyndon Johnson."35 Press Secretary George 
Reedy recalled that "the Johnson IQ took a back seat to very few others— perhaps even 
to none. His mind was magnificent—fast, penetrating, resourceful."36 His coarse 
mannerisms, Hubert Humphrey recalled, "were the black keys of the piano he 
played....the only time he ever became a phony was when he tried to become too 
pure."37 Kennedy and Johnson assistant, and former Harvard dean, McGeorge Bundy, 
once snapped at fellow Kennedy assistants who ridiculed Johnson's mannerisms. "You 
people are snobs," Bundy declared. "You don't understand Texans and you don't 
understand this man. He can become one of the greatest forces for good. He has a gut 
power which gets things done."38 Harry McPherson referred to Johnson as Boccaccio, 
Machiavelli, and Keats rolled into one.39 Many refused, however, to see Johnson as 
anything but a slightly more refined version o f George Wallace, himself once a New 
Deal populist politician. Many of his most prominent liberal or left-wing critics believed 
Johnson to be always on the verge o f a Wallace-like metamorphosis, reverting to racism 
and reactionary social policies at a moment's notice and resigning himself to a career as 
a "redneck poultergeist."40 Though conservatives also encouraged this outlook— from 
the 1964 National Review lampooning o f Johnson as "Uncle Cornpone" onward, fellow 
liberals and those on the left in general tended to offer the most disapproving 
caricatures.41
35 Goldman, The Tragedy o f  Lyndon Johnson, 525.
36 Quoted in Dallek, Lone Star Rising, 356.
37 Quoted in Miller, Lyndon, 541. Humphrey and others often contrasted Johnson with Nixon in this 
regard, suggesting that when the latter cursed it was contrived and unnatural and a transparent attempt to 
be "one o f  the boys."
38 Quoted in Sam Houston Johnson, My Brother Lyndon, 199.
39 Cited in Connally, with Herskowitz, In History's Shadow, 195.
40 The "redneck poultergeist" characterization comes from Dan Thomas Carter, "Race, Politics, and the 
Second Reconstruction," Walter Lynwood Fieming Lecture in Southern History, Louisiana State 
University, April 8, 1992.
41 See "Uncle Cornpone Greets the Press," National Review, October 6, 1964. Johnson’s brother Sam 
maintained that the "Uncle Cornpone" sobriquet originated with Kennedy staffers. Sam Houston Johnson, 
My Brother Lyndon, 108.
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John Connally blamed himself for part o f this problem for he always encouraged 
Johnson to be himself and to avoid masquerading as a cultural sophisticate. "You're 
terrible on television," he once told Johnson, "because you want to be Roosevelt or 
Kennedy. Why did Harry Truman finally win over the people? Because they came to 
see him as someone who was real, whose emotions were his own."42 Indeed, television 
and the print media, added to Johnson's reputation for coarseness and lack of 
sophistication or intelligence. He was "syrupy," Joe McGinniss recalled. "He stuck to 
the lens."43 Johnson realized it too, agreeing once to a TV handling session with Stuart 
Rosenberg, director o f the 1967 film "Cool Hand Luke," only to call it off when it was 
leaked to the press. Johnson's syrupiness, however, stemmed more from his efforts at 
reining in his personality, than from his inability to smooth out its rough edges. 
"Watching him on television from my hospital bed," Johnson's brother Sam noted in 
1964, "I saw once more how poorly that medium works for him. He looked stiff and 
unnatural and you could tell that he was reading some one else's words."44 After 
conducting a number o f interviews with President Johnson, Doris Kearns suggested a 
convincing explanation o f this predicament:
The power of his tales lay always in the telling— in the gestures, tone, and 
timing....But, for reasons connected perhaps with the relationship between his 
parents, he never accepted the validity o f this mode o f talk. It could only be used, 
he thought, in private; it was inappropriate for public meetings...Before a more 
formal gathering, or in front of the television screen, he feared that his audience 
would scorn his wild gesticulations and crude language. And in the Presidency 
these feelings were reinforced by the view that the office was a stately institution 
demanding decorous appearances at all times."45
Late in the presidency during one press conference, in a more measured approach to
public relations and coaching by concerned assistants, Johnson agreed to move out from
behind the rostrum and to utilize a lavalier (lapel) microphone. It made him look more
42 Connally, with Herskowitz, In History's Shadow, 195.
43 McGinniss, The Selling o f  the President, 28.
44 Sam Houston Johnson, My Brother Lyndon, 171.
4:1 Kearns, Lyndon Johnson and  the American Dream, 354-355.
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natural and more trustworthy but Johnson thought it too informal for public appearances 
by the nation's chief executive. It was not repeated.46
While Nixon often leapt at the opportunity for skillfully contrived appearances and 
almost wholly encouraged the elevation o f style over substance, Johnson tried instead, 
to the chagrin o f some of his closest advisers, to resist the choreography and artifice 
implied by this clearly emerging trend47 "Hard for P [President Nixon] to stay on the 
big issues," H. R. Haldeman complained to his diary in March 1969, "he keeps hacking 
away at PR concern, especially in the domestic program area."48 On the other hand, 
when CBS' Dan Rather requested an opportunity to film White House assistants at work 
on Vietnam policy in 1965, Johnson denied the request and wrote to Press Secretary 
George Reedy: "[I] have much more work that you can handle and these men are 
workers on routine, not actors. This man and CBS out to get us anyway."49 Johnson 
simply hated being hemmed in by choreographed public relations or press leaks, 
something many in the press corps and much of the American public failed to 
understand. "That striding Texas president," Liz Carpenter recalled, "never relented 
from scooping up the whole press and walking them around the South lawn, or suddenly 
flying to the grass roots to sign legislation. They weren't used to a man who spilled over 
like that."50 Many o f Johnson's defenders would argue that he failed to project a more 
likeable image simply because he tried to place substance ahead of style. It is more 
likely, however, that his style, never in short supply, could simply not play well in an 
electronic age. "If you read the dictionary about style," Washington Post editor Ben 
Bradlee remarked, "the fact is that Johnson had more style than Kennedy. If style is
46 Valenti, A Very Human President, 274-276.
47 See John Anthony Maltese, Spin Control: The White House Office o f  Communications and  the 
M anagement o f  Presidential News (Chapel Hill: University o f  North Carolina Press, 1994), for an 
illuminating analysis o f  this trend and the role o f  the White House Office o f  Communications, created in 
1969 by Richard Nixon.
48 Haldeman, The Haldeman D iaries, 39.
49 Memo, George Reedy to LBJ, not dated, LBJ Handwriting File, Box 9, LBJ Library.
50 Quoted in Hardesty, ed., The Johnson Years, 29.
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individuality—that individuality by which one distinguishes a person— he was just a 
goddamn bank vault o f style."51 Although Johnson applauded the democratization of 
politics implied by greater and more pervasive media coverage, and immersed himself 
constantly in the pulse o f the nation's print and electronic media, he always lamented the 
eclipse of messy but practical political maneuvers for a more polite, less effective brand 
of politics fit for a more image-conscious mass media. "You guys, all you guys in the 
media," Johnson complained prophetically in the late 1950s. "All o f politics has 
changed because o f you. You've broken all the machines and the ties between us in 
Congress and the city machines."52
However it was effected, liberal and left-radical disdain for Johnson was, and 
largely remains, replete with contradiction and perilous oversimplification. Novelist 
Joseph Heller suggested in a 1975 interview that the ideal politician must possess the 
willingness and ability to compromise. "I don't like the way reformers react to our 
political process," Heller noted. "They have a difficult time realizing they must 
compromise or remain outsiders." In a separate interview four years later he also 
lamented that "no one is trying to deal with unemployment and inflation at the same 
time." Though Johnson was perhaps the one twentieth century President who best 
conformed to Heller's political ideal, Heller expressed little but contempt for the thirty- 
sixth President, particularly during his presidency.53 In a 1968 interview, Heller 
declared:
I have a spiteful animosity for Johnson and Humphrey, because we're not dealing 
with something insignificant like the Teapot Dome scandal. We are dealing with 
organized mass murder.... Every thing else is dwarfed by the monumental atrocity 
of Vietnam.... Where are Johnson's accomplishments? He may have done
51 Quoted in Miller, Lyndon, 343.
52 Quoted in Culbert, "Johnson and the Media," 214.
53 Joseph Heller, "Playboy Interview," interviewed by Sam Merrill, June 1975; and Heller, interviewed 
by the editor, U.S. News and World Report, April 9, 1979 in Adam Sorkin, ed„ Conversations with 
Joseph Heller (Jackson: University Press o f  Mississippi, 1993), 156, .
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something in terms of statutes, but the state of the country is infinitely worse 
today than when he came in.54
Seven years later Heller's position had softened somewhat. "At least Johnson had a
sense o f humor," he remarked. "His jokes were apparently very cruel, but they were
jokes. And Johnson was shrewd. He had a quality o f strength missing in both Nixon and
Agnew." His appraisal was, nevertheless, still dominated by the war in Vietnam and his
belief that Johnson had waged the war single-handedly: "Johnson and Nixon were
frightening because they demonstrated that an American President—even in a
democracy, without government censorship— is capable o f waging a one man war. That
would not be possible in Russia, which is a dictatorship run by committee, or in China,
where there are several powerful men."55 The same popular culture that ridiculed
ineffectual liberalism (President Merkin Muffley in Dr. Strangelove, for example) as
well as crass materialism—buoyed by the New Left and by Hollywood liberals—
rejected without reservation the one President who most closely conformed to its
ideals.56
Professional historians with liberal inclinations also exhibited similar 
contradictions. When the Organization o f American Historians reported the results of a 
survey on the practice and purpose of American history, in the December 1994, Journal 
o f  American History, 178 respondents chose either the Civil Rights Movement (135), 
the 1960s (20), the 1964 Civil Rights bill and the Voting Rights Act (19), or the Great 
Society/War on Poverty (4) as "a bright spot in American history"—all events with 
which Lyndon Johnson was intimately associated or even for which he was primarily 
responsible (the latter two). When the same survey asked, "What person in American
54 Heller, New York Times interview, interviewed by Israel Shenker, December 29, 1968, in ibid., 53.
55 Heller, "Playboy Interview," 157.
56 See Charles Maland, "Dr. Strangelove: Nightmare Comedy and the Ideology o f  the Liberal 
Consensus," in Steven Mintzand Randy Roberts, eds., Hollywood's America: United States History> 
Through Its Films (St. James, NY: Brandywine Press, 1993), 252-264; and Michael Ryan and Douglas 
Kellner, "From Counterculture to Counterrevolution, 1967-1971," in ibid., 265-274, for insightful 
analyses o f  Hollywood as a reflection o f  the 1960s counterculture.
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history do you most admire?" 482 respondents chose twelve different U.S. presidents, 
but not a one chose Lyndon B. Johnson.57
Historian Garry Wills, in an essay entitled "What Makes a Good Leader?" 
described the great leader as one who issues a call that followers are prepared to hear. 
Lincoln forged a combination o f voters, Wills contended, who joined him "in at least a 
minimal disapproval of slavery;" and he "trimmed and hedged on slavery in order to 
make people take small steps toward facing the problem." Franklin Roosevelt made 
"deals with the devil" (his conservative opposition) to maintain a hold on those who 
"might respond to his call." Both were great leaders, as Wills saw it, because they were 
able to find "common ground with those they sought to lead."58 On economic strategy, 
comprised of principles infinitely more difficult to comprehend than the inhumanity of 
slavery or the need for optimism and a stiff upper lip during an economic depression 
(FDR's major accomplishment according to Wills), Johnson did the same, but few 
acknowledged the requisite leadership. Most historians have drawn, instead, a picture of 
Lyndon Johnson as a leader without a genuine strategy, and for whom the passing of 
legislation "became and end in itself."59 "I've got his pecker in my pocket" was the 
Johnsonian declaration that defined the 36th President for much of the nation's 
intelligentsia and liberal establishment.60 Among the liberal vanguard o f the 1960s and 
1970s, only black civil rights leaders continued to hold Johnson in high regard, despite 
their own deep misgivings and protest over the war in Vietnam. Sharpening their focus 
on economic issues as many fellow liberals were losing their own, leaders o f the civil 
rights movement generally remained strongly opposed to but not blinded by events in
57 "A Statistical Summary o f  Survey Results," Journal o f  American History, December 1994, Tables 3.6, 
3.5, 1210-1211.
58 Garry Wills, "What Makes a Good Leader?" Atlantic Monthly, April 1994, 67, 68, 69, 79, 80.
59 Matusow, The Unraveling o f  America, 153.
60 Joseph Heller used this quotation on the epigraph page o f  his 1979 novel G ood  As Gold.
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Southeast Asia. In 1968, as the Johnson presidency approached its end, Ralph Ellison 
wrote:
It is possible that much of the intellectual's distrust o f President Johnson springs 
from a false knowledge drawn from the shabby myths purveyed by Western 
movies. Perhaps they feel that a Texan intoning the values o f humanism in an 
unreconstructed Texas accent is to be regarded as suspiciously as a Greek bearing 
gifts; thus they can listen to what he says with provincial ears and ignore the 
President's concrete achievements here at home while staring blindly at the fires 
o f a distant war.
Well, I too am concerned with the war in Vietnam and would like to see it 
ended, but the fact remains that I am also familiar with other costly wars o f much 
longer duration right here at home...and therefore I cannot so easily ignore the 
changes that the President has made in the condition of my people and still 
consider myself a responsible intellectual....No one has initiated more legislation 
for education, for health, for racial justice, for the arts, for urban reform than 
Lyndon Johnson. Presently it is the fashion o f many intellectuals to ignore these 
accomplishments., .but if  those of other backgrounds and interests can afford to be 
blind to their existence, my own interests and background compel me to bear 
witness....When all o f the returns are in, perhaps President Johnson will have to 
settle for being the greatest American President for the poor and for the Negroes, 
but that, as I see it, is a very great honor indeed.61
Ellison also suggested that Johnson's most successful measures "have produced
impatience and released forces and energies which obscure the full extent of his
accomplishments."62 Touched by this impatience and by the crosscurrents of
revolutionary politics, many black Americans saw Johnson differently, as a far less
honorable politician, and often compared him unfavorably with his martyred
predecessor. "Daddy always had been a conspiracy buff," noted Henry Louis Gates, Jr.
"He hated 'Lynchin' Johnson, as he called him, and was convinced in November 1963,
that he had killed JFK."63 Robert Divine suggested that ignorance of Johnson's
complexity even led some biographers, who should have known better, to overlook
much o f what made Johnson successful throughout his career. If his "path to power"
61 Ralph Ellison, "The Myth o f  the Flawed White Southerner," in To H eal and to Build: The Program s o f  
Lyndon Johnson , ed. James McGregor Burns, 2 1 2 ,216 .
62 Ibid., 216.
63 Henry Louis Gates, Jr., C olored People: A M emoir (Hew  York: Knopf, 1994), 187.
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was paved with nothing but duped colleagues, Divine noted, then it certainly would 
have been far less successful and productive than it was.64 "If he was such a Satanic 
figure, as some depicted him," John Connally added, "why were so many so loyal to 
him?"65 As Bill Moyers recalled, "I was always surprised, how Lyndon Johnson could 
always make me want to act above my age and ability. That's a peculiarity that I don't 
understand to this day."66
Many of Johnson's critics on the left also misapprehended Johnson's ideological 
commitment and his economic strategy, simply because they failed to understand, or 
even acknowledge, the thrust of his drive for consensus. To them, particularly after the 
escalation in Vietnam, Johnson's overwhelming and obvious desire for consensus 
indicated little but a willingness to surrender to predatious but still obsequious and 
utterly dependent conservative forces. "To accomplish social reform," Allen Matusow 
asserted, "they [Johnsonian liberals] had to buy off vested interests and call it 
consensus."67 Suspicious of Johnson from the time John Kennedy had picked him as his 
running mate in the 1960 presidential campaign, liberals and left-wing radicals alike had 
extended little more than grudging respect for Johnson before Vietnam became a source 
of increasing dissension. With Vietnam, suspicion turned to outright animosity. "This 
bumbling man...holds a hot LBJ brand in his aging fist," wrote Sidney Bernard in 1968, 
"and wants to initial us all with the infamy of his six-shooter ego. Who talks o f courage 
and austerity while golden eggs are being hatched in the henhouse of the rich."68 From 
the June 1965, White House Festival of the Arts—where talk o f boycott and protest was
64 Robert Divine, "The Johnson Revival: A Bibliographic Appraisal," in Robert Divine, ed., The Johnson 
Years, Vol. 2: Vietnam, the Environment, and Science (Lawrence: University Press o f  Kansas, 1987), 5. 
Divine was referring primarily to the two volumes written by Robert A. Caro: The Years o f  Lyndon 
Johnson: The Path to Power and The Years o f  Lyndon Johnson: Means o f  Ascent.
65 Connally, with Herskowitz, In History's Shadow, 209.
66 Quoted in Hardesty, ed., The Johnson Years, 35.
67 Matusow, The Unraveling o f  America, 270.
68 Sidney Bernard, This Way to the Apocalypse: The 60s (N ew  York: The Smith, Horizon Press, 1969), 
75.
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in the air—to the end of his term in 1969, Johnson became the recipient o f left-liberal 
scorn and revulsion, and a visceral hatred that seldom depended upon rational analysis. 
"It used to be," John Steinbeck noted, "that we worried about protecting the intellectuals 
and artists from the government. Now it looks like we have to protect the government 
from the intellectuals and artists."69 Performing at the close o f the 1965 Arts festival one 
member of Duke Ellington's orchestra summed up the confusion, consternation, and the 
anti-LBJ furor: "Man, the trouble with these cats is that they wanna be here, and they 
don't wanna be here."70
Johnson's entire career, though, had been one during which populist or liberal ideas 
and policies had always faced almost insurmountable odds, and where he had struggled 
earnestly and consistently to reduce such a handicap. As Robert Dallek pointed out, 
even when Johnson seemed to be capitulating to conservative trends or legislative 
initiatives he typically worked quietly behind the scenes to sustain fundamental liberal 
prerogatives.71 "Every leader expresses high ideals," John Gardner once noted. "The 
task is to figure out the degree o f hypocrisy, and Washington makes the calculation 
swiftly and precisely. It took the town no time at all to figure out that with respect to 
health, education, poverty, and the like, President Johnson meant exactly what he said, 
and the impact was great."72 Johnson knew, perhaps better than any politician in U.S. 
history, just how deeply the nation's conservative instincts ran, and he had amassed an 
impressive and colorful arsenal o f political weapons designed to confront and challenge 
both prejudice and reaction. The opportunity to use these weapons often required "dirty 
politics" or capitulation to the nation's conservative leadership on some of their short­
term imperatives. As Dallek put it, however, Johnson did not come to his appreciation 
for dirty politics out of some "character flaw," but did so having "learned it from the
69 Quoted in Goldman, The Tragedy o f  Lyndon Johnson, 452.
70 Quoted in ibid., 471.
71 See Dallek's chapters, "The Liberal as Conservative," and "Bipartisan Politics," in Lone Star Rising.
72 Quoted in Hardesty, ed., The Johnson Years, 23.
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rough and tumble that characterized Texas politics in the first half of the twentieth 
century."73 Bill Moyers was even more emphatic:
He rose to the top in a game where you do not get there on 
the wings o f truth, candor, or conscience. I never felt he 
wanted to use his power for himself. He questioned, in 
conversations with me, the very institutions he had ridden 
to the top. He was obligated to Brown and Root, but he 
wasn't owned by them. He came out of a racist culture, 
but was not a servant o f it. He adopted the Southern wing 
o f his party, but he was never its instrument.74
Johnson had listened to his father tell o f the vicious reaction to populist reform on 
the part o f the oil, lumber, and railroad interests. He remembered how the liberal- 
minded President o f his college had to disavow his own brother in the 1920s—a KKK 
Imperial Grand Wizard. And he recalled all too readily President Hoover's callous yet 
popular response to the onset of Depression, the defeat o f fellow Texas liberal Maury 
Maverick in 1938, his own narrow victory (87 votes) over reactionary Texas politician 
Coke Stevenson in the 1948 U.S. Senate race, the whirlwind that was Joe McCarthy in 
the early 1950s, and the torrent o f physical and verbal abuse heaped on him and Lady 
Bird when they confronted right-wing demonstrators in Dallas four days before the 
1960 election. When Johnson settled in at his new Washington office after the 1948 
victory he told Bobby Baker, "My state is much more conservative than the national 
Democratic party. I got elected by just eighty-seven votes and I ran against a caveman.... 
I cannot always vote with President Truman if I'm going to stay a Senator."75 When Joe 
McCarthy's anti-communist crusade swept the nation and threatened Democrats with 
significant losses in the early 1950s, Johnson, sensing how difficult it would be to 
oppose McCarthy's appeal, declared as Senate Minority leader, that he had no relish "for 
a high school debate on the subject: 'Resolved, that communism is good for the United
73 Dallek, Lone S tar Rising, 9.
74 Quoted in Connally, with Herskowitz, In History's Shadow, 196.
75 Ibid., 372. Emphasis in original.
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States,' with my party taking the affirmative."76 Likewise, when Johnson fought House 
Ways and Means chairman Wilbur Mills over welfare (AFDC) payments during a 1967 
White House meeting he turned to Joe Califano and noted, "You hear that good, now. 
That's what we're dealing with. That's the way most members [of Congress] feel. 
They're just not willing to say it publicly unless they come from redneck districts."77
In the McCarthy case, Johnson knew that McCarthy was an alcoholic, was not 
articulate or thoughtful, and that he was despised by some members o f his own party, 
including President Eisenhower. He told Bobby Baker that McCarthy was "the sorriest 
Senator up here. Can't tie his goddam shoes," but he also knew that the Wisconsin 
Senator was sounding a popular message, and was, as John Dos Passos once put it, 
making "the Eagle scream."78 Johnson learned, in other words, particularly in the 1940s 
and 1950s, that bold liberalism was often dead liberalism. On the other hand, when 
McCarthy finally opened himself up for criticism and censure, it was largely due to the 
diligent behind the scenes efforts of Lyndon Johnson at getting him in front o f the TV 
cameras.79
Johnson had also discovered that moralistic speeches and strident intellectual 
debates would often carry a politician to certain defeat and he tended to avoid such 
pronouncements in the public arena. The only exception to this rule came when these 
speeches or arguments captured a vague sense of unease or guilt that the American 
public possessed but could not yet define or understand. Unfortunately, for those 
advocates o f civil rights and greater economic opportunity little but a sabre-rattling 
conservativism presented this type of opportunity to most American politicians at the 
height o f the Cold War in the 1950s. As a result, Johnson also learned how to establish a
76 Richard Fried, Nightmare in Red: The M cCarthy Era in Perspective (N ew  York: Oxford University 
Press, 1990), 133.
77 Califano, Triumph and  Tragedy, 246.
78 Dallek, Lone Star Rising, 453.
79 Ibid., 454.
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practical consensus and to further liberal legislative goals by impersonating reactionary 
politicians. Struggling to get fellow Southerners to support a civil rights bill in 1957, for 
example, Johnson prodded his Southern colleagues with the vernacular o f white 
supremacy and Southern paternalism but never resorted to an outright plea for the 
welfare of American blacks denied fundamental civil rights.80 Johnson's prodding, 
indeed, helped this civil rights bill become law, and though liberal Senator Paul Douglas 
said that it was like "soup made from the shadow of a crow that had starved to death," 
Johnson understood the significance o f political inertia and o f getting one's foot in the 
door, quietly promising liberal colleagues a new civil rights bill every two years until 
they got something of substance.81
Harry McPherson noted how Johnson was often forced to play the part o f the bigoted 
Southern senator on many other occasions. Johnson was, McPherson recalled, "your 
typical Southern liberal who would have done a lot more in the field o f civil rights early 
in his career had it been possible; but the very naked reality was that if  you did take a 
position...it was almost certain that you would be defeated...by a bigot."82 In the 
observable public arena where it mattered most, and privately, away from political 
opponents, however, there was little if any trace o f this rhetorical charade. "...Think how 
you would like to be treated," Johnson told six hundred business executives in 1965, "if 
you lived in a land where you could not go to school with your fellow Americans, 
where you could not work along the side o f them, where you could travel from Texas to 
Washington, across many states and not be able to go to the bathroom without hiding in 
a thicket or dodging behind a culvert. Ask yourself how you would feel."83 His 
Memorial Day address at Gettysburg on May 30, 1963 and his commencement address 
at Howard University on June 4, 1965 still stand as two of the most eloquent and
80 Robert Dallek, "My Search for Lyndon Johnson," American Heritage, September 1991, 87.
81 Dallek, Lone Star Rising, 526.
82 Dallek, "My Search," 87.
83 Quoted in Goldman, The Tragedy o f  Lyndon Johnson, 5 19.
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powerful messages o f the entire civil rights movement.84 When Johnson intoned the 
words "we shall overcome," winding up his speech on behalf o f the 1965 Voting Rights 
Act, Louisiana senator Allen J. Ellender slumped gloomily in his seat, J. Edgar Hoover 
stared off blindly into space, but Mike Mansfield, Emmanuel Celler, Roy Wilkins, and 
countless others found themselves overcome with emotion. "I cried said Wilkins, "and 
from then on I loved Lyndon Johnson."85 In a much more private setting, when 
Secretary of State Dean Rusk offered to resign after his daughter's marriage to a black 
man, Johnson upbraided his strangely disconsolate cabinet secretary: "This is the most 
progressive administration in the civil rights field in history, and you're gonna quit over 
that? You better start thinking right. I want the Johnson administration to practice what 
it preaches."86
Just as he learned to speak honestly and forthrightly on issues of race and red­
baiting while disarming conservative opponents, Johnson also learned how to sell the 
New Economics while appealing to the anti-government, anti-spending instincts of 
conservatives in both parties. By all accounts, he was a frugal man to begin with, and 
sought the elimination o f wasteful government spending and superfluous government 
bureaucracy throughout his presidential term. But he also knew how to portray 
increased government intervention and increased government spending, where it was 
warranted, as the means to greater productivity and economic efficiency. As Hobart
84 "Memorial Day Address," Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, May 30, 1963 in Lyndon B. Johnson, A Time fo r  
Action  (N ew  York: Atheneum, 1964), 124-127; "Commencement Address at Howard University: 'To 
Fulfill These Rights,'" June 4, 1965 in Johnson, Public Papers, 1965: II, 635-640. "One hundred years 
ago the slave was freed," Johnson declared at Gettysburg, "One hundred years later the Negro remains in 
bondage to the color o f  his skin. The Negro today asks, 'Justice.' We do not answer him— we do not 
answer those who lie beneath this soil— when we reply to the Negro by asking, 'Patience'....To ask for 
patience from the Negro is to ask him to give more o f  what he has already given enough." Stokely 
Carmichael called the Howard address, a speech "that could make a rattlesnake cry." Paul Conkin called 
the Gettysburg speech "perhaps the most beloved speech o f  his whole career." Conkin, Big D addy From 
the Pedernales, 295.
85 The description o f  reaction to Johnson's Voting Rights speech, before a joint session o f  Congress on 
March 15, 1965, comes from Eric Goldman, The Tragedy o f  Lyndon Johnson, 319-322. Wilkins' remark 
is quoted in Jordan and Rostow, eds., The Great Society, 175.
86 Cited in Baker, "Wheeling and Dealing," 264.
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Rowen pointed out in 1964, Johnson was one who knew the "difference between 
economizing that eliminates waste, and budget slashing that is offered as a tribute to the 
anti-intellectual bloc o f Southern Democrats and hidebound Republicans."87 He also 
recognized that business leaders, however reactionary, had legitimate concerns, in spite 
o f his belief in their general cupidity and reluctance to act in the interest o f the common 
good. U.S. Steel Chairman Roger Blough, though a critic o f Johnson's overall economic 
strategy, highlighted Johnson's ability to understand these very concerns, a trait that 
clearly helped him win over much of the conservative business community. "My 
impression o f Lyndon Johnson," Blough recalled, "is that out o f all the presidents I've 
known since Hoover, he understood business problems better than any one of the other 
presidents."88 Sidney Weinberg, the Goldman Sachs executive known as Mr. Wall 
Street, expressed a similar sentiment. After the first Business Council meeting with 
President Johnson, Weinberg said he never heard "any President be more impressive 
with businessmen," and added that he had been listening to them for thirty years or so.89
Convinced that success was by far the best educational tool, Johnson also hoped to 
gain the favor o f the business community by sprinkling his pep talks with as many 
positive numbers as cliches and corporate buzzwords. Relating capacity utilization, 
productivity, purchasing power, and profits to high demand and to full employment, 
Johnson sought nothing less than a complete reorientation o f the nation's economy 
toward a demand management strategy. "I am going to use some of those figures here," 
Johnson declared to the Business Council in 1968; "not because I am enamored of 
figures, or because I want to celebrate the virtues of this administration, but because the 
figures tell a story of what Americans have achieved by using their intelligence and 
listening to their conscience in these years."90 He hoped to prove to these reluctant
87 Rowen, The Free Enterprisers, 282.
88 Roger Blough, Oral History Interview, LBJ Library, interviewed by Joe B. Frantz, July 29, 1971, 3.
89 Quoted by Horace Busby in Miller, Lyndon, 341.
90 Johnson, Public Papers, 1968-1969: II, 1165.
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corporate executives how government could indeed guarantee the essential promise of 
Keynesian economics: low and diminishing unemployment without inflation. And once 
this became an article o f faith— something that these businessmen could see and feel—  
they would also realize and begin to believe, like Johnson, that the surest way to steady 
and growing opportunity for profit came through Keynesian demand management. 
Telling them that they all had "a martyr complex," that they never had it so good, and 
yet, at the same time, promising that he would never substitute "persuasion for...hard- 
nosed monetary and fiscal policy," Johnson cajoled and admonished his way into 
acceptance and esteem among the nation's business leaders.91 "I am not sure I like 
everything he does," one Business Council member remarked in 1964, "but he 
understands my problems, and he is smart as the devil, and I think I'll go along with 
him."92
Although there were many business leaders who expressed similar sentiments, most 
were not yet won over by Johnson's new economic strategy, if they even recognized it 
as such. Many still doubted that inflation could be checked in a full employment 
economy and tended to respond to what Keynes termed points o f "semi-inflation," those 
points at which tight labor markets made it possible for workers to seek a larger share of 
income, by raising prices, clinging to customary levels o f profit in the short-run, and 
therefore avoiding the struggle over income shares all together. By doing so these 
business leaders also fulfilled their own pessimistic prophecies, pricing themselves out 
o f the marketplace, or out o f the global comparative advantages that allowed them to 
operate as semi-monopolists in the first place. Moreover, this self-defeating response 
often made it even more likely that businesses would then feel compelled to seek special 
supply side favors (tariffs, subsidies, investment tax credits) as a way out o f their sales
91 Rowen, The Free Enterprisers, 228.
92 Valenti, A Very Human President, 200.
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slump or profit "squeeze," favors which only helped further the evasion o f a creditable 
policy for continued prosperity.
Confident that the New Economics provided an answer, Johnson and his economic 
advisers sought an end to this profit-price quandary. As Gardner Ackley had warned in 
1966, somehow business had to be persuaded that profits could not always rise, and that 
if  profits were exceptionally high, as they had been in the late 1960s, these same 
businesses had to learn that everyone would benefit if workers received a slightly larger 
share o f the growing national income. Johnson was convinced that most business 
managers understood the importance of secure markets and consistent demand, and that 
most o f them had always based critical investment decisions upon forecasts for the 
same. He also knew that high short term profits, whatever the level of consumer 
demand, might present a similar incentive, particularly for new businesses unaware of 
real market conditions. Only consistent demand and secure markets, however, Johnson 
hoped to demonstrate, could sustain this behavior for any considerable length of time. 
Even deficit spending, in and o f itself, could not accomplish as much, simply because 
supply side leakages and the growing burden o f debt would soon obviate much of the 
stimulus associated with deficit spending.93 Johnson's role as economic manager and 
disciple of the New Economics may best be summed up as an ongoing attempt to wean 
conservatives from their prejudices and insecurities, to project an understanding of their 
most decent objectives, and to draw them accordingly toward his own vision of 
Keynesian full employment and sustainable profitability. Johnson's relationship with the 
National Alliance of Businessmen, an organization launched by his administration in 
January 1968 in an attempt to hire the nation's hard-core unemployed, exemplified this 
approach. Announcing the NAB program at a luncheon in the White House living 
quarters on January 27, 1968, where he served the fifteen corporate participants juicy
93 See Gene Koritz, "Why Uncle Sam's Rising Deficit Isn't Igniting the Economy," Business Week, 
October 28, 1991, 24, for an updated version o f  this outlook.
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New York strip steaks, fine red wines, and rich ice cream, Johnson opened quickly with 
his most forthright sales pitch. "This is no bullshit meeting," he announced with the 
confident swagger so often prized by his corporate guests. "We're going to have 
assignments and commitments for you to deliver on." He finished by reminding his 
guests of their own good fortune. "This economy has been so good to you that you can 
afford to give a little back," he declared, adding that he wanted from all of them a 
commitment "to make taxpayers out of taxeaters." Responding enthusiastically, James 
McDonnell, chairman of McDonnell-Douglas, blurted out "I commit! Mr. President, I 
commit!" The president turned, glared at McDonnell and said, clinching the 
commitment of the entire group in the process, "Mr. McDonnell, you committed when 
you ate the first bite of my steak."94 Johnson's combination of macho posturing, genuine 
commitment, and economic common sense was precisely the kind of political 
persuasion to which these business leaders responded. With the commitment o f James 
McDonnell and others, the NAB program became an unconditional success, 
substantiating what Henry J. Aaron once called "the one basic unproven assumption" of 
the demand management school: that employers will recruit and train the hard-core 
unemployed, or fit jobs to their skill levels in a high demand labor market.95 By 
December 1, 1968, with constant pressure from the White House, 100,000 of the hard­
core unemployed had received jobs through the NAB program, with a retention rate of 
approximately 75%.96
94 Califano, Triumph and  Tragedy, 225-226. Johnson exhibited a similar hold on conservative business 
leaders on many other occasions. One o f  the most notable was during the 1964 railway negotiations. 
When one railroad management began a presentation with "I'm just an old country boy..." Johnson broke 
in and exclaimed, "Hold it, stop right there. When I hear that around this town, 1 put my hand on my 
billfold. Don't start that with me." All the negotiators roared with laughter, the deadlock was broken, and 
Johnson helped the nation avoid a costly rail strike in the process. See "Man o f  the Year: The Prudent 
Progressive," Time, January 1, 1965, 25.
95 Henry J. Aaron, Politics and the Professors, 130.
96 Califano, Triumph and Tragedy, 226. This followed Johnson's successful recruitment o f  the National 
Association o f  Manufacturers to the poverty program. In late 1967, he had convinced the NAM  to 
participate in two o f  three "demonstration grants" designed to help employ the hard core unemployed 
(North Carolina, Baltimore, and Harlem were the areas targeted by the three grants). The NAM  role was
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While conservatives were often smitten by Johnson's common sense approach to 
economics, his personal frugality, and his boardroom swagger—in addition to the 
astronomical profit margins of the 1960s—they were by 1969, sure o f Johnson and of 
economic prosperity, but as yet, unsure of the reason for it all. Johnson had won them 
over with symbol and cliche and they loved to hear him say things like "let's make 
taxpayers out o f taxeaters," but, as Hobart Rowen pointed out, the American 
businessman seemed to be "as much interested in symbol as reality," and it was 
ultimately reality that Johnson was trying to sell.97 Just as Johnson hoped they would in 
all sectors of the economy, and in all types of businesses, for example, tight labor 
markets had indeed made it easier to secure victories in the War on Poverty. But these 
markets also tended to unsettle and alarm business managers at the same time, many of 
whom clung to a short term outlook that blinded them to all but an impending profit 
squeeze and potential economic disaster.98 With their overriding emphasis on short-term 
profits and an "exit and change" mentality, most corporate managers, as Paul Weaver 
noted in The Suicidal Corporation, "have few incentives to stand and fight" economic 
strategies that damage the entire economy, "provided they can attach riders or create
to test a computer job  matching system and an experimental adult basic education program, both devised  
by NAM  task forces. See Telegram, Guy S. Peppiat, Chairman o f  the Board-NAM, to LBJ, October 3, 
1967, Papers o f  the National Association o f  Manufacturers, Series I, Box 215, Hagley Library; and 
Morton Mintz, "NAM to Participate in Poverty Program," Washington Star, June 15, 1967, K 11.
97 Rowen, The Free Enterprisers, 18.
98 Paul H. Weaver in The Suicidal Corporation  pointed out how the rapid post World War 11 shift from 
U-form corporations (those engaged in a single line o f  business) to M-form corporations (those with a 
multi-divisional framework) created a managerial psychology that encouraged a more passive and 
reactive managerial style. Accordingly, this made it more difficult to encourage these managers to 
consider long-term objectives since it was so much easier to exit and switch, to simply deemphasize 
divisions that were marketplace laggards and to emphasize divisions (or obtain new ones) that were not. 
In 1959 36% o f  the Fortune 500 were U-form corporations and 51% were M-form. Ten years later, at the 
end o f  the Johnson administration, 11% were U-form and 79% were M-form. See Weaver, The Suicidal 
C orporation, 139-142. Rising interest rates, encouraged in an unprecedented fashion in the Nixon  
administration, also helped increase the attractiveness and business reliance upon increasingly short-term 
financing which in turn furthered the growing short-term mentality o f  the business community, (average 
maturity o f  money market loans to business went from approximately four months in the early seventies 
to about thirty days by the end o f  the decade. See Gregg Easterbrook, "The Meaning o f  M oney Markets: 
How 8 Million People Learned to Stop Worrying and Love High Interest Rates," Washington Monthly, 
November 1981, 30-37.
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loopholes that make individual lines o f business relatively lucrative amid the general 
economic chaos."99 Johnson wanted to expose and to disparage this often self-defeating, 
if  wholly rational behavior. To him, the growing scarcity of labor was a positive 
development, and he knew full well, for example, that the NAB program to hire the 
hard-core unemployed would have been a much harder sell had it not been for the 
prevailing labor scarcity. Amid tight labor markets, participating companies wanted to 
hire and train the hard-core unemployed, for it was then a cheaper alternative to the 
recruitment o f skilled workers already in the labor force.
While Johnson never tried to popularize the notion o f a short run profit loss, he 
took great pains to point out that few companies were suffering from a wage-induced 
profit squeeze to begin with, and that by choosing to support long term price and market 
stability they were also opting for greater capacity utilization and enhanced future  
profitability. Much to Johnson's disappointment, however, many businesses continued 
to evade what he believed to be their genuine responsibility. Wall Street brokerage 
firms, commercial lenders, and corporate executive officers alike continued to predicate 
their behavior, first and foremost, on the level of corporate short term profit and 
continued to pass on, where they were able, all cost increases in the form of increased 
product prices. CEA Chairman, Arthur Okun, would label this phenomenon "the 
invisible handshake," but to Johnson, no matter what it was called, it was myopic and 
selfish behavior that hurt all parties in the long run.100 Equating the "free market" not 
with genuine market clearing mechanisms (which could just as easily work against 
corporate profit margins as they could for them), but only with laissez-faire based 
opportunities for exploitation, corporations were, as Johnson saw it, forsaking 
opportunities for a stable, secure, and profitable business environment in the name of
99 Ibid., 142.
100 Arthur Okun, The Invisible Handshake. Okun noted that this "handshake" also implied, in its most 
typical manifestation, rig id  prices when markets warranted price cuts.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
485
short term profits alone. Henry Wallich, a Council o f Economic Advisers member under 
Eisenhower, echoed the position of the Johnson administration in a 1966 Newsweek 
editorial. "Business cannot consistently have it both ways: to use market power in 
recessions, and act like barefooted little competitors in booms," Wallich declared to his 
readers. "If price maintenance is justifiable in recessions, in violation o f the laws of 
supply and demand, then price restraint is called for in booms."101
It took little to convince Johnson that this "problem for the decade," as Gardner 
Ackley termed it in 1966, demanded his attention. He continued, as a result, to work on 
George Meany and Walter Reuther and the rest of his labor friends, but he also knew 
that their struggle for wage increases, over and above the level of productivity advance, 
had some merit. Profits had indeed outpaced wages over the last decade, and to some 
extent, then, their unions were playing "catch-up." This was particularly true in the 
airline industry where the "fatal" 5% wage increase in 1966 was easily absorbed by the 
airlines.102 Since most American unions were also among what he considered to be his 
natural constituency, and therefore counted on in the crunch, Johnson had, by the 
second half o f his presidency, already asked them for great sacrifice. By late 1967 
sacrifice had to be shared more evenly and had to be welcomed by the business 
community or it would fall completely, and far too heavily, upon the shoulders of the 
American consumer. Applauding Johnson's focus on high demand and full employment 
over short-term profitability, Leon Keyserling reminded skeptics that this was a lesson 
that should have been learned a generation earlier, though it was no less difficult to 
discern in 1969:
When I hear all these analyses of the nature of the unemployed people today- 
they're too old, they're too young, or too sick, or too female, or too black, or too 
untrained—there's a kernel of truth in it, but not much. Because if you look back
101 Henry Wallich, "Desert Guideposts," Newsweek, August 23, 1966, 82.
102 According to Civil Aeronautics Board figures, for example, Northwest Airlines took in $939,000/day  
in revenues and paid out $98,000/day in wages before the strike. Comparable figures for other airlines: 
National, $528,000/$70,000; TWA, $2,573,000/5406,000; United, $2,906,000/5518,000.
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at the eight million unemployed in 1939, they had every single one o f these 
characteristics in more virulent form.103
The lesson had not been learned in 1939, however, for Roosevelt had been unable 
to displace the orthodox political economy he had inherited six years earlier. By 1938 
he wanted to follow the lead of those in his administration who counseled both 
Keynesian demand management and a more vigorous anti-trust policy. Economist 
Lauchlin Currie, Solicitor General Robert Jackson and Interior Secretary Harold Ickes, 
were among those urging him to do so. He told Jackson that he was "sick o f sitting here 
kissing people's asses to get them to do what they ought to be volunteering for the 
Republic."104 Neither a full-fledged demand management strategy nor a substantial anti­
trust effort ever came to pass under FDR, however, for the diplomatic pressure o f the 
impending world war mounted, forcing Roosevelt to court the producers o f war materiel 
and to shirk all designs for a new economic strategy; his acceptance of the Keynesian 
revolution, late or not, became a moot point.105 While the war allowed him to stimulate 
the economy with massive deficit spending, girding the nation for war also necessitated 
adherence to a supply side economic strategy. Special tax breaks designed for the 
Duponts and the GMs, price fixing schemes evolved partly from his own National 
Recovery Administration, and lucrative cost-plus defense contracts would remain as the 
most integral parts of his administration's economic strategy even as his budgets 
signalled a partial turn away from the prevailing conservative orthodoxy.106 New
103 Leon Keyserling, Oral History Interview, LBJ Library, interviewed by Stephen Goodeil, January 9, 
1969,39-40.
104 Joseph P. Lash, Dealers and Dreamers: A N ew Look a t the N ew D eal (N ew  York: Doubleday, 1988), 
324.
105 Andrew Shonfield, writing in 1965, noted that while American economists were the intellectual 
leaders in the 1930s and 1940s, American politicians tended to be "institutional laggards."Andrew 
Shonfield, Modern Capitalism, 333. Even in academia, however, as John Kenneth Galbraith noted, the 
overturning o f  Say's Law (which argued that there could be no shortage o f  demand) and the exalting o f  
Keynes' G eneral Theory were not completed until about 1940. John Kenneth Galbraith, "The Second 
Death o f  Laissez Faire," Essay presented at a symposium celebrating the 25th anniversary o f  the Great 
Society, "LBJ: The Difference He Made," Austin, TX, May 4, 1990.
106 When the U.S. aviation industry', for example, already implicated for building up Hitler's Luftwaffe, 
refused to help mobilize for war unless granted special favors, FDR threw in the towel. The Vinson- 
Trammell Act limiting profits on defense contracts to 8% was thrown out, the government continued to
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spending could be applied to the creation o f jobs and to the augmentation o f demand, as 
it was, but only after being applied to the augmentation of corporate profit. Even in the 
labor intensive war industries o f the 1940s, full employment did not come cheap and 
Keynesianism did not come undiluted.
Nor was it possible to overcome corporate intransigence or transcend economic 
conservatism in the first two decades following Roosevelt's death. Even in 1945 and 
1946, when military demobilization troubled all but the most hidebound conservatives, 
the first Full Employment Bill, proposed by James Murray o f Montana in 1945, 
emerged heavily laden with qualifying clauses as the relatively punchless Employment 
Act o f 1946.107 A public commitment to full employment was deemed to be an 
admirable goal but not yet safe enough to be established as the first order o f  the nation's 
economy.108 As for demand management, most of what passed for it since the New Deal 
came either as an afterthought during war or a military buildup, or as a biproduct of 
supply side programs where the policy tool of choice was the government contract. 
Obscured by the Korean conflict during the Truman administration, utilized only to 
promote (unsuccessfully) upper income and corporate tax cuts during the Eisenhower 
years, and adopted cautiously and somewhat surreptitiously by the narrowly elected 
Kennedy administration, Keynesian demand side economics was not fully embraced by 
the U.S. government until Lyndon Johnson moved into the White House in late 1963.
foot the bill for new plant construction, and it was agreed that industry could amortize new plants in five 
years for tax benefits. See I.F. Stone, "Aviation's Sit-Down Strike," in The War Years, 1939-1945  
(Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1988), 18-20.
107 The complete declaration: "The Congress declares that it is the continuing policy and responsibility o f  
the federal government to use all practicable means consistent with its needs and obligations and other 
essential considerations o f  national policy, with the assistance and cooperation o f  industry, agriculture, 
labor, and state and local governments, to coordinate and utilize all its plans, functions, and resources for 
the purpose o f  creating and maintaining, in a manner calculated to foster and promote free competitive 
enterprise and the general welfare, conditions under which there will be afforded useful employment 
opportunities, including self-employment, for those able, willing, and seeking to work, and to promote 
maximum employment, production, and purchasing power."
108 Gary Mucciaroni, The Political Failure o f  Employment Policy, 1954-1982  (Pittsburgh: University o f  
Pittsburgh Press, 1990).
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Unlike his predecessors, however, Johnson had both the wherewithal and the desire to 
supplant the prevailing "trickle-down" political economy with a compelling Keynesian 
demand side strategy. The New Economics had presumably come of age.
Johnson understood how the prevailing political economy, built largely on a profit- 
centered, supply side framework, relied heavily on an assortment of economic myths to 
remain convincing and popular. Kennedy had attacked some o f these myths, most 
notably in his 1962 commencement address at Yale University, and Johnson had 
applauded him for it, but Johnson had been laying siege to orthodox, supply side 
economic views almost from the moment he entered politics. When an economic 
recession occurred in 1954, and the Republican party began its usual chatter about the 
need for upper bracket tax cuts, Johnson noted that the GOP, "like the Bourbons of 
France...have learned nothing— and forgotten nothing— since the days o f McKinley and 
high-button shoes."109 In 1968, in what was by then a well rehearsed speech, he took 
aim at the "trickle-down" theory. "It worked just like it sounded," Johnson recalled, "by 
the time the money got down to the poor people it was nothing more than a trickle— a 
drip, and that was when things were prosperous. If  we had a recession, the money 
stopped all together."110
This crusade, however, which Johnson saw as perhaps the single most important 
endeavor of his political career—including policy for the war in Vietnam—proved to be 
only partly successful and almost completely friendless. Sensing that business interests 
were acting only out of isolated self-interest, and that labor was quickly losing whatever 
social democratic potential it once possessed, Johnson sought, among other things, to 
merge the Departments o f Labor and Commerce. "Come let us reason together," a 
biblical exhortation his father had often used at family meetings, became the hallmark 
o f his approach. He received little support though from either camp and was
109 Dallek, Lone S tar Rising, 442.
110 Johnson, Public Papers, 1968-1969: II, 1166.
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increasingly hemmed in by the reluctance o f labor to assume a more social democratic 
posture, to always make the first sacrifice, and to bargain with the interests o f their 
employers and the interests of consumers in mind.111 When liberals abandoned Johnson 
over the war in Vietnam, they abandoned him to conservatives that he had won over but 
whose conversion depended ultimately upon a more universal understanding o f the New 
Economics than the one they possessed. Like Samuel Gompers who avoided Social 
Democracy because he knew how capricious government policymakers could be, the 
nation's business community had little trouble deserting the New Economics when 
Johnson left office amid great repudiation and dishonor and his successor offered a 
divergent economic strategy. Though he believed that Johnson could have afforded a 
much bolder strategy, Leon Keyserling, CEA chairman under President Truman, 
understood what Johnson was up against and how liberal disdain had compromised his 
nascent economic revolution. He was "the most unfairly treated," Keyserling recalled, 
"the most unfairly demeaned, the most underrated President in my lifetime and 
longer."112
This is where Lyndon Johnson bogged down in his attempt to develop a more 
democratic and prosperous economic strategy. As long as corporations were willing to 
create inflation so as to avoid a struggle over income shares with their workers, he 
found himself unable to prove one critical part of the Keynesian promise. And though
111 Joined at their inception in 1903, separate departments o f  Commerce and Labor were established in 
1913 at the behest o f  President Woodrow Wilson, a man Johnson once described as an "insufferable 
prig." William E. Forbath suggested in Law and the Shaping o f  the American Labor Movement 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), 28, that the federal structure o f  the U.S. government had 
much to do with this reluctance. Because workplace reform had to be contested on several levels at once 
(local, state, and national) the cost o f  the struggle was raised dramatically, strengthening the case for 
voluntarism in the process. The New York State Organized Crime Task Force, in Corruption und  
Racketeering in the N ew York C ity Construction Industry (New York: New York University Press, 1990), 
180, also noted how reform minded statutes have been altered to fix rather than remedy union corruption. 
Landrum-Griffin Title II, for example, designed to help national unions discipline corrupt local unions 
has been used instead (with the encouragement o f  conservative politicians) to curb dissident, reform- 
minded locals.
112 Leon Keyserling, Oral History Interview, 4 1.
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his efforts to control the proliferation of these administered profits and inflated prices 
was just hitting stride as he left the White House, Liberal desertion left few if any 
behind to carry on this struggle.113 Corporate intransigence and Liberal disdain 
combined to limit economic management to an awkward combination of supply side 
profit enhancements and demand side reinforcements, with many of the latter falling 
into the "safety net" category where their macroeconomic potential would be politically 
and psychologically circumscribed.114 Even in this truncated and attenuated form, 
however, demand side emphasis would prove its merit. Recalling the War on Poverty 
and the conservative onslaught of the early 1980s, for example, Joe Califano noted how 
remnants of the Great Society saved the country from itself in the 1980s. One reason 
Reagan was able to "drive down inflation with a sledgehammer [without producing a 
full-blown depression]," Califano noted, was because o f the "safety net" provided by 
Great Society programs. Califano failed to mention that this "sledgehammer" also 
forced these Great Society programs to serve more people, making tax-eaters out o f tax­
payers as it were, increasing their overall cost, and opening them up to a less easily 
dissuaded censure. The proof was in the pudding but few would see it as Joe Califano 
had. What struck him as notable and ironic, however, was simply that Reagan, a man 
who had campaigned his entire political life against these types o f programs, relied on 
them— if only by default—as an integral part o f his economic "revolution."115
113 The efforts o f  Arthur Okun represent the one obvious exception to this rule. From the confines o f  the 
Brookings Institution, Okun railed against Nixon-Ford economics and tried somewhat vainly to impose 
his view s upon the Carter administration (where Johnson BoB Director and Brookings colleague Charles 
Schultze presided over the Council o f  Economic Advisers). While Okun attended the infamous July 1979 
Camp David retreat there is little evidence to suggest that his advice was taken, then or thereafter. 
Moreover, while Schultze shared many o f  Okun's concerns and views, the CEA had diminished in 
importance through the Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations; conservatives Bert Lance (Budget 
Director), Charles Kirbo (attorney and informal adviser), and Michael Blumenthal (Treasury Secretary) 
all had as much if  not more influence over economic policy than Schultze in the Carter administration.
114 Some neo-conservatives have even come to this realization. See, for example, Glen Loury, "Black 
Dignity and the Common Good," chapter in l W  by One From ike Inside Out: Essciyw find Reviews on 
Race an d Responsibility in America  (New York: Free Press, 1994).
115 Quoted in Jordan and Rostow, eds., The Great Society, 127. Martin Anderson,chief domestic policy 
adviser to Reagan, admitted that while Reagan clearly counted on a domestic policy "safety net," his
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Eric Goldman, historian and one-time Johnson adviser, called Lyndon Johnson a 
"Machiavelli with a Stetson."116 Indeed, part of Johnson's quest to direct the U.S. 
economy under a Keynesian demand side framework involved a quiet, often 
manipulative cultivation o f bipartisanship and consensus that was thoroughly 
Machiavellian. Despite his reputation for "the Johnson treatment" and "wheeler-dealer" 
political machinations, the Machiavellian practices o f Lyndon Johnson emphasized 
consent and ideological hegemony over deceit and outright domination. Despite the 
charges o f "fine tuning" and the reliance upon complex economic forecasting models, 
the New Economics truly sought to bridge the gulf between experts and laymen and to 
break down the distinction between those who rule and the ruled. Johnson always 
believed that success was the best teacher; the more the nation learned to support high 
demand and full employment, the more prosperous and stable the nation would become; 
the more prosperous and stable the nation became, the easier it would become to gauge 
and to remedy marketplace aberrations. Having reckoned his support, even after the 
1964 landslide, "like a Western river, broad but not deep," Johnson had to begin by 
adopting an unwieldy and often contradictory amalgam of economic management tools 
to move the economy onto a higher plane and to condition the behavior o f key 
economic participants. The ultimate object, however, was a demand side strategy that 
was far less abstruse and contradictory.117
administration never attempted to define it. Cited by Michael Weiler, "The Reagan Attack on Welfare," 
in Michael Weiler and W. Barnett Pearce, eds., Reagan an d  Public D iscourse in America  (Tuscaloosa: 
University o f  Alabama Press, 1992), 246. Nancy Reagan even said that Foster Grandparents (a great 
Society program introduced in 1965 under the Office o f  Economic Opportunity) was her favorite 
government program until someone told her that it was created during a Democratic administration. See 
also Robert Mogull, "Determinants o f  Federal Welfare Spending," Presidential Studies Q uarterly , Spring 
1990, 368, for an overview o f  linear and curvilinear regression models that suggest a decline in the 
delivery o f  welfare payments in proportion to GNP as the Democratic party's influence in the House o f  
Representatives increased.
116 Eric Goldman, The Tragedy o f  Lyndon Johnson, 523.
117 Quoted in Goldman, The Tragedy o f  Lyndon Johnson, 336. LBJ told Doris Kearns that he saw the 
1964 landslide, the greatest popular vote landslide in the history o f  the U.S. presidency, as a "loophole," 
not a "mandate." Kearns also noted that public opinion polls taken in 1964 showed that "the consensus 
behind the Great Society merely signified an acceptance o f  the individual programs Johnson had
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The danger here, o f course, was that the continued reliance on some orthodox, 
supply side solutions, though relied upon to a diminishing extent as demand 
strengthened, the economy improved, and the business cycle all but vanished, would 
maintain enough noise and confusion in the economy (mainly in the form of 
administered price inflation) so as to impair the public's ability to understand the 
ongoing policy transformation or the actual stakes involved in the process. On the other 
hand, Johnson's rhetoric and action also made it easy for the public to define his 
economic strategy as something it hoped to be but was not. Examining Johnson's 
rhetoric associated principally with the War on Poverty, David Zarefsky came the 
closest, perhaps, to capturing and defining the nature of the political vacuum exploited 
by opponents o f the New Economics. "The gap between absolutist rhetoric," Zarefsky 
noted, "and an incrementalist policy nurtured a conservative ideology, which was 
further stimulated by the public misperception that legislative programs are really o f the 
same magnitude as their symbolic dimension would suggest."118 Johnson clearly had to 
struggle against the muddled conception o f recent economic history that conflated 
presidential rhetoric with actual economic strategy, and that convinced active citizens 
that the nation had already undergone a Keynesian revolution and that direct aid to the 
poor was, in and of itself, the Johnson economic strategy. The rhetoric o f the Roosevelt, 
Truman, and Kennedy administrations in particular, made it difficult to see the 
Keynesian revolution as it was. The rhetoric of the Johnson administration made it 
equally diifficult for the public to properly assess the War on Poverty and the Keynesian 
economic strategy of his administration. As a consequence, deficit spending and
sponsored...it did not represent a shift in underlying philosophy." See Kearns, Lyndon Johnson and the 
American Dream, 291. This conception o f  Macchiavellian intent is borrowed from Benedetto Fontana, 
Hegem ony and Power: On the Relation Between Gramsci and  M acchiavelli (Minneapolis: University o f  
Minnesota Press, 1993). I see Johnson as someone, like Gramsci, who believed that the masses are 
capable o f  moving from the particular to the universal, and from the realm o f  private interest to the realm 
o f  universal interest.
118 Zarefsky, President Johnson's War on Poverty, 205.
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aggressive government intervention—no matter the spending targets or the locus of 
intervention— somehow became equated with Keynesian economics in general, and 
small experimental programs, such as Community Action, became equated with the 
Keynesian economics o f the Johnson administration. Externalities and instabilities, such 
as inflation, the products o f an evolving Keynesian strategy, were also likely to be 
mistaken instead for the products o f an already consummated Keynesian revolution. 
Reporting on the 1968 Republican convention, I.F. Stone marveled at the incongruence 
o f this otherwise inconceivable outlook:
We remember with special pleasure that passage in Ivy Baker Priest's nominating 
speech for Ronald Reagan in which she said, 'We cannot afford the status quo.' 
The only real sense we could get out of that remark in that upper bracket 
assemblage was that maybe some delegates were falling behind in the payments 
on their yachts. We had always assumed that the status quo was something 
Republicans could never have too much of.119
Johnson had the unenviable task, then, o f undertaking and directing a revolution in 
economic management that many believed had already taken place. To that end, he 
courted the business community and much of his conservative opposition with great 
relish and much success, only to find, however, that in many cases the messenger often 
turned out to be more compelling than the message. Indeed, Johnson had little difficulty 
winning over business groups and business leaders throughout the country, though 
Hobart Rowen suggested that Kennedy "would have choked on" some o f the lines he 
employed.120 When Johnson stumped for the Economic Opportunity Act, for example, 
one Republican congressman was "startled" to receive a lobbying group, pushing for the 
passage o f the EOA, composed o f the Chairman of the Board o f the Pennsylvania 
Railroad, the President o f the Wabash Railroad, and directors from the Buckeye 
Pipeline Co., Chase National Bank, the Equitable Life Insurance Co., and the U.S. Steel
119 I.F. Stone, "The GOP Convention Was Not Without Its Cheering Aspects," August 19, 1968, in 
Polem ics and  Prophecies, 44.
120 Ibid., 19.
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Co.121 Unfortunately, many o f these business leaders became more attached to Lyndon 
Johnson than Johnsonian economics. When Nixon proposed sweeping changes in 1969, 
and when he asked John Ehrlichman to "flush the Great Society" in 1973, few of these 
once enthralled business leaders stood in opposition. Johnson's personal pleas were so 
overwhelming, and so compelling, "like being under a waterfall," according to George 
Reedy, that much of the business community was likely to credit him for the economic 
success of the late 1960s, and not the "New Economics" that he was preaching.122
"The accomplishments of this era," Business Week felt compelled to note in January 
1969, "should not be underrated. Eight years ago, when John F. Kennedy took the oath 
o f office, it was almost universally believed that recessions were an inevitable fact of 
life; there had been three in the previous decade. It is a proper tribute to the new 
economics that it is no longer considered noteworthy that the economy is in its 95th 
straight month of expansion."123 It was as if  many believed, right to the end, that there 
was no New Economics, only a dressed up and more universally palatable version o f the 
"old time religion." While Kennedy and Johnson had once exploited this confusion to 
sell the 1964 demand side tax cut—disguising it partly as a supply side maneuver to 
attract business support—by 1969 the capriciousness and confusion of the business 
community was no longer much of an asset. Johnson was by then in dire need of a less 
equivocal message and a less divided liberal constituency. Liberals took the Johnson era 
prosperity so much for granted, however, and became so blinded by their belief that 
Johnson had singlehandedly created the atrocity of Vietnam, that they either forgot, or 
failed to realize all together, just how much control their conservative opponents 
retained over the management o f the nation's economy. "You mean well, but you are
121 Goldman, The Tragedy o f  Lyndon Johnson, 186.
122 Quoted by Geoffrey C. Ward, "The Full Johnson," American H eritage, September 1991, 16.
123 "President Johnson's Economic Legacy," Business Week, January 18, 1969, 132.
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foolish," said a Hopi Indian spokesman to Allen Ginsberg. You are a tribe o f strangers 
to yourselves."124
Only a few predicted doom in the wake of liberal dissolution. "To play with 
revolutionary talk and tactics," I.F. Stone prophesied in 1968, "when there is no 
revolutionary situation, is to act as provocateurs for an American fascism."125 
Ultimately, however, the genuine choices were increasingly difficult to discern and the 
war in Vietnam was more than a simple distraction. "To meet the crises o f race and 
war," Stone declared, "time and patience, faith in persuasion, are required. But how 
preach these virtues to a youth who may be called up any day for the Army?"126 
Johnsonian liberalism and the New Economics required an equal— if not greater— 
measure of time, patience, and persuasion. In the face o f a powerful yet surprisingly 
malleable conservative opposition, and with support from a perceptive, democratically 
inclined constituency, the New Economics was still precarious and uncertain, but it also 
held much promise. Absent this support it was destined, instead, for dissolution and an 
irresistable conservative onslaught.
"I hope it may be said, a hundred years from now," Johnson declared in his last 
State o f the Union address, "that by working together we helped make our country more 
just, more just for all of its people, as well as to insure and guarantee the blessings of 
liberty for all o f our posterity. That is what I hope. But I believe at least that it will be 
said that we tried."127 Like the Great Society described by President Johnson in 1964, 
The New Economics was not a "safe harbor, a resting place, a final objective, a finished 
work," but it was "a challenge constantly renewed" and an unparalleled success. It
124 Quoted in Matusow, The Unraveling o f  America, 298.
125 I.F. Stone, "When a Two-Party System Becomes a One-Party Rubber Stamp," September 9, 1968, in 
Polem ics and Prophecies, 49.
126 Ibid., 48.
127 Johnson, "Annual Message to Congress on the State o f  the Union," January 14, 1969, Public Papers, 
1968-1969: II, 1270.
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worked and it promised even greater rewards, but it did not outlast the Johnson 
presidency. In the end, trying was simply not enough.
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